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The Medical School of the University of California at Davis (hereinafter Davis) had two admissions programs for the entering class of 100 students - the regular admissions program and the special admissions program. Under the regular procedure, candidates whose overall under-graduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. About one out of six applicants was then given an interview, following which he was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by each of the committee members (five in 1973 and six in 1974), his rating being based on the interviewers' summaries, his overall grade point average, his science courses grade point average, his Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT) scores, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical data, all of which resulted in a total "benchmark score." The full admissions committee then made offers of admission on the basis of their review of the applicant's file and his score, considering and acting upon applications as they were received. The committee chairman was responsible for placing names on the waiting list and had discretion to include persons with "special skills." A separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority groups, operated the special admissions program. The 1973 and 1974 application forms, respectively, asked candidates whether they wished to be considered as "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants and members of a "minority group" (blacks, Chicanos, Asians, American Indians). If an applicant of a minority group was found to be "disadvantaged," he would be rated in a manner similar to the one employed by the general admissions committee. Special candidates, however, did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point cutoff and were not ranked against candidates in the general admissions process. About one-fifth of the special applicants were invited for interviews in 1973 and 1974, following which they were given benchmark scores, and the top choices were then given to the general admissions committee, which could reject special candidates for failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies. The special committee continued to recommend candidates until 16 special admission selections had been made. During a four-year period 63 minority [438 U.S. 265, 266] students were admitted to Davis under the special program and 44 under the general program. No disadvantaged whites were admitted under the special program, though many applied. Respondent, a white male, applied to Davis in 1973 and 1974, in both years being considered only under the general admissions program. Though he had a 468 out of 500 score in 1973, he was rejected since no general applicants with scores less than 470 were being accepted after respondent's application, which was filed late in the year, had been processed and completed. At that time four special admission slots were still unfilled. In 1974 respondent applied early, and though he had a total score of 549 out of 600, he was again rejected. In neither year was his name placed on the discretionary waiting list. In both years special applicants were admitted with significantly lower scores than respondent's. After his second rejection, respondent filed this action in state court for mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief to compel his admission to Davis, alleging that the special admissions program operated to exclude him on the basis of his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a provision of the California Constitution, and 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides, inter alia, that no person shall on the ground of race or color be excluded from participating in any program receiving federal financial assistance. Petitioner cross-claimed for a declaration that its special admissions program was lawful. The trial court found that the special program operated as a racial quota, because minority applicants in that program were rated only against one another, and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. Declaring that petitioner could not take race into account in making admissions decisions, the program was held to violate the Federal and State Constitutions and Title VI. Respondent's admission was not ordered, however, for lack of proof that he would have been admitted but for the special program. The California Supreme Court, applying a strict-scrutiny standard, concluded that the special admissions program was not the least intrusive means of achieving the goals of the admittedly compelling state interests of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of doctors willing to serve minority patients. Without passing on the state constitutional or federal statutory grounds the court held that petitioner's special admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause. Since petitioner could not satisfy its burden of demonstrating that respondent, absent the special program, would not have been admitted, the court ordered his admission to Davis.
Archibald Cox argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Paul J. Mishkin, Jack B. Owens, and Donald L. Reidhaar.
Reynold H. Colvin argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent.
Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. With him on the briefs were Attorney General Bell, Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Brian K. Landsberg, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Miriam R. Eisenstein, and Vincent F. O'Rourke. *
[ Footnote * ] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and James B. Wilson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Washington et al.; by E. Richard Larson, Joel M. Gora, Charles C. Marson, Sanford Jay Rosen, Fred Okrand, Norman Dorsen, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Frank Askin for the American Civil Liberties Union et al.; by Edgar S. Cahn, Jean Camper Cahn, and Robert S. Catz for the Antioch School of Law; by William Jack Chow for the Asian American Bar Assn. of the Greater Bay Area; by A. Kenneth Pye, Robert B. McKay, David E. Feller, and Ernest Gellhorn for the Association of American Law Schools; by John Holt Myers for the Association of American Medical Colleges; by Jerome B. Falk and Peter Roos for the Bar Assn. of San Francisco et al.; by Ephraim Margolin for the Black Law Students Assn. at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law; by John T. Baker for the Black Law Students Union of Yale University Law School; by Annamay T. Sheppard and Jonathan M. Hyman for the Board of Governors of Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, et al.; by Robert J. Willey for the Cleveland State University Chapter of the Black American Law Students Assn.; by John Mason Harding, Albert J. Rosenthal, Daniel Steiner, Iris Brest, James V. Siena, Louis H. Pollak, and Michael I. Sovern for Columbia University et al.; by Herbert O. Reid for Howard University; by Harry B. Reese and L. Orin Slagle for the Law School Admission Council; by Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Stephen J. Pollak, Burke Marshall, [438 U.S. 265, 269] Norman Redlich, Robert A. Murphy, and William E. Caldwell for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; by Alice Daniel and James E. Coleman, Jr., for the Legal Services Corp.; by Nathaniel R. Jones, Nathaniel S. Colley, and Stanley Goodman for the National Assn. for the Advancement of Colored People; by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles S. Ralston, Eric Schnapper, and David E. Kendall for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.; by Stephen V. Bomse for the National Assn. of Minority Contractors et al.; by Richard B. Sobol, Marian Wright Edelman, Stephen P. Berzon, and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., for the National Council of Churches of Christ in the United States et al.; by Barbara A. Morris, Joan Bertin Lowy, and Diana H. Greene for the National Employment Law Project, Inc.; by Herbert O. Reid and J. Clay Smith, Jr., for the National Medical Assn., Inc., et al.; by Robert Hermann for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund et al.; by Robert Allen Sedler, Howard Lesnick, and Arval A. Morris for the Society of American Law Teachers; for the American Medical Student Assn.; and for the Council on Legal Education Opportunity.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lawrence A. Poltrock and Wayne B. Giampietro for the American Federation of Teachers; by Abraham S. Goldstein, Nathan Z. Dershowitz, Arthur J. Gajarsa, Thaddeus L. Kowalski, Anthony J. Fornelli, Howard L. Greenberger, Samuel Rabinove, Themis N. Anastos, Julian E. Kulas, and Alan M. Dershowitz for the American Jewish Committee et al.; by McNeill Stokes and Ira J. Smotherman, Jr., for the American Subcontractors Assn.; by Philip B. Kurland, Daniel D. Polsby, Larry M. Lavinsky, Arnold Forster, Dennis Rapps, Anthony J. Fornelli, Leonard Greenwald, and David I. Ashe for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al.; by Charles G. Bakaly and Lawrence B. Kraus for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States; by Roger A. Clark, Jerome K. Tankel, and Glen R. Murphy for the Fraternal Order of Police et al.; by Judith R. Cohn for the Order Sons of Italy in America; by Ronald A. Zumbrun, John H. Findley, and William F. Harvey for the Pacific Legal Foundation; by Benjamin Vinar and David I. Caplan for the Queens Jewish Community Council et al.; and by Jennings P. Felix for Young Americans for Freedom.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Matthew W. Finkin for the American Assn. of University Professors; by John W. Finley, Jr., Michael [438 U.S. 265, 270] Blinick, John Cannon, Leonard J. Theberge, and Edward H. Dowd for the Committee on Academic Nondiscrimination and Integrity et al.; by Kenneth C. McGuiness, Robert E. Williams, Douglas S. McDowell, and Ronald M. Green for the Equal Employment Advisory Council; by Charles E. Wilson for the Fair Employment Practice Comm'n of California; by Mario G. Obledo for Jerome A. Lackner, Director of the Department of Health of California, et al.; by Vilma S. Martinez, Peter D. Roos, and Ralph Santiago Abascal for the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund et al.; by Eva S. Goodwin for the National Assn. of Affirmative Action Officers; by Lennox S. Hinds for the National Conference of Black Lawyers; by David Ginsburg for the National Fund for Minority Engineering Students; by A. John Wabaunsee, Walter R. EchoHawk, and Thomas W. Fredericks for the Native American Law Students of the University of California at Davis et al.; by Joseph A. Broderick, Calvin Brown, LeMarquis DeJarmon, James E. Ferguson II, Harry E. Groves, John H. Harmon, William A. Marsh, Jr., and James W. Smith for the North Carolina Assn. of Black Lawyers; by Leonard F. Walentynowicz for the Polish American Congress et al.; by Daniel M. Luevano and John E. McDermott for the UCLA Black Law Students Assn. et al.; by Henry A. Waxman pro se; by Leo Branton, Jr., Ann Fagan Ginger, Sam Rosenwein, and Laurence R. Sperber for Price M. Cobbs, M.D., et al.; by John S. Nolan for Ralph J. Galliano; and by Daniel T. Spitler for Timothy J. Hoy. [438 U.S. 265, 269]
MR. JUSTICE POWELL announced the judgment of the Court.
This case presents a challenge to the special admissions program of the petitioner, the Medical School of the University of California at Davis, which is designed to assure the admission [438 U.S. 265, 270] of a specified number of students from certain minority groups. The Superior Court of California sustained respondent's challenge, holding that petitioner's program violated the California Constitution, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court enjoined petitioner from considering respondent's race or the race of any other applicant in making admissions decisions. It refused, however, to order respondent's admission to the Medical School, holding that he had not carried his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the constitutional and statutory violations. The Supreme Court of California affirmed those portions of the trial court's judgment declaring the special admissions program unlawful and enjoining petitioner from considering the race of any applicant. 1 [438 U.S. 265, 271] It modified that portion of the judgment denying respondent's requested injunction and directed the trial court to order his admission.
For the reasons stated in the following opinion, I believe that so much of the judgment of the California court as holds petitioner's special admissions program unlawful and directs that respondent be admitted to the Medical School must be affirmed. For the reasons expressed in a separate opinion, my Brothers THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS concur in this judgment. [438 U.S. 265, 272]
I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the portion of the court's judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admissions process must be reversed. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN concur in this judgment.
Under the regular admissions procedure, a candidate could submit his application to the Medical School beginning in July of the year preceding the academic year for which admission was sought. Record 149. Because of the large number of applications, 2 the admissions committee screened each one to select candidates for further consideration. Candidates whose overall undergraduate grade point averages fell below 2.5 on a scale of 4.0 were summarily rejected. Id., at 63. About [438 U.S. 265, 274] one out of six applicants was invited for a personal interview. Ibid. Following the interviews, each candidate was rated on a scale of 1 to 100 by his interviewers and four other members of the admissions committee. The rating embraced the interviewers' summaries, the candidate's overall grade point average, grade point average in science courses, scores on the Medical College Admissions Test (MCAT), letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities, and other biographical data. Id., at 62. The ratings were added together to arrive at each candidate's "benchmark" score. Since five committee members rated each candidate in 1973, a perfect score was 500; in 1974, six members rated each candidate, so that a perfect score was 600. The full committee then reviewed the file and scores of each applicant and made offers of admission on a "rolling" basis. 3 The chairman was responsible for placing names on the waiting list. They were not placed in strict numerical order; instead, the chairman had discretion to include persons with "special skills." Id., at 63-64.
The special admissions program operated with a separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority groups. Id., at 163. On the 1973 application form, candidates were asked to indicate whether they wished to be considered as "economically and/or educationally disadvantaged" applicants; on the 1974 form the question was whether they wished to be considered as members of a "minority group," which the Medical School apparently viewed as "Blacks," "Chicanos," "Asians," and "American Indians." Id., at 65-66, 146, 197, 203-205, 216-218. If these questions were answered affirmatively, the application was forwarded to the special admissions committee. No formal definition of "disadvantaged" [438 U.S. 265, 275] was ever produced, id., at 163-164, but the chairman of the special committee screened each application to see whether it reflected economic or educational deprivation. 4 Having passed this initial hurdle, the applications then were rated by the special committee in a fashion similar to that used by the general admissions committee, except that special candidates did not have to meet the 2.5 grade point average cutoff applied to regular applicants. About one-fifth of the total number of special applicants were invited for interviews in 1973 and 1974. 5 Following each interview, the special committee assigned each special applicant a benchmark score. The special committee then presented its top choices to the general admissions committee. The latter did not rate or compare the special candidates against the general applicants, id., at 388, but could reject recommended special candidates for failure to meet course requirements or other specific deficiencies. Id., at 171-172. The special committee continued to recommend special applicants until a number prescribed by faculty vote were admitted. While the overall class size was still 50, the prescribed number was 8; in 1973 and 1974, when the class size had doubled to 100, the prescribed number of special admissions also doubled, to 16. Id., at 164, 166.
From the year of the increase in class size - 1971 - through 1974, the special program resulted in the admission of 21 black students, 30 Mexican-Americans, and 12 Asians, for a total of 63 minority students. Over the same period, the regular admissions program produced 1 black, 6 Mexican-Americans, [438 U.S. 265, 276] and 37 Asians, for a total of 44 minority students. 6 Although disadvantaged whites applied to the special program in large numbers, see n. 5, supra, none received an offer of admission through that process. Indeed, in 1974, at least, the special committee explicitly considered only "disadvantaged" special applicants who were members of one of the designated minority groups. Record 171.
Allan Bakke is a white male who applied to the Davis Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. In both years Bakke's application was considered under the general admissions program, and he received an interview. His 1973 interview was with Dr. Theodore C. West, who considered Bakke "a very desirable applicant to [the] medical school." Id., at 225. Despite a strong benchmark score of 468 out of 500, Bakke was rejected. His application had come late in the year, and no applicants in the general admissions process with scores below 470 were accepted after Bakke's application was completed. Id., at 69. There were four special admissions slots unfilled at that time, however, for which Bakke was not considered. Id., at 70. After his 1973 rejection, Bakke wrote to Dr. George H. Lowrey, Associate Dean and Chairman of the Admissions Committee, protesting that the special admissions program operated as a racial and ethnic quota. Id., at 259. [438 U.S. 265, 277]
Bakke's 1974 application was completed early in the year. Id., at 70. His student interviewer gave him an overall rating of 94, finding him "friendly, well tempered, conscientious and delightful to speak with." Id., at 229. His faculty interviewer was, by coincidence, the same Dr. Lowrey to whom he had written in protest of the special admissions program. Dr. Lowrey found Bakke "rather limited in his approach" to the problems of the medical profession and found disturbing Bakke's "very definite opinions which were based more on his personal viewpoints than upon a study of the total problem." Id., at 226. Dr. Lowrey gave Bakke the lowest of his six ratings, an 86; his total was 549 out of 600. Id., at 230. Again, Bakke's application was rejected. In neither year did the chairman of the admissions committee, Dr. Lowrey, exercise his discretion to place Bakke on the waiting list. Id., at 64. In both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's. 7
After the second rejection, Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California. 8 He sought mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. He alleged that the Medical School's special admissions program operated to exclude him from the [438 U.S. 265, 278] school on the basis of his race, in violation of his rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 Art. I, 21, of the California Constitution, 10 and 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d. 11 The University cross-complained for a declaration that its special admissions program was lawful. The trial [438 U.S. 265, 279] court found that the special program operated as a racial quota, because minority applicants in the special program were rated only against one another, Record 388, and 16 places in the class of 100 were reserved for them. Id., at 295-296. Declaring that the University could not take race into account in making admissions decisions, the trial court held the challenged program violative of the Federal Constitution, the State Constitution, and Title VI. The court refused to order Bakke's admission, however, holding that he had failed to carry his burden of proving that he would have been admitted but for the existence of the special program.
Bakke appealed from the portion of the trial court judgment denying him admission, and the University appealed from the decision that its special admissions program was unlawful and the order enjoining it from considering race in the processing of applications. The Supreme Court of California transferred the case directly from the trial court, "because of the importance of the issues involved." 18 Cal. 3d 34, 39, 553 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1976). The California court accepted the findings of the trial court with respect to the University's program. 12 Because the special admissions program involved a racial classification, the Supreme Court held itself bound to apply strict scrutiny. Id., at 49, 553 P.2d, at 1162-1163. It then turned to the goals the University presented as justifying the special program. Although the court agreed that the goals of integrating the medical profession and increasing the number of physicians willing to serve members of minority groups were compelling state interests, id., at 53, 553 P.2d, at 1165, it concluded that the special admissions program was not the least intrusive means of achieving those goals. Without passing on the state constitutional or the federal statutory grounds cited in the trial court's judgment, the California court held [438 U.S. 265, 280] that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that "no applicant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by standards applied without regard to race." Id., at 55, 553 P.2d, at 1166.
Turning to Bakke's appeal, the court ruled that since Bakke had established that the University had discriminated against him on the basis of his race, the burden of proof shifted to the University to demonstrate that he would not have been admitted even in the absence of the special admissions program. 13 Id., at 63-64, 553 P.2d, at 1172. The court analogized Bakke's situation to that of a plaintiff under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-17 (1970 ed., Supp. V), see, e. g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772 (1976). 18 Cal. 3d, at 63-64, 553 P.2d, at 1172. On this basis, the court initially ordered a remand for the purpose of determining whether, under the newly allocated burden of proof, Bakke would have been admitted to either the 1973 or the 1974 entering class in the absence of the special admissions program. App. A to Application for Stay 48. In its petition for rehearing below, however, the University conceded its inability to carry that burden. App. B to Application for Stay A19-A20. 14 The [438 U.S. 265, 281] California court thereupon amended its opinion to direct that the trial court enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission to the Medical School. 18 Cal. 3d, at 64, 553 P.2d, at 1172. That order was stayed pending review in this Court. 429 U.S. 953 (1976). We granted certiorari to consider the important constitutional issue. 429 U.S. 1090 (1977).
In this Court the parties neither briefed nor argued the applicability of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Rather, as had the California court, they focused exclusively upon the validity of the special admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause. Because it was possible, however, that a decision on Title VI might obviate resort to constitutional interpretation, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 -348 (1936) (concurring opinion), we requested supplementary briefing on the statutory issue. 434 U.S. 900 (1977).
At the outset we face the question whether a right of action for private parties exists under Title VI. Respondent argues that there is a private right of action, invoking the test set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). He contends [438 U.S. 265, 282] that the statute creates a federal right in his favor, that legislative history reveals an intent to permit private actions, 15 that such actions would further the remedial purposes of the statute, and that enforcement of federal rights under the Civil Rights Act generally is not relegated to the States. In addition, he cites several lower court decisions which have recognized or assumed the existence of a private right of action. 16 Petitioner denies the existence of a private right of action, arguing that the sole function of 601, see n. 11, supra, was to establish a predicate for administrative action under 602, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1. 17 In its view, administrative curtailment of federal funds under that section was the only sanction to be imposed upon recipients that [438 U.S. 265, 283] violated 601. Petitioner also points out that Title VI contains no explicit grant of a private right of action, in contrast to Titles II, III, IV, and VII, of the same statute, 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3 (a), 2000b-2, 2000c-8, and 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed. and Supp. V). 18
We find it unnecessary to resolve this question in the instant case. The question of respondent's right to bring an action under Title VI was neither argued nor decided in either of the courts below, and this Court has been hesitant to review questions not addressed below. McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 -435 (1940). See also Massachusetts v. Westcott, 431 U.S. 322 (1977); Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437, 439 (1969). Cf. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976). We therefore do not address this difficult issue. Similarly, we need not pass [438 U.S. 265, 284] upon petitioner's claim that private plaintiffs under Title VI must exhaust administrative remedies. We assume, only for the purposes of this case, that respondent has a right of action under Title VI. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 n. 2 (1974) (STEWART, J., concurring in result).
The language of 601, 78 Stat. 252, like that of the Equal Protection Clause, is majestic in its sweep:
The problem confronting Congress was discrimination against Negro citizens at the hands of recipients of federal moneys. Indeed, the color blindness pronouncements cited in the margin at n. 19, generally occur in the midst of extended remarks dealing with the evils of segregation in federally funded programs. Over and over again, proponents of the bill detailed the plight of Negroes seeking equal treatment in such programs. 20 There simply was no reason for Congress to consider the validity of hypothetical preferences that might be accorded minority citizens; the legislators were dealing with the real and pressing problem of how to guarantee those citizens equal treatment.
In addressing that problem, supporters of Title VI repeatedly declared that the bill enacted constitutional principles. For example, Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and floor manager of the legislation in the House, emphasized this in introducing the bill:
In the Senate, Senator Humphrey declared that the purpose of Title VI was "to insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and the moral sense of the Nation." Id., at 6544. Senator Ribicoff agreed that Title VI embraced the constitutional standard: "Basically, there is a constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of federal funds; and title VI simply spells out the procedure to be used in enforcing that restriction." Id., at 13333. Other Senators expressed similar views. 22
Further evidence of the incorporation of a constitutional standard into Title VI appears in the repeated refusals of the legislation's supporters precisely to define the term "discrimination." Opponents sharply criticized this failure, 23 but proponents of the bill merely replied that the meaning of [438 U.S. 265, 287] "discrimination" would be made clear by reference to the Constitution or other existing law. For example, Senator Humphrey noted the relevance of the Constitution:
Petitioner does not deny that decisions based on race or ethnic origin by faculties and administrations of state universities are reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). For his part, respondent does not argue that all racial or ethnic classifications are per se invalid. See, e. g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan, and STEWART, JJ., concurring); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The parties do disagree as to the level of judicial scrutiny to be applied to the special admissions program. Petitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny, as this inexact term has been [438 U.S. 265, 288] applied in our cases. That level of review, petitioner asserts, should be reserved for classifications that disadvantage "discrete and insular minorities." See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the California court correctly rejected the notion that the degree of judicial scrutiny accorded a particular racial or ethnic classification hinges upon membership in a discrete and insular minority and duly recognized that the "rights established [by the Fourteenth Amendment] are personal rights." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948).
