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Patrick Singleton v. Warden
THE COURT: The following will constitute the decision of this Court. Plea bargains are, of course, the incredible part of the criminal justice system. Without that, without plea bargains, the criminal justice system would probably come to a crashing halt under the weight and load of the crush of cases. A very significant portion of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas and plea agreements.
A plea bargain is, therefore, a credible stage of the criminal justice system at which a criminal defendant is entitled to receive the assistance and therefore the effective assistance of counsel.
However, contrary to what may be the belief on the street, there is no constitutional right to have a plea agreement. Nothing in the law requires the state to even make any sort of offer of a plea deal.
There's no requirement that there be three offers, and there is no such thing as a plea agreement between the Court and the defendant.
Plea agreements, to the extent that there are plea agreements that are enforceable, are between the state and the defendant. It is the role of the Court to accept or reject that agreement.
However, in the State of Connecticut, we do conduct judicially supervised pretrials, and during these pretrials, it is the role of the Court to broker but not to make a deal.
In the final analysis, if there is a plea agreement that is capable of being enforced, then this agreement must be between the state and the defendant.
Now, given the facts of this case, the Court finds that there was in fact a plea agreement between the state and the defendant. The state cannot remain silent and induce and participate in inducing a guilty plea from a defendant who gives up important and precious constitutional rights and then try to claim there is no plea agreement.
Now, in this case, it is clear that while there was an agreement, because nothing in the transcript shows that the state in any way objected to the entry into this agreement, it's clear, both from the testimony produced here and the comments made at sentencing that the state would have preferred to have had a higher sentence.
Now, I've reviewed the plea canvass. I've reviewed all the evidence, in particular, the plea canvass on July 29th of 2002. It's thorough. It's detailed. It's comprehensive. It is unassailable. There is absolutely nothing that would permit this Court to set aside the finding of guilty.
Likewise, the plea, the sentencing transcript-I think I have the exhibits, correct?
MS. MASI: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That took place on October 7th of 2002, is likewise beyond any sort of criticism. In essence, this is an attempt by the petitioner to renegotiate his contract, and that is clearly not permissible in the habeas court.
It is crystal clear in the State of Connecticut that the habeas court does not have any authority to resentence a prisoner, a petitioner, and at its heart, a habeas petition attacks the legality of the confinement, and it is crystal clear in this case that there is no illegality in the confinement to which Mr. Singleton has been committed.
As far as ineffective assistance of counsel, as is well-known, in Strickland versus Washington case, there are two prongs to ineffective assistance of counsel. The first is that there must have been deficient performance on the part of the trial defense counsel.
Now, having listened to the testimony, having reviewed the evidence, it again is crystal clear to this Court that Attorney Smith conducted an admirable defense of Mr. Singleton. There is not a single instance of deficient performance that this Court can find in connection with his representation of Mr. Singleton.
The second prong of the Strickland standard is that there must be prejudice. Now, these are in the conjunctive, not the disjunctive. In other words, there must be both deficient performance and prejudice, and the Court is free to decide on either prong or both.
Well, since there's no deficient performance, then there clearly is no ineffective assistance of counsel, but even if, even if there had been some sort of deficient performance, the Court cannot see any prejudice that inured to the detriment of the petitioner.
The petitioner was faced with very-with a very lengthy prison sentence. He was faced with a very strong government case arraigned against him, the facts of which are particularly egregious. Without going into the details, because details are well-established in the transcripts that are before this Court, this was a brutal act on the part of Mr. Singleton, an act that he himself recognizes as way beyond what any human being should do. In fact, in his own words at sentencing, he admitted that his mother would probably view him as a monster for what he had done.
Now I say that not to rub it in, so to speak, to Mr. Singleton, but to bring to attention the fact that it was a difficult case, and Mr. Singleton himself clearly recognized that. The fact that he is remorseful is to his credit; however, given the facts in this particular case, a twenty-five year sentence is not out of line. It may well be that others have committed acts that are similar and have received lesser sentences. It may well be that the state was being unduly draconian in seeking forty years, but the point remains that a twenty-five-year sentence, based on the fact pattern and scenario in this particular case, is not an unreasonable sentence. And, Madam Clerk, you may serve the appeal papers on the petitioner.
THE CLERK: Let the record reflect the petitioner is receiving a copy of his notice of appeal and his application for waiver of fees and appointment of counsel on appeal.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Singleton, I really wish you the best of luck, despite the fact that I realize at the time you took the plea bargain, you knew forty-three is ancient and may even still view that as somewhat old. There will come a point in your life when you look at age forty-three and realize that's a very young age, and I hope that when you do come out into the community that you're able to have peaceful life, and I wish you the best of luck. Is there anything further?
MS. MASI: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Court will stand in recess until 2:10, at which point we'll take up the-
MR. FOX: Your Honor, if you could just say about making the transcript as the memo of decision.
THE COURT: I already did.
MR. FOX: Oh.
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)
S.T. Fuger, Judge
Fuger, S.T., J.
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Docket No: CV064001123
Decided: September 17, 2009
Court: Superior Court of Connecticut.
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