Kimberly Scott v. Stuart Scott

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Superior Court of Connecticut.

Kimberly Scott v. Stuart Scott

FA044005987S

    Decided: March 24, 2014

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY AND OTHERS

These parties dissolved their marriage on January 2, 2007.   The Judgment provided alimony for plaintiff and child support for their two children, currently ages 18 and 14.   Plaintiff now asserts changed circumstances in her “Postjudgment Motion to Modify Support and Alimony” dated and filed January 15, 2013 (# 163.00 & 163.01).   Plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt (# 180) on May 31, 2013 seeking full compliance with certain aspects of the Judgment.   She filed a second motion (# 181) that same day to allocate the Guardian ad Litem's (GAL) fees and award legal fees.   Plaintiff filed a motion (# 184) for contempt on August 2, 2013 asserting that defendant had wilfully failed to pay a therapy bill for the parties' elder daughter.1

The court heard testimony and arguments over four days from May 2013 to February 2014.   Neither party disputes that this is a “high-income” case and that the reasoning of Maturo v. Maturo, 296 Conn. 80, 995 A.2d 1 (2010), Misthopoulos v. Misthopoulos, 297 Conn. 358, 999 A.2d 721 (2010) and their more recent progeny like Dowling v. Szymczak, 309 Conn. 390, 72 A.3d 1 (2013) must be applied to plaintiff's motion for modification of child support.

The court ordered all Financial Affidavits filed from the time of the judgment forward to be unsealed for its consideration.

APPLICABLE LAW

The court reviewed and applied all pertinent law, particularly C.G.S. §§ 46b–62, 82, 84 and 86 to decide this case.

Determination of Child Support in High–Income Cases

Cases where the theoretical combined net weekly family income exceeds $4,000—”high-income cases”—are controlled by the analysis provided in Dowling, supra.   Justice McDonald, writing for a unanimous court, held that “child support payments ․ should presumptively not exceed the [maximum] percent [set forth in the schedule] when the combined net weekly income of the family exceeds $4,000, and, in most cases, should reflect less than that amount.   See Maturo, supra., 96 and Misthopoulos, supra., 369.   Either the presumptive ceiling of income percentage or presumptive floor of dollar amount on any given child support obligation, however, may be rebutted by application of the deviation criteria enumerated in the [G]uidelines and by the statutory factors set forth in § 46b–84(d).  See Maturo, supra., 106.[A]s long as the child support award is derived from a total support obligation within this range—between the presumptive minimum dollar amount and the presumptive maximum percentage of net income—a finding in support of a deviation is not necessary.  Dowling, supra., 401–02.  “[T]he uppermost multiplier will provide the presumptive ceiling that will guide the trial courts in determining an appropriate child support award ‘on a case-by-case basis';  Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 46b–215a–2b(a)(2);  without the need to resort to deviation criteria.   We underscore, however, that, in exercising discretion in any given case, the magistrate or trial court should consider evidence submitted by the parties regarding actual past and projected child support expenditures to determine the appropriate award, with due regard for the principle that such expenditures generally decline as income rises.”   Dowling, supra., 402–03.2

Alimony

“General Statutes § 46b–82 describes circumstances under which a court may award alimony.   The court is to consider these factors in making an award of alimony, but it need not give each factor equal weight ․ As long as the trial court considers all of these statutory criteria, it may exercise broad discretion in awarding alimony.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Hughes v. Hughes, 95 Conn.App. 200, 210, 895 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 902, 907 A.2d 90 (2006).

In many cases, time-limited alimony is appropriate so the receiving spouse can rehabilitate his or her vocational skills and return to the workforce.   The court in Marmo v. Marmo, 131 Conn.App. 43, 26 A.3d 652 (2011), stated:  “The traditional purpose of alimony is to meet one's continuing duty to support ․ [C]ourts ․ limit the duration of alimony awards in order to encourage the receiving spouse to become self-sufficient,” citing Roach v. Roach, 20 Conn.App. 500, 506, 568 A.2d 1037 (1990).

Alimony is the obligation of support that spouses assume toward each other by virtue of their marriage.   Alimony is always represented by money and is damages to compensate for the loss of marital support and maintenance.   Wiegand v. Wiegand, 129 Conn.App. 526, 21 A.3d 489 (2011).

