STATE OF WASHINGTON v. WALDO EMERSON WALDRON RAMSEY (2011)

- Waldo Emerson Waldron-Ramsey appeals the trial court's ex parte order giving him two days' additional credit for time served pretrial.   He contends the original sentence is void.   We conclude that the court had the authority to correct a clerical error, and we affirm.

Mr. Waldron-Ramsey is entitled to credit for the time he served in jail pending his 1989 trial, both as a matter of constitutional mandate ¹ and by provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW:  “The sentencing court shall give

the offender credit for all confinement time served before the sentencing if that confinement was solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced.”   Former RCW 9.94A.120(12) (1984) (now RCW 9.94A.505(6)).   A sentencing court's actions are void if those actions exceed its sentencing authority.  State v. Paulson, 131 Wn.App. 579, 588, 128 P.3d 133 (2006).   Whether the court's actions here amount to a resentencing or a correction of the original judgment and sentence is a question of law that we will review de novo.  Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 60, 59 P.3d 611 (2002) (citing State v. Niedergang, 43 Wn.App. 656, 660-61, 719 P.2d 576 (1986)).

Mr. Waldron-Ramsey contends that the court's original sentence is void and that the court must resentence him.   He also contends that he is entitled to be present at that resentencing.   The State responds that the court's action does not amount to a resentencing;  the court's action was simply a “ministerial correction” of the original judgment and sentence.   Resp't's Br. at 3. This court's response to Mr. Waldron-Ramsey's petition turns on whether the court's clarifying order amounts to a resentencing or whether, instead, it is a ministerial correction of the original judgment and sentence.

In State v. Snapp, 119 Wn.App. 614, 618, 82 P.3d 252 (2004), the court sentenced Danny Snapp to six months in jail for felony violation of a no contact order and interfering with the reporting of domestic violence.   The court later amended the order to require that Mr. Snapp “attend a batterer's treatment class and have no contact with [the victim] until allowed by the treatment provider.”  Id. Mr. Snapp appealed and challenged the authority of the court to amend the sentence.   Division Two's resolution turned on whether the sentencing court's action was “clerical or judicial.”  Id. at 627.   If the court's action was simply “clerical,” the court had authority under CrR 7.8 to change the judgment and sentence.  Id. at 626-27.   If, on the other hand, the action was judicial, then the court did not have authority to change the final judgment and sentence.   Division Two concluded that the court's action was clerical because “before adding the treatment program condition, the trial court reviewed the clerk's minutes for June 22, 2001, and found that the treatment program was intended to be included.”  Id. at 627.   The decision then turned on whether the added provisions or amendment were something that was originally intended by the court or whether, instead, it was something new.  Id.

The principles set out in Snapp compel the result here.   Clearly, the court intended to give Mr. Waldron-Ramsey credit for the time he had served in jail pending his trial.   The court's order “clarifying” then simply did what the sentencing judge had intended to do all along-give Mr. Waldron-Ramsey credit for the time he had served.   The court had authority to correct what amounted to a clerical error.  CrR 7.8(a) (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party.”);  Snapp, 119 Wn.App. at 626-27.

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW

Mr. Waldron-Ramsey also filed a statement of additional grounds but he makes the same arguments his lawyer made and cites the same cases.   His assumption is that the court's actions amounted to a resentencing.   They did not.

We affirm the trial court's order amending the judgment to credit Mr. Waldron-Ramsey with two additional days of time served.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to

RCW 2.06.040.

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Kulik, C.J.

WE CONCUR:

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Sweeney, J. Brown, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 342, 347, 517 P.2d 949 (1974)..  FN1. Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wn.2d 342, 347, 517 P.2d 949 (1974).

Kulik, C.J. FACTS Waldo Emerson Waldron-Ramsey was convicted of first degree murder in 1989.   His first trial resulted in a mistrial.   State v. Waldron-Ramsey, noted at 74 Wn.App. 1014, 1994 WL 908021.   The second trial began on March 27, 1989, two years after the first trial.   The second jury found Mr. Waldron-Ramsey guilty of first degree murder.   The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict and sentenced Mr. Waldron-Ramsey to an exceptional term of 575 months.   The court gave him 1,329 days' credit for the time he had served in jail pending his trials.   Mr. Waldron-Ramsey appealed his conviction.   This court affirmed.   Id. On January 11, 2010, Mr. Waldron-Ramsey The State responded by presenting an ex parte order to the trial court “Clarifying the Judgment and Sentence Section 4.2” to reflect credit for 1,331 days for time served rather than the original credit for 1,329 days.   Clerk's Papers (CP) at 5. Mr. Waldron-Ramsey now appeals this order.   He contends that the original judgment and sentence is void on its face and he is therefore entitled to have the original sentence vacated and a new sentence.   ANALYSIS