En route to this crucial battle over the scope of judicial review, 25 the parties fight a sharp preliminary action over the proper characterization of the special admissions program. Petitioner prefers to view it as establishing a "goal" of minority representation in the Medical School. Respondent, echoing the courts below, labels it a racial quota. 26 [438 U.S. 265, 289]
This semantic distinction is beside the point: The special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status. 27
The guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons. Its language is explicit: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." It is settled beyond question that the "rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights established are personal rights," Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 22. Accord, Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, supra, at 351; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U.S. 151, 161 -162 (1914). The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when [438 U.S. 265, 290] applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal.
Nevertheless, petitioner argues that the court below erred in applying strict scrutiny to the special admissions program because white males, such as respondent, are not a "discrete and insular minority" requiring extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. Carolene Products Co., supra, at 152-153, n. 4. This rationale, however, has never been invoked in our decisions as a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny. Nor has this Court held that discreteness and insularity constitute necessary preconditions to a holding that a particular classification is invidious. 28 See, e. g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 -97 (1965). These characteristics may be relevant in deciding whether or not to add new types of classifications to the list of "suspect" categories or whether a particular classification survives close examination. See, e. g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (age); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (wealth); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (aliens). Racial and ethnic classifications, however, are subject to stringent examination without regard to these additional characteristics. We declared as much in the first cases explicitly to recognize racial distinctions as suspect:
This perception of racial and ethnic distinctions is rooted in our Nation's constitutional and demographic history. The Court's initial view of the Fourteenth Amendment was that its "one pervading purpose" was "the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised dominion over him." Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1873). The Equal Protection Clause, however, was "[v]irtually strangled in infancy by post-civil-war judicial reactionism." 29 It was relegated to decades of relative desuetude while the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, after a short germinal period, flourished as a cornerstone in the Court's defense of property and liberty of contract. See, e. g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In that cause, the Fourteenth Amendment's "one pervading purpose" was displaced. See, e. g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). It was only as the era of substantive due process came to a close, see, e. g., Nebbia v. New [438 U.S. 265, 292] York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), that the Equal Protection Clause began to attain a genuine measure of vitality, see, e. g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, supra.
By that time it was no longer possible to peg the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the struggle for equality of one racial minority. During the dormancy of the Equal Protection Clause, the United States had become a Nation of minorities. 30 Each had to struggle 31 - and to some extent struggles still 32 - to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a "majority" composed of various minority groups of whom it was said - perhaps unfairly in many cases - that a shared characteristic was a willingness to disadvantage other groups. 33 As the Nation filled with the stock of many lands, the reach of the Clause was gradually extended to all ethnic groups seeking protection from official discrimination. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (Celtic Irishmen) (dictum); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (Chinese); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915) (Austrian resident aliens); Korematsu, supra (Japanese); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (Mexican-Americans). The guarantees of equal protection, said the Court in [438 U.S. 265, 293] Yick Wo, "are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." 118 U.S., at 369 .
Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white "majority," Slaughter-House Cases, supra, the Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude. As this Court recently remarked in interpreting the 1866 Civil Rights Act to extend to claims of racial discrimination against white persons, "the 39th Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976). And that legislation was specifically broadened in 1870 to ensure that "all persons," not merely "citizens," would enjoy equal rights under the law. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 192 -202 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Indeed, it is not unlikely that among the Framers were many who would have applauded a reading of the Equal Protection Clause that states a principle of universal application and is responsive to the racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity of the Nation. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1056 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Niblack); id., at 2891-2892 (remarks of Sen. Conness); id., 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 883 (1868) (remarks of Sen. Howe) (Fourteenth Amendment "protect[s] classes from class legislation"). See also Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 60-63 (1955).
Over the past 30 years, this Court has embarked upon the crucial mission of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause with the view of assuring to all persons "the protection of [438 U.S. 265, 294] equal laws," Yick Wo, supra, at 369, in a Nation confronting a legacy of slavery and racial discrimination. See, e. g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). Because the landmark decisions in this area arose in response to the continued exclusion of Negroes from the mainstream of American society, they could be characterized as involving discrimination by the "majority" white race against the Negro minority. But they need not be read as depending upon that characterization for their results. It suffices to say that "[o]ver the years, this Court has consistently repudiated `[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being `odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S., at 100 .
Petitioner urges us to adopt for the first time a more restrictive view of the Equal Protection Clause and hold that discrimination against members of the white "majority" cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as "benign." 34 [438 U.S. 265, 295] The clock of our liberties, however, cannot be turned back to 1868. Brown v. Board of Education, supra, at 492; accord, Loving v. Virginia, supra, at 9. It is far too late to argue that the guarantee of equal protection to all persons permits the recognition of special wards entitled to a degree of protection greater than that accorded others. 35 "The Fourteenth Amendment is not directed solely against discrimination due to a `two-class theory' - that is, based upon differences between `white' and Negro." Hernandez, 347 U.S., at 478 .
Once the artificial line of a "two-class theory" of the Fourteenth Amendment is put aside, the difficulties entailed in varying the level of judicial review according to a perceived "preferred" status of a particular racial or ethnic minority are intractable. The concepts of "majority" and "minority" necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political judgments. As observed above, the white "majority" itself is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history of prior discrimination at the hands of the State and private individuals. Not all of these groups can receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance [438 U.S. 265, 296] of distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality, for then the only "majority" left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. There is no principled basis for deciding which groups would merit "heightened judicial solicitude" and which would not. 36 Courts would be asked to evaluate the extent of the prejudice and consequent [438 U.S. 265, 297] harm suffered by various minority groups. Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other groups. Those classifications would be free from exacting judicial scrutiny. As these preferences began to have their desired effect, and the consequences of past discrimination were undone, new judicial rankings would be necessary. The kind of variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings simply does not lie within the judicial competence - even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable. 37 [438 U.S. 265, 298]
Moreover, there are serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself. First, it may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign. Courts may be asked to validate burdens imposed upon individual members of a particular group in order to advance the group's general interest. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S., at 172 -173 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). Nothing in the Constitution supports the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise impermissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their ethnic groups. Second, preferential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Third, there is a measure of inequity in forcing innocent persons in respondent's position to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making.
By hitching the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause to these transitory considerations, we would be holding, as a constitutional principle, that judicial scrutiny of classifications touching on racial and ethnic background may vary with the ebb and flow of political forces. Disparate constitutional tolerance of such classifications well may serve to exacerbate [438 U.S. 265, 299] racial and ethnic antagonisms rather than alleviate them. United Jewish Organizations, supra, at 173-174 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). Also, the mutability of a constitutional principle, based upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 650 -651 (1895) (White, J., dissenting). In expounding the Constitution, the Court's role is to discern "principles sufficiently absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over significant periods of time, and to lift them above the level of the pragmatic political judgments of a particular time and place." A. Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 114 (1976).
If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only because of his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may be applied consistently. Political judgments regarding the necessity for the particular classification may be weighed in the constitutional balance, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), but the standard of justification will remain constant. This is as it should be, since those political judgments are the product of rough compromise struck by contending groups within the democratic process. 38 When they touch upon an individual's race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. The Constitution guarantees that right to every person regardless of his background. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S., at 22 ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S., at 351 . [438 U.S. 265, 300]
Petitioner contends that on several occasions this Court has approved preferential classifications without applying the most exacting scrutiny. Most of the cases upon which petitioner relies are drawn from three areas: school desegregation, employment discrimination, and sex discrimination. Each of the cases cited presented a situation materially different from the facts of this case.
The school desegregation cases are inapposite. Each involved remedies for clearly determined constitutional violations. E. g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Racial classifications thus were designed as remedies for the vindication of constitutional entitlement. 39 Moreover, the scope of the remedies was not permitted to exceed the extent of the [438 U.S. 265, 301] violations. E. g., Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). See also Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 -995 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). Here, there was no judicial determination of constitutional violation as a predicate for the formulation of a remedial classification.
The employment discrimination cases also do not advance petitioner's cause. For example, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), we approved a retroactive award of seniority to a class of Negro truckdrivers who had been the victims of discrimination - not just by society at large, but by the respondent in that case. While this relief imposed some burdens on other employees, it was held necessary "`to make [the victims] whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.'" Id., at 763, quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). The Courts of Appeals have fashioned various types of racial preferences as remedies for constitutional or statutory violations resulting in identified, race-based injuries to individuals held entitled to the preference. E. g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Commission, 482 F.2d 1333 (CA2 1973); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (CA8 1972), modified on rehearing en banc, id., at 327. Such preferences also have been upheld where a legislative or administrative body charged with the responsibility made determinations of past discrimination by the industries affected, and fashioned remedies deemed appropriate to rectify the discrimination. E. g., Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (CA3), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); 40 Associated General [438 U.S. 265, 302] Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (CA1 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). But we have never approved preferential classifications in the absence of proved constitutional or statutory violations. 41
Nor is petitioner's view as to the applicable standard supported by the fact that gender-based classifications are not subjected to this level of scrutiny. E. g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 -317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 n. (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). Gender-based distinctions are less likely to create the analytical and practical [438 U.S. 265, 303] problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria. With respect to gender there are only two possible classifications. The incidence of the burdens imposed by preferential classifications is clear. There are no rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment. Classwide questions as to the group suffering previous injury and groups which fairly can be burdened are relatively manageable for reviewing courts. See, e. g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212 -217 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). The resolution of these same questions in the context of racial and ethnic preferences presents far more complex and intractable problems than gender-based classifications. More importantly, the perception of racial classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classifications do not share. In sum, the Court has never viewed such classification as inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classifications for the purpose of equal protection analysis.
Petitioner also cites Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), in support of the proposition that discrimination favoring racial or ethnic minorities has received judicial approval without the exacting inquiry ordinarily accorded "suspect" classifications. In Lau, we held that the failure of the San Francisco school system to provide remedial English instruction for some 1,800 students of oriental ancestry who spoke no English amounted to a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Those regulations required remedial instruction where inability to understand English excluded children of foreign ancestry from participation in educational programs. 414 U.S., at 568 . Because we found that the students in Lau were denied "a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program," ibid., we remanded for the fashioning of a remedial order. [438 U.S. 265, 304]
Lau provides little support for petitioner's argument. The decision rested solely on the statute, which had been construed by the responsible administrative agency to reach educational practices "which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination," ibid. We stated: "Under these state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education." Id., at 566. Moreover, the "preference" approved did not result in the denial of the relevant benefit - "meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program" - to anyone else. No other student was deprived by that preference of the ability to participate in San Francisco's school system, and the applicable regulations required similar assistance for all students who suffered similar linguistic deficiencies. Id., at 570-571 (STEWART, J., concurring in result).
In a similar vein, 42 petitioner contends that our recent decision in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), indicates a willingness to approve racial classifications designed to benefit certain minorities, without denominating the classifications as "suspect." The State of New York had redrawn its reapportionment plan to meet objections of the Department of Justice under 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). Specifically, voting districts were redrawn to enhance the electoral power [438 U.S. 265, 305] of certain "nonwhite" voters found to have been the victims of unlawful "dilution" under the original reapportionment plan. United Jewish Organizations, like Lau, properly is viewed as a case in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity - meaningful participation in the electoral process.
In this case, unlike Lau and United Jewish Organizations, there has been no determination by the legislature or a responsible administrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice requiring remedial efforts. Moreover, the operation of petitioner's special admissions program is quite different from the remedial measures approved in those cases. It prefers the designated minority groups at the expense of other individuals who are totally foreclosed from competition for the 16 special admissions seats in every Medical School class. Because of that foreclosure, some individuals are excluded from enjoyment of a state-provided benefit - admission to the Medical School - they otherwise would receive. When a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as suspect. E. g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S., at 641 -642.
We have held that in "order to justify the use of a suspect classification, a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is `necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 -722 (1973) (footnotes omitted); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S., at 11 ; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). The special admissions [438 U.S. 265, 306] program purports to serve the purposes of: (i) "reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession," Brief for Petitioner 32; (ii) countering the effects of societal discrimination; 43 (iii) increasing the number of physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and (iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body. It is necessary to decide which, if any, of these purposes is substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classification. [438 U.S. 265, 307]
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids. E. g., Loving v. Virginia, supra, at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 196; Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The State certainly has a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination. The line of school desegregation cases, commencing with Brown, attests to the importance of this state goal and the commitment of the judiciary to affirm all lawful means toward its attainment. In the school cases, the States were required by court order to redress the wrongs worked by specific instances of racial discrimination. That goal was far more focused than the remedying of the effects of "societal discrimination," an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the past.
We have never approved a classification that aids persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations. See, e. g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 -376 (1977); United Jewish Organizations, 430 U.S., at 155 -156; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966). After such findings have been made, the governmental interest in preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is substantial, since the legal rights of the victims must be vindicated. In such a case, the [438 U.S. 265, 308] extent of the injury and the consequent remedy will have been judicially, legislatively, or administrative defined. Also, the remedial action usually remains subject to continuing oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for the benefit. Without such findings of constitutional or statutory violations, 44 it cannot be [438 U.S. 265, 309] said that the government has any greater interest in helping one individual than in refraining from harming another. Thus, the government has no compelling justification for inflicting such harm.
Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no position to make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not the formulation of any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality. For reasons similar to those stated in Part III of this opinion, isolated segments of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make those decisions, at least in the absence of legislative mandates and legislatively determined criteria. 45 Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); n. 41, supra. Before relying upon these sorts of findings in establishing a racial classification, a governmental body must have the authority and capability to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to identified discrimination. See, e. g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S., at 316 -321; Califano [438 U.S. 265, 310] v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S., at 212 -217. Lacking this capability, petitioner has not carried its burden of justification on this issue.
Hence, the purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classification that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimination. That is a step we have never approved. Cf. Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
Petitioner identifies, as another purpose of its program, improving the delivery of health-care services to communities currently underserved. It may be assumed that in some situations a State's interest in facilitating the health care of its citizens is sufficiently compelling to support the use of a suspect classification. But there is virtually no evidence in the record indicating that petitioner's special admissions program is either needed or geared to promote that goal. 46 The court below addressed this failure of proof:
The fourth goal asserted by petitioner is the attainment of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally permissible [438 U.S. 265, 312] goal for an institution of higher education. Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body. Mr. Justice Frankfurter summarized the "four essential freedoms" that constitute academic freedom:
Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the "robust exchange of ideas," petitioner invokes a countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment. In this light, petitioner must be viewed as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission.
It may be argued that there is greater force to these views at the undergraduate level than in a medical school where the training is centered primarily on professional competency. But even at the graduate level, our tradition and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity is substantial. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S., at 634 , the [438 U.S. 265, 314] Court made a similar point with specific reference to legal education:
Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body. Although a university must have wide discretion in making the sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted, constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may not be disregarded. Respondent urges - and the courts below have held - that petitioner's dual admissions program is a racial classification that impermissibly infringes his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. As the interest of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admissions program, the question remains whether the [438 U.S. 265, 315] program's racial classification is necessary to promote this interest. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S., at 721 -722.
It may be assumed that the reservation of a specified number of seats in each class for individuals from the preferred ethnic groups would contribute to the attainment of considerable ethnic diversity in the student body. But petitioner's argument that this is the only effective means of serving the interest of diversity is seriously flawed. In a most fundamental sense the argument misconceives the nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or ethnic background. It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity. 50
Nor would the state interest in genuine diversity be served by expanding petitioner's two-track system into a multitrack program with a prescribed number of seats set aside for each identifiable category of applicants. Indeed, it is inconceivable that a university would thus pursue the logic of petitioner's two-track program to the illogical end of insulating each category of applicants with certain desired qualifications from competition with all other applicants. [438 U.S. 265, 316]
The experience of other university admissions programs, which take race into account in achieving the educational diversity valued by the First Amendment, demonstrates that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not a necessary means toward that end. An illuminating example is found in the Harvard College program:
This kind of program treats each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a "plus" on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname. It would mean only that his combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those of the other applicant. His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 52
It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers race only as one factor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated - but no less effective - means of according racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to discriminate, however, is evident in petitioner's preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial infirmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one element - to be weighed fairly against other elements - in the selection process. "A boundary line," as Mr. Justice Frankfurter remarked in another connection, "is none the worse for being narrow." McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327, 329 (1944). And a court would not assume that a university, professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy, would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota system. In short, good faith [438 U.S. 265, 319] would be presumed in the absence of a showing to the contrary in the manner permitted by our cases. See, e. g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 53
In summary, it is evident that the Davis special admissions program involves the use of an explicit racial classification never before countenanced by this Court. It tells applicants who are not Negro, Asian, or Chicano that they are totally excluded from a specific percentage of the seats in an entering class. No matter how strong their qualifications, quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, they are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the preferred groups for the special admissions seats. At the same time, the preferred [438 U.S. 265, 320] applicants have the opportunity to compete for every seat in the class.
The fatal flaw in petitioner's preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S., at 22 . Such rights are not absolute. But when a State's distribution of benefits or imposition of burdens hinges on ancestry or the color of a person's skin, that individual is entitled to a demonstration that the challenged classification is necessary to promote a substantial state interest. Petitioner has failed to carry this burden. For this reason, that portion of the California court's judgment holding petitioner's special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be affirmed.
In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of any applicant, however, the courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.
With respect to respondent's entitlement to an injunction directing his admission to the Medical School, petitioner has conceded that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program, respondent still would not have been admitted. Hence, respondent is entitled to the injunction, and that portion of the judgment must be affirmed. 54 [438 U.S. 265, 321]
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of applicants who are "admissible" and deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates' cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer. The quality of the educational experience of all the students in Harvard College depends in part on these differences in the background and outlook that students bring with them.
In Harvard College admissions the Committee has not set target-quotas for the number of blacks, or of musicians, football players, physicists or Californians to be admitted in a given year. At the same time the Committee is aware that if Harvard College is to provide a truly heterogen[e]ous environment that reflects the rich diversity of the United States, it cannot be provided without some attention to numbers. It would not make sense, for example, to have 10 or 20 students out of 1,100 whose homes are west of the Mississippi. Comparably, 10 or 20 black students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and experiences of blacks in the United States. Their small numbers might also create a sense of isolation among the black students themselves and thus make it more difficult for them to develop and achieve their potential. Consequently, when making its decisions, the Committee on Admissions is aware that there is some relationship between numbers and achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable environment for those students admitted. But [438 U.S. 265, 324] that awareness does not mean that the Committee sets a minimum number of blacks or of people from west of the Mississippi who are to be admitted. It means only that in choosing among thousands of applicants who are not only "admissible" academically but have other strong qualities, the Committee, with a number of criteria in mind, pays some attention to distribution among many types and categories of students.
The further refinements sometimes required help to illustrate the kind of significance attached to race. The Admissions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, the child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic performance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner-city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently-abiding interest in black power. If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had already been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa. If C, a white student with extraordinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give him an edge over both A and B. Thus, the critical criteria are often individual qualities or experience not dependent upon race but sometimes associated with it.
2 [438 U.S. 265, 272] MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join Parts I and V-C of this opinion. MR. JUSTICE WHITE also joins Part III-A of this opinion.
[ Footnote 2 ] For the 1973 entering class of 100 seats, the Davis Medical School received 2,464 applications. Id., at 117. For the 1974 entering class, 3,737 applications were submitted. Id., at 289.
[ Footnote 3 ] That is, applications were considered and acted upon as they were received, so that the process of filling the class took place over a period of months, with later applications being considered against those still on file from earlier in the year. Id., at 64.
[ Footnote 4 ] The chairman normally checked to see if, among other things, the applicant had been granted a waiver of the school's application fee, which required a means test; whether the applicant had worked during college or interrupted his education to support himself or his family; and whether the applicant was a member of a minority group. Id., at 65-66.
[ Footnote 5 ] For the class entering in 1973, the total number of special applicants was 297, of whom 73 were white. In 1974, 628 persons applied to the special committee, of whom 172 were white. Id., at 133-134.
[ Footnote 6 ] The following table provides a year-by-year comparison of minority admissions at the Davis Medical School:
Id., at 216-218. Sixteen persons were admitted under the special program in 1974, ibid., but one Asian withdrew before the start of classes, and the vacancy was filled by a candidate from the general admissions waiting list. Brief for Petitioner 4 n. 5.
[ Footnote 7 ] The following table compares Bakke's science grade point average, overall grade point average, and MCAT scores with the average scores of regular admittees and of special admittees in both 1973 and 1974. Record 210, 223, 231, 234:
Average of regular admittees ....... 3.51 3.49 81 76 83 69
Average of special admittees ....... 2.62 2.88 46 24 35 33
[438 U.S. 265, 278] Bakke ........... 3.44 3.46 96 94 97 72
Average of regular admittees ...... 3.36 3.29 69 67 82 72
Average of special admittees ...... 2.42 2.62 34 30 37 18
Applicants admitted under the special program also had benchmark scores significantly lower than many students, including Bakke, rejected under the general admissions program, even though the special rating system apparently gave credit for overcoming "disadvantage." Id., at 181, 388.