Postjudgment Modification

Postjudgment modification of alimony and child support is governed by General Statutes § 46b–86(a), which provides in relevant part:

Unless and to the extent that the decree precludes modification ․ an order for alimony or support ․ may, at any time thereafter, be ․ altered or modified ․ upon a showing of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party ․ See Schade v. Schade, 110 Conn.App. 57, 62, 954 A.2d 846, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 945, 959 A.2d 1009 (2008);  Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 104 Conn.App. 482, 491, 934 A.2d 306;  cert. denied 285 Conn. 911, 943 A.2d 472 (2008).

When presented with a motion for modification, a court must first determine whether there has been a substantial change in the financial circumstances of one or both of the parties ․ Second, if the court finds a substantial change in circumstances, it may properly consider the motion and, on the basis of the ․ § 46b–82 criteria, make an order for modification ․ The court has the authority to issue a modification only if it conforms the order to the distinct and definite changes in the circumstances of the parties ․ simply put, before the court may modify an alimony award [or child support order] pursuant to § 46b–86, it must make a threshold finding of a substantial change in circumstances with respect to one of the parties.  (Citation omitted;  emphasis omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Schade v. Schade, supra, 110 Conn.App. 63.   The party seeking the modification has the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances.   See Simms v. Simms, 283 Conn. 494, 502, 927 A.2d 894, (2007).  “To obtain a modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order such that it would be unjust or inequitable to hold either party to it.   Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party's relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification of the existing order.   In making such an inquiry, the trial court's discretion is essential.”  Borkowski v. Borkowsk, 228 Conn. 729, 737–38, 638 A.2d 1060 (1994).  “A conclusion that there has been a substantial change in financial circumstances justifying a modification of alimony based only on income is erroneous;  rather, the present overall circumstances of the parties must be compared with the circumstances existing at the time of the original award to determine if there has been substantial change.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

O'Donnell v. Bozzuti, AC 35094, February 11, 2014 cites Gay v. Gay, 70 Conn.App. 772, 781, 800 A.2d 1231 (2002), aff'd in part, 266 Conn. 641, 835 A.2d 1 (2003).   This court has applied all of the applicable guiding criteria to make its decision.   The substantial change being advanced is the increased income of defendant, but the court does not consider this fact in a vacuum.   Rather, the court considers defendant's income in the context of all current circumstances.

Attorneys Fees

“[T]he common law rule in Connecticut, also known as the American Rule, is that attorneys fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Berzins v. Berzins, 306 Conn. 651, 661, 51 A.3d 941 (2012).  Munro v. Munoz, 146 Conn.App. 853, 857–58, 81 A.3d 252 (2013).

The court in Misthopoulos, supra., held that:  [t]he order requiring the defendant to pay a portion of the plaintiff's attorneys fees was necessary so as not to undermine the trial court's other financial orders, the record having demonstrated that the defendant had a significantly higher earning capacity than the plaintiff, and it was reasonable to presume that the trial court was attempting to equalize the amount of marital assets that were used to pay each of the parties' attorneys fees.   The court observed in Adamo v. Adamo, 123 Conn.App. 38, 1 A.3d 221 (2010) that General Statutes § 46b–62 vests in the trial court the discretion to award attorneys fees as well as costs of litigation including expert fees.   Where both parties are financially able to pay their own counsel fees they should.   An exception to this rule is that an award of attorneys fees is justified even where both parties are financially able to pay their own fees if the failure to make an award would undermine the court's other financial orders.  Id., 53.

Effect of Inflation on Child Support and Alimony Awards

Plaintiff argues that rising inflation is one reason to increase Plaintiff's child support and alimony awards.   The mere fact of inflation ․ is not sufficient ground for increasing an order of support.   It must also be shown that inflation (a) has substantially increased the necessary expenses of the children and (b) has not increased the necessary expenses of the parent against whom the order is entered to a point which renders him unable to pay increased support.  Moore v. Moore, 173 Conn. 120, 123, 376 A.2d 1085 (1977);  Izard v. Izard, 88 Conn.App. 506, 869 A.2d 1278 (2005).   Plaintiff has not sustained this burden, and the court rejects inflation as a reason to increase either award to plaintiff.

