STATE v. JOHNSON (2000)

At issue is whether release agreements or bail agreements may trigger the speedy trial clock when a citation form has not been issued.   We hold that they do not.   Consequently, we reverse the superior court's dismissal of charges in Mary Laurent's case, and affirm the court's refusal to dismiss charges in Terry Johnson's case.

I

Mary Laurent

Laurent was arrested and charged with resisting arrest and rendering criminal assistance in the second degree.   The arresting officer filled out and signed a citation form, but did not give Laurent a copy or ask her to sign it.   Laurent was booked and released the following day on her personal recognizance after signing a release agreement.   The release agreement listed the charges with cause numbers, and specified that Laurent would be contacted by the court regarding the date and time of her court appearance.   By signing the form, Laurent agreed to appear at all future court appearances and was notified that failure to do so would result in the issuance of an arrest warrant.   The agreement required that she notify the court should there be any change in her address or phone number.   There was a line on the form to be checked if charges had not yet been filed, but that line was not checked.

The citation was never filed with the court.   A complaint was filed approximately five and a half months after her arrest, and the court issued a summons to appear at arraignment two weeks later.   Laurent filed a motion to dismiss, contending that her right to a speedy trial under CrRLJ 3.3 had been violated.   The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the officer's act of filling out the citation, and the subsequent booking on that citation, was the legal equivalent of issuing the citation, thus triggering the speedy trial clock.   The State's motion for reconsideration was denied.

The State appealed to the superior court, which reversed the district court's finding that the citation had been issued.   However, the superior court affirmed the dismissal of the case for a violation of CrRLJ 3.3 (the speedy trial rule) on the grounds that the release agreement caused Laurent to reasonably believe herself to be in “legal limbo,” a status condemned in the case of City of Seattle v. Bonifacio.¹  Although the Bonifacio case dealt with a citation that was issued but not filed, the superior court below ruled that Laurent's uncertain legal position following her release from jail was analogous to Bonifacio's “legal limbo,” and should similarly trigger commencement of the speedy trial period.   The State appeals.

 Terry Johnson

Johnson was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while license suspended in the second degree.   The arresting officer filled out and signed a citation, attaching a copy of his police report.   However, the officer never filed the citation with the court.   That night, Johnson was booked and released after posting bail.²  The court retained Johnson's bail throughout the lower court proceedings.

Eighty-six days after Johnson posted bail and was released from jail, the State filed charges against him.   Johnson filed a motion to dismiss based upon violation of his right to a speedy trial under CrRLJ 3.3.   The district court denied the motion, finding that the act of posting bail did not start the speedy trial clock.   Johnson appealed to the superior court, which affirmed.   Johnson was found guilty of driving under the influence, and now appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss.

II

 A criminal charge not brought within the required time limit of the speedy trial court rule must be dismissed with prejudice.³  The interpretation of a court rule is a matter of law requiring de novo review.⁴  Application of a court rule to a particular set of facts is a question of law subject to de novo review.⁵

 Laurent and Johnson argue that they are in the same situation as the defendant in Bonifacio.   In Bonifacio, the officer issued a citation at the scene.⁶  Bonifacio was released from custody after signing the citation and promising to respond as directed on the notice.   However, the portion of the notice which was to contain the date and time for Bonifacio's appearance was left blank, and the citation was never filed.⁷  Approximately four months later, the city attorney filed a complaint.   The trial court granted Bonifacio's motion to dismiss, concluding that criminal proceedings had been initiated when the citation was issued, thus starting the time for trial under CrRLJ 3.3.⁸  The City appealed, arguing that an unfiled citation does not initiate criminal proceedings under CrRLJ 2.1(b)(6), which specifies that a citation and notice is deemed a lawful complaint when signed by the citing officer and filed with the court.

