ANDRUS v. BOARD OF PARDONS (2009)

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication)

Howard Philip Andrus appeals the district court's dismissal of his petition for extraordinary relief. This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

Andrus asserts that the Board of Pardons (the Board) abused its discretion by depriving him of a fair hearing which improperly influenced the decision to deny his request for parole. Andrus filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the district court seeking to challenge the Board's determination. The district court dismissed the petition as frivolous.

Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a court to dismiss claims in a petition for extraordinary relief when “the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding” or the claims appear frivolous on their face. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(5). Utah Code section 77-27-5(3) provides that the Board's decisions involving parole or terminations of sentence are final and are not subject to judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (2008). However, a limited exception exists where a petitioner demonstrates a clear abuse in the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function. See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 25, 127 P.3d 682; see also Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684 (Utah 1995).

The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that if a petitioner demonstrates an abuse of discretion in the Board's process, a court may “weigh the various interests implicated by the proceeding and the possible consequences of judicial action or inaction before deciding whether to exercise its discretion by granting extraordinary relief.” Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 25, 127 P.3d 682. As a threshold matter, a petitioner must first demonstrate a legitimate abuse of discretion before a court makes its discretionary decision to grant or deny extraordinary relief. See id. ¶ 26. Even if a petitioner demonstrates an abuse of discretion, a petitioner is not automatically entitled to judicial intervention. See id. ¶ 24.

The district court considered Andrus's assertion that the Board deprived him of a fair hearing by considering his involvement in a fatal car accident. The record supports the district court's determination that the Board did not deprive Andrus of a fair hearing as it considered factors wholly unrelated to the fatal automobile accident.¹ Andrus has not demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by denying his petition for extraordinary relief as frivolous.

Accordingly, the district court's order is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.  For example, the record demonstrates that Andrus admitted that within weeks of the fatal crash, he was involved in a highspeed automobile chase in an effort to evade law enforcement officers.

PER CURIAM: