PEOPLE v. MAYORGA (2025)

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County (Robert G. Bogle, J.), rendered January 19, 2023, convicting him of burglary in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.  The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical evidence and his statements to law enforcement officials.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The County Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence obtained from a bedroom he rented in a building.  “ ‘[T]he police may lawfully conduct a warrantless search when they have obtained the voluntary consent of a party who possesses the requisite degree of authority and control over the premises or personal property in question’ ” (People v. Watson, 101 A.D.3d 913, 914, 955 N.Y.S.2d 411, quoting People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 290, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652, 397 N.E.2d 1319).  Here, the People met their burden of establishing that the defendant's consent to search his bedroom was voluntarily given and was not the product of coercion (see People v. Wright–Hale, 180 A.D.3d 814, 815, 117 N.Y.S.3d 677;  People v. Quagliata, 53 A.D.3d 670, 671, 861 N.Y.S.2d 792).  Contrary to the defendant's contention, the failure of police to inform him of his right to refuse consent to the search does not compel a finding that his consent was involuntarily given (see People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 130, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 347 N.E.2d 575;  People v. Wright–Hale, 180 A.D.3d at 815, 117 N.Y.S.3d 677;  People v. Evans, 157 A.D.3d 716, 717, 69 N.Y.S.3d 79).

The County Court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials made prior to the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694).  “The Miranda rule protects the privilege against self-incrimination and, because the privilege applies only when an accused is compelled to testify, the safeguards required by Miranda are not triggered unless a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation” (People v. Paulman, 5 N.Y.3d 122, 129, 800 N.Y.S.2d 96, 833 N.E.2d 239 [internal quotation marks omitted]).  Here, the defendant's statements at issue either were made in response to questions that were investigatory in nature—rather than accusatory—before the defendant was in custody (see People v. Gough, 203 A.D.3d 747, 749, 162 N.Y.S.3d 492;  People v. Henderson, 197 A.D.3d 663, 665, 152 N.Y.S.3d 731), or were spontaneous and not triggered by police questioning or other conduct that reasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him (see People v. Watson, 214 A.D.3d 911, 912, 186 N.Y.S.3d 278;  People v. Foster, 153 A.D.3d 853, 854, 60 N.Y.S.3d 372).

The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2]).  In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The sentence imposed was not excessive (see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 85–86, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

DILLON, J.P., WOOTEN, TAYLOR and MCCORMACK, JJ., concur.