[ Footnote 8 ] Prior to the actual filing of the suit, Bakke discussed his intentions with Peter C. Storandt, Assistant to the Dean of Admissions at the Davis Medical School. Id., at 259-269. Storandt expressed sympathy for Bakke's position and offered advice on litigation strategy. Several amici imply that these discussions render Bakke's suit "collusive." There is no indication, however, that Storandt's views were those of the Medical School or that anyone else at the school even was aware of Storandt's correspondence and conversations with Bakke. Storandt is no longer with the University.
[ Footnote 9 ] "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
[ Footnote 10 ] "No special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Legislature; nor shall any citizen, or class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens."
This section was recently repealed and its provisions added to Art. I, 7, of the State Constitution.
[ Footnote 11 ] Section 601 of Title VI, 78 Stat. 252, provides as follows:
[ Footnote 12 ] Indeed, the University did not challenge the finding that applicants who were not members of a minority group were excluded from consideration in the special admissions process. 18 Cal. 3d, at 44, 553 P.2d, at 1159.
[ Footnote 13 ] Petitioner has not challenged this aspect of the decision. The issue of the proper placement of the burden of proof, then, is not before us.
[ Footnote 14 ] Several amici suggest that Bakke lacks standing, arguing that he never showed that his injury - exclusion from the Medical School - will be redressed by a favorable decision, and that the petitioner "fabricated" jurisdiction by conceding its inability to meet its burden of proof. Petitioner does not object to Bakke's standing, but inasmuch as this charge concerns our jurisdiction under Art. III, it must be considered and rejected. First, there appears to be no reason to question the petitioner's concession. It was not an attempt to stipulate to a conclusion of law or to disguise actual facts of record. Cf. Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley R. Co., 243 U.S. 281 (1917).
Second, even if Bakke had been unable to prove that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special program, it would not follow that he [438 U.S. 265, 281] lacked standing. The constitutional element of standing is plaintiff's demonstration of any injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by favorable decision of his claim. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). The trial court found such an injury, apart from failure to be admitted, in the University's decision not to permit Bakke to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his race. Record 323. Hence the constitutional requirements of Art. III were met. The question of Bakke's admission vel non is merely one of relief.
Nor is it fatal to Bakke's standing that he was not a "disadvantaged" applicant. Despite the program's purported emphasis on disadvantage, it was a minority enrollment program with a secondary disadvantage element. White disadvantaged students were never considered under the special program, and the University acknowledges that its goal in devising the program was to increase minority enrollment.
[ Footnote 15 ] See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5255 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Case).
[ Footnote 16 ] E. g., Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 851-852 (CA5), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967); Natonabah v. Board of Education, 355 F. Supp. 716, 724 (NM 1973); cf. Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-1287 (CA7 1977) (Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 790 et seq. (1976 ed.)); Piascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 780 n. 1 (ND Ohio 1976) (Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq. (1976 ed.)).
[ Footnote 17 ] Section 602, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1, reads as follows:
[ Footnote 18 ] Several comments in the debates cast doubt on the existence of any intent to create a private right of action. For example, Representative Gill stated that no private right of action was contemplated:
[ Footnote 19 ] For example, Senator Humphrey stated as follows:
[ Footnote 20 ] See, e. g., id., at 7064-7065 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); 7054-7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 6543-6544 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 2595 (remarks of Rep. Donohue); 2467-2468 (remarks of Rep. Celler); 1643, 2481-2482 (remarks of Rep. Ryan); H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, pp. 24-25 (1963).
[ Footnote 21 ] See, e. g., at 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay). See also id., at 2766 (remarks of Rep. Matsunaga); 2731-2732 (remarks of Rep. Dawson); 2595 (remarks of Rep. Donohue); 1527-1528 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
[ Footnote 22 ] See, e. g., id., at 12675, 12677 (remarks of Sen. Allott); 7064 (remarks of Sen. Pell); 7057, 7062-7064 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 5243 (remarks of Sen. Clark).
[ Footnote 23 ] See, e. g., id., at 6052 (remarks of Sen. Johnston); 5863 (remarks of Sen. Eastland); 5612 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); 5251 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge); 1632 (remarks of Rep. Dowdy); 1619 (remarks of Rep. Abernethy).
[ Footnote 24 ] See also id., at 7057, 13333 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff); 7057 (remarks of Sen. Pastore); 5606-5607 (remarks of Sen. Javits); 5253, 5863-5864, 13442 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
[ Footnote 25 ] That issue has generated a considerable amount of scholarly controversy. See, e. g., Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1974); Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 559 (1975); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 363 (1966); Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 Va. L. Rev. 955 (1974); O'Neil, Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 Va. L. Rev. 925 (1974); Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Redish, Preferential Law School Admissions and the Equal Protection Clause: An Analysis of the Competing Arguments, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 343 (1974); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1975); Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 329 (1977); Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 285 (1977).
[ Footnote 26 ] Petitioner defines "quota" as a requirement which must be met but can never be exceeded, regardless of the quality of the minority applicants. Petitioner declares that there is no "floor" under the total number of [438 U.S. 265, 289] minority students admitted; completely unqualified students will not be admitted simply to meet a "quota." Neither is there a "ceiling," since an unlimited number could be admitted through the general admissions process. On this basis the special admissions program does not meet petitioner's definition of a quota.
The court below found - and petitioner does not deny - that white applicants could not compete for the 16 places reserved solely for the special admissions program. 18 Cal. 3d, at 44, 553 P.2d, at 1159. Both courts below characterized this as a "quota" system.
[ Footnote 27 ] Moreover, the University's special admissions program involves a purposeful, acknowledged use of racial criteria. This is not a situation in which the classification on its face is racially neutral, but has a disproportionate racial impact. In that situation, plaintiff must establish an intent to discriminate. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 -265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976); see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
[ Footnote 28 ] After Carolene Products, the first specific reference in our decisions to the elements of "discreteness and insularity" appears in Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 606 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting). The next does not appear until 1970. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 295 n. 14 (STEWART, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). These elements have been relied upon in recognizing a suspect class in only one group of cases, those involving aliens. E. g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
[ Footnote 29 ] Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 381 (1949).
[ Footnote 30 ] M. Jones, American Immigration 177-246 (1960).
[ Footnote 31 ] J. Higham, Strangers in the Land (1955); G. Abbott, The Immigrant and the Community (1917); P. Roberts, The New Immigration 66-73, 86-91, 248-261 (1912). See also E. Fenton, Immigrants and Unions: A Case Study 561-562 (1975).
[ Footnote 32 ] "Members of various religious and ethnic groups, primarily but not exclusively of Eastern, Middle, and Southern European ancestry, such as Jews, Catholics, Italians, Greeks, and Slavic groups, continue to be excluded from executive, middle-management, and other job levels because of discrimination based upon their religion and/or national origin." 41 CFR 60-50.1 (b) (1977).
[ Footnote 33 ] E. g., P. Roberts, supra n. 31, at 75; G. Abbott, supra n. 31, at 270-271. See generally n. 31, supra.
[ Footnote 34 ] In the view of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, the pliable notion of "stigma" is the crucial element in analyzing racial classifications. See, e. g., post, at 361, 362. The Equal Protection Clause is not framed in terms of "stigma." Certainly the word has no clearly defined constitutional meaning. It reflects a subjective judgment that is standardless. All state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities may outrage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious. These individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the deprivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by the supposedly benign purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly dismiss the inherent unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic origin. Moreover, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE [438 U.S. 265, 295] WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN offer no principle for deciding whether preferential classifications reflect a benign remedial purpose or a malevolent stigmatic classification, since they are willing in this case to accept mere post hoc declarations by an isolated state entity - a medical school faculty - unadorned by particularized findings of past discrimination, to establish such a remedial purpose.
[ Footnote 35 ] Professor Bickel noted the self-contradiction of that view:
[ Footnote 36 ] As I am in agreement with the view that race may be taken into account as a factor in an admissions program, I agree with my Brothers BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN that the portion of the judgment that would proscribe all consideration of race must be reversed. See Part V, infra. But I disagree with much that is said in their opinion.
They would require as a justification for a program such as petitioner's, only two findings: (i) that there has been some form of discrimination against the preferred minority groups by "society at large," post, at 369 (it being conceded that petitioner had no history of discrimination), and (ii) that "there is reason to believe" that the disparate impact sought to be rectified by the program is the "product" of such discrimination:
[ Footnote 37 ] Mr. Justice Douglas has noted the problems associated with such inquiries:
[ Footnote 38 ] R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); Posner, supra n. 25, at 27.
[ Footnote 39 ] Petitioner cites three lower court decisions allegedly deviating from this general rule in school desegregation cases: Offermann v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22 (CA2 1967); Wanner v. County School Board, 357 F.2d 452 (CA4 1966); Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (CA1 1965). Of these, Wanner involved a school system held to have been de jure segregated and enjoined from maintaining segregation; racial districting was deemed necessary. 357 F.2d, at 454. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). In Barksdale and Offermann, courts did approve voluntary districting designed to eliminate discriminatory attendance patterns. In neither, however, was there any showing that the school board planned extensive pupil transportation that might threaten liberty or privacy interests. See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 240 -250 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nor were white students deprived of an equal opportunity for education.
Respondent's position is wholly dissimilar to that of a pupil bused from his neighborhood school to a comparable school in another neighborhood in compliance with a desegregation decree. Petitioner did not arrange for respondent to attend a different medical school in order to desegregate Davis Medical School; instead, it denied him admission and may have deprived him altogether of a medical education.
[ Footnote 40 ] Every decision upholding the requirement of preferential hiring under the authority of Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), has emphasized the existence of previous discrimination as a predicate for [438 U.S. 265, 302] the imposition of a preferential remedy. Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania; Southern Illinois Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (CA7 1972); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (NJ 1970); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N. E. 2d 907, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970). See also Rosetti Contracting Co. v. Brennan, 508 F.2d 1039, 1041 (CA7 1975); Associated General Contractors of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (CA1 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 157 U.S. App. D.C. 381, 383, 390, 485 F.2d 752, 754, 761 (1973).
[ Footnote 41 ] This case does not call into question congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as consent decrees under Title VII or approval of reapportionment plans under 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V). In such cases, there has been detailed legislative consideration of the various indicia of previous constitutional or statutory violations, e. g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 -310 (1966) ( 5), and particular administrative bodies have been charged with monitoring various activities in order to detect such violations and formulate appropriate remedies. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976).
Furthermore, we are not here presented with an occasion to review legislation by Congress pursuant to its powers under 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). We have previously recognized the special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority to take appropriate remedial measures.
[ Footnote 42 ] Petitioner also cites our decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), for the proposition that the State may prefer members of traditionally disadvantaged groups. In Mancari, we approved a hiring preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior (BIA). We observed in that case, however, that the legal status of the BIA is sui generis. Id., at 554. Indeed, we found that the preference was not racial at all, but "an employment criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to . . . groups . . . whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion." Ibid.
[ Footnote 43 ] A number of distinct subgoals have been advanced as falling under the rubric of "compensation for past discrimination." For example, it is said that preferences for Negro applicants may compensate for harm done them personally, or serve to place them at economic levels they might have attained but for discrimination against their forebears. Greenawalt, supra n. 25, at 581-586. Another view of the "compensation" goal is that it serves as a form of reparation by the "majority" to a victimized group as a whole. B. Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (1973). That justification for racial or ethnic preference has been subjected to much criticism. E. g., Greenawalt, supra n. 25, at 581; Posner, supra n. 25, at 16-17, and n. 33. Finally, it has been argued that ethnic preferences "compensate" the group by providing examples of success whom other members of the group will emulate, thereby advancing the group's interest and society's interest in encouraging new generations to overcome the barriers and frustrations of the past. Redish, supra n. 25, at 391. For purposes of analysis these subgoals need not be considered separately.
Racial classifications in admissions conceivably could serve a fifth purpose, one which petitioner does not articulate: fair appraisal of each individual's academic promise in the light of some cultural bias in grading or testing procedures. To the extent that race and ethnic background were considered only to the extent of curing established inaccuracies in predicting academic performance, it might be argued that there is no "preference" at all. Nothing in this record, however, suggests either that any of the quantitative factors considered by the Medical School were culturally biased or that petitioner's special admissions program was formulated to correct for any such biases. Furthermore, if race or ethnic background were used solely to arrive at an unbiased prediction of academic success, the reservation of fixed numbers of seats would be inexplicable.
[ Footnote 44 ] MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN misconceive the scope of this Court's holdings under Title VII when they suggest that "disparate impact" alone is sufficient to establish a violation of that statute and, by analogy, other civil rights measures. See post, at 363-366, and n. 42. That this was not the meaning of Title VII was made quite clear in the seminal decision in this area, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971):
Moreover, the presumption in Griggs - that disparate impact without any showing of business justification established the existence of discrimination in violation of the statute - was based on legislative determinations, wholly absent here, that past discrimination had handicapped various minority groups to such an extent that disparate impact could be traced to identifiable instances of past discrimination:
[ Footnote 45 ] For example, the University is unable to explain its selection of only the four favored groups - Negroes, Mexican-Americans, American Indians, and Asians - for preferential treatment. The inclusion of the last group is especially curious in light of the substantial numbers of Asians admitted through the regular admissions process. See also n. 37, supra.
[ Footnote 46 ] The only evidence in the record with respect to such underservice is a newspaper article. Record 473.
[ Footnote 47 ] It is not clear that petitioner's two-track system, even if adopted throughout the country, would substantially increase representation of blacks in the medical profession. That is the finding of a recent study by Sleeth & Mishell, Black Under-Representation in United States Medical Schools, 297 New England J. of Med. 1146 (1977). Those authors maintain that the cause of black underrepresentation lies in the small size of the national pool of qualified black applicants. In their view, this problem is traceable to the poor premedical experiences of black under-graduates, and can be remedied effectively only by developing remedial programs for black students before they enter college.
[ Footnote 48 ] The president of Princeton University has described some of the benefits derived from a diverse student body:
[ Footnote 49 ] Graduate admissions decisions, like those at the undergraduate level, are concerned with "assessing the potential contributions to the society of each individual candidate following his or her graduation - contributions defined in the broadest way to include the doctor and the poet, the most active participant in business or government affairs and the keenest critic of all things organized, the solitary scholar and the concerned parent." Id., at 10.
[ Footnote 50 ] See Manning, The Pursuit of Fairness in Admissions to Higher Education, in Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, Selective Admissions in Higher Education 19, 57-59 (1977).
[ Footnote 51 ] The admissions program at Princeton has been described in similar terms:
[ Footnote 52 ] The denial to respondent of this right to individualized consideration without regard to his race is the principal evil of petitioner's special admissions program. Nowhere in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN is this denial even addressed.
[ Footnote 53 ] Universities, like the prosecutor in Swain, may make individualized decisions, in which ethnic background plays a part, under a presumption of legality and legitimate educational purpose. So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process. If an applicant can establish that the institution does not adhere to a policy of individual comparisons, or can show that a systematic exclusion of certain groups results, the presumption of legality might be overcome, creating the necessity of proving legitimate educational purpose.
There also are strong policy reasons that correspond to the constitutional distinction between petitioner's preference program and one that assures a measure of competition among all applicants. Petitioner's program will be viewed as inherently unfair by the public generally as well as by applicants for admission to state universities. Fairness in individual competition for opportunities, especially those provided by the State, is a widely cherished American ethic. Indeed, in a broader sense, an underlying assumption of the rule of law is the worthiness of a system of justice based on fairness to the individual. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared in another connection, "[j]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
[ Footnote 54 ] There is no occasion for remanding the case to permit petitioner to reconstruct what might have happened if it had been operating the type of program described as legitimate in Part V, supra. Cf. Mt. Healthy [438 U.S. 265, 321] City Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284 -287 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, there was considerable doubt whether protected First Amendment activity had been the "but for" cause of Doyle's protested discharge. Here, in contrast, there is no question as to the sole reason for respondent's rejection - purposeful racial discrimination in the form of the special admissions program. Having injured respondent solely on the basis of an unlawful classification, petitioner cannot now hypothesize that it might have employed lawful means of achieving the same result. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S., at 265 -266. No one can say how - or even if - petitioner would have operated its admissions process if it had known that legitimate alternatives were available. Nor is there a record revealing that legitimate alternative grounds for the decision existed, as there was in Mt. Healthy. In sum, a remand would result in fictitious recasting of past conduct.
[ Footnote 55 ] This statement appears in the Appendix to the Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae.
Opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
The Court today, in reversing in part the judgment of the Supreme Court of California, affirms the constitutional power of Federal and State Governments to act affirmatively to achieve equal opportunity for all. The difficulty of the issue presented - whether government may use race-conscious programs to redress the continuing effects of past discrimination - [438 U.S. 265, 325] and the mature consideration which each of our Brethren has brought to it have resulted in many opinions, no single one speaking for the Court. But this should not and must not mask the central meaning of today's opinions: Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.
THE CHIEF JUSTICE and our Brothers STEWART, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, have concluded that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., prohibits programs such as that at the Davis Medical School. On this statutory theory alone, they would hold that respondent Allan Bakke's rights have been violated and that he must, therefore, be admitted to the Medical School. Our Brother POWELL, reaching the Constitution, concludes that, although race may be taken into account in university admissions, the particular special admissions program used by petitioner, which resulted in the exclusion of respondent Bakke, was not shown to be necessary to achieve petitioner's stated goals. Accordingly, these Members of the Court form a majority of five affirming the judgment of the Supreme Court of California insofar as it holds that respondent Bakke "is entitled to an order that he be admitted to the University." 18 Cal. 3d 34, 64, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (1976).
We agree with MR. JUSTICE POWELL that, as applied to the case before us, Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. We also agree that the effect of the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the judgment of the Superior Court of California would be to prohibit the University from establishing in the future affirmative-action programs that take race into account. See ante, at 271 n. Since we conclude that the affirmative admissions program at the Davis [438 U.S. 265, 326] Medical School is constitutional, we would reverse the judgment below in all respects. MR. JUSTICE POWELL agrees that some uses of race in university admissions are permissible and, therefore, he joins with us to make five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it prohibits the University from establishing race-conscious programs in the future. 1
Our Nation was founded on the principle that "all Men are created equal." Yet candor requires acknowledgment that the Framers of our Constitution, to forge the 13 Colonies into one Nation, openly compromised this principle of equality with its antithesis: slavery. The consequences of this compromise are well known and have aptly been called our promise are well known and have aptly been called our "American Dilemma." Still, it is well to recount how recent the time has been, if it has yet come, when the promise of our principles has flowered into the actuality of equal opportunity for all regardless of race or color.
The Fourteenth Amendment, the embodiment in the Constitution of our abiding belief in human equality, has been the law of our land for only slightly more than half its 200 years. And for half of that half, the Equal Protection Clause of the Amendment was largely moribund so that, as late as 1927, Mr. Justice Holmes could sum up the importance of that Clause by remarking that it was the "last resort of constitutional arguments." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Worse than desuetude, the Clause was early turned against those whom it was intended to set free, condemning them to a "separate but equal" 2 status before the law, a status [438 U.S. 265, 327] always separate but seldom equal. Not until 1954 - only 24 years ago - was this odious doctrine interred by our decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (Brown I), and its progeny, 3 which proclaimed that separate schools and public facilities of all sorts were inherently unequal and forbidden under our Constitution. Even then inequality was not eliminated with "all deliberate speed." Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). In 1968 4 and again in 1971, 5 for example, we were forced to remind school boards of their obligation to eliminate racial discrimination root and branch. And a glance at our docket 6 and at dockets of lower courts will show that even today officially sanctioned discrimination is not a thing of the past.
Against this background, claims that law must be "color-blind" or that the datum of race is no longer relevant to public policy must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of reality. This is not to denigrate aspiration; for reality rebukes us that race has too often been used by those who would stigmatize and oppress minorities. Yet we cannot - and, as we shall demonstrate, need not under our Constitution or Title VI, which merely extends the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment to private parties who receive federal funds - let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many "created equal" have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens. [438 U.S. 265, 328]
The threshold question we must decide is whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars recipients of federal funds from giving preferential consideration to disadvantaged members of racial minorities as part of a program designed to enable such individuals to surmount the obstacles imposed by racial discrimination. 7 We join Parts I and V-C of our Brother POWELL'S opinion and three of us agree with his conclusion in Part II that this case does not require us to resolve the question whether there is a private right of action under Title VI. 8
In our view, Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies; it does not bar the preferential treatment of racial minorities as a means of remedying past societal discrimination to the extent that such action is consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. The legislative history of Title VI, administrative regulations interpreting the statute, subsequent congressional and executive action, and the prior decisions of this Court compel this conclusion. None of these sources lends support to the proposition that Congress intended to bar all race-conscious efforts to extend the benefits of federally financed programs to minorities who have been historically excluded from the full benefits of American life.
The history of Title VI - from President Kennedy's request that Congress grant executive departments and agencies authority [438 U.S. 265, 329] to cut off federal funds to programs that discriminate against Negroes through final enactment of legislation incorporating his proposals - reveals one fixed purpose: to give the Executive Branch of Government clear authority to terminate federal funding of private programs that use race as a means of disadvantaging minorities in a manner that would be prohibited by the Constitution if engaged in by government.
