ESTATE OF JORDAN BENJAMIN BROWN DENNIS BROWN v. THE GEO GROUP INC INCORPORATED (2026)

The King County Department of Adult and Juvenile Detention (DAJD) supervised the pretrial electronic home monitoring (EHM) of two youths. The youths cut off their EHM devices, absconded, and five days later murdered Jordan Brown. Brown's estate (Estate) sued King County for negligence. The trial court granted King County's summary judgment motion, concluding that it owed no duty to Brown at the time he was murdered and that any negligence assertable against King County did not proximately cause Brown's murder.

We conclude that DAJD owed a duty to third persons, such as Brown, to protect them from the foreseeable harm caused by the two youths and that a rational trier of fact could find that DAJD breached its duty by not promptly notifying law enforcement after each youth absconded. However, we conclude that no rational trier of fact could find that DAJD's breach of duty was the cause in fact of Brown's murder. We affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of the Estate's negligence claim.

FACTS

On February 22, 2022, Montrell Hatfield, Marshon Jones, and an unidentified male robbed a pawn shop. All three were armed with handguns. Hatfield forced the manager to the safe, demanded money, and struck him across the face with the butt of his gun, while Jones ordered customers to lie on the floor and fired a single shot into the wall. Hatfield was 16 years old, and Jones was 15 years old. Police arrived moments after the robbery and located Hatfield and Jones hiding in an apartment complex stairwell and took them into custody. In the stairwell, officers found the cash and jewelry taken from the pawn shop.

The following day, King County employee Lisaa Lucas completed screening reports for Hatfield and Jones. A screening report generally includes information on school involvement and medical concerns and is intended to provide contextual information to the court and probation officers. Lucas's reports for Hatfield and Jones included a summary of the police report detailing the pawn shop robbery and its violent undertones. Lucas confirmed that Hatfield and Jones had no prior convictions or warrants. Lucas also used a detention risk assessment instrument (DRAI). The DRAI is a risk assessment tool used to assist in determining if the youth may be immediately released or held until an initial appearance before the court. Lucas entered the first degree robbery charge, the involvement of a gun, and the lack of any prior warrants or convictions. The DRAI placed Hatfield at 1: low risk and recommended an alternative to secure detention; Jones's DRAI placed him at 2: low risk with the same recommendation. Lucas's report was provided to the judge and the assigned probation officer.

Intake juvenile probation counselor Yoko Maeshiro was assigned to both youths. She reviewed the certification for determination of probable cause, the police report, and Lucas’ screening report. Maeshiro also developed her own recommendation report. She spoke with Hatfield's mother, who reported a close relationship with him, no prior problems before he ran away two weeks earlier, surprise at his involvement, and recent depression following his best friend's death three weeks earlier. Maeshiro recommended release of Hatfield to his mother without monitoring, concluding he was not a community safety threat given his prosthetic leg and his mother's ability to supervise.

Maeshiro recommended that Jones be released on EHM to his legal guardian, with permission to live with his grandparents, because she believed he posed a threat to community safety and to himself due to the gun-involved robbery. She did not rely on Lucas's DRAI report in making these recommendations. Part of the reason Maeshiro recommended nonsecure detention was because she believed both youths had suffered trauma and would benefit from the services and counseling available outside secure detention. Although she recognized the seriousness of the potential charge, she believed detention offered a low likelihood of needed help. Her recommendations were sent to the judge, defense, and prosecution.

At Hatfield's and Jones's first appearance hearing on February 24, the prosecuting attorney described the violent pawnshop robbery involving guns and recommended secure detention for Hatfield and Jones. The trial court stressed the seriousness of the allegations and its concern for community safety yet determined that EHM with conditions was sufficient to address its concerns. At their respective arraignment hearings on February 28, the court continued their status on EHM custody.

King County's DAJD is responsible for supervising adults and youths on EHM custody. The EHM devices are provided and monitored by B.I., Inc. According to DAJD protocol, if a youth escapes, DAJD tries to locate the youth using whatever information is available to it. For example, it would contact the youth's parents, guardians, or service providers to obtain information that might assist in locating the youth and would ask the person it contacted to encourage the youth to report to the juvenile detention facility. DAJD is not authorized to discuss a juvenile's record unless specifically authorized, so it does not reach out to an escaped youth's friends or known associates.

DAJD community corrections placement specialist Dominique Porter met with Hatfield and Jones to explain EHM custody and to execute the alternatives to secure detention (ASD) contracts. The contracts informed the youths that any violation would result in remand to secure detention and, among several other restrictions, imposed a curfew, a strict geographical restriction, and required the youths not to tamper with their EHM devices.

The Escape

Over the next two to three weeks, field notes reflect that Hatfield was compliant with his ASD contract and doing well, with no violations or major concerns. Jones likewise remained compliant with his ASD contract.

On March 11, a local news station aired a story about Hatfield's and Jones's pawnshop robbery and criticized the court's decision to place them on EHM custody rather than in secure detention. On March 14, at approximately 4:22 p.m., Hatfield's EHM tracker sent a tamper alert. Shortly after, Debra Hindman, a DAJD community surveillance officer, telephoned Hatfield's grandmother. Hatfield's grandmother said she was not home but would return home and call Hindman. Around this time, Talia Carter, another DAJD community surveillance officer, messaged Jones and asked him to call her. Jones called Carter within 10 minutes and reported he was doing well.

At 5:09 p.m., Hatfield's mother called Carter and told her that Hatfield had cut off his tracker and left the residence.¹ She explained that Hatfield had texted her from an unknown number stating he had seen the news story and believed he would be taken off EHM custody, prompting him to run. Maeshiro learned of Hatfield's escape and advised his mother to text him and encourage him to turn himself in. Carter placed Hatfield on escape status. She also distributed a violation report to Maeshiro, Hatfield's attorney, the prosecutor, and the court. No further contact occurred between Carter and Hatfield's family.

Neither Carter nor Maeshiro contacted law enforcement to report Hatfield's escape. Under DAJD's unwritten policy and common practice, police are not notified when a youth removes an EHM device. Maeshiro also did not notify Jones's family of Hatfield's escape because she did not want to give Jones the idea to run. As a result, neither Jones nor his family were informed that Hatfield had escaped EHM custody.

At 8:54 that evening, Jones's EHM tracker generated a tamper alert. King County correction's supervisor Vanessa Marroquin received notice of the alert soon after. A series of alerts generated until 10:05 p.m. After receiving the final alert, Marroquin contacted Jones's grandmother, who confirmed that Jones had cut off his bracelet and left home.

After Jones left, his aunt called the police and said her nephew had escaped. The police came to the residence. After speaking with Jones's family, the police said they would search for Jones and bring him back. Jones's aunt and family also searched for Jones. Neither the police nor Jones's family found Jones.

Marroquin notified her supervisor that Jones had absconded but did not contact law enforcement or any other agency; she was unaware at that time that Hatfield had earlier escaped EHM custody. Maeshiro spoke with Jones's grandmother that night, asking her to encourage Jones to surrender if he contacted her.

Soon after, Maeshiro informed Jones's mentor at LINC ² that Jones had escaped. LINC is a mentorship program that offers support to youths and connects youths to services like counseling, treatment, and employment. The mentor said he would try to contact Jones on social media. The mentor also tried to look for Jones in downtown Seattle to see if he could convince Jones to turn himself in.

Immediately after Hatfield's escape, Maeshiro reported his escape to DAJD community corrections placement specialist Porter. By 5:19 p.m. that day, Porter had requested a warrant hearing for Hatfield. The following morning at 8:00 a.m., Porter requested a warrant hearing for Jones and noted that the matter was a high profile case. The warrant hearings for both Hatfield and Jones were held on the morning of March 16. The court authorized arrest warrants.

The arrest warrants were entered into the Washington Crime Information Center. This database is used by law enforcement to access information on persons of interest. If law enforcement has contact with a person who is subject to an arrest warrant, law enforcement will arrest the person. Law enforcement initially made no effort to locate Hatfield or Jones.

Hatfield's and Jones's escape prompted a robbery spree. Less than two hours after Jones escaped, he and Hatfield robbed another store. The next day, they robbed two more stores and the following day, they returned to one of the stores and robbed it again. On March 19, they robbed two more stores, including the World of Weed marijuana dispensary.

A World of Weed surveillance video showed Hatfield in an altercation with Jordan Brown, an employee of the store. During the altercation, Jones shot and killed Brown. Jones and Hatfield fled, as did their unknown male lookout.

The detective investigating Brown's murder viewed the surveillance video and learned of other marijuana dispensary robberies in King and Pierce counties with similar modus operandi. Detectives soon after linked Hatfield and Jones to five similar robberies. Hatfield was linked because of his prosthetic leg, which was partly exposed in the surveillance video, and Jones was linked partly because of his bushy eyebrows.

Detective Ashley Fitzgerald was part of a task force investigating the series of marijuana dispensary robberies. Many of these robberies were committed by masked juveniles. Detective Fitzgerald confirmed that although Hatfield and Jones were arrested for the pawnshop robbery, probable cause linking them to prior robberies was not established until after Brown's murder. Detective Fitzgerald recounted the extensive law enforcement efforts and resources expended looking for Hatfield and Jones after Brown's homicide:

Hundreds of hours, if not more, were spent by law enforcement officers in multiple Puget Sound jurisdictions in the search for Jones and Hatfield after the two were identified as suspects in the World of Weed homicide. During this investigation, we utilized numerous investigative techniques and options at our disposal to locate them ․ but ultimately we were not successful in finding and arresting them, even before several other robberies occurred in late March and early April 2022.

Clerks Papers (CP) at 1003.

On April 11, Jones turned himself into authorities. Law enforcement arrested Hatfield one week later, after a geolocating tracking device placed in a bag during a robbery led to his location.

Procedural History

The Estate filed suit against King County for the shooting death of Brown, alleging in part that King County was negligent in failing to promptly recapture Hatfield and Jones after they absconded from EHM custody. The parties engaged in substantial discovery, including the Estate deposing 12 witnesses.

On November 7, 2024, the Estate provided a CR 30(b)(6) notice of deposition to King County, directing it to make available for video deposition witnesses with knowledge of several topics, including Hatfield's and Jones's suspected criminal activity before the March 19 homicide. The following day, King County filed a motion for a protective order. King County noted its motion for November 22, 2024. The motion sought to strike several topics of inquiry and sought to postpone further depositions until after the court heard King County's summary judgment motion, which it intended to note for December 13, 2024.

During the November 22 protective order hearing, King County argued that the evidence sought by the Estate went to the issue of foreseeability of harm and would be rendered moot if the court determined that King County owed no duty to Brown. The Estate responded that it wanted CR 30(b)(6) depositions to confirm what King County knew about Hatfield's and Jones's criminal history and when King County knew it. King County replied that the discovery sought was repetitive to previous discovery, and substantial time and expense might be saved by first ruling on its upcoming summary judgment motion. The court mostly denied King County's motion to strike the Estate's areas of inquiry but granted its request to delay depositions for a few weeks until after its summary judgment ruling.

In its summary judgment briefing, King County argued that the Estate could point to no duty owed to Jordan Brown individually, rather than the public at large. Nor could the Estate identify a direct causal link between King County's conduct and the shooting of Brown.

The Estate responded that King County breached its “take charge” duties under Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 315, 319 (A.L.I. 1965). It additionally argued that a jury could find King County liable for ministerial malfeasance in failing to fully inform the prosecutor and the court about the dangerous propensities of Hatfield and Jones in its screening reports, including the determination of “low risk” from the DRAI screening tool. It also argued that King County failed to fully inform the prosecutor and court about the youths’ other armed robberies, if King County had linked those robberies to them before the youths were placed on EHM custody. Lastly, the Estate contended that King County could be liable for a breach of a statutorily mandated duty under RCW 9.94A.736(2)(a).

As to causation, the Estate argued a jury could find that a reasonable precaution would have been to immediately have a King County sheriff's deputy or other law enforcement search for Hatfield and Jones. The Estate also argued that a jury could find that a simple welfare check on Jones done within five hours after Hatfield's tamper alert would have prevented Jones from escaping.

On December 13, the court heard arguments and granted King County's motion for summary judgment. The Estate moved for reconsideration, and the court denied the motion and accompanied its order with a letter. In its letter, the court clarified two aspects of its prior ruling. The court noted that “with the undisputed facts in this case, any finding of proximate cause would rest solely upon mere speculation.” CP at 1131. The court also noted it granted summary judgment “because the ‘take charge’ duty had ended when Jones and Hatfield absconded, and arrest warrants were obtained.” CP at 1131. The Estate appeals the summary judgment dismissal and the reconsideration denial to this court.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

We review summary judgment orders de novo. Rangers Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552, 192 P.3d 886 (2008). Summary judgment is a burden-shifting scheme, where the “moving party is entitled to summary judgment if it submits affidavits establishing it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The nonmoving party must then set forth evidentiary facts and cannot rely on speculation or conclusory statements.