Contempt

To conclude that a party is in contempt, the court must find that there existed a sufficiently clear and unambiguous order for which the party had notice, that the party did not comply with the order, and that the non-compliance was wilful.  Brody v. Brody, 145 Conn.App. 654, 77 A.3d 156 (2013);  Pace v. Pace, 134 Conn.App. 212, 215–16, 39 A.3d 756 (2012);  Celini v. Celini, 115 Conn.App. 371, 380–81, 973 A.2d 664 (2009), citing In re Leah, 284 Conn. 685, 935 A.2d 1021 (2007).  “To constitute contempt, a party's conduct must be wilful ․ Noncompliance alone will not support a judgment of contempt ․” Scott v. Scott, 90 Conn.App. 883, 889, 879 A.2d 540 (2005).

FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

All facts are found by a preponderance of the evidence after careful review of the testimony and exhibits presented.   The court observed the attitude and demeanor of each witness who appeared before it and assessed and weighed their credibility.   The court also considered the parties' past and current Financial Affidavits, the arguments of counsel and their Proposed Orders, as amended.   The court finds the following facts.

General Findings

1. The 2007 judgment contains the most recent orders for child support and alimony:  $600,000.00 annual alimony and $636.00 weekly child support for two minor children.   Defendant then earned $1,924,000.00 a year.

2. Defendant currently earns $3,800,000.00 a year.   He once earned additional income from endorsements and commercials, but his current health limits these opportunities at present.

3. Defendant paid 100% of his daughters' private school education and their “enrichment” activities fees like soccer, dance, tai kwon do and “Jack & Jill” conferences, an African–American leadership training group.   He continues to do so for Sydney, and he is 100% responsible for Taelor's university tuition and fees, some $60,000 per year.   He provides Taelor with a weekly allowance of at least $100.00.   There are “529” college education plans in place for both girls, but neither have any significant assets of their own.   The court finds that both girls remain dependent on their parents for financial support even though Taelor is legally an adult.

4. These children have always enjoyed an affluent and privileged lifestyle.   They have met the President of the United States, regularly attend sports events like the London Olympics and the NBA Championship, are invited to balls, cotillions, movie premieres and other such “red carpet” events.   The testimony described Sydney as a typical teenager:  active, athletic, indulged, creative, artsy, gifted and confident.   The court previously made similar findings about Taelor.3

5. Plaintiff lives in Unionville, Connecticut.   She has a BA degree.   She is currently 50 years old.   She attempted a return to school for an advanced degree, but she was not able to complete her program because she made providing for the needs of her girls and her extended family a higher priority.   She decided instead to invest in her family's business, a pharmacy in North Carolina.   She currently owns 100% of this business.   She believes the pharmacy holds great promise and potential for her future financial security, and she has not otherwise provided for her retirement.

6. Plaintiff has invested about $600,000 in this business in the last four years.   She also has provided about $120,000 to her sister and $237,000 toward the building housing the business.   The rough total of her investment through May 2013 was over $900,000.   The current total is significantly higher.

7. More specifically, plaintiff puts about $8,000 a month into the pharmacy to cover its current losses.   This number may have improved recently, but she has and will spend $5,000 a month for the property alone for the next four months.   She pays certain “personal expenses” for her sister as compensation for the sister's work at the pharmacy.   She has paid some expenses for her parents like their condo fees for the past three years.

8. Plaintiff owns a townhome in Raleigh, North Carolina with her sister.   It is worth a minimum of $102,000.00.   It has been rented for some time at $700.00 per month.

9. Plaintiff charges defendant for numerous expenses associated with the girls.   Some include transportation, gas, clothing, hotel costs, gifts to teachers and counselors and trips with friends.   When her mother or another family member accompanies the girls on a trip, plaintiff has included their costs and expenses for payment or reimbursement by defendant.

10. Defendant paid or reimbursed such costs and expenses without question for a period of time, but more recently he sought a clear accounting of what he was being asked to provide over and above alimony and child support.   He has not paid all of the girls' expenses currently claimed by plaintiff.

11. Plaintiff's accounting of these expenses in Defendant's Exhibits A and B is confusing at best.   Coupled with the errors and “estimations” on her sworn Financial Affidavits, the court finds defendant's apprehension about plaintiff's money management and requests for reimbursement to be justified and prudent.

12. The court finds each party financially able to pay their own attorneys fees.

Findings Pertaining to GAL Fees

13. The court finds that the costs, fees and expenses of the GAL are reasonable based on its review of the Affidavit of Fees that she filed with the court on February 4, 2014.