This purpose was first expressed in President Kennedy's June 19, 1963, message to Congress proposing the legislation that subsequently became the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 [438 U.S. 265, 330] Representative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, and the floor manager of the legislation in the House, introduced Title VI in words unequivocally expressing the intent to provide the Federal Government with the means of assuring that its funds were not used to subsidize racial discrimination inconsistent with the standards imposed by the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments upon state and federal action.
Other sponsors of the legislation agreed with Representative Celler that the function of Title VI was to end the Federal Government's complicity in conduct, particularly the segregation or exclusion of Negroes, inconsistent with the standards to be found in the antidiscrimination provisions of the Constitution. Representative Lindsay, also a member of the Judiciary Committee, candidly acknowledged, in the course of explaining why Title VI was necessary, that it did not create any new standard of equal treatment beyond that contained in the Constitution:
The Senate's consideration of Title VI reveals an identical understanding concerning the purpose and scope of the legislation. Senator Humphrey, the Senate floor manager, opened the Senate debate with a section-by-section analysis of the Civil Rights Act in which he succinctly stated the purpose of Title VI:
Senate supporters of Title VI repeatedly expressed agreement with Senator Humphrey's description of the legislation as providing the explicit authority and obligation to apply the standards of the Constitution to all recipients of federal funds. Senator Ribicoff described the limited function of Title VI:
Respondent's contention that Congress intended Title VI to bar affirmative-action programs designed to enable minorities disadvantaged by the effects of discrimination to participate in federally financed programs is also refuted by an examination of the type of conduct which Congress thought it was prohibiting by means of Title VI. The debates reveal that the legislation was motivated primarily by a desire to eradicate a very specific evil: federal financial support of programs which disadvantaged Negroes by excluding them from participation or providing them with separate facilities. Again and again supporters of Title VI emphasized that the purpose of the statute was to end segregation in federally funded activities and to end other discriminatory uses of race disadvantaging Negroes. Senator Humphrey set the theme in his speech presenting Title VI to the Senate:
The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing is clear. Congress recognized that Negroes, in some cases with congressional acquiescence, were being discriminated against in the administration of programs and denied the full benefits of activities receiving federal financial support. It was aware that there were many federally funded programs and institutions which discriminated against minorities in a manner inconsistent with the standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but whose activities might not involve sufficient state or federal action so as to be in violation of these Amendments. Moreover, Congress believed that it was questionable whether the Executive Branch possessed legal authority to terminate the funding of activities on the ground that they discriminated racially against Negroes in a manner violative of the standards contained in the Fourteenth and Fifth [438 U.S. 265, 336] Amendments. Congress' solution was to end the Government's complicity in constitutionally forbidden racial discrimination by providing the Executive Branch with the authority and the obligation to terminate its financial support of any activity which employed racial criteria in a manner condemned by the Constitution.
Of course, it might be argued that the Congress which enacted Title VI understood the Constitution to require strict racial neutrality or color blindness, and then enshrined that concept as a rule of statutory law. Later interpretation and clarification of the Constitution to permit remedial use of race would then not dislodge Title VI's prohibition of race-conscious action. But there are three compelling reasons to reject such a hypothesis.
First, no decision of this Court has ever adopted the proposition that the Constitution must be colorblind. See infra, at 355-356.
Second, even if it could be argued in 1964 that the Constitution might conceivably require color blindness, Congress surely would not have chosen to codify such a view unless the Constitution clearly required it. The legislative history of Title VI, as well as the statute itself, reveals a desire to induce voluntary compliance with the requirement of nondiscriminatory treatment. 13 See 602 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1 (no funds shall be terminated unless and until it has been "determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means"); H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 25 (1963); 110 Cong Rec. 13700 (1964) (Sen. Pastore); id., at 6546 (Sen. Humphrey). It is inconceivable that Congress intended to encourage voluntary efforts to eliminate the evil of racial discrimination while at the same time forbidding the voluntary use of race-conscious remedies to cure acknowledged or obvious statutory violations. Yet a reading of Title VI as prohibiting all action predicated upon race which adversely [438 U.S. 265, 337] affects any individual would require recipients guilty of discrimination to await the imposition of such remedies by the Executive Branch. Indeed, such an interpretation of Title VI would prevent recipients of federal funds from taking race into account even when necessary to bring their programs into compliance with federal constitutional requirements. This would be a remarkable reading of a statute designed to eliminate constitutional violations, especially in light of judicial decisions holding that under certain circumstances the remedial use of racial criteria is not only permissible but is constitutionally required to eradicate constitutional violations. For example, in Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), the Court held that a statute forbidding the assignment of students on the basis of race was unconstitutional because it would hinder the implementation of remedies necessary to accomplish the desegregation of a school system: "Just as the race of students must be considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered in formulating a remedy." Id., at 46. Surely Congress did not intend to prohibit the use of racial criteria when constitutionally required or to terminate the funding of any entity which implemented such a remedy. It clearly desired to encourage all remedies, including the use of race, necessary to eliminate racial discrimination in violation of the Constitution rather than requiring the recipient to await a judicial adjudication of unconstitutionality and the judicial imposition of a racially oriented remedy.
Third, the legislative history shows that Congress specifically eschewed any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine. Although it is clear from the debates that the supporters of Title VI intended to ban uses of race prohibited by the Constitution and, more specifically, the maintenance of segregated [438 U.S. 265, 338] facilities, they never precisely defined the term "discrimination," or what constituted an exclusion from participation or a denial of benefits on the ground of race. This failure was not lost upon its opponents. Senator Ervin complained:
The explanation for this failure is clear. Specific definitions were undesirable, in the views of the legislation's principal backers, because Title VI's standard was that of the Constitution and one that could and should be administratively and judicially applied. See remarks of Senator Humphrey (id., at 5253, 6553); Senator Ribicoff (id., at 7057, 13333); Senator Pastore (id., at 7057); Senator Javits (id., at 5606-5607, 6050). 14 Indeed, there was a strong emphasis throughout [438 U.S. 265, 339] Congress' consideration of Title VI on providing the Executive Branch with considerable flexibility in interpreting and applying the prohibition against racial discrimination. Attorney General Robert Kennedy testified that regulations had not been written into the legislation itself because the rules and regulations defining discrimination might differ from one program to another so that the term would assume different meanings in different contexts. 15 This determination to preserve flexibility in the administration of Title VI was shared by the legislation's supporters. When Senator Johnston offered an amendment that would have expressly authorized federal grantees to take race into account in placing children in adoptive and foster homes, Senator Pastore opposed the amendment, which was ultimately defeated by a 56-29 vote, on the ground that federal administrators could be trusted to act reasonably and that there was no danger that they would prohibit the use of racial criteria under such circumstances. Id., at 13695.
Congress' resolve not to incorporate a static definition of discrimination into Title VI is not surprising. In 1963 and 1964, when Title VI was drafted and debated, the courts had only recently applied the Equal Protection Clause to strike down public racial discrimination in America, and the scope of that Clause's nondiscrimination principle was in a state of flux and rapid evolution. Many questions, such as whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred only de jure discrimination or in at least some circumstances reached de facto discrimination, had not yet received an authoritative judicial resolution. The congressional debate reflects an awareness of the evolutionary [438 U.S. 265, 340] change that constitutional law in the area of racial discrimination was undergoing in 1964. 16
In sum, Congress' equating of Title VI's prohibition with the commands of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its refusal precisely to define that racial discrimination which it intended to prohibit, and its expectation that the statute would be administered in a flexible manner, compel the conclusion that Congress intended the meaning of the statute's prohibition to evolve with the interpretation of the commands of the Constitution. Thus, any claim that the use of racial criteria is barred by the plain language of the statute must fail in light of the remedial purpose of Title VI and its legislative history. The cryptic nature of the language employed in Title VI merely reflects Congress' concern with the then-prevalent use of racial standards as a means of excluding or disadvantaging Negroes and its determination to prohibit absolutely such discrimination. We have recently held that "`[w]hen aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no "rule of law" which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on "superficial examination."'" Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 543 -544 (1940). This is especially so when, as is the case here, the literal application of what is believed to be the plain language of the statute, assuming that it is so plain, would lead to results in direct conflict with Congress' unequivocally expressed legislative purpose. 17 [438 U.S. 265, 341]
Section 602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1, instructs federal agencies to promulgate regulations interpreting Title [438 U.S. 265, 342] VI. These regulations, which, under the terms of the statute, require Presidential approval, are entitled to considerable deference in construing Title VI. See, e. g., Lau v. Nichols, [438 U.S. 265, 343] 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969). Consequently, it is most significant that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), which provides much of the federal assistance to institutions of higher education, has adopted regulations requiring affirmative measures designed to enable racial minorities which have been previously discriminated against by a federally funded institution or program to overcome the effects of such actions and authorizing the voluntary undertaking of affirmative-action programs by federally funded institutions that have not been guilty of prior discrimination in order to overcome the effects of conditions which have adversely affected the degree of participation by persons of a particular race.
Title 45 CFR 80.3 (b) (6) (i) (1977) provides:
Title 45 CFR 80.3 (b) (6) (ii) (1977) provides:
The Court has recognized that the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution is particularly deserving of respect where Congress has directed its attention to the administrative construction and left it unaltered. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 381 ; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11 -12 (1965). Congress recently took just this kind of action when it considered an amendment to the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare appropriation bill for 1978, which would have restricted significantly the remedial use of race in programs funded by the appropriation. The amendment, as originally submitted by Representative Ashbrook, provided that "[n]one of the funds appropriated in this Act may be used to initiate, carry out or enforce any program of affirmative action or any other system of quotas or goals in regard to admission policies or employment practices which encourage or require any discrimination on the basis of race, creed, religion, sex or age." 123 Cong. [438 U.S. 265, 347] Rec. 19715 (1977). In support of the measure, Representative Ashbrook argued that the 1964 Civil Rights Act never authorized the imposition of affirmative action and that this was a creation of the bureaucracy. Id., at 19722. He explicitly stated, however, that he favored permitting universities to adopt affirmative-action programs giving consideration to racial identity but opposed the imposition of such programs by the Government. Id., at 19715. His amendment was itself amended to reflect this position by only barring the imposition of race-conscious remedies by HEW:
Finally, congressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VI eliminates any possible doubt about Congress' views concerning the permissibility of racial preferences for the purpose of assisting disadvantaged racial minorities. It confirms that Congress did not intend to prohibit and does not now believe that Title VI prohibits the consideration of race as part of a remedy for societal discrimination even where there is no showing that the institution extending the preference has been guilty of past discrimination nor any judicial finding that the particular beneficiaries of the racial preference have been adversely affected by societal discrimination.
Just last year Congress enacted legislation 22 explicitly requiring that no grants shall be made "for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises." The statute defines the term "minority business enterprise" as "a business, at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the stock of which is owned by minority group members." The term "minority group members" is defined in explicitly racial terms: "citizens of the United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Although the statute contains an exemption from this requirement "to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise," this escape clause was provided only to deal with the possibility that certain areas of the country might not contain sufficient qualified "minority business enterprises" to permit compliance with the quota provisions of the legislation. 23
The legislative history of this race-conscious legislation reveals that it represents a deliberate attempt to deal with [438 U.S. 265, 349] the excessive rate of unemployment among minority citizens and to encourage the development of viable minority controlled enterprises. 24 It was believed that such a "set-aside" was required in order to enable minorities, still "new on the scene" and "relatively small," to compete with larger and more established companies which would always be successful in underbidding minority enterprises. 123 Cong. Rec. 5327 (1977) (Rep. Mitchell). What is most significant about the congressional consideration of the measure is that although the use of a racial quota or "set-aside" by a recipient of federal funds would constitute a direct violation of Title VI if that statute were read to prohibit race-conscious action, no mention was made during the debates in either the House or the Senate of even the possibility that the quota provisions for minority contractors might in any way conflict with or modify Title VI. It is inconceivable that such a purported conflict would have escaped congressional attention through an inadvertent failure to recognize the relevance of Title VI. Indeed, the Act of which this affirmative-action provision is a part also contains a provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex which states that this prohibition "will be enforced through agency provisions and rules similar to those already established, with respect to racial and other discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 42 U.S.C. 6709 (1976 ed.). Thus Congress was fully aware of the applicability of Title VI to the funding of public works projects. Under these circumstances, the enactment of the 10% "set-aside" for minority enterprises reflects a congressional judgment that the remedial use of race is permissible under Title VI. We have repeatedly recognized that subsequent legislation reflecting an interpretation of an earlier Act is entitled to great weight in determining the meaning of the earlier statute. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., at 380 -381; [438 U.S. 265, 350] Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243 -244 (1972). See also United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 64 -65 (1940). 25
Prior decisions of this Court also strongly suggest that Title VI does not prohibit the remedial use of race where such action is constitutionally permissible. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), the Court held that the failure of the San [438 U.S. 265, 351] Francisco school system to provide English-language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak English, or to provide them with instruction in Chinese, constituted a violation of Title VI. The Court relied upon an HEW regulation which stipulates that a recipient of federal funds "may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin." 45 CFR 80.3 (b) (2) (1977). It interpreted this regulation as requiring San Francisco to extend the same educational benefits to Chinese-speaking students as to English-speaking students, even though there was no finding or allegation that the city's failure to do so was a result of a purposeful design to discriminate on the basis of race.
Lau is significant in two related respects. First, it indicates that in at least some circumstances agencies responsible for the administration of Title VI may require recipients who have not been guilty of any constitutional violations to depart from a policy of color blindness and to be cognizant of the impact of their actions upon racial minorities. Secondly, Lau clearly requires that institutions receiving federal funds be accorded considerable latitude in voluntarily undertaking race-conscious action designed to remedy the exclusion of significant numbers [438 U.S. 265, 352] of minorities from the benefits of federally funded programs. Although this Court has not yet considered the question, presumably, by analogy to our decisions construing Title VII, a medical school would not be in violation of Title VI under Lau because of the serious under representation of racial minorities in its student body as long as it could demonstrate that its entrance requirements correlated sufficiently with the performance of minority students in medical school and the medical profession. 26 It would be inconsistent with Lau and the emphasis of Title VI and the HEW regulations on voluntary action, however, to require that an institution wait to be adjudicated to be in violation of the law before being permitted to voluntarily undertake corrective action based upon a good-faith and reasonable belief that the failure of certain racial minorities to satisfy entrance requirements is not a measure of their ultimate performance as doctors but a result of the lingering effects of past societal discrimination.
We recognize that Lau, especially when read in light of our subsequent decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which rejected the general proposition that governmental action is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact, may be read as being predicated upon the view that, at least under some circumstances, Title VI proscribes conduct which might not be prohibited by the Constitution. Since we are now of the opinion, for the reasons set forth above, that Title VI's standard, applicable alike to public and private recipients of federal funds, is no broader than the Constitution's, we have serious doubts concerning the correctness of what appears to be the premise of that decision. However, even accepting Lau's implication that impact alone is in some contexts sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI, contrary to our view that Title VI's definition of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's, this would not assist the respondent [438 U.S. 265, 353] in the least. First, for the reasons discussed supra, at 336-350, regardless of whether Title VI's prohibitions extend beyond the Constitution's the evidence fails to establish, and, indeed, compels the rejection of, the proposition that Congress intended to prohibit recipients of federal funds from voluntarily employing race-conscious measures to eliminate the effects of past societal discrimination against racial minorities such as Negroes. Secondly, Lau itself, for the reasons set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, strongly supports the view that voluntary race-conscious remedial action is permissible under Title VI. If discriminatory racial impact alone is enough to demonstrate at least a prima facie Title VI violation, it is difficult to believe that the Title would forbid the Medical School from attempting to correct the racially exclusionary effects of its initial admissions policy during the first two years of the School's operation.
The Court has also declined to adopt a "colorblind" interpretation of other statutes containing nondiscrimination provisions similar to that contained in Title VI. We have held under Title VII that where employment requirements have a disproportionate impact upon racial minorities they constitute a statutory violation, even in the absence of discriminatory intent, unless the employer is able to demonstrate that the requirements are sufficiently related to the needs of the job. 27 More significantly, the Court has required that preferences be given by employers to members of racial minorities as a remedy for past violations of Title VII, even where there has been no finding that the employer has acted with a discriminatory intent. 28 Finally, we have construed the Voting [438 U.S. 265, 354] Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), which contains a provision barring any voting procedure or qualification that denies or abridges "the right of [438 U.S. 265, 355] any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color," as permitting States to voluntarily take race into account in a way that fairly represents the voting strengths of different racial groups in order to comply with the commands of the statute, even where the result is a gain for one racial group at the expense of others. 29
These prior decisions are indicative of the Court's unwillingness to construe remedial statutes designed to eliminate discrimination against racial minorities in a manner which would impede efforts to attain this objective. There is no justification for departing from this course in the case of Title VI and frustrating the clear judgment of Congress that race-conscious remedial action is permissible.
We turn, therefore, to our analysis of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The assertion of human equality is closely associated with the proposition that differences in color or creed, birth or status, are neither significant nor relevant to the way in which persons should be treated. Nonetheless, the position that such factors must be "constitutionally an irrelevance," Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 185 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring), summed up by the shorthand phrase "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind," Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), has never been adopted by this Court as the proper meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, [438 U.S. 265, 356] we have expressly rejected this proposition on a number of occasions.
Our cases have always implied that an "overriding statutory purpose," McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964), could be found that would justify racial classifications. See, e. g., ibid.; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 -101 (1943). More recently, in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971), this Court unanimously reversed the Georgia Supreme Court which had held that a desegregation plan voluntarily adopted by a local school board, which assigned students on the basis of race, was per se invalid because it was not colorblind. And in North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann we held, again unanimously, that a statute mandating colorblind school-assignment plans could not stand "against the background of segregation," since such a limit on remedies would "render illusory the promise of Brown [I]." 402 U.S., at 45 -46.
We conclude, therefore, that racial classifications are not per se invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we turn to the problem of articulating what our role should be in reviewing state action that expressly classifies by race.
Respondent argues that racial classifications are always suspect and, consequently, that this Court should weigh the importance of the objectives served by Davis' special admissions program to see if they are compelling. In addition, he asserts that this Court must inquire whether, in its judgment, there are alternatives to racial classifications which would suit Davis' purposes. Petitioner, on the other hand, states that our proper role is simply to accept petitioner's determination that the racial classifications used by its program are reasonably related to what it tells us are its benign [438 U.S. 265, 357] purposes. We reject petitioner's view, but, because our prior cases are in many respects in apposite to that before us now, we find it necessary to define with precision the meaning of that inexact term, "strict scrutiny."
Unquestionably we have held that a government practice or statute which restricts "fundamental rights" or which contains "suspect classifications" is to be subjected to "strict scrutiny" and can be justified only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less restrictive alternative is available. 30 See, e. g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 -17 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). But no fundamental right is involved here. See San Antonio, supra, at 29-36. Nor do whites as a class have any of the "traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." Id., at 28; see United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 31
Moreover, if the University's representations are credited, this is not a case where racial classifications are "irrelevant and therefore prohibited." Hirabayashi, supra, at 100. Nor has anyone suggested that the University's purposes contravene the cardinal principle that racial classifications that stigmatize - because they are drawn on the presumption that one race is inferior to another or because they put the weight of government [438 U.S. 265, 358] behind racial hatred and separatism - are invalid without more. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886); 32 accord, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880); Korematsu v. United States, supra, at 223; Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 663 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 191-192; Loving v. Virginia, supra, at 11-12; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 -376 (1967); United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165 (1977) (UJO) (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ.); id., at 169 (opinion concurring in part). 33
On the other hand, the fact that this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases does not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard of review that is the very least that is always applied in equal protection cases. 34 "`[T]he mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield [438 U.S. 265, 359] which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.'" Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977), quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). Instead, a number of considerations - developed in gender-discrimination cases but which carry even more force when applied to racial classifications - lead us to conclude that racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes "`must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.'" Califano v. Webster, supra, at 317, quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 35 [438 U.S. 265, 360]
First, race, like, "gender-based classifications too often [has] been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stigmatize politically powerless segments of society." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (dissenting opinion). While a carefully tailored statute designed to remedy past discrimination could avoid these vices, see Califano v. Webster, supra; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, supra, we nonetheless have recognized that the line between honest and thoughtful appraisal of the effects of past discrimination and paternalistic stereotyping is not so clear and that a statute based on the latter is patently capable of stigmatizing all women with a badge of inferiority. Cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, supra, at 508; UJO, supra, at 174, and n. 3 (opinion concurring in part); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 -15 (1975). State programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination obviously create the same hazard of stigma, since they may promote racial separatism and reinforce the views of those who believe that members of racial minorities are inherently incapable of succeeding on their own. See UJO, supra, at 172 (opinion concurring in part); ante, at 298 (opinion of POWELL, J.).
Second, race, like gender and illegitimacy, see Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), is an immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape or set aside. While a classification is not per se invalid because it divides classes on the basis of an immutable characteristic, see supra, at 355-356, it is nevertheless true that such divisions are contrary to our deep belief that "legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or [438 U.S. 265, 361] wrongdoing," Weber, supra, at 175; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), and that advancement sanctioned, sponsored, or approved by the State should ideally be based on individual merit or achievement, or at the least on factors within the control of an individual. See UJO, 430 U.S., at 173 (opinion concurring in part); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 566 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
Because this principle is so deeply rooted it might be supposed that it would be considered in the legislative process and weighed against the benefits of programs preferring individuals because of their race. But this is not necessarily so: The "natural consequence of our governing processes [may well be] that the most `discrete and insular' of whites . . . will be called upon to bear the immediate, direct costs of benign discrimination." UJO, supra, at 174 (opinion concurring in part). Moreover, it is clear from our cases that there are limits beyond which majorities may not go when they classify on the basis of immutable characteristics. See, e. g., Weber, supra. Thus, even if the concern for individualism is weighed by the political process, that weighing cannot waive the personal rights of individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 736 (1964).
In sum, because of the significant risk that racial classifications established for ostensibly benign purposes can be misused, causing effects not unlike those created by invidious classifications, it is inappropriate to inquire only whether there is any conceivable basis that might sustain such a classification. Instead, to justify such a classification an important and articulated purpose for its use must be shown. In addition, any statute must be stricken that stigmatizes any group or that singles out those least well represented in the political process to bear the brunt of a benign program. Thus, our review under the Fourteenth Amendment should be [438 U.S. 265, 362] strict - not "`strict' in theory and fatal in fact," 36 because it is stigma that causes fatality - but strict and searching nonetheless.
Davis' articulated purpose of remedying the effects of past societal discrimination is, under our cases, sufficiently important to justify the use of race-conscious admissions programs where there is a sound basis for concluding that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic, and that the handicap of past discrimination is impeding access of minorities to the Medical School.
At least since Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), it has been clear that a public body which has itself been adjudged to have engaged in racial discrimination cannot bring itself into compliance with the Equal Protection Clause simply by ending its unlawful acts and adopting a neutral stance. Three years later, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and its companion cases, Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); and North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971), reiterated that racially neutral remedies for past discrimination were inadequate where consequences of past discriminatory acts influence or control present decisions. See, e. g., Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra, at 28. And the Court further held both that courts could enter desegregation orders which assigned students and faculty by reference to race, Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra; Davis, supra; United States v. Montgomery County Board of Ed., 395 U.S. 225 (1969), and that local school boards could voluntarily adopt desegregation [438 U.S. 265, 363] plans which made express reference to race if this was necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination. McDaniel v. Barresi, supra. Moreover, we stated that school boards, even in the absence of a judicial finding of past discrimination, could voluntarily adopt plans which assigned students with the end of creating racial pluralism by establishing fixed ratios of black and white students in each school. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, supra, at 16. In each instance, the creation of unitary school systems, in which the effects of past discrimination had been "eliminated root and branch," Green, supra, at 438, was recognized as a compelling social goal justifying the overt use of race.
Finally, the conclusion that state educational institutions may constitutionally adopt admissions programs designed to avoid exclusion of historically disadvantaged minorities, even when such programs explicitly take race into account, finds direct support in our cases construing congressional legislation designed to overcome the present effects of past discrimination. Congress can and has outlawed actions which have a disproportionately adverse and unjustified impact upon members of racial minorities and has required or authorized race-conscious action to put individuals disadvantaged by such impact in the position they otherwise might have enjoyed. See Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Such relief does not require as a predicate proof that recipients of preferential advancement have been individually discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is within a general class of persons likely to have been the victims of discrimination. See id., at 357-362. Nor is it an objection to such relief that preference for minorities will upset the settled expectations of nonminorities. See Franks, supra. In addition, we have held that Congress, to remove barriers to equal opportunity, can and has required employers to use test criteria that fairly reflect the qualifications of minority applicants [438 U.S. 265, 364] vis-a-vis nonminority applicants, even if this means interpreting the qualifications of an applicant in light of his race. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 435 (1975). 37
These cases cannot be distinguished simply by the presence of judicial findings of discrimination, for race-conscious remedies have been approved where such findings have not been made. McDaniel v. Barresi, supra; UJO; see Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Indeed, the requirement of a judicial determination of a constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious remedial actions would be self-defeating. Such a requirement would severely undermine efforts to achieve voluntary compliance with the requirements of law. And our society and jurisprudence have always stressed the value of voluntary efforts to further the objectives of the law. Judicial intervention is a last resort to achieve cessation of illegal conduct or the remedying of its effects rather than a prerequisite to action. 38 [438 U.S. 265, 365]
Nor can our cases be distinguished on the ground that the entity using explicit racial classifications itself had violated 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment or an antidiscrimination regulation, for again race-conscious remedies have been approved where this is not the case. See UJO, 430 U.S., at 157 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ.); 39 id., at 167 (opinion of WHITE, J., joined by REHNQUIST and STEVENS, JJ.); 40 cf. Califano v. Webster, supra, at 317; Kahn v. Shevin, supra. Moreover, the presence or absence of past discrimination by universities or employers is largely irrelevant to resolving respondent's constitutional claims. The claims of those burdened by the race-conscious actions of a university or employer who has never been adjudged in violation of an antidiscrimination law are not any more or less entitled to deference than the claims of the burdened nonminority workers in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., supra, in which the employer had violated Title VII, for in each case the employees are innocent of past discrimination. And, although it might be argued that, where an employer has violated an antidiscrimination law, the expectations of nonminority workers are themselves products of discrimination and hence "tainted," see Franks, supra, at 776, and therefore more easily upset, the same argument can be made with respect to respondent. If it was reasonable to conclude - as we hold that it was - that the failure of minorities to qualify for admission at Davis under regular procedures was due principally to the effects of past discrimination, than there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for pervasive racial discrimination, [438 U.S. 265, 366] respondent would have failed to qualify for admission even in the absence of Davis' special admissions program. 41
Thus, our cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act have held that, in order to achieve minority participation in previously segregated areas of public life, Congress may require or authorize preferential treatment for those likely disadvantaged by societal racial discrimination. Such legislation has been sustained even without a requirement of findings of intentional racial discrimination by those required or authorized to accord preferential treatment, or a case-by-case determination that those to be benefited suffered from racial discrimination. These decisions compel the conclusion that States also may adopt race-conscious programs designed to overcome substantial, chronic minority under representation where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a product of past racial discrimination. 42 [438 U.S. 265, 367]
Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress' power under the Commerce Clause and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that Congress acted under the Commerce Clause power, it was restricted in the use of race in governmental decisionmaking by the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment precisely to the same extent as are the States by 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 43 Therefore, to the extent that Title VII rests on the Commerce Clause power, our decisions such as Franks and [438 U.S. 265, 368] Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), implicitly recognize that the affirmative use of race is consistent with the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and therefore with the Fourteenth Amendment. To the extent that Congress acted pursuant to 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, those cases impliedly recognize that Congress was empowered under that provision to accord preferential treatment to victims of past discrimination in order to overcome the effects of segregation, and we see no reason to conclude that the States cannot voluntarily accomplish under 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment what Congress under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment validly may authorize or compel either the States or private persons to do. A contrary position would conflict with the traditional understanding recognizing the competence of the States to initiate measures consistent with federal policy in the absence of congressional pre-emption of the subject matter. Nothing whatever in the legislative history of either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Civil Rights Acts even remotely suggests that the States are foreclosed from furthering the fundamental purpose of equal opportunity to which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed. Indeed, voluntary initiatives by the States to achieve the national goal of equal opportunity have been recognized to be essential to its attainment. "To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword against such State power would stultify that Amendment." Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 44 We therefore [438 U.S. 265, 369] conclude that Davis' goal of admitting minority students disadvantaged by the effects of past discrimination is sufficiently important to justify use of race-conscious admissions criteria.
Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to remove the disparate racial impact its actions might otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large. There is no question that Davis' program is valid under this test.
Certainly, on the basis of the undisputed factual submissions before this Court, Davis had a sound basis for believing that the problem of under representation of minorities was substantial and chronic and that the problem was attributable to handicaps imposed on minority applicants by past and present racial discrimination. Until at least 1973, the practice of medicine in this country was, in fact, if not in law, largely the prerogative of whites. 45 In 1950, for example, while Negroes [438 U.S. 265, 370] constituted 10% of the total population, Negro physicians constituted only 2.2% of the total number of physicians. 46 The overwhelming majority of these, moreover, were educated in two predominantly Negro medical schools, Howard and Meharry. 47 By 1970, the gap between the proportion of Negroes in medicine and their proportion in the population had widened: The number of Negroes employed in medicine remained frozen at 2.2% 48 while the Negro population had increased to 11.1%. 49 The number of Negro admittees to predominantly white medical schools, moreover, had declined in absolute numbers during the years 1955 to 1964. Odegaard 19.
Moreover, Davis had very good reason to believe that the national pattern of underrepresentation of minorities in medicine would be perpetuated if it retained a single admissions standard. For example, the entering classes in 1968 and 1969, the years in which such a standard was used, included only 1 Chicano and 2 Negroes out of the 50 admittees for each year. Nor is there any relief from this pattern of underrepresentation in the statistics for the regular admissions program in later years. 50
Davis clearly could conclude that the serious and persistent underrepresentation of minorities in medicine depicted by these statistics is the result of handicaps under which minority applicants labor as a consequence of a background of deliberate, purposeful discrimination against minorities in education [438 U.S. 265, 371] and in society generally, as well as in the medical profession. From the inception of our national life, Negroes have been subjected to unique legal disabilities impairing access to equal educational opportunity. Under slavery, penal sanctions were imposed upon anyone attempting to educate Negroes. 51 After enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment the States continued to deny Negroes equal educational opportunity, enforcing a strict policy of segregation that itself stamped Negroes as inferior, Brown I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), that relegated minorities to inferior educational institutions, 52 and that denied them intercourse in the mainstream of professional life necessary to advancement. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Segregation was not limited to public facilities, moreover, but was enforced by criminal penalties against private action as well. Thus, as late as 1908, this Court enforced a state criminal conviction against a private college for teaching Negroes together with whites. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 . See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), gave explicit recognition to the fact that the habit of discrimination and the cultural tradition of race prejudice cultivated by centuries of legal slavery and segregation were not immediately dissipated when Brown I, supra, announced the constitutional principle that equal educational opportunity and participation in all aspects of American life could not be denied on the basis of race. Rather, massive official and private resistance prevented, and to a lesser extent still prevents, attainment of equal opportunity in education at all levels and in the professions. The generation of minority students applying to Davis Medical School since it opened in 1968 - most of whom [438 U.S. 265, 372] were born before or about the time Brown I was decided - clearly have been victims of this discrimination. Judicial decrees recognizing discrimination in public education in California testify to the fact of widespread discrimination suffered by California-born minority applicants; 53 many minority group members living in California, moreover, were born and reared in school districts in Southern States segregated by law. 54 Since separation of schoolchildren by race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone," Brown I, supra, at 494, the conclusion is inescapable that applicants to medical school must be few indeed who endured the effects of de jure segregation, the resistance to Brown I, or the equally debilitating pervasive private discrimination fostered by our long history of official discrimination, cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), and yet come to the starting line with an education equal to whites. 55
Moreover, we need not rest solely on our own conclusion that Davis had sound reason to believe that the effects of past discrimination were handicapping minority applicants to the Medical School, because the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the expert agency charged by Congress with promulgating regulations enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see supra, at 341-343, has also reached the conclusion that race may be taken into account in situations [438 U.S. 265, 373] where a failure to do so would limit participation by minorities in federally funded programs, and regulations promulgated by the Department expressly contemplate that appropriate race-conscious programs may be adopted by universities to remedy unequal access to university programs caused by their own or by past societal discrimination. See supra, at 344-345, discussing 45 CFR 80.3 (b) (6) (ii) and 80.5 (j) (1977). It cannot be questioned that, in the absence of the special admissions program, access of minority students to the Medical School would be severely limited and, accordingly, race-conscious admissions would be deemed an appropriate response under these federal regulations. Moreover, the Department's regulatory policy is not one that has gone unnoticed by Congress. See supra, at 346-347. Indeed, although an amendment to an appropriations bill was introduced just last year that would have prevented the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from mandating race-conscious programs in university admissions, proponents of this measure, significantly, did not question the validity of voluntary implementation of race-conscious admissions criteria. See ibid. In these circumstances, the conclusion implicit in the regulations - that the lingering effects of past discrimination continue to make race-conscious remedial programs appropriate means for ensuring equal educational opportunity in universities - deserves considerable judicial deference. See, e. g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); UJO, 430 U.S., at 175 -178 (opinion concurring in part). 56
The second prong of our test - whether the Davis program stigmatizes any discrete group or individual and whether race [438 U.S. 265, 374] is reasonably used in light of the program's objectives - is clearly satisfied by the Davis program.
It is not even claimed that Davis' program in any way operates to stigmatize or single out any discrete and insular, or even any identifiable, nonminority group. Nor will harm comparable to that imposed upon racial minorities by exclusion or separation on grounds of race be the likely result of the program. It does not, for example, establish an exclusive preserve for minority students apart from and exclusive of whites. Rather, its purpose is to overcome the effects of segregation by bringing the races together. True, whites are excluded from participation in the special admissions program, but this fact only operates to reduce the number of whites to be admitted in the regular admissions program in order to permit admission of a reasonable percentage - less than their proportion of the California population 57 - of otherwise underrepresented qualified minority applicants. 58 [438 U.S. 265, 375]
Nor was Bakke in any sense stamped as inferior by the Medical School's rejection of him. Indeed, it is conceded by all that he satisfied those criteria regarded by the school as generally relevant to academic performance better than most of the minority members who were admitted. Moreover, there is absolutely no basis for concluding that Bakke's rejection as a result of Davis' use of racial preference will affect him throughout his life in the same way as the segregation of the Negro school children in Brown I would have affected them. Unlike discrimination against racial minorities, the use of racial preferences for remedial purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon individual whites in the sense that wherever they go or whatever they do there is a significant likelihood that they will be treated as second-class citizens because of their color. This distinction does not mean that the exclusion of a white resulting from the preferential use of race is not sufficiently serious to require justification; but it does mean that the injury inflicted by such a policy is not distinguishable from disadvantages caused by a wide range of government actions, none of which has ever been thought impermissible for that reason alone.
In addition, there is simply no evidence that the Davis program discriminates intentionally or unintentionally against any minority group which it purports to benefit. The program does not establish a quota in the invidious sense of a ceiling on the number of minority applicants to be admitted. Nor can the program reasonably be regarded as stigmatizing the program's beneficiaries or their race as inferior. The Davis program does not simply advance less qualified applicants; rather, it compensates applicants, who it is uncontested are fully qualified to study medicine, for educational disadvantages which it was reasonable to conclude were a product of [438 U.S. 265, 376] state-fostered discrimination. Once admitted, these students must satisfy the same degree requirements as regularly admitted students; they are taught by the same faculty in the same classes; and their performance is evaluated by the same standards by which regularly admitted students are judged. Under these circumstances, their performance and degrees must be regarded equally with the regularly admitted students with whom they compete for standing. Since minority graduates cannot justifiably be regarded as less well qualified than nonminority graduates by virtue of the special admissions program, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that minority graduates at schools using such programs would be stigmatized as inferior by the existence of such programs.
We disagree with the lower courts' conclusion that the Davis program's use of race was unreasonable in light of its objectives. First, as petitioner argues, there are no practical means by which it could achieve its ends in the foreseeable future without the use of race-conscious measures. With respect to any factor (such as poverty or family educational background) that may be used as a substitute for race as an indicator of past discrimination, whites greatly outnumber racial minorities simply because whites make up a far larger percentage of the total population and therefore far outnumber minorities in absolute terms at every socio-economic level. 59 For example, of a class of recent medical school applicants from families with less than $10,000 income, at least 71% were white. 60 Of all 1970 families headed by a [438 U.S. 265, 377] person not a high school graduate which included related children under 18, 80% were white and 20% were racial minorities. 61 Moreover, while race is positively correlated with differences in GPA and MCAT scores, economic disadvantage is not. Thus, it appears that economically disadvantaged whites do not score less well than economically advantaged whites, while economically advantaged blacks score less well than do disadvantaged whites. 62 These statistics graphically illustrate that the University's purpose to integrate its classes by compensating for past discrimination could not be achieved by a general preference for the economically disadvantaged or the children of parents of limited education unless such groups were to make up the entire class.
Second, the Davis admissions program does not simply equate minority status with disadvantage. Rather, Davis considers on an individual basis each applicant's personal history to determine whether he or she has likely been disadvantaged by racial discrimination. The record makes clear that only minority applicants likely to have been isolated from the mainstream of American life are considered in the special program; other minority applicants are eligible only through the regular admissions program. True, the procedure by which disadvantage is detected is informal, but we have never insisted that educators conduct their affairs through adjudicatory proceedings, and such insistence here is misplaced. A case-by-case inquiry into the extent to which each individual applicant has been affected, either directly or indirectly, by racial discrimination, would seem to be, as a practical matter, virtually impossible, despite the fact that there are excellent reasons for concluding that such effects generally exist. When individual measurement is impossible or extremely impractical, there is nothing to prevent a State [438 U.S. 265, 378] from using categorical means to achieve its ends, at least where the category is closely related to the goal. Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 295 -296 (1969); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). And it is clear from our cases that specific proof that a person has been victimized by discrimination is not a necessary predicate to offering him relief where the probability of victimization is great. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
Finally, Davis' special admissions program cannot be said to violate the Constitution simply because it has set aside a predetermined number of places for qualified minority applicants rather than using minority status as a positive factor to be considered in evaluating the applications of disadvantaged minority applicants. For purposes of constitutional adjudication, there is no difference between the two approaches. In any admissions program which accords special consideration to disadvantaged racial minorities, a determination of the degree of preference to be given is unavoidable, and any given preference that results in the exclusion of a white candidate is no more or less constitutionally acceptable than a program such as that at Davis. Furthermore, the extent of the preference inevitably depends on how many minority applicants the particular school is seeking to admit in any particular year so long as the number of qualified minority applicants exceeds that number. There is no sensible, and certainly no constitutional, distinction between, for example, adding a set number of points to the admissions rating of disadvantaged minority applicants as an expression of the preference with the expectation that this will result in the admission of an approximately determined number of qualified minority applicants and setting a fixed number of places for such applicants as was done here. 63 [438 U.S. 265, 379]
The "Harvard" program, see ante, at 316-318, as those employing it readily concede, openly and successfully employs a racial criterion for the purpose of ensuring that some of the scarce places in institutions of higher education are allocated to disadvantaged minority students. That the Harvard approach does not also make public the extent of the preference and the precise workings of the system while the Davis program employs a specific, openly stated number, does not condemn the latter plan for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment adjudication. It may be that the Harvard plan is more acceptable to the public than is the Davis "quota." If it is, any State, including California, is free to adopt it in preference to a less acceptable alternative, just as it is generally free, as far as the Constitution is concerned, to abjure granting any racial preferences in its admissions program. But there is no basis for preferring a particular preference program simply because in achieving the same goals that the Davis Medical School is pursuing, it proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to the public.
Accordingly, we would reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of California holding the Medical School's special admissions program unconstitutional and directing respondent's admission, as well as that portion of the judgment enjoining the Medical School from according any consideration to race in the admissions process.
[ Footnote 1 ] We also agree with MR. JUSTICE POWELL that a plan like the "Harvard" plan, see ante, at 316-318, is constitutional under our approach, at least so long as the use of race to achieve an integrated student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past discrimination.
[ Footnote 2 ] See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[ Footnote 3 ] New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
[ Footnote 4 ] See Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
[ Footnote 5 ] See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Davis v. School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33 (1971); North Carolina Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
[ Footnote 6 ] See, e. g., cases collected in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 n. 5 (1978).
[ Footnote 7 ] Section 601 of Title VI provides:
[ Footnote 8 ] MR. JUSTICE WHITE believes we should address the private-right-of-action issue. Accordingly, he has filed a separate opinion stating his view that there is no private right of action under Title VI. See post, p. 379.
[ Footnote 9 ] "Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial discrimination. Direct discrimination by Federal, State or local governments is prohibited by the Constitution. But indirect discrimination, through the use of Federal funds, is just as invidious; and it should not be necessary to resort to the courts to prevent each individual violation. Congress and the Executive have their responsibilities to uphold the Constitution also . . . .
[ Footnote 10 ] See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 2732 (1964) (Rep. Dawson); id., at 2481-2482 (Rep. Ryan); id., at 2766 (Rep. Matsunaga); id., at 2595 (Rep. Donahue).
[ Footnote 11 ] There is also language in 42 U.S.C. 2000d-5, enacted in 1966, which supports the conclusion that Title VI's standard is that of the Constitution. Section 2000d-5 provides that "for the purpose of determining [438 U.S. 265, 334] whether a local educational agency is in compliance with [Title VI], compliance by such agency with a final order or judgment of a Federal court for the desegregation of the school or school system operated by such agency shall be deemed to be compliance with [Title VI], insofar as the matters covered in the order or judgment are concerned." This provision was clearly intended to avoid subjecting local educational agencies simultaneously to the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the federal administrative agencies in connection with the imposition of remedial measures designed to end school segregation. Its inclusion reflects the congressional judgment that the requirements imposed by Title VI are identical to those imposed by the Constitution as interpreted by the federal courts.
[ Footnote 12 ] As has already been seen, the proponents of Title VI in the House were motivated by the identical concern. See remarks of Representative Celler (110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964)); Representative Ryan (id., at 1643, 2481-2482); H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, Additional Views of Seven Representatives 24-25 (1963).