A. Duty

Strauss v. Premera Blue Cross, 194 Wn.2d 296, 301, 449 P.3d 640 (2019). Facts and all reasonable inferences are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ranger Ins., 164 Wn.2d at 552. The nonmoving party avoids summary judgment by setting forth specific facts that sufficiently rebut the moving party's contentions and disclose the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. An issue of material fact is genuine if the factual averments are sufficient for a rational trier of fact to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist., 191 Wn.2d 79, 86, 419 P.3d 819 (2018).

“The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, breach of the duty, and injury to plaintiff proximately caused by the breach.” Hertog v. City of Seattle, 138 Wn.2d 265, 275, 979 P.2d 400 (1999). The Estate argues the trial court erred by concluding that King County had no duty to protect Brown because its duty ended when arrest warrants were issued for the youths. We agree. As explained hereafter, King County DAJD had a duty that ended when arrest warrants were issued, but a rational trier of fact could find that King County breached its duty before then by failing to notify law enforcement of each youth's escape.

The existence of a duty is a question of law we review de novo. Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wn.2d 226, 228, 677 P.2d 166 (1984). Under common law, a person has no duty to prevent a third person from causing physical injury to another. Taggart v. State, 118 Wn.2d 195, 218, 822 P.2d 243 (1992). However, a duty to prevent a third person from causing physical injury to another is imposed when “ ‘a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315).

In Taggart, the court rejected the State's argument that it owed no duty to the plaintiff because of the public duty doctrine. Id. at 217. It noted there were many exceptions to the doctrine, including one it had recognized years earlier under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315. Id. at 217-18. The court noted:

As a preliminary matter, we note that a duty will be imposed under § 315 only upon a showing of a “definite, established and continuing relationship between the defendant and the third party.” Under RCW 72.04A.080, parolees “shall be subject to the supervision of the department of corrections, and the probation and parole officers of the department shall be charged with the preparation of progress reports of parolees and to give guidance and supervision to such parolees within the conditions of a parolee's release from custody.” RCW 72.04A.080. This statute is sufficient to establish that parole officers have a “definite, established and continuing relationship” with their parolees.

Id. at 219 (citation omitted). The Taggart court noted that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 through § 320 defined various special relations that give rise to duties to control persons. Id. It then discussed § 319, which states, “ ‘One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.’ ” Id. The court discussed various features of the relationship between parole officers and their parolees that gave the former the authority to control the latter. Id. at 219-20. It then stated:

[W]e hold that parole officers have “taken charge” of the parolees they supervise for purposes of § 319. When a parolee's criminal history and progress during parole show that the parolee is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled, the parole officer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the parolee and to prevent [them] from doing such harm.

Id. at 220.

Later, the Supreme Court determined that the same rules applicable to parole officers and parolees apply to pretrial release counselors and released persons. In Hertog, the court held that “county pretrial release counselors who have supervisory authority, and their employing agencies have a duty to protect others from reasonably foreseeable danger resulting from the dangerous propensities of probationers and pretrial releasees under their supervision.” 138 Wn.2d at 292. The court reasoned that a probation officer acts in a sufficient supervisory capacity to impose liability under § 315 and § 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 290-91. This was because a person on pretrial release signs a supervised release contract with numerous conditions, and the probation officer knows or should know the released person's relevant criminal history. Id.

Persons on EHM custody also sign contracts with numerous conditions, and personnel charged with supervising them are informed of their known criminal histories. The same duties found applicable in Taggart and Hertog therefore apply equally here. We conclude that DAJD had a duty to protect third persons, such as Brown, from the reasonably foreseeable dangers posed by Hatfield and Jones.

In Taggart and Hertog, the Supreme Court discussed when the duty to protect third persons is imposed, it did not discuss when that duty ends. Divisions One and Two of our court have held that the duty to protect others from dangerous parolees ends when the paroled person no longer has a continuing relationship with their parole officer, which both courts defined as when an arrest warrant is issued for the absconding offender. Husted v. State, 187 Wn. App. 579, 348 P.3d 776 (2015); Smith v. Dep't of Corr., 189 Wn. App. 839, 359 P.3d 867 (2015).