14. The court declines to reallocate fees already paid to the GAL by the parties.   The court finds that the allocation of the current balance owed to her and any future fees shall be 25% to plaintiff and 75% to defendant.

Findings Pertaining to Contempt

15. The Dissolution Judgment at Paragraph 4.3 pertains to health-related expenses, ordering “[t]he Wife and Husband shall not incur extraordinary health care costs for the children without prior consultation with each other, except in emergency.”

16. Doctor David Russell provided marriage counseling to plaintiff, and defendant participated.   Defendant credibly testified that at one such session, the doctor called his work travel schedule “a philanderer's dream.”   Defendant took offense, thinking the remark inappropriate and unprofessional.   He testified that Dr. Russell later apologized.

17. After these events Plaintiff decided to bring Taelor to Dr. Russell for mental-health therapy.   The evidence does not reflect that there was any emergency.

18. The parties did consult, and, based on his earlier experience, defendant objected strongly to Dr. Russell's provision of services to Taelor.   Plaintiff engaged Dr. Russell despite defendant's objections.

19. Plaintiff seeks $27,452.56 from defendant to reimburse her payment of the doctor's services.   The court finds that defendant raised significant, valid concerns about Dr. Russell's provision of therapeutic services to Taelor.   The court declines to find defendant in contempt because the order relied on is not sufficiently clear under these circumstances to hold him accountable.

Findings Pertaining to Child Support

20. Taelor turned eighteen on February 20, 2013 and graduated high school on May 30, 2013.   See, C.G.S. § 46b–84(b).  This event in addition to defendant's increased earnings is found to be a substantial change in circumstances that occurred after the date of the judgment warranting a recalculation of defendant's child support obligation guided by Maturo and Dowling.

21. The court finds that plaintiff served defendant her Motion to Modify on January 15, 2013.   The court further finds in all equity that the starting point for the court's re-calculation of child support must begin on this date.4  Children are entitled to a fair share of each parents' earnings per the Guidelines.   Regs., Conn. State Agency, Preamble, Subsection (d) (2005).

22. The court, therefore, calculates two periods of modified child support:  for two children until Taelor's graduation from high school and for one child from the date of the graduation to the present.   The court finds that 19 weeks passed from the service of plaintiff's Motion and Taelor's graduation from high school;  the latter period for the remaining minor child, May 30, 2013 through February 28, 2014, is 38 weeks.

23. There is no claim that plaintiff has failed to pay his weekly child support as it is currently ordered.

24. Neither party ascribes any current earning capacity to plaintiff.5  The court adopts defendant's counsel's Guidelines Worksheet dated August 2, 2013 as to her client's gross weekly income and allowable deductions.   She arrives at a combined net weekly income of $40,178.00 (Line 15 of the Child Support Guidelines Worksheet).   These numbers accurately reflect the findings of the court from the credible evidence.   Based on these earnings, the court finds the minimum presumptive amount of child support for two children to be $636.00 per week;  the maximum is $6,384.00.6  The court finds the minimum presumptive amount of child support for one child to be $473 per week;  the maximum is $4,753.00.7  The court may set the amount of child support anywhere between the presumptive minimum and maximum without resort to the Guidelines' deviation criteria per Dowling, supra.

25. The court calculates the presumptive amount of unreimbursed health-related expenses 8 for two children in Attachments 1 and 2.

Minimum for Two Children

Plaintiff's minimum share of unreimbursed health-related expenses is 24.5%;  defendant's is 75.5%.

Maximum for Two Children

Plaintiff's minimum share of unreimbursed health-related expenses is 38.9%;  defendant's is 61.1%. The court may set the percentage of unreimbursed health-related expenses for plaintiff and defendant anywhere between the presumptive minimum and maximum without resort to the Guidelines' deviation criteria per Dowling, supra.

26. The court calculates the presumptive amount of unreimbursed health-related expenses for one child in Attachments 3 and 4.

Minimum for One Child

Plaintiff's minimum share of unreimbursed health-related expenses is 24.2%;  defendant's maximum is 75.8%.

Maximum for One Child

Plaintiff's maximum share of unreimbursed health-related expenses is 34.8%;  defendant's minimum is 65.2%. The court may set the percentage of unreimbursed health-related expenses for plaintiff and defendant anywhere between the presumptive minimum and maximum without resort to the Guidelines' deviation criteria per Dowling, supra.

27. The court has considered the evidence submitted by the parties regarding actual past and projected child support expenditures to determine an appropriate award.   The court scrutinized Defendant's Exhibits A and B and listened closely to plaintiff's testimony at the August 2, 2013 hearing about her expenditures on behalf of Sydney totaling about $100,000 per year.   The court credits this testimony.   The court reasonably infers that such expenditures for two girls, while not doubled, would be considerably more.   The court has considered all of the guiding criteria of C.G.S. § 46b–84(d), especially “the respective abilities of the parents to provide such maintenance and the amount thereof” and the “station” of this family.   Given their fortunate financial circumstances, these parents determined the “station” of their children:  a privileged lifestyle that certainly exceeded basic childhood needs.   The children should now be maintained in that lifestyle even though the family is no longer intact.

28. The court finds that child support for the parties' two children for the period from January 15, 2013 to May 30, 2013 is $3,000.00 per week.   The split of unreimbursed health-related expenses is plaintiff:  25% and defendant 75%.   The court further finds that these awards are within the Guidelines.

29. This finding renders an under-payment of child support during this period of $44,916.00.9

30. The court finds that child support for the parties' remaining minor child for the period from May 30, 2013 to date is $2,000.00 per week.   The split of unreimbursed health-related expenses is plaintiff 25% and defendant 75%.   The court further finds that these awards are within the Guidelines.

31. This finding renders an under-payment of child support during this period of $51,832.00.10

32. The sum of these under-payments is $96,748.00.

33. Connecticut's Guidelines neither list nor define specific expenditures that comprise child support, but it is clear that such general categories of basic need like food, housing, clothing and transportation are fairly considered a part of child support.   The cost of children's extra-curricular or “enrichment” activities are not part of child support.   Defendant was court-ordered to pay 100% of his minor children's “enrichment” activities.   These have in the past included soccer, dance, tai-kwon-do and “Jack & Jill” leadership conferences.   Defendant remains obligated to pay such expenses for Sydney.   Costs for anyone else to attend these activities if they are supervising the minor child in place of the responsible parent lie with that parent.   Therefore, if an activity for the child occurs during defendant's time of parental responsibility, he must both plan and effectuate the event or arrange for another responsible adult to do so with all of the attendant costs and expenses.   If, however, defendant has parental responsibility for Sydney and he arranges a trip to a soccer tournament supervised by himself or another responsible adult, and if plaintiff chooses to attend that same event, she is solely responsible for her own expenses.

Findings Pertaining to Alimony

34. The court finds that defendant's increased income after the judgment is a substantial change in circumstances.   The court considered all of the guiding criteria of C.G.S. § 46b–82 to determine plaintiff's Motion to Modify Alimony.

35. Plaintiff is 50 and relatively healthy.   She has no set occupation or specific vocational skills.   Plaintiff is not currently employed except for the time she spends at the pharmacy and therefore has no income except the alimony provided by defendant.   She expresses concern for her retirement years, although she continues to enjoy an affluent lifestyle.

36. Defendant currently faces health challenges, but his income has not yet been significantly affected.   Defendant's income has doubled since the time of the Judgment, and there is no evidence of any event or circumstance, except his health, that might interrupt the trajectory of his career.   His current Financial Affidavit shows a weekly surplus net income of over $33,000.00.   The value of the assets he owns is twice that of plaintiff.

37. There is no evidence that defendant has not paid his current alimony obligation.

38. The court is mindful that the duration of plaintiff's alimony is non-modifiable but that the amount of alimony during the set term is modifiable.   (See Judgment, Sections 3.2 & 3.3).

ORDERS

Child Support

1. The court grants plaintiff's motion to modify child support (# 163.01).

2. For the 19–week period from January 16, 2013 through May 30, 2013, defendant shall pay weekly child support to plaintiff of $3,000.00.   During this same period defendant shall pay 75% and plaintiff 25% of the minor children's unreimbursed health-related expenses except as ordered in Paragraph 11, below.

3. Commencing the first week following May 30, 2013, defendant shall pay weekly child support to plaintiff of $2,000.00 for the remaining minor child.   Defendant shall pay 75% and plaintiff 25% of the minor child's unreimbursed health-related expenses.

4. Defendant shall maintain both children's health insurance for as long as allowed by applicable law.

5. Defendant shall pay the child support underpayments of $96,748.00 in installments of at least $1,000.00 per week in addition to his weekly child support until the full amount is paid.