[ Footnote 13 ] See separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, post, at 382-383, n. 2.
[ Footnote 14 ] These remarks also reflect the expectations of Title VI's proponents that the application of the Constitution to the conduct at the core of their [438 U.S. 265, 339] concern - the segregation of Negroes in federally funded programs and their exclusion from the full benefits of such programs - was clear. See supra, at 333-336; infra, at 340-342, n. 17.
[ Footnote 15 ] Testimony of Attorney General Kennedy in Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 1731 and S. 1750, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 398-399 (1963).
[ Footnote 16 ] See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 6544, 13820 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6050 (Sen. Javits); id., at 12677 (Sen. Allott).
[ Footnote 17 ] Our Brother STEVENS finds support for a colorblind theory of Title VI in its legislative history, but his interpretation gives undue weight to a few isolated passages from among the thousands of pages of the legislative history of Title VI. See id., at 6547 (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6047, 7055 (Sen. Pastore); id., at 12675 (Sen. Allott); id., at 6561 (Sen. Kuchel). These fragmentary comments fall far short of supporting a [438 U.S. 265, 341] congressional intent to prohibit a racially conscious admissions program designed to assist those who are likely to have suffered injuries from the effects of past discrimination. In the first place, these statements must be read in the context in which they were made. The concern of the speakers was far removed from the incidental injuries which may be inflicted upon non-minorities by the use of racial preferences. It was rather with the evil of the segregation of Negroes in federally financed programs and, in some cases, their arbitrary exclusion on account of race from the benefits of such programs. Indeed, in this context there can be no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment does command color blindness and forbids the use of racial criteria. No consideration was given by these legislators, however, to the permissibility of racial preference designed to redress the effects of injuries suffered as a result of one's color. Significantly one of the legislators, Senator Pastore, and perhaps also Senator Kuchel, who described Title VI as proscribing decisionmaking based upon skin color, also made it clear that Title VI does not outlaw the use of racial criteria in all circumstances. See supra, at 339-340; 110 Cong. Rec. 6562 (1964). See also id., at 2494 (Rep. Celler). Moreover, there are many statements in the legislative history explicitly indicating that Congress intended neither to require nor to prohibit the remedial use of racial preferences where not otherwise required or prohibited by the Constitution. Representative MacGregor addressed directly the problem of preferential treatment:
Much the same can be said of the scattered remarks to be found in the legislative history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race in terms somewhat similar to those contained in Title VI, see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (a) (1) (unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire" any applicant "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . ."), to the effect that any deliberate attempt by an employer to maintain a racial balance is not required by the statute and might in fact violate it. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (Sens. Clark and Case); id., at 6549 (Sen. Humphrey); id., at 2560 (Rep. Goodell). Once again, there is no indication that Congress intended to bar the voluntary use of racial preferences to assist minorities to surmount the obstacles imposed by the remnants of past discrimination. Even assuming that Title VII prohibits employers from deliberately maintaining a particular racial composition in their work force as an end in itself, this does not imply, in the absence of any consideration of the question, that Congress intended to bar the use of racial preferences as a tool for achieving the objective of remedying past discrimination or other compelling ends. The former may well be contrary to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment (where state action is involved), while the latter presents very different constitutional considerations. Indeed, as discussed infra, at 353, this Court has construed Title VII as requiring the use of racial preferences for the purpose of hiring and advancing those who have been adversely affected by past discriminatory employment practices, even at the expense of other employees innocent of discrimination. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767 -768 (1976). Although Title VII clearly does not require employers to take action to remedy the disadvantages imposed upon racial minorities by hands other than their own, such an objective is perfectly consistent with the remedial goals of the statute. See id., at 762-770; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975). There is no more indication in the legislative history of Title VII than in that of Title VI that Congress desired to prohibit such affirmative action to the extent that it is permitted by the Constitution, yet judicial decisions as well as subsequent executive and congressional action clearly establish that Title VII does not forbid race-conscious remedial action. See infra, at 353-355, and n. 28.
[ Footnote 18 ] HEW has stated that the purpose of these regulations is "to specify that affirmative steps to make services more equitably available are not prohibited and that such steps are required when necessary to overcome the consequences of prior discrimination." 36 Fed. Reg. 23494 (1971). Other federal agencies which provide financial assistance pursuant to Title VI have adopted similar regulations. See Supplemental Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 n. 14.
[ Footnote 19 ] Moreover, the President has delegated to the Attorney General responsibility for coordinating the enforcement of Title VI by federal departments and agencies and has directed him to "assist the departments and agencies in accomplishing effective implementation." Exec. Order No. 11764, 3 CFR 849 (1971-1975 Comp.). Accordingly, the views of the Solicitor General, as well as those of HEW, that the use of racial preferences for remedial purposes is consistent with Title VI are entitled to considerable respect.
[ Footnote 20 ] HEW administers at least two explicitly race-conscious programs. Details concerning them may be found in the Office of Management and [438 U.S. 265, 346] Budget, 1977 Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance 205-206, 401-402. The first program, No. 13.375, "Minority Biomedical Support," has as its objectives:
The second program, No. 13.880, entitled "Minority Access To Research Careers," has as its objective to "assist minority institutions to train greater numbers of scientists and teachers in health related fields." Grants under this program are made directly to individuals and to institutions for the purpose of enabling them to make grants to individuals.
[ Footnote 21 ] H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-538, p. 22 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 26188 (1977). See H. J. Res. 662, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Pub. L. 95-205, 91 Stat. 1460.
[ Footnote 22 ] 91 Stat. 117, 42 U.S.C. 6705 (f) (2) (1976 ed.).
[ Footnote 23 ] 123 Cong. Rec. 7156 (1977); id., at 5327-5330.
[ Footnote 24 ] See id., at 7156 (Sen. Brooke).
[ Footnote 25 ] In addition to the enactment of the 10% quota provision discussed supra, Congress has also passed other Acts mandating race-conscious measures to overcome disadvantages experienced by racial minorities. Although these statutes have less direct bearing upon the meaning of Title VI, they do demonstrate that Congress believes race-conscious remedial measures to be both permissible and desirable under at least some circumstances. This in turn undercuts the likelihood that Congress intended to limit voluntary efforts to implement similar measures. For example, 7 (a) of the National Science Foundation Authorization Act, 1977, provides:
[ Footnote 26 ] Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
[ Footnote 27 ] Ibid.; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
[ Footnote 28 ] Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Executive, judicial, and congressional action subsequent to the passage of Title VII conclusively established that the Title did not bar the remedial use of race. Prior to the 1972 amendments to Title VII (Equal Employment Opportunity Act [438 U.S. 265, 354] of 1972, 86 Stat. 103) a number of Courts of Appeals approved race-conscious action to remedy the effects of employment discrimination. See, e. g., Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (CA5 1969); United States v. Electrical Workers, 428 F.2d 144, 149-150 (CA6), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); United States v. Sheetmetal Workers, 416 F.2d 123 (CA8 1969). In 1965, the President issued Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 CFR 339 (1964-1965 Comp.), which as amended by Exec. Order No. 11375, 3 CFR 684 (1966-1970 Comp.), required federal contractors to take affirmative action to remedy the disproportionately low employment of racial minorities in the construction industry. The Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that the race consciousness required by Exec. Order No. 11246 did not conflict with Title VII:
[ Footnote 29 ] United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). See also id., at 167-168 (opinion of WHITE, J.).
[ Footnote 30 ] We do not pause to debate whether our cases establish a "two-tier" analysis, a "sliding scale" analysis, or something else altogether. It is enough for present purposes that strict scrutiny is applied at least in some cases.
[ Footnote 31 ] Of course, the fact that whites constitute a political majority in our Nation does not necessarily mean that active judicial scrutiny of racial classifications that disadvantage whites is inappropriate. Cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499 -500 (1977); id., at 501 (MARSHALL, J., concurring).
[ Footnote 32 ] "[T]he conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for [the refusal to issue permits to Chinese] exists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong . . . . The discrimination is, therefore, illegal . . . ."
[ Footnote 33 ] Indeed, even in Plessy v. Ferguson the Court recognized that a classification by race that presumed one race to be inferior to another would have to be condemned. See 163 U.S., at 544 -551.
[ Footnote 34 ] Paradoxically, petitioner's argument is supported by the cases generally thought to establish the "strict scrutiny" standard in race cases, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Hirabayashi, for example, the Court, responding to a claim that a racial classification was rational, sustained a racial classification solely on the basis of a conclusion in the double negative that it could not say that facts which might have been available "could afford no ground for differentiating citizens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States." 320 U.S., at 101 . A similar mode of analysis was followed in Korematsu, see 323 U.S., at 224 , even though the Court stated there that racial classifications were "immediately suspect" and should be subject to "the most rigid scrutiny." Id., at 216.
[ Footnote 35 ] We disagree with our Brother POWELL's suggestion, ante, at 303, that the presence of "rival groups which can claim that they, too, are entitled to preferential treatment" distinguishes the gender cases or is relevant to the question of scope of judicial review of race classifications. We are not asked to determine whether groups other than those favored by the Davis program should similarly be favored. All we are asked to do is to pronounce the constitutionality of what Davis has done.
But, were we asked to decide whether any given rival group - German-Americans for example - must constitutionally be accorded preferential treatment, we do have a "principled basis," ante, at 296, for deciding this question, one that is well established in our cases: The Davis program expressly sets out four classes which receive preferred status. Ante, at 274. The program clearly distinguishes whites, but one cannot reason from this a conclusion that German-Americans, as a national group, are singled out for invidious treatment. And even if the Davis program had a differential impact on German-Americans, they would have no constitutional claim unless they could prove that Davis intended invidiously to discriminate against German-Americans. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 -265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 -241 (1976). If this could not be shown, then "the principle that calls for the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying fundamental rights . . . is inapplicable," Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966), and the only question is whether it was rational for Davis to conclude that the groups it preferred had a greater claim to compensation than the groups it excluded. See ibid.; San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 38 -39 (1973) (applying Katzenbach test to state action intended to remove discrimination [438 U.S. 265, 360] in educational opportunity). Thus, claims of rival groups, although they may create thorny political problems, create relatively simple problems for the courts.
[ Footnote 36 ] Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1972).
[ Footnote 37 ] In Albemarle, we approved "differential validation" of employment tests. See 422 U.S., at 435 . That procedure requires that an employer must ensure that a test score of, for example, 50 for a minority job applicant means the same thing as a score of 50 for a nonminority applicant. By implication, were it determined that a test score of 50 for a minority corresponded in "potential for employment" to a 60 for whites, the test could not be used consistently with Title VII unless the employer hired minorities with scores of 50 even though he might not hire nonminority applicants with scores above 50 but below 60. Thus, it is clear that employers, to ensure equal opportunity, may have to adopt race-conscious hiring practices.
[ Footnote 38 ] Indeed, Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 put great emphasis on voluntarism in remedial action. See supra, at 336-338. And, significantly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has recently proposed guidelines authorizing employers to adopt racial preferences as a remedial measure where they have a reasonable basis for [438 U.S. 265, 365] believing that they might otherwise be held in violation of Title VII. See 42 Fed. Reg. 64826 (1977).
[ Footnote 39 ] "[T]he [Voting Rights] Act's prohibition . . . is not dependent upon proving past unconstitutional apportionments . . . ."
[ Footnote 40 ] "[T]he State is [not] powerless to minimize the consequences of racial discrimination by voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls."
[ Footnote 41 ] Our cases cannot be distinguished by suggesting, as our Brother POWELL does, that in none of them was anyone deprived of "the relevant benefit." Ante, at 304. Our school cases have deprived whites of the neighborhood school of their choice; our Title VII cases have deprived nondiscriminating employees of their settled seniority expectations; and UJO deprived the Hassidim of bloc-voting strength. Each of these injuries was constitutionally cognizable as is respondent's here.
[ Footnote 42 ] We do not understand MR. JUSTICE POWELL to disagree that providing a remedy for past racial prejudice can constitute a compelling purpose sufficient to meet strict scrutiny. See ante, at 305. Yet, because petitioner is a corporation administering a university, he would not allow it to exercise such power in the absence of "judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Ante, at 307. While we agree that reversal in this case would follow a fortiori had Davis been guilty of invidious racial discrimination or if a federal statute mandated that universities refrain from applying any admissions policy that had a disparate and unjustified racial impact, see, e. g., McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971); Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), we do not think it of constitutional significance that Davis has not been so adjudged.
Generally, the manner in which a State chooses to delegate governmental functions is for it to decide. Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 , [438 U.S. 265, 367] 256 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result). California, by constitutional provision, has chosen to place authority over the operation of the University of California in the Board of Regents. See Cal. Const., Art. 9, 9 (a). Control over the University is to be found not in the legislature, but rather in the Regents who have been vested with full legislative (including policymaking), administrative, and adjudicative powers by the citizens of California. See ibid.; Ishimatsu v. Regents, 266 Cal. App. 2d 854, 863-864, 72 Cal. Rptr. 756, 762-763 (1968); Goldberg v. Regents, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468 (1967); 30 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 162, 166 (1957) ("The Regents, not the legislature, have the general rule-making or policy-making power in regard to the University"). This is certainly a permissible choice, see Sweezy, supra, and we, unlike our Brother POWELL, find nothing in the Equal Protection Clause that requires us to depart from established principle by limiting the scope of power the Regents may exercise more narrowly than the powers that may constitutionally be wielded by the Assembly.
Because the Regents can exercise plenary legislative and administrative power, it elevates form over substance to insist that Davis could not use race-conscious remedial programs until it had been adjudged in violation of the Constitution or an antidiscrimination statute. For, if the Equal Protection Clause required such a violation as a predicate, the Regents could simply have promulgated a regulation prohibiting disparate treatment not justified by the need to admit only qualified students, and could have declared Davis to have been in violation of such a regulation on the basis of the exclusionary effect of the admissions policy applied during the first two years of its operation. See infra, at 370.
[ Footnote 43 ] "Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam), citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975).
[ Footnote 44 ] Railway Mail Assn. held that a state statute forbidding racial discrimination by certain labor organizations did not abridge the Association's due process rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment because that result "would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color." 326 U.S., at 94 . That case thus established the principle that a State voluntarily could go beyond what the Fourteenth Amendment required in eliminating private racial discrimination.
[ Footnote 45 ] According to 89 schools responding to a questionnaire sent to 112 medical schools (all of the then-accredited medical schools in the United States except Howard and Meharry), substantial efforts to admit minority students did not begin until 1968. That year was the earliest year of involvement for 34% of the schools; an additional 66% became involved during the years 1969 to 1973. See C. Odegaard, Minorities in Medicine: From Receptive Passivity to Positive Action, 1966-1976, p. 19 (1977) (hereinafter Odegaard). These efforts were reflected in a significant increase in the percentage of minority M. D. graduates. The number of American Negro graduates increased from 2.2% in 1970 to 3.3% in 1973 and 5.0% in 1975. Significant percentage increases in the number of Mexican-American, American Indian, and mainland Puerto Rican graduates were also recorded during those years. Id., at 40.
The statistical information cited in this and the following notes was compiled by Government officials or medical educators, and has been [438 U.S. 265, 370] brought to our attention in many of the briefs. Neither the parties nor the amici challenge the validity of the statistics alluded to in our discussion.
[ Footnote 46 ] D. Reitzes, Negroes and Medicine, pp. xxvii, 3 (1958).
[ Footnote 47 ] Between 1955 and 1964, for example, the percentage of Negro physicians graduated in the United States who were trained at these schools ranged from 69.0% to 75.8%. See Odegaard 19.
[ Footnote 48 ] U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, Minorities and Women in the Health Fields 7 (Pub. No. (HRA) 75-22, May 1974).
[ Footnote 49 ] U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census, vol. 1, pt. 1, Table 60 (1973).
[ Footnote 50 ] See ante, at 276 n. 6 (opinion of POWELL, J.).
[ Footnote 51 ] See, e. g., R. Wade, Slavery in the Cities: The South 1820-1860, pp. 90-91 (1964).
[ Footnote 52 ] For an example of unequal facilities in California schools, see Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Board, 386 F. Supp. 539, 542 (CD Cal. 1974). See also R. Kluger, Simple Justice (1976).
[ Footnote 53 ] See e. g., Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28 (1976); Soria v. Oxnard School Dist. Board, supra; Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 311 F. Supp. 501 (CD Cal. 1970); C. Wollenberg, All Deliberate Speed: Segregation and Exclusion in California Schools, 1855-1975, pp. 136-177 (1976).
[ Footnote 54 ] For example, over 40% of American-born Negro males aged 20 to 24 residing in California in 1970 were born in the South, and the statistic for females was over 48%. These statistics were computed from data contained in Census, supra n. 49, pt. 6, California, Tables 139, 140.
[ Footnote 55 ] See, e. g., O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to Higher Education, 80 Yale L. J. 699, 729-731 (1971).
[ Footnote 56 ] Congress and the Executive have also adopted a series of race-conscious programs, each predicated on an understanding that equal opportunity cannot be achieved by neutrality because of the effects of past and present discrimination. See supra, at 348-349.
[ Footnote 57 ] Negroes and Chicanos alone constitute approximately 22% of California's population. This percentage was computed from data contained in Census, supra n. 49, pt. 6, California, sec. 1, 6-4, and Table 139.
[ Footnote 58 ] The constitutionality of the special admissions program is buttressed by its restriction to only 16% of the positions in the Medical School, a percentage less than that of the minority population in California, see ibid., and to those minority applicants deemed qualified for admission and deemed likely to contribute to the Medical School and the medical profession. Record 67. This is consistent with the goal of putting minority applicants in the position they would have been in if not for the evil of racial discrimination. Accordingly, this case does not raise the question whether even a remedial use of race would be unconstitutional if it admitted unqualified minority applicants in preference to qualified applicants or admitted, as a result of preferential consideration, racial minorities in numbers significantly in excess of their proportional representation in the relevant population. Such programs might well be inadequately justified by the legitimate remedial objectives. Our allusion to the proportional percentage of minorities in the population of the State administering the program is not intended to establish either that figure or that population universe as a constitutional benchmark. In this case, [438 U.S. 265, 375] even respondent, as we understand him, does not argue that, if the special admissions program is otherwise constitutional, the allotment of 16 places in each entering class for special admittees is unconstitutionally high.
[ Footnote 59 ] See Census, supra n. 49, Sources and Structure of Family Income, pp. 1-12.
[ Footnote 60 ] This percentage was computed from data presented in B. Waldman, Economic and Racial Disadvantage as Reflected in Traditional Medical School Selection Factors: A Study of 1976 Applicants to U.S. Medical Schools 34 (Table A-15), 42 (Table A-23) (Association of American Medical Colleges 1977).
[ Footnote 61 ] This figure was computed from data contained in Census, supra n. 49, pt. 1, United States Summary, Table 209.
[ Footnote 62 ] See Waldman, supra n. 60, at 10-14 (Figures 1-5).
[ Footnote 63 ] The excluded white applicant, despite MR. JUSTICE POWELL's contention [438 U.S. 265, 379] to the contrary, ante, at 318 n. 52, receives no more or less "individualized consideration" under our approach than under his.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE.
I write separately concerning the question of whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., provides for a private cause of action. Four Justices are apparently of the view that such a private cause of action [438 U.S. 265, 380] exists, and four Justices assume it for purposes of this case. I am unwilling merely to assume an affirmative answer. If in fact no private cause of action exists, this Court and the lower Courts as well are without jurisdiction to consider respondent's Title VI claim. As I see it, if we are not obliged to do so, it is at least advisable to address this threshold jurisdictional issue. See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 (1938). 1 Furthermore, just as it is inappropriate to address constitutional issues without determining whether statutory grounds urged before us are dispositive, it is at least questionable practice to adjudicate a novel and difficult statutory issue without first considering whether we have jurisdiction to decide it. Consequently, I address the question of whether respondent may bring suit under Title VI.
A private cause of action under Title VI, in terms both of [438 U.S. 265, 381] the Civil Rights Act as a whole and that Title, would not be "consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme" and would be contrary to the legislative intent. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Title II, 42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq., dealing with public accommodations, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), dealing with employment, proscribe private discriminatory conduct that as of 1964 neither the Constitution nor other federal statutes had been construed to forbid. Both Titles carefully provided for private actions as well as for official participation in enforcement. Title III, 42 U.S.C. 2000b et seq., and Title IV, 42 U.S.C. 2000c et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. V), dealing with public facilities and public education, respectively, authorize suits by the Attorney General to eliminate racial discrimination in these areas. Because suits to end discrimination in public facilities and public education were already available under 42 U.S.C. 1983, it was, of course, unnecessary to provide for private actions under Titles III and IV. But each Title carefully provided that its provisions for public actions would not adversely affect pre-existing private remedies. 2000b-2 and 2000c-8.
The role of Title VI was to terminate federal financial support for public and private institutions or programs that discriminated on the basis of race. Section 601, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, imposed the proscription that no person, on the grounds of race, color, or national origin, was to be excluded from or discriminated against under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. But there is no express provision for private actions to enforce Title VI, and it would be quite incredible if Congress, after so carefully attending to the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, intended silently to create a private cause of action to enforce Title VI.