In Husted, a parolee was released and was required to report to the Department of Corrections (DOC) the next business day. 187 Wn. App. at 581. When the parolee failed to report, a DOC officer immediately requested a warrant for his arrest and attempted to ascertain his whereabouts. Id. About four months later, the parolee robbed an armored car and killed someone. Id. The State contended that its duty to control ended when the offender absconded supervision, had no contact with his community corrections officer, and when a warrant had been issued for his arrest. Id. at 583. Division One disagreed. The Husted court reasoned that under Taggart, to “take charge” of a third person means to have a “ ‘definite, established and continuing relationship between the defendant and the third party.’ ” Id. at 584 (quoting Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 219).

It is the continuing nature of the relationship that allows the community corrections officer to exercise control. An offender who has absconded and for whom a warrant has been issued no longer has a continuing relationship with the community corrections officer. When this occurs, the offender is not subject to the community corrections officer's control because he or she cannot be monitored, given direction, or sanctioned.

Id. at 588. For this reason, the Husted court held, “where an offender absconds from supervision and a warrant is issued for his or her arrest, the requisite continuing relationship no longer exists and the duties associated with the take charge relationship are terminated.” Id. at 590.

In Smith, a violent sex offender on parole repeatedly violated his terms of community custody. 189 Wn. App. at 843-45. The court remanded the offender to jail several times for violating his conditions. Id. DOC's last contact with him occurred on April 10. Id. at 845. The following day, the offender absconded and five days later DOC requested an arrest warrant. The offender was missing until August 5, when he shot and killed someone. Id. The Smith court followed Husted’s holding and determined that “the special relationship between the offender and DOC terminated once [the offender] absconded and an arrest warrant issued.” Id. at 849.

We agree with our sibling divisions. Once a trial court issues an arrest warrant, the supervising authority's right to control the absconder has ended and, with that, its duty to protect others.³

Here, a rational trier of fact could find that the criminal histories of Hatfield and Jones showed they were reasonably likely to cause harm to others if not controlled. The youths were charged with first degree robbery and, during the robbery, both had used their guns to harm or to intimidate others. Thus, until the arrest warrants were issued, King County DAJD was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the youths from doing bodily harm to others. Taggart, 118 Wn.2d at 220.

RCW 9A.76.120(1)(b) and (3) makes escape from custody a class C felony if the persons in custody, such as the youths here, were charged with a felony. A rational trier of fact could find that King County DAJD breached its duty of reasonable care by not promptly reporting these felonies to law enforcement. Had it reported these felonies, law enforcement had legal authority to arrest the youths. See State v. Gaddy, 152 Wn.2d 64, 71-72, 93 P.3d 872 (2004) (reliable information provided to police by a nonpolice government agency provides sufficient probable cause for a warrantless arrest).⁴

Having concluded that King County DAJD may have breached its duty of reasonable care by failing to promptly notify law enforcement after each youth escaped, we must now determine whether the Estate met its summary judgment burden of establishing proximate cause between these failures and Brown's killing.

B. Proximate Cause

The Estate argues, “A jury could find that a reasonable response would have been for King County to immediately have dispatched [its] deputies to search for the escapees and/or alert other law enforcement agencies. [And t]he jury could find a simple welfare check on Jones done within a few hours after Hatfield's tamper alert would have prevented Jones from escaping.” Appellant's Br. at 65.

These arguments are unsupported by law. King County DAJD had a duty to protect others from the reasonably foreseeable dangers posed by Hatfield and Jones. The Estate's attempts to expand DAJD's duty to other county agencies is unsupported by law. The Estate provides no legal authority for making law enforcement liable for failing to search for a fugitive. Law enforcement's duty to investigate and arrest is a duty owed to the public and no liability for individual harm can be predicated on such a duty. Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wn.2d 275, 284, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).

At this point, we can either reject Brown's proximate cause argument or rephrase the issue so it is potentially viable. We elect to rephrase the issue as: Can a rational trier of fact find that King County DAJD's breach of duty proximately caused Brown's murder?