Alimony

6. The court grants plaintiff's motion to modify alimony (# 163.00).

7. From the week of January 15, 2013 forward, defendant shall pay plaintiff $60,000.00 per month alimony.   This amount shall be income to her and fully deductible to him.   Any arrearage resulting from this order shall be repaid at the rate of at least $1,000.00 per week in addition to defendant's other obligations.

8. All of defendant's payments to plaintiff shall be secured by a contingent wage-withholding.

Reimbursement of Expenses

The court denies plaintiff's Motion for Contempt (# 180), concerning reimbursement of expenses for the children, but under its remedial contempt authority orders that any reimbursement sought by one party from the other shall be consistent with the findings and orders of this court.   It shall be timely presented with documentation sufficient to identify the source, amount and date of the expense, such as a receipt or bill from the provider.   Once received, the expense shall be reimbursed or paid by the responsible party within thirty (30) days.

GAL Fees

The court denies plaintiff's Motion to Allocate GAL Fees (# 181) pertaining to fees previously paid.   The current and any future balance due shall be paid 25% by plaintiff and 75% by defendant.

Contempt

The court denies plaintiff's Motion for Contempt (# 184).   Plaintiff shall be solely responsible for Dr. Russell's bill for Taelor.

Attorneys Fees

Each party shall be solely responsible to pay their own attorneys fees.

General

Any prior order of the court not affected by this court's decision remains unaltered and in full force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Carbonneau, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Counsel agreed at the close of the evidence that the court would decide all financial matters then pending.   Other motions dealing with the parenting plan would be heard by another judge at a later time if necessary..  FN1. Counsel agreed at the close of the evidence that the court would decide all financial matters then pending.   Other motions dealing with the parenting plan would be heard by another judge at a later time if necessary.

FN2. The court reads this to mean that the percentage of income expended for child support declines as income increases rather than the straight dollar amount..  FN2. The court reads this to mean that the percentage of income expended for child support declines as income increases rather than the straight dollar amount.

FN3. Plaintiff's Motion for Modification (# 163 & 163.01) originally asserted that Taelor's child support should be extended to her 21st birthday pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b–84(c).  Plaintiff withdrew this claim when, at an earlier hearing, the parties presented overwhelming evidence of Taelor's talent, ability and potential..  FN3. Plaintiff's Motion for Modification (# 163 & 163.01) originally asserted that Taelor's child support should be extended to her 21st birthday pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b–84(c).  Plaintiff withdrew this claim when, at an earlier hearing, the parties presented overwhelming evidence of Taelor's talent, ability and potential.

FN4. Starting the modification at this time is not considered a retroactive modification.  C.G.S. § 46b–86(a)..  FN4. Starting the modification at this time is not considered a retroactive modification.  C.G.S. § 46b–86(a).

FN5. Defendant's counsel included an allowable deduction of $160 for plaintiff.   The court does not find this amount in the evidence, omits it and concludes that such a number would have a minimal effect on the overall child support calculations..  FN5. Defendant's counsel included an allowable deduction of $160 for plaintiff.   The court does not find this amount in the evidence, omits it and concludes that such a number would have a minimal effect on the overall child support calculations.

FN6. $40,178 times .1589 = $6,384, rounded to the nearest dollar..  FN6. $40,178 times .1589 = $6,384, rounded to the nearest dollar.

FN7. $40,178 times .1183 = $4,753, rounded to the nearest dollar..  FN7. $40,178 times .1183 = $4,753, rounded to the nearest dollar.

FN8. The court finds that the young adults involved require no work-related day care!.  FN8. The court finds that the young adults involved require no work-related day care!

FN9. 19 weeks times $3,000 = $57,000.00.   Defendant owed and paid $636.00 times 19 weeks, or $12,084.00.   The resulting difference is $44,916.00..  FN9. 19 weeks times $3,000 = $57,000.00.   Defendant owed and paid $636.00 times 19 weeks, or $12,084.00.   The resulting difference is $44,916.00.

FN10. 38 weeks times $2,000 = $76,000.00.   Defendant owed and paid $636.00 times 38 weeks, or $24,168.00.   The resulting difference is $51,832.00..  FN10. 38 weeks times $2,000 = $76,000.00.   Defendant owed and paid $636.00 times 38 weeks, or $24,168.00.   The resulting difference is $51,832.00.

Carbonneau, John L., J.

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