It is also evident from the face of 602, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1, that Congress intended the departments and agencies [438 U.S. 265, 382] to define and to refine, by rule or regulation, the general proscription of 601, subject only to judicial review of agency action in accordance with established procedures. Section 602 provides for enforcement: Every federal department or agency furnishing financial support is to implement the proscription by appropriate rule or regulation, each of which requires approval by the President. Termination of funding as a sanction for noncompliance is authorized, but only after a hearing and after the failure of voluntary means to secure compliance. Moreover, termination may not take place until the department or agency involved files with the appropriate committees of the House and Senate a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action and 30 days have elapsed thereafter. Judicial review was provided, at least for actions terminating financial assistance.
Termination of funding was regarded by Congress as a serious enforcement step, and the legislative history is replete with assurances that it would not occur until every possibility for conciliation had been exhausted. 2 To allow a private [438 U.S. 265, 383] individual to sue to cut off funds under Title VI would compromise these assurances and short circuit the procedural preconditions provided in Title VI. If the Federal Government may not cut off funds except pursuant to an agency rule, approved by the President, and presented to the appropriate committee of Congress for a layover period, and after voluntary means to achieve compliance have failed, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to permit individuals to circumvent these administrative prerequisites themselves.
Furthermore, although Congress intended Title VI to end federal financial support for racially discriminatory policies of not only public but also private institutions and programs, it is extremely unlikely that Congress, without a word indicating that it intended to do so, contemplated creating an independent, private statutory cause of action against all private as well as public agencies that might be in violation of the section. There is no doubt that Congress regarded private litigation as an important tool to attack discriminatory practices. It does not at all follow, however, that Congress anticipated new private actions under Title VI itself. Wherever a discriminatory program was a public undertaking, such as a public school, private remedies were already available under other statutes, and a private remedy under Title VI was [438 U.S. 265, 384] unnecessary. Congress was well aware of this fact. Significantly, there was frequent reference to Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (CA4 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), throughout the congressional deliberations. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (1964) (Sen. Humphrey). Simkins held that under appropriate circumstances, the operation of a private hospital with "massive use of public funds and extensive state-federal sharing in the common plan" constituted "state action" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 323 F.2d, at 967. It was unnecessary, of course, to create a Title VI private action against private discriminators where they were already within the reach of existing private remedies. But when they were not - and Simkins carefully disclaimed holding that "every subvention by the federal or state government automatically involves the beneficiary in `state action,'" ibid. 3 - it is difficult [438 U.S. 265, 385] to believe that Congress silently created a private remedy to terminate conduct that previously had been entirely beyond the reach of federal law.
For those who believe, contrary to my views, that Title VI was intended to create a stricter standard of color blindness than the Constitution itself requires, the result of no private cause of action follows even more readily. In that case Congress must be seen to have banned degrees of discrimination, as well as types of discriminators, not previously reached by law. A Congress careful enough to provide that existing private causes of action would be preserved (in Titles III and IV) would not leave for inference a vast new extension of private enforcement power. And a Congress so exceptionally concerned with the satisfaction of procedural preliminaries before confronting fund recipients with the choice of a cutoff or of stopping discriminating would not permit private parties to pose precisely that same dilemma in a greatly widened category of cases with no procedural requirements whatsoever.
Significantly, in at least three instances legislators who played a major role in the passage of Title VI explicitly stated that a private right of action under Title VI does not exist. 4 [438 U.S. 265, 386] As an "indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one," Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S., at 78 , clearer statements cannot be imagined, and under Cort, "an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action [is] controlling." Id., at 82. Senator Keating, for example, proposed a private "right to sue" for the "person suffering from discrimination"; but the Department of Justice refused to include it, and the Senator acquiesced. 5 These are not neutral, ambiguous statements. They indicate the absence of a legislative intent to create a private remedy. Nor do any of these statements make nice distinctions between a private cause of action to enjoin discrimination and one to cut off funds, as MR. JUSTICE STEVENS and the three Justices who join his opinion apparently would. See post, at 419-420, n. 26. Indeed, it would be odd if they did, since the practical effect of either type of private cause of action would be identical. If private suits to enjoin conduct allegedly violative of 601 were permitted, recipients of federal funds would be presented with the choice of either ending what the court, rather than the agency, determined to be a discriminatory practice within the meaning of Title VI or refusing federal funds and thereby escaping from the statute's jurisdictional predicate. 6 This is precisely the same choice as would confront recipients if suit were brought to cut off funds. Both types of actions would equally jeopardize the administrative processes so carefully structured into the law. [438 U.S. 265, 387]
This Court has always required "that the inference of such a private cause of action not otherwise authorized by the statute must be consistent with the evident legislative intent and, of course, with the effectuation of the purposes intended to be served by the Act." National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974). See also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 418 -420 (1975). A private cause of action under Title VI is unable to satisfy either prong of this test.
Because each of my colleagues either has a different view or assumes a private cause of action, however, the merits of the Title VI issue must be addressed. My views in that regard, as well as my views with respect to the equal protection issue, are included in the joint opinion that my Brothers BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN and I have filed. 7
[ Footnote 1 ] It is also clear from Griffin that "lack of jurisdiction . . . touching the subject matter of the litigation cannot be waived by the parties . . . ." 303 U.S., at 229 . See also Mount Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908); Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), we did adjudicate a Title VI claim brought by a class of individuals. But the existence of a private cause of action was not at issue. In addition, the understanding of MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S concurring opinion, which observed that standing was not being contested, was that the standing alleged by petitioners was as third-party beneficiaries of the funding contract between the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the San Francisco United School District, a theory not alleged by the present respondent. Id., at 571 n. 2. Furthermore, the plaintiffs in Lau alleged jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. 1983 rather than directly under the provisions of Title VI, as does the plaintiff in this case. Although the Court undoubtedly had an obligation to consider the jurisdictional question, this is surely not the first instance in which the Court has bypassed a jurisdictional problem not presented by the parties. Certainly the Court's silence on the jurisdictional question, when considered in the context of the indifference of the litigants to it and the fact that jurisdiction was alleged under 1983, does not foreclose a reasoned conclusion that Title VI affords no private cause of action.
[ Footnote 2 ] "Yet, before that principle [that `Federal funds are not to be used to support racial discrimination'] is implemented to the detriment of any person, agency, or State, regulations giving notice of what conduct is required must be drawn up by the agency administering the program. . . . Before such regulations become effective, they must be submitted to and approved by the President.
[ Footnote 3 ] This Court has never held that the mere receipt of federal or state funds is sufficient to make the recipient a federal or state actor. In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), private schools that received state aid were held subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on discrimination, but the Court's test required "tangible financial aid" with a "significant tendency to facilitate, reinforce, and support private discrimination." Id., at 466. The mandate of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), to sift facts and weigh circumstances of governmental support in each case to determine whether private or state action was involved, has not been abandoned for an automatic rule based on receipt of funds.
Contemporaneous with the congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act was this Court's decision in Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). Tuition grants and tax concessions were provided for parents of students in private schools, which discriminated racially. The Court found sufficient state action, but carefully limited its holding to the circumstances presented: "[C]losing the Prince Edward schools and meanwhile contributing to the support of the private segregated white schools that took their place denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws." Id., at 232.
Hence, neither at the time of the enactment of Title VI, nor at the present time to the extent this Court has spoken, has mere receipt of [438 U.S. 265, 385] state funds created state action. Moreover, Simkins has not met with universal approval among the United States Courts of Appeals. See cases cited in Greco v. Orange Memorial Hospital Corp., 423 U.S. 1000, 1004 (1975) (WHITE, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
[ Footnote 4 ] "Nowhere in this section do you find a comparable right of legal action for a person who feels he has been denied his rights to participate in the benefits of Federal funds. Nowhere. Only those who have been cut off can go to court and present their claim." 110 Cong. Rec. 2467 (1964) (Rep. Gill).
[ Footnote 5 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 6 ] As Senator Ribicoff stated: "Sometimes those eligible for Federal assistance may elect to reject such aid, unwilling to agree to a nondiscrimination requirement. If they choose that course, the responsibility is theirs." Id., at 7067.
[ Footnote 7 ] I also join Parts I, III-A, and V-C of MR. JUSTICE POWELL'S opinion.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL.
I agree with the judgment of the Court only insofar as it permits a university to consider the race of an applicant in making admissions decisions. I do not agree that petitioner's admissions program violates the Constitution. For it must be remembered that, during most of the past 200 years, the Constitution as interpreted by this Court did not prohibit the most ingenious and pervasive forms of discrimination against the Negro. Now, when a state acts to remedy the effects of that legacy of discrimination, I cannot believe that this same Constitution stands as a barrier.
Three hundred and fifty years ago, the Negro was dragged to this country in chains to be sold into slavery. Uprooted from his homeland and thrust into bondage for forced labor, [438 U.S. 265, 388] the slave was deprived of all legal rights. It was unlawful to teach him to read; he could be sold away from his family and friends at the whim of his master; and killing or maiming him was not a crime. The system of slavery brutalized and dehumanized both master and slave. 1
The denial of human rights was etched into the American Colonies' first attempts at establishing self-government. When the colonists determined to seek their independence from England, they drafted a unique document cataloguing their grievances against the King and proclaiming as "self-evident" that "all men are created equal" and are endowed "with certain unalienable Rights," including those to "Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." The self-evident truths and the unalienable rights were intended, however, to apply only to white men. An earlier draft of the Declaration of Independence, submitted by Thomas Jefferson to the Continental Congress, had included among the charges against the King that
The implicit protection of slavery embodied in the Declaration of Independence was made explicit in the Constitution, which treated a slave as being equivalent to three-fifths of a person for purposes of apportioning representatives and taxes among the States. Art. I, 2. The Constitution also contained a clause ensuring that the "Migration or Importation" of slaves into the existing States would be legal until at least 1808, Art. I, 9, and a fugitive slave clause requiring that when a slave escaped to another State, he must be returned on the claim of the master, Art. IV, 2. In their declaration of the principles that were to provide the cornerstone of the new Nation, therefore, the Framers made it plain that "we the people," for whose protection the Constitution was designed, did not include those whose skins were the wrong color. As Professor John Hope Franklin has observed, Americans "proudly accepted the challenge and responsibility of their new political freedom by establishing the machinery and safeguards that insured the continued enslavement of blacks." Franklin 100.
The individual States likewise established the machinery to protect the system of slavery through the promulgation of the Slave Codes, which were designed primarily to defend the property interest of the owner in his slave. The position of the Negro slave as mere property was confirmed by this Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), holding that the Missouri Compromise - which prohibited slavery in the portion of the Louisiana Purchase Territory north of Missouri - was unconstitutional because it deprived slave owners of their property without due process. The Court declared that under the Constitution a slave was property, and "[t]he right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of the United [438 U.S. 265, 390] States . . . ." Id., at 451. The Court further concluded that Negroes were not intended to be included as citizens under the Constitution but were "regarded as beings of an inferior order . . . altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect . . . ." Id., at 407.
The status of the Negro as property was officially erased by his emancipation at the end of the Civil War. But the long-awaited emancipation, while freeing the Negro from slavery, did not bring him citizenship or equality in any meaningful way. Slavery was replaced by a system of "laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an extent that their freedom was of little value." Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 70 (1873). Despite the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Negro was systematically denied the rights those Amendments were supposed to secure. The combined actions and inactions of the State and Federal Governments maintained Negroes in a position of legal inferiority for another century after the Civil War.
The Southern States took the first steps to re-enslave the Negroes. Immediately following the end of the Civil War, many of the provisional legislatures passed Black Codes, similar to the Slave Codes, which, among other things, limited the rights of Negroes to own or rent property and permitted imprisonment for breach of employment contracts. Over the next several decades, the South managed to disenfranchise the Negroes in spite of the Fifteenth Amendment by various techniques, including poll taxes, deliberately complicated balloting processes, property and literacy qualifications, and finally the white primary.
Congress responded to the legal disabilities being imposed [438 U.S. 265, 391] in the Southern States by passing the Reconstruction Acts and the Civil Rights Acts. Congress also responded to the needs of the Negroes at the end of the Civil War by establishing the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, better known as the Freedmen's Bureau, to supply food, hospitals, land, and education to the newly freed slaves. Thus, for a time it seemed as if the Negro might be protected from the continued denial of his civil rights and might be relieved of the disabilities that prevented him from taking his place as a free and equal citizen.
That time, however, was short-lived. Reconstruction came to a close, and, with the assistance of this Court, the Negro was rapidly stripped of his new civil rights. In the words of C. Vann Woodward: "By narrow and ingenious interpretation [the Supreme Court's] decisions over a period of years had whittled away a great part of the authority presumably given the government for protection of civil rights." Woodward 139.
The Court began by interpreting the Civil War Amendments in a manner that sharply curtailed their substantive protections. See, e. g., Slaughter-House Cases, supra; United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876). Then in the notorious Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court strangled Congress' efforts to use its power to promote racial equality. In those cases the Court invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that made it a crime to deny equal access to "inns, public conveyances, theaters and other places of public amusement." Id., at 10. According to the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to proscribe only discriminatory action by the State. The Court ruled that the Negroes who were excluded from public places suffered only an invasion of their social rights at the hands of private individuals, and Congress had no power to remedy that. Id., at 24-25. "When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that [438 U.S. 265, 392] state," the Court concluded, "there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws . . . ." Id., at 25. As Mr. Justice Harlan noted in dissent, however, the Civil War Amendments and Civil Rights Acts did not make the Negroes the "special favorite" of the laws but instead "sought to accomplish in reference to that race . . . - what had already been done in every State of the Union for the white race - to secure and protect rights belonging to them as freemen and citizens; nothing more." Id., at 61.
The Court's ultimate blow to the Civil War Amendments and to the equality of Negroes came in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In upholding a Louisiana law that required railway companies to provide "equal but separate" accommodations for whites and Negroes, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended "to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either." Id., at 544. Ignoring totally the realities of the positions of the two races, the Court remarked:
The fears of Mr. Justice Harlan were soon to be realized. In the wake of Plessy, many States expanded their Jim Crow laws, which had up until that time been limited primarily to passenger trains and schools. The segregation of the races was extended to residential areas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms, and bathrooms. There were even statutes and ordinances which authorized separate phone booths for Negroes and whites, which required that textbooks used by children of one race be kept separate from those used by the other, and which required that Negro and white prostitutes be kept in separate districts. In 1898, after Plessy, the Charlestown News and Courier printed a parody of Jim Crow laws:
Nor were the laws restricting the rights of Negroes limited [438 U.S. 265, 394] solely to the Southern States. In many of the Northern States, the Negro was denied the right to vote, prevented from serving on juries, and excluded from theaters, restaurants, hotels, and inns. Under President Wilson, the Federal Government began to require segregation in Government buildings; desks of Negro employees were curtained off; separate bathrooms and separate tables in the cafeterias were provided; and even the galleries of the Congress were segregated. When his segregationist policies were attacked, President Wilson responded that segregation was "`not humiliating but a benefit'" and that he was "`rendering [the Negroes] more safe in their possession of office and less likely to be discriminated against.'" Kluger 91.
The enforced segregation of the races continued into the middle of the 20th century. In both World Wars, Negroes were for the most part confined to separate military units; it was not until 1948 that an end to segregation in the military was ordered by President Truman. And the history of the exclusion of Negro children from white public schools is too well known and recent to require repeating here. That Negroes were deliberately excluded from public graduate and professional schools - and thereby denied the opportunity to become doctors, lawyers, engineers, and the like - is also well established. It is of course true that some of the Jim Crow laws (which the decisions of this Court had helped to foster) were struck down by this Court in a series of decisions leading up to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, e. g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Those decisions, however, did not automatically end segregation, nor did they move Negroes from a position of legal inferiority to one of equality. The legacy of years of slavery and of years of second-class citizenship in the wake of emancipation could not be so easily eliminated. [438 U.S. 265, 395]
The position of the Negro today in America is the tragic but inevitable consequence of centuries of unequal treatment. Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaningful equality remains a distant dream for the Negro.
A Negro child today has a life expectancy which is shorter by more than five years than that of a white child. 2 The Negro child's mother is over three times more likely to die of complications in childbirth, 3 and the infant mortality rate for Negroes is nearly twice that for whites. 4 The median income of the Negro family is only 60% that of the median of a white family, 5 and the percentage of Negroes who live in families with incomes below the poverty line is nearly four times greater than that of whites. 6
When the Negro child reaches working age, he finds that America offers him significantly less than it offers his white counterpart. For Negro adults, the unemployment rate is twice that of whites, 7 and the unemployment rate for Negro teenagers is nearly three times that of white teenagers. 8 A Negro male who completes four years of college can expect a median annual income of merely $110 more than a white male who has only a high school diploma. 9 Although Negroes [438 U.S. 265, 396] represent 11.5% of the population, 10 they are only 1.2% of the lawyers and judges, 2% of the physicians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of the engineers and 2.6% of the college and university professors. 11
The relationship between those figures and the history of unequal treatment afforded to the Negro cannot be denied. At every point from birth to death the impact of the past is reflected in the still disfavored position of the Negro.
In light of the sorry history of discrimination and its devastating impact on the lives of Negroes, bringing the Negro into the mainstream of American life should be a state interest of the highest order. To fail to do so is to ensure that America will forever remain a divided society.
I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment requires us to accept that fate. Neither its history nor our past cases lend any support to the conclusion that a university may not remedy the cumulative effects of society's discrimination by giving consideration to race in an effort to increase the number and percentage of Negro doctors.
This Court long ago remarked that
Since the Congress that considered and rejected the objections to the 1866 Freedmen's Bureau Act concerning special relief to Negroes also proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, it is inconceivable that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prohibit all race-conscious relief measures. It "would be a distortion of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or color," Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 94 (1945), to hold that it barred state action to remedy the effects of that discrimination. Such a result would pervert the intent of the Framers by substituting abstract equality for the genuine equality the Amendment was intended to achieve.
As has been demonstrated in our joint opinion, this Court's past cases establish the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures. Beginning with the school desegregation cases, we recognized that even absent a judicial or legislative finding of constitutional violation, a school board constitutionally could consider the race of students in making school-assignment decisions. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971). We noted, moreover, that a
Only last Term, in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), we upheld a New York reapportionment plan that was deliberately drawn on the basis of race to enhance the electoral power of Negroes and Puerto Ricans; the plan had the effect of diluting the electoral strength of the Hasidic Jewish community. We were willing in UJO to sanction the remedial use of a racial classification even though it disadvantaged otherwise "innocent" individuals. In another case last Term, Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977), the Court upheld a provision in the Social Security laws that discriminated against men because its purpose was "`the permissible one of redressing our society's longstanding disparate treatment of women.'" Id., at 317, quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 209 n. 8 (1977) (plurality opinion). We thus recognized the permissibility of remedying past societal discrimination through the use of otherwise disfavored classifications.
Nothing in those cases suggests that a university cannot similarly act to remedy past discrimination. 12 It is true that [438 U.S. 265, 400] in both UJO and Webster the use of the disfavored classification was predicated on legislative or administrative action, but in neither case had those bodies made findings that there had been constitutional violations or that the specific individuals to be benefited had actually been the victims of discrimination. Rather, the classification in each of those cases was based on a determination that the group was in need of the remedy because of some type of past discrimination. There is thus ample support for the conclusion that a university can employ race-conscious measures to remedy past societal discrimination, without the need for a finding that those benefited were actually victims of that discrimination.
While I applaud the judgment of the Court that a university may consider race in its admissions process, it is more than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today's judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It is unnecessary in 20th-century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes in America has been different in kind, not just in degree, from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured. The dream of America as the great melting pot has [438 U.S. 265, 401] not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot.
These differences in the experience of the Negro make it difficult for me to accept that Negroes cannot be afforded greater protection under the Fourteenth Amendment where it is necessary to remedy the effects of past discrimination. In the Civil Rights Cases, supra, the Court wrote that the Negro emerging from slavery must cease "to be the special favorite of the laws." 109 U.S., at 25 ; see supra, at 392. We cannot in light of the history of the last century yield to that view. Had the Court in that decision and others been willing to "do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship, what it did . . . for the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves," 109 U.S., at 53 (Harlan, J., dissenting), we would not need now to permit the recognition of any "special wards."
Most importantly, had the Court been willing in 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson, to hold that the Equal Protection Clause forbids differences in treatment based on race, we would not be faced with this dilemma in 1978. We must remember, however, that the principle that the "Constitution is color-blind" appeared only in the opinion of the lone dissenter. 163 U.S., at 559 . The majority of the Court rejected the principle of color blindness, and for the next 60 years, from Plessy to Brown v. Board of Education, ours was a Nation where, by law, an individual could be given "special" treatment based on the color of his skin.
It is because of a legacy of unequal treatment that we now must permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in making decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in America. For far too long, the doors to those positions have been shut to Negroes. If we are ever to become a fully integrated society, one in which the color of a person's skin will not determine the opportunities available to him or her, we must be willing [438 U.S. 265, 402] to take steps to open those doors. I do not believe that anyone can truly look into America's past and still find that a remedy for the effects of that past is impermissible.
It has been said that this case involves only the individual, Bakke, and this University. I doubt, however, that there is a computer capable of determining the number of persons and institutions that may be affected by the decision in this case. For example, we are told by the Attorney General of the United States that at least 27 federal agencies have adopted regulations requiring recipients of federal funds to take "`affirmative action to overcome the effects of conditions which resulted in limiting participation . . . by persons of a particular race, color, or national origin.'" Supplemental Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 16 (emphasis added). I cannot even guess the number of state and local governments that have set up affirmative-action programs, which may be affected by today's decision.