Cause in Fact (reporting escapes to law enforcement)

Proximate cause has two elements: cause in fact and legal causation. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). Here, the trial court granted summary judgment partly due to the absence of cause in fact. Cause in fact, or “but for” causation, requires the plaintiff to “establish that the harm suffered would not have occurred but for an act or omission of the defendant.” Joyce v. Dep't of Corr., 155 Wn.2d 306, 322, 119 P.3d 825 (2005). “Cause in fact is usually a question for the jury.” Id. Factual causation may be decided as a matter of law, however, “if the facts, and inferences from them, are plain and not subject to reasonable doubt or a difference of opinion.” Little v. Countrywood Homes, Inc., 132 Wn. App. 777, 780, 133 P.3d 944 (2006). King County argues that the Estate's causation argument is too speculative to create a genuine issue of material fact. We agree.

“The plaintiff cannot rest a claim for liability on a ‘speculative theory.’ ” Behla v. R.J. Jung, LLC, 11 Wn. App. 2d 329, 335, 453 P.3d 729 (2019) (citing Marshall v. Bally's Pacwest, Inc., 94 Wn. App. 372, 381, 972 P.2d 475 (1999)). Neither can it rest on conclusory statements. Strauss, 194 Wn.2d at 301. However, the plaintiff need not prove cause in fact to an absolute certainty. Gardner v. Seymour, 27 Wn.2d 802, 808, 180 P.2d 564 (1947). “Stated another way, causation becomes a question of law for the court only when the causal connection is ‘so speculative and indirect’ that reasonable minds could not differ.” Behla, 11 Wn. App. 2d at 347 (quoting Mehlert v. Baseball of Seattle, Inc., 1 Wn. App. 2d 115, 119, 404 P.3d 97 (2017)).

The only evidence the Estate presented to support causation is the unsigned, unsworn report of its expert, Gabriel Rogers.⁵ Rogers is the president of Containment Dynamics Consulting and from 2007 until 2019 oversaw an electronic monitoring program for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. He reviewed records relating to Hatfield's and Jones's EHM custody. Based on his review, he listed a number of supposed deficiencies but only a couple made its way into the Estate's briefing. One such deficiency was not treating an EHM escape the same as an escape from custody. Elaborating on this, Rogers wrote: “In my professional experience, escape plans include armed personnel going to look for the escapee. No one ever went to look for these minors.” CP at 947. Rogers concluded:

I think DAJD failed the community by not treating these escapes in the same manner as a secure facility, an escape is an escape. I also think, [DAJD] failed by waiting two (2) days to enact warrants for these minors.[6] It's definitely possible [Brown] would be alive today if King's [sic] County DAJD staff followed Court Orders, Policies and Procedures and best practices.

CP at 948.

To the extent Rogers's opinion is based on armed personnel looking for an escapee, as noted previously, the Estate has no viable claim against law enforcement's failure to investigate and arrest. Otherwise, Rogers's opinion is based on unargued deficiencies and is conclusory.

The Estate also argues that Jones would not have escaped had law enforcement visited him soon after Hatfield escaped. This argument is also speculative.

What we do know is that Jones's aunt notified law enforcement soon after Jones escaped, and police went to the residence and assured her they would look for her nephew and return him. But the police did not look for him. Had DAJD notified law enforcement of the escapes of Hatfield and Jones, there is no reason to believe the outcomes would have been any different, i.e., police may have gone to their homes but they would not have otherwise looked for them.

It was not until Jones murdered Brown that law enforcement began an active search for Hatfield and Jones and even an intensive multi-agency search did not find them. Given these facts, a trier of fact would be left to speculate that prompt notification by DAJD would have led to Hatfield's or Jones's apprehension within the five days before Brown's murder. We conclude that no rational trier of fact could find cause in fact between DAJD's breach of duty and Brown's murder.

Affirmed.

A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder, having no precedential value, shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

The Estate’s Other Claims

The Estate raises arguments beyond its central argument that DAJD violated its take charge duty. We address them here.

1. Negligent delay

The Estate argues that King County could be found liable for “negligent delay” by not dispatching law enforcement to Jones's residence in the four to six hours between Hatfield's first tamper alert and Jones's escape. To support its argument, the Estate cites and discusses Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wn.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451 (1983).

In Chambers-Castanes, three men stopped the plaintiffs’ car and two of them severely beat the husband and struck the wife. Id. at 278. During the next hour, calls were made by several witnesses, including three calls by the wife, asking for police assistance and saying that the men were being aggressive to others and were still in the area. Id. at 278-80. The police operator repeatedly assured the callers that police were on their way, but they were not. Id. Approximately 90 minutes after the first call, police arrived. Id. at 280. Plaintiffs husband and wife sued the police for their untimely response and asserted a number of different tort theories. Id. at 281. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit on a CR 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court reversed and concluded that the complaint stated a cause of action because express assurances by the police operator created a special relationship between the police and the plaintiffs. Id. at 285-87.

Chambers-Castanes is readily distinguishable. Here, there were no express assurances given by King County dispatch to Brown and thus no special relationship arose between them that would render King County subject to tort liability.

2. Ministerial malfeasance

The Estate argues that King County could be liable for ministerial malfeasance for reporting that Hatfield and Jones posed a low risk and not considering the other four armed robberies in the assessment. We disagree.

Although the DRAI screening tool labeled Hatfield and Jones as “low risk,” Lucas's report documented Hatfield assaulting an employee with a gun butt and Jones firing a gun near employees and customers, as well as kicking a customer during the armed pawnshop robbery. The prosecutor recounted the circumstances of the pawnshop robbery to the court, who acknowledged the seriousness of the allegations. There is no evidence the court was misled by the DRAI that placed Hatfield and Jones at “low risk.”

The Estate also failed to present evidence that Lucas's report was negligent or that its ultimate determination of “low risk” was misleading to the court based on the information King County had at the time. The Estate implies King County misled the court by not including Hatfield's and Jones's other armed robberies in the assessment. However, the record shows that Hatfield and Jones were not linked to the other robberies until after a detective viewed the surveillance video of Brown's murder.

3. The trial court's decision to postpone the CR 30(b)(6) depositions

The Estate argues the trial court erred by preventing it from obtaining additional depositions relevant to ministerial malfeasance. Here, the trial court delayed further depositions for a few weeks, until after it ruled on King County's summary judgment motion. A trial court has broad discretion to manage the discovery process and limit the scope of discovery. CR 26(c); Rhinehart v. Seattle Times Co., 98 Wn.2d 226, 232, 654 P.2d 673 (1982).

As noted above, the Estate had learned in discovery that King County did not link Hatfield and Jones to their other robberies until after Brown was murdered. The detective who reviewed the surveillance video of the killing noticed a portion of Hatfield's prosthetic leg and Hatfield struggling to run after Jones murdered Brown. This prompted detectives to look into other investigations of marijuana dispensary robberies and they noticed similar modus operandi that tied the crimes together, including the prior crimes committed by Hatfield and Jones.

Here, the Estate was not denied discovery on this issue. Rather, the trial court delayed further discovery—most likely a fishing expedition—on whether anyone might have tied Hatfield and Jones to their previous crimes before Brown's murder. In delaying discovery for three weeks until after its summary judgment ruling, the trial court acted within its broad discretion in managing discovery.

Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the record is silent on this, we infer that Hatfield's mother overheard the call between Hindman and the grandmother, and the mother took the lead on calling DAJD back.

2.   Legal Intervention & Network of Care.

3.   In Smith, the court concluded that the duty ends when the parolee absconds and an arrest warrant is issued. 189 Wn. App. at 849. This phrasing leads to confusion. The arrest warrant is always issued after the parolee absconds. Therefore, it is more clear to say that the supervising authority's duty ends when an arrest warrant is issued for the absconder.

4.   The Estate cites RCW 9.94A.736(2)(a) for its argument that DAJD was required to promptly notify law enforcement of Hatfield's and Jones's absconding. That subsection does not support the Estate's argument.Subsection (2)(a) requires the monitoring agency to notify the supervising agency within 24 hours of learning that a monitored individual is unaccounted for. B.I., Inc., the company monitoring its EHM device, is the “monitoring agency,” and DAJD is the “supervising agency.” RCW 9.94A.736(8)(a), (b). Thus, subsection (2)(a) required B.I., Inc. to promptly notify DAJD; it did not require DAJD to promptly notify law enforcement.

5.   King County did not move to strike the report from the summary judgment record. Our review of summary judgment orders is generally limited to the evidence and the issues called to the attention of the trial court. RAP 9.12. Thus, we will consider the expert's unsigned, unsworn report.

6.   This is not accurate. DAJD immediately prepared requests for warrants. The requests were filed the day after the escapes but the requirement to provide notice to opposing counsel caused a one-day delay.

Lawrence-Berrey, C.J. WE CONCUR: Murphy, J. Hill, J.