The Washington Supreme Court rejected the City's argument and held that issuance of a citation, regardless of whether it is subsequently filed, starts the running of the speedy trial clock.⁹  The court construed CrRLJ 2.1(b)(6) with CrRLJ 2.1(d), which provides that the officer shall file the citation within 48 hours after issuance, and concluded that the mandatory filing requirement buttresses a conclusion that the criminal process is initiated by issuance of the citation.¹⁰  Elaborating on the policy reasoning behind its decision, the Court stated that

[t]he issuance and receipt of a citation is not an insignificant intrusion on one's liberty.   It is, therefore, important that the rule requiring the filing of citations, CrRLJ 2.1(d), be observed.   If consequences do not flow from an officer's failure to file a citation within the time allotted, many persons who have been issued citations will be left in legal limbo, not knowing whether or not the citation they have received will lead to proceedings in court.   Under the trial court's decision, greater fairness and efficiency is assured because persons who have been issued  citations will generally know within forty-eight hours of the issuance of a citation whether it will lead to court proceedings.[¹¹ ]

Laurent and Johnson concede that their arresting officers did not actually issue a copy of the citation to them.   However, they contend that Bonifacio controls because the signed release and bail agreements, which imposed conditions of release including the requirement to notify the court of any change of address or phone number, are functionally equivalent to issued citations.   Laurent and Johnson argue that they never had a probable cause hearing within 48 hours following arrest as required by CrRLJ 3.2.1(a) and that it is only after this preliminary appearance that an accused may be exonerated from conditions of release.   Consequently, they claim that they were continuously “held to answer” to the court, with the threat of criminal penalty in the event of noncompliance.   Laurent also argues that any reasonable person in her position would have believed that charges had been filed, particularly because the portion of the release agreement that could have informed her that no charges had been filed was not checked.   Johnson similarly argues that he was continually subject to conditions of release because the court kept his bail throughout the proceedings.   Both defendants argue that this situation placed them in “legal limbo,” a condition frowned upon by the Bonifacio court.

The State argues that the time for trial clock cannot be triggered by Laurent's release agreement or by Johnson's bail agreement because those agreements cannot be construed as the functional equivalent of issued citations.   The State contends that Bonifacio is readily distinguishable because there the court held that the speedy trial clock begins to run upon the issuance of a citation regardless of whether it is subsequently filed, whereas here a citation was never issued.   The State argues that this distinction is significant because CrRLJ 2.1 provides the exclusive means by which a criminal action can be initiated, and that rule  does not provide for initiation merely by releasing a suspect prior to the first court appearance.   Furthermore, there is no statute, rule or case law to support the notion that a criminal proceeding can be initiated based upon the defendant's reasonable, if mistaken, belief that she has been charged with a crime.   Therefore, there was no initiation of an action here, and the speedy trial rule is inapplicable.   The State also argues that Laurent and Johnson were not “held to answer” because they were exonerated from conditions of release within 72 hours under CrRLJ 3.2.1(f).

The primary distinction between Bonifacio and the cases at bar is that Bonifacio's arresting officer clearly issued a citation to Bonifacio, whereas Laurent and Johnson never signed or received a copy of their citations.   We agree with the State that this difference is significant.   The Bonifacio court held that the issuance and receipt of a citation initiated criminal proceedings and triggered the speedy trial clock because a court rule requires the filing of a citation within 48 hours after issuance.   Consequently, the court reasoned Bonifacio was in legal limbo because criminal proceedings had been initiated, yet he had no way of knowing whether court proceedings would follow.   The decision clearly turns on the court's conclusion that criminal proceedings had been initiated by the issuance of the citation.

 We conclude that Bonifacio does not control the outcome of these cases, because we are not persuaded that release agreements or bail agreements are functionally equivalent to issued citations for purposes of triggering commencement of the speedy trial clock.   CrRLJ 2.2 expressly defines three methods of initiating a criminal proceeding:  filing a complaint, issuing a citation, or filing a citizen complaint.   We decline the defendants' invitation to significantly expand the rule by adding release agreements and bail agreements as two additional options for initiation of an action.   Furthermore, arresting officers may choose whether or not to issue a citation, but if they choose to do so they are required to file it.   CrRLJ 2.1(b)(1) states that an arresting officer may serve a citation and notice to appear, and CrRLJ 2.1(d)(2) states that “[t]he citation and notice shall be filed with the clerk of the court within two days after issuance.”   Because Laurent and Johnson were never issued citations, there was no requirement to file them under CrRLJ 2.1(d), and no criminal action had been initiated, unlike Bonifacio.

