POA v. CTRE LLC CT (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 194)

FACTS

This litigation arises out of a dispute regarding real estate located at 12 Pearl Street, Mystic.   Presently before the court is the motion for summary judgment of the counterclaim defendants, Robert Reardon, Jr., as power of attorney for Kelly Reardon, Robert Reardon, Jr., and Kelly Reardon, individually, filed in response to the two-count counterclaim of the plaintiff, Geoffrey Jones.   As to count one, alleging unlawful interference with contractual relations, the Reardons argue that it is undisputed that there was no interference with Jones' contractual relations in his purchase of 12 Pearl Street and that Jones suffered no actual damages.   As to count two, alleging abuse of process, the Reardons argue that there is “no evidence that either Robert or Kelly Reardon intended to cause Mr. Jones specific injury outside of the normal contemplation of private litigation.”   Therefore, the Reardons argue summary judgment in their favor is appropriate.   The Reardons filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion for summary judgment, along with supporting evidence.   On July 12, 2011, Jones filed his memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and supporting evidence.   On July 20, 2011, the Reardons filed a reply to Jones' opposition.   Jones filed a reply on July 27, 2011.   The matter was heard at short calendar on August 1, 2011.   The evidence offered by the parties will be discussed as necessary.

DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989).  “The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law.   The courts hold the movant to a strict standard ․ As the burden of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc., 285 Conn. 1, 11, 938 A.2d 576 (2008).  “[S]ummary judgment procedure is particularly inappropriate where the inferences which the parties seek to have drawn deal with questions of motive, intent and subjective feelings and reactions.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 111, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).

Count one of the counterclaim alleges unlawful interference with contractual relations.  “A claim for tortious interference with contractual relations requires the plaintiff to establish (1) the existence of a contractual or beneficial relationship, (2) the defendants' knowledge of that relationship, (3) the defendants' intent to interfere with the relationship, (4) the interference was tortious, and (5) a loss suffered by the plaintiff that was caused by the defendants' tortious conduct.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 212–13, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000).  “The plaintiff in a tortious interference claim must demonstrate malice on the part of the defendant, not in the sense of ill will, but intentional interference without justification.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Stancuna v. Schaffer, 122 Conn.App. 484, 488, 988 A.2d 1221 (2010).

In the present case, the court has reviewed the evidence presented by both parties and concludes that the deposition transcripts, affidavits and other documents demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute.¹  The Reardons argue that there was no actual interference with Jones' contractual relations because he was able to purchase 12 Pearl Street for the negotiated price.   In an excerpt from Robert Reardon's deposition, he states that he was suspicious about collusion based on an assumed business relationship between Jones and Marie Cox, the real estate agent.   Jones counters that Robert Reardon intended to interfere with his contractual relations by threatening litigation, threatening an injunction and threatening to have a marshal arrest anyone who tried to record evidence of the sale on the land records.   Jones offers examples of these threats in his own affidavit and the affidavit of Richard Dixon, his attorney for the transactions regarding 12 Pearl Street.

In addition, the Reardons claim that Jones suffered no damages.   In contrast, Jones argues that legal fees would be appropriate damages in this suit and offers as evidence of additional damages Dixon's affidavit, which states that the costs and fees to Jones were significantly increased in closing on the property due to the actions of the Reardons.   Jones also offers his own affidavit which states that he accepted lower rental payments and sold the property for a loss because of the Reardons' actions.

Accordingly, there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Robert Reardon intentionally interfered without justification in Jones' contractual relations and whether Jones suffered actual damages.

Count two of the counterclaim alleges abuse of process.  “An action for abuse of process lies against any person using a legal process against another in an improper manner or to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 494, 529 A.2d 171 (1987).  “Because the tort arises out of the accomplishment of a result that could not be achieved by the proper and successful use of process, the Restatement Second (1977) of Torts, § 682, emphasizes that the gravamen of the action for abuse of process is the use of a legal process ․ against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed ․ Comment [b] to § 682 explains that the addition of primarily is meant to exclude liability when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant ․ When deciding whether the employment of a legal process constituted abuse of that process, we have examined the purpose served by the particular process at issue in the case.”  (Citation omitted;  emphasis in original;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 301 Conn. 194, 213, 21 A.3d 709 (2011).  “The existing case law demonstrates that there is no bright line that clearly distinguishes between the ends ordinarily associated with litigation and the ulterior purpose that the tort of abuse of process is intended to sanction.   Much turns on the specificity of the pleadings ․ When ․ such allegations are buttressed by specific claims of egregious misconduct, such as utter failure to investigate the validity of the underlying action, or unwarranted pursuit of inappropriate motions, some courts have sustained liability for abuse of process.”   (Citations omitted.)  Mozzochi v. Beck, supra, 204 Conn. 496.

The Reardons argue that their motive was to enjoin a property transfer that they believed was tainted with fraud.   Robert Reardon, in an excerpt from his deposition, stated “that I wanted to have a hearing and find out more details about what happened before the closing took place.   And I was simply restraining the closing until such time as a full evidentiary hearing took place.”   Jones argues, on the other hand, that the purpose of this litigation was to derail the sale of the property to Jones and to gain a tactical advantage, allowing the Reardons more time to make a counteroffer.   In Dixon's affidavit, offered by Jones, Dixon states that when Robert Reardon could provide no basis for why he was seeking an injunction, Dixon suggested Robert Reardon's suit may be frivolous and Robert Reardon responded with threatening and foul language.   The determination of the Reardons' intent will require a fact-finder to weigh the evidence and determine credibility.   In regards to count two, the court determines that genuine issues of material fact exist as to Robert Reardon's primary motive in initiating his suit;  therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Reardons' motion for summary judgment is denied.

Martin, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Where uncertified deposition transcripts are submitted without objection in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the court may, in its discretion choose to consider or exclude them.”   Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006).   Here, the court has chosen to consider the uncertified deposition transcripts offered by the Reardons in support of their motion for summary judgment, along with the other evidence offered by both parties..  FN1. Where uncertified deposition transcripts are submitted without objection in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, the court may, in its discretion choose to consider or exclude them.”   Barlow v. Palmer, 96 Conn.App. 88, 92, 898 A.2d 835 (2006).   Here, the court has chosen to consider the uncertified deposition transcripts offered by the Reardons in support of their motion for summary judgment, along with the other evidence offered by both parties.

Martin, Robert A., J.