Moreover, Laurent and Johnson were not continually “held to answer” to the court.   Under CrRLJ 3.2.1(f)(1) and (2), the court can fix conditions of release, but those conditions are only in effect for 72 hours unless charges are filed or the suspect consents to a longer time frame.   Given that the defendants were released prior to the filing of charges, the conditions imposed on Laurent and Johnson became unenforceable within 72 hours following their release.   At that point, the defendants were free to move to have the conditions lifted and, in Johnson's case, the bail exonerated.¹²

 Johnson and Laurent contend that the conditions could not be lifted unless the State brought them before the court for a preliminary appearance.   However, they were not entitled to a preliminary appearance at that stage in the proceedings.   CrRLJ 3.2.1(d)(1) states that “any accused detained in jail must be brought before a court of limited jurisdiction as soon as practicable after the detention is commenced, but in any event before the close of business on the next court day.”   Because Laurent and Johnson were booked and released, they were not entitled to a preliminary appearance.

 We also disagree with the superior court's conclusion that Laurent was held to answer based on her reasonable belief that charges had been filed and that she remained subject to conditions.   The time for trial clock should not be triggered by something as uncertain as a defendant's “reasonable belief.”   A defendant who believes that charges have been filed or that conditions of release remain may inquire as to the status of the case and move to have the conditions exonerated.

 We conclude that neither a signed release agreement nor a signed bail agreement can trigger the requirements of the speedy trial rule where formal prosecution has not yet been initiated.   To hold otherwise would necessitate extending Bonifacio significantly in a manner that would cast speedy trial analysis adrift without any statute or court rule moorings, leaving commencement of speedy trial beyond the court's control.   The defendants' concerns regarding “legal limbo” are real and understandable, but artificial commencement of the speedy trial clock is not an appropriate remedy.

We reverse the order granting Laurent's motion to dismiss, and we affirm the denial of Johnson's motion to dismiss.

FOOTNOTES

1.   127 Wash.2d 482, 900 P.2d 1105 (1995).

2.   No bail agreement appears in the record;  thus, we cannot ascertain what the terms or conditions of release might have been.   Presumably, the form specified that Johnson's release was conditioned upon a promise to appear.

3.   CrRLJ 3.3(i);  State v. Carlyle, 84 Wash.App. 33, 35, 925 P.2d 635 (1996).

4.   Nevers v. Fireside, Inc., 133 Wash.2d 804, 809, 947 P.2d 721 (1997).

5.   State v. Ledenko, 87 Wash.App. 39, 42, 940 P.2d 280 (1997), review denied, 134 Wash.2d 1003, 953 P.2d 96 (1998).

6.   Bonifacio, 127 Wash.2d at 483, 900 P.2d 1105.

7.   Bonifacio, 127 Wash.2d at 484, 900 P.2d 1105.

8.   Bonifacio, 127 Wash.2d at 484, 900 P.2d 1105.

9.   Bonifacio, 127 Wash.2d at 488, 900 P.2d 1105.

10.   Bonifacio, 127 Wash.2d at 489, 900 P.2d 1105.

11.   Bonifacio, 127 Wash.2d at 488-89, 900 P.2d 1105.

12.   Our holding is in accord with a recent Division III case, State v. Fulps, 97 Wash.App. 935, 941-42, 988 P.2d 1002 (1999).   In Fulps, the court rejected arguments very similar to Johnson's and held that the defendant was not held to answer for purposes of speedy trial calculations when he was released on bail.

BAKER, J.

COLEMAN, J., and BECKER, A.C.J., concur.