I fear that we have come full circle. After the Civil War our Government started several "affirmative action" programs. This Court in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson destroyed the movement toward complete equality. For almost a century no action was taken, and this nonaction was with the tacit approval of the courts. Then we had Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Acts of Congress, followed by numerous affirmative-action programs. Now, we have this Court again stepping in, this time to stop affirmative-action programs of the type used by the University of California.
[ Footnote 1 ] The history recounted here is perhaps too well known to require documentation. But I must acknowledge the authorities on which I rely in retelling it. J. Franklin, from Slavery to Freedom (4th ed. 1974) (hereinafter Franklin); R. Kluger, Simple Justice (1975) (hereinafter Kluger); C. Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (3d ed. 1974) (hereinafter Woodward).
[ Footnote 2 ]
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 65 (1977) (Table 94).
[ Footnote 3 ] Id., at 70 (Table 102).
[ Footnote 4 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 5 ] U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 107, p. 7 (1977) (Table 1).
[ Footnote 6 ] Id., at 20 (Table 14).
[ Footnote 7 ] U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, January 1978, p. 170 (Table 44).
[ Footnote 8 ] Ibid.
[ Footnote 9 ] U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 105, p. 198 (1977) (Table 47).
[ Footnote 10 ]
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract, supra, at 25 (Table 24).
[ Footnote 11 ] Id., at 407-408 (Table 662) (based on 1970 census).
[ Footnote 12 ] Indeed, the action of the University finds support in the regulations promulgated under Title VI by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and approved by the President, which authorize a federally funded institution to take affirmative steps to overcome past discrimination [438 U.S. 265, 400] against groups even where the institution was not guilty of prior discrimination. 45 CFR 80.3 (b) (6) (ii) (1977).
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN.
I participate fully, of course, in the opinion, ante, p. 324, that bears the names of my Brothers BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and myself. I add only some general observations that hold particular significance for me, and then a few comments on equal protection. [438 U.S. 265, 403]
At least until the early 1970's, apparently only a very small number, less than 2%, of the physicians, attorneys, and medical and law students in the United States were members of what we now refer to as minority groups. In addition, approximately three-fourths of our Negro physicians were trained at only two medical schools. If ways are not found to remedy that situation, the country can never achieve its professed goal of a society that is not race conscious.
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come when an "affirmative action" program is unnecessary and is, in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could reach this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decided almost a quarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a slim one. At some time, however, beyond any period of what some would claim is only transitional inequality, the United States must and will reach a stage of maturity where action along this line is no longer necessary. Then persons will be regarded as persons, and discrimination of the type we address today will be an ugly feature of history that is instructive but that is behind us.
The number of qualified, indeed highly qualified, applicants for admission to existing medical schools in the United States far exceeds the number of places available. Wholly apart from racial and ethnic considerations, therefore, the selection process inevitably results in the denial of admission to many qualified persons, indeed, to far more than the number of those who are granted admission. Obviously, it is a denial to the deserving. This inescapable fact is brought into sharp focus here because Allan Bakke is not himself charged with discrimination and yet is the one who is disadvantaged, and because the Medical School of the University of California at Davis itself is not charged with historical discrimination.
One theoretical solution to the need for more minority [438 U.S. 265, 404] members in higher education would be to enlarge our graduate schools. Then all who desired and were qualified could enter, and talk of discrimination would vanish. Unfortunately, this is neither feasible nor realistic. The vast resources that apparently would be required simply are not available. And the need for more professional graduates, in the strict numerical sense, perhaps has not been demonstrated at all.
There is no particular or real significance in the 84-16 division at Davis. The same theoretical, philosophical, social, legal, and constitutional considerations would necessarily apply to the case if Davis' special admissions program had focused on any lesser number, that is, on 12 or 8 or 4 places or, indeed, on only 1.
It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a program where race is an element of consciousness, and yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the graduate level, have given conceded preferences up to a point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous, and the powerful.
Programs of admission to institutions of higher learning are basically a responsibility for academicians and for administrators and the specialists they employ. The judiciary, in contrast, is ill-equipped and poorly trained for this. The administration and management of educational institutions are beyond the competence of judges and are within the special competence of educators, provided always that the educators perform within legal and constitutional bounds. For me, therefore, interference by the judiciary must be the rare exception and not the rule.
I, of course, accept the propositions that (a) Fourteenth Amendment rights are personal; (b) racial and ethnic distinctions [438 U.S. 265, 405] where they are stereotypes are inherently suspect and call for exacting judicial scrutiny; (c) academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment; and (d) the Fourteenth Amendment has expanded beyond its original 1868 concept and now is recognized to have reached a point where, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL states, ante, at 293, quoting from the Court's opinion in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976), it embraces a "broader principle."
This enlargement does not mean for me, however, that the Fourteenth Amendment has broken away from its moorings and its original intended purposes. Those original aims persist. And that, in a distinct sense, is what "affirmative action," in the face of proper facts, is all about. If this conflicts with idealistic equality, that tension is original Fourteenth Amendment tension, constitutionally conceived and constitutionally imposed, and it is part of the Amendment's very nature until complete equality is achieved in the area. In this sense, constitutional equal protection is a shield.
I emphasize in particular that the decided cases are not easily to be brushed aside. Many, of course, are not precisely on point, but neither are they off point. Racial factors have been given consideration in the school desegregation cases, in the employment cases, in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), and in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). To be sure, some of these may be "distinguished" on the ground that victimization was directly present. But who is to say that victimization is not present for some members of today's minority groups, although it is of a lesser and perhaps different degree. The petitioners in United Jewish Organizations certainly complained bitterly of their reapportionment treatment, and I rather doubt that they regard the "remedy" there imposed as one that was "to improve" the group's ability to participate, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL describes it, ante, at 305. And surely in Lau v. Nichols we looked to ethnicity. [438 U.S. 265, 406]
I am not convinced, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL seems to be, that the difference between the Davis program and the one employed by Harvard is very profound or constitutionally significant. The line between the two is a thin and indistinct one. In each, subjective application is at work. Because of my conviction that admission programs are primarily for the educators, I am willing to accept the representation that the Harvard program is one where good faith in its administration is practiced as well as professed. I agree that such a program, where race or ethnic background is only one of many factors, is a program better formulated than Davis' two-track system. The cynical, of course, may say that under a program such as Harvard's one may accomplish covertly what Davis concedes it does openly. I need not go that far, for despite its two-track aspect, the Davis program, for me, is within constitutional bounds, though perhaps barely so. It is surely free of stigma, and, as in United Jewish Organizations, I am not willing to infer a constitutional violation.
It is worth noting, perhaps, that governmental preference has not been a stranger to our legal life. We see it in veterans' preferences. We see it in the aid-to-the-handicapped programs. We see it in the progressive income tax. We see it in the Indian programs. We may excuse some of these on the ground that they have specific constitutional protection or, as with Indians, that those benefited are wards of the Government. Nevertheless, these preferences exist and may not be ignored. And in the admissions field, as I have indicated, educational institutions have always used geography, athletic ability, anticipated financial largess, alumni pressure, and other factors of that kind.
I add these only as additional components on the edges of the central question as to which I join my Brothers BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL in our more general approach. It is gratifying to know that the Court at least finds it constitutional for an academic institution to take race and ethnic background into consideration as one factor, among many, in [438 U.S. 265, 407] the administration of its admissions program. I presume that that factor always has been there, though perhaps not conceded or even admitted. It is a fact of life, however, and a part of the real world of which we are all a part. The sooner we get down the road toward accepting and being a part of the real world, and not shutting it out and away from us, the sooner will these difficulties vanish from the scene.
I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.
So the ultimate question, as it was at the beginning of this litigation, is: Among the qualified, how does one choose?
A long time ago, as time is measured for this Nation, a Chief Justice, both wise and farsighted, said:
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
It is always important at the outset to focus precisely on the controversy before the Court. 1 It is particularly important to do so in this case because correct identification of the issues will determine whether it is necessary or appropriate to express any opinion about the legal status of any admissions program other than petitioner's.
This is not a class action. The controversy is between two specific litigants. Allan Bakke challenged petitioner's special admissions program, claiming that it denied him a place in medical school because of his race in violation of the Federal and California Constitutions and of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq. The California Supreme Court upheld his challenge and ordered him admitted. If the [438 U.S. 265, 409] state court was correct in its view that the University's special program was illegal, and that Bakke was therefore unlawfully excluded from the Medical School because of his race, we should affirm its judgment, regardless of our views about the legality of admissions programs that are not now before the Court.
The judgment as originally entered by the trial court contained four separate paragraphs, two of which are of critical importance. 2 Paragraph 3 declared that the University's special admissions program violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the State Constitution, and Title VI. The trial court did not order the University to admit Bakke because it concluded that Bakke had not shown that he would have been admitted if there had been no special program. Instead, in paragraph 2 of its judgment it ordered the University to consider Bakke's application for admission without regard to his race or the race of any other applicant. The order did not include any broad [438 U.S. 265, 410] prohibition against any use of race in the admissions process; its terms were clearly limited to the University's consideration of Bakke's application. 3 Because the University has since been ordered to admit Bakke, paragraph 2 of the trial court's order no longer has any significance.
The California Supreme Court, in a holding that is not challenged, ruled that the trial court incorrectly placed the burden on Bakke of showing that he would have been admitted in the absence of discrimination. The University then conceded "that it [could] not meet the burden of proving that the special admissions program did not result in Mr. Bakke's failure to be admitted." 4 Accordingly, the California Supreme Court directed the trial court to enter judgment ordering Bakke's admission. 5 Since that order superseded paragraph [438 U.S. 265, 411] 2 of the trial court's judgment, there is no outstanding injunction forbidding any consideration of racial criteria in processing applications.
It is therefore perfectly clear that the question whether race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions decision is not an issue in this case, and that discussion of that issue is inappropriate. 6
Both petitioner and respondent have asked us to determine the legality of the University's special admissions program by reference to the Constitution. Our settled practice, however, is to avoid the decision of a constitutional issue if a case can be fairly decided on a statutory ground. "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 . 7 The more important the issue, the more force [438 U.S. 265, 412] there is to this doctrine. 8 In this case, we are presented with a constitutional question of undoubted and unusual importance. Since, however, a dispositive statutory claim was raised at the very inception of this case, and squarely decided in the portion of the trial court judgment affirmed by the California Supreme Court, it is our plain duty to confront it. Only if petitioner should prevail on the statutory issue would it be necessary to decide whether the University's admissions program violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d, provides:
Title VI is an integral part of the far-reaching Civil Rights Act of 1964. No doubt, when this legislation was being debated, Congress was not directly concerned with the legality of "reverse discrimination" or "affirmative action" programs. Its attention was focused on the problem at hand, the "glaring . . . discrimination against Negroes which exists throughout our Nation," 10 and, with respect to Title VI, the federal funding of segregated facilities. 11 The genesis of the legislation, however, did not limit the breadth of the solution adopted. Just as Congress responded to the problem of employment discrimination by enacting a provision that protects all races, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 , 12 so, too, its answer to the problem of federally funding of segregated facilities stands as a broad prohibition against the exclusion of any individual from a federally funded program "on the ground of race." In the words of the House Report, Title VI stands for "the general principle that no person . . . be excluded from participation . . . on the ground of race, color, or national origin under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th [438 U.S. 265, 414] Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 25 (1963) (emphasis added). This same broad view of Title VI and 601 was echoed throughout the congressional debate and was stressed by every one of the major spokesmen for the Act. 13
Petitioner contends, however, that exclusion of applicants on the basis of race does not violate Title VI if the exclusion carries with it no racial stigma. No such qualification or limitation of 601's categorical prohibition of "exclusion" is justified by the statute or its history. The language of the entire section is perfectly clear; the words that follow "excluded from" do not modify or qualify the explicit outlawing of any exclusion on the stated grounds.
The legislative history reinforces this reading. The only suggestion that 601 would allow exclusion of non minority applicants came from opponents of the legislation and then only by way of a discussion of the meaning of the word "discrimination." 14 The opponents feared that the term "discrimination" [438 U.S. 265, 415] would be read as mandating racial quotas and "racially balanced" colleges and universities, and they pressed for a specific definition of the term in order to avoid this possibility. 15 In response, the proponents of the legislation gave repeated assurances that the Act would be "colorblind" in its application. 16 Senator Humphrey, the Senate floor manager for the Act, expressed this position as follows:
As with other provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Congress' expression of its policy to end racial discrimination may independently proscribe conduct that the Constitution does not. 20 However, we need not decide the Congruence - or lack of congruence - of the controlling statute and the Constitution [438 U.S. 265, 418] since the meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear: Race cannot be the basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.
In short, nothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad language of 601 should not be given its natural meaning. We are dealing with a distinct statutory prohibition, enacted at a particular time with particular concerns in mind; neither its language nor any prior interpretation suggests that its place in the Civil Rights Act, won after long debate, is simply that of a constitutional appendage. 21 In unmistakable terms the Act prohibits the exclusion of individuals from federally funded programs because of their race. 22 As succinctly phrased during the Senate debate, under Title VI it is not "permissible to say `yes' to one person; but to say `no' to another person, only because of the color of his skin." 23
Belatedly, however, petitioner argues that Title VI cannot be enforced by a private litigant. The claim is unpersuasive in the context of this case. Bakke requested injunctive and declaratory relief under Title VI; petitioner itself then joined [438 U.S. 265, 419] issue on the question of the legality of its program under Title VI by asking for a declaratory judgment that it was in compliance with the statute. 24 Its view during state-court litigation was that a private cause of action does exist under Title VI. Because petitioner questions the availability of a private cause of action for the first time in this Court, the question is not properly before us. See McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U.S. 430, 434 , Even if it were, petitioner's original assumption is in accord with the federal courts' consistent interpretation of the Act. To date, the courts, including this Court, have unanimously concluded or assumed that a private action may be maintained under Title VI. 25 The United States has taken the same position; in its amicus curiae brief directed to this specific issue, it concluded that such a remedy is clearly available, 26 [438 U.S. 265, 420] and Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation predicated on the assumption that Title VI may be enforced in a private action. 27 The conclusion that an individual may maintain a private cause of action is amply supported in the legislative history of Title VI itself. 28 In short, a fair consideration of [438 U.S. 265, 421] petitioner's tardy attack on the propriety of Bakke's suit under Title VI requires that it be rejected.
The University's special admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by excluding Bakke from the Medical School because of his race. It is therefore our duty to affirm the judgment ordering Bakke admitted to the University.
Accordingly, I concur in the Court's judgment insofar as it affirms the judgment of the Supreme Court of California. To the extent that it purports to do anything else, I respectfully dissent.
[ Footnote 1 ] Four Members of the Court have undertaken to announce the legal and constitutional effect of this Court's judgment. See opinion of JUSTICES BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, ante, at 324-325. It is hardly necessary to state that only a majority can speak for the Court or determine what is the "central meaning" of any judgment of the Court.
[ Footnote 2 ] The judgment first entered by the trial court read, in its entirety, as follows:
[ Footnote 3 ] In paragraph 2 the trial court ordered that "plaintiff [Bakke] is entitled to have his application for admission to the medical school considered without regard to his race or the race of any other applicant, and defendants are hereby restrained and enjoined from considering plaintiff's race or the race of any other applicant in passing upon his application for admission." See n. 2, supra (emphasis added). The only way in which this order can be broadly read as prohibiting any use of race in the admissions process, apart from Bakke's application, is if the final "his" refers to "any other applicant." But the consistent use of the pronoun throughout the paragraph to refer to Bakke makes such a reading entirely unpersuasive, as does the failure of the trial court to suggest that it was issuing relief to applicants who were not parties to the suit.
[ Footnote 4 ] Appendix B to Application for Stay A19-A20.
[ Footnote 5 ] 18 Cal. 3d 34, 64, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (1976). The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of California affirms only paragraph 3 of the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court's judgment reads as follows:
[ Footnote 6 ] "This Court . . . reviews judgments, not statements in opinions." Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 .
[ Footnote 7 ] "From Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409, to Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co. [, 329 U.S. 129 ,] and the Hatch Act case [United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 ] decided this term, this Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues. The earliest exemplifications, too well known for repeating the history here, arose in the Court's refusal to render advisory opinions and in applications of the related jurisdictional policy drawn from the case and controversy limitation. U.S. Const., Art. III. . . .
[ Footnote 8 ] The doctrine reflects both our respect for the Constitution as an enduring set of principles and the deference we owe to the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government in developing solutions to complex social problems. See A. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 131 (1962).
[ Footnote 9 ] Record 29.
[ Footnote 10 ] Page H. R. Rep. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 18 (1963).
[ Footnote 11 ] It is apparent from the legislative history that the immediate object of Title VI was to prevent federal funding of segregated facilities. See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1521 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 6544 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey).
[ Footnote 12 ] In McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., the Court held that "Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against . . . white petitioners . . . upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes . . . ." 427 U.S., at 280 . Quoting from our earlier decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 , the Court reaffirmed the principle that the statute "prohibit[s] `[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial] group, minority or majority.'" 427 U.S., at 279 (emphasis in original).
[ Footnote 13 ] See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1520 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler); id., at 5864 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id., at 6561 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel); id., at 7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore). (Representative Celler and Senators Humphrey and Kuchel were the House and Senate floor managers for the entire Civil Rights Act, and Senator Pastore was the majority Senate floor manager for Title VI.)
[ Footnote 14 ] Representative Abernethy's comments were typical:
[ Footnote 15 ] E. g., id., at 5863, 5874 (remarks of Sen. Eastland).
[ Footnote 16 ] See, e. g., id., at 8346 (remarks of Sen. Proxmire) ("Taxes are collected from whites and Negroes, and they should be expended without discrimination"); id., at 7055 (remarks of Sen. Pastore) ("[Title VI] will guarantee that the money collected by colorblind tax collectors will be distributed by Federal and State administrators who are equally colorblind"); and id., at 6543 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("`Simple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination'") (quoting from President Kennedy's Message to Congress, June 19, 1963).
[ Footnote 17 ] See, e. g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5253 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); and id., at 7102 (remarks of Sen. Javits). The parallel between the prohibitions of Title VI and those of the Constitution was clearest with respect to the immediate goal of the Act - an end to federal funding of "separate but equal" facilities.
[ Footnote 18 ] "As in Monroe [v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 ], we have no occasion here to `reach the constitutional question whether Congress has the power to make municipalities liable for acts of its officers that violate the civil rights of individuals.' 365 U.S., at 191 . For in interpreting the statute it is not our task to consider whether Congress was mistaken in 1871 in its view of the limits of its power over municipalities; rather, we must construe the statute in light of the impressions under which Congress did in fact act, see Ries v. Lynskey, 452 F.2d, at 175." Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709 .
[ Footnote 19 ] Both Title VI and Title VII express Congress' belief that, in the long struggle to eliminate social prejudice and the effects of prejudice, the principle of individual equality, without regard to race or religion, was one on which there could be a "meeting of the minds" among all races and a common national purpose. See Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 ("[T]he basic policy of the statute [Title VII] requires that we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness [438 U.S. 265, 417] to classes"). This same principle of individual fairness is embodied in Title VI.
[ Footnote 20 ] For example, private employers now under duties imposed by Title VII were wholly free from the restraints imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments which are directed only to governmental action.
In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 , the Government's brief stressed that "the applicability of Title VI . . . does not depend upon the outcome of the equal protection analysis. . . . [T]he statute independently proscribes the conduct challenged by petitioners and provides a discrete basis for injunctive relief." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, O. T. 1973, No. 72-6520, p. 15. The Court, in turn, rested its decision on Title VI. MR. JUSTICE POWELL takes pains to distinguish Lau from the case at hand because the Lau decision "rested solely on the statute." Ante, at 304. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 -239; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 588 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
[ Footnote 21 ] As explained by Senator Humphrey, 601 expresses a principle imbedded in the constitutional and moral understanding of the times.
[ Footnote 22 ] Petitioner's attempt to rely on regulations issued by HEW for a contrary reading of the statute is unpersuasive. Where no discriminatory policy was in effect, HEW's example of permissible "affirmative action" refers to "special recruitment policies." 45 CFR 80.5 (j) (1977). This regulation, which was adopted in 1973, sheds no light on the legality of the admissions program that excluded Bakke in this case.
[ Footnote 23 ] 110 Cong. Rec. 6047 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Pastore).
[ Footnote 24 ] Record 30-31.
[ Footnote 25 ] See, e. g., Lau v. Nichols, supra; Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (CA5 1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 ; Uzzell v. Friday, 547 F.2d 801 (CA4 1977), opinion on rehearing en bane, 558 F.2d 727, cert. pending, No. 77-635; Serna v. Portales, 499 F.2d 1147 (CA10 1974); cf. Chambers v. Omaha Public School District, 536 F.2d 222, 225 n. 2 (CA8 1976) (indicating doubt over whether a money judgment can be obtained under Title VI). Indeed, the Government's brief in Lau v. Nichols, supra, succinctly expressed this common assumption: "It is settled that petitioners . . . have standing to enforce Section 601 . . . ." Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in Lau v. Nichols, O. T. 1973, No. 72-6520, p. 13 n. 5.
[ Footnote 26 ] Supplemental Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 24-34. The Government's supplemental brief also suggests that there may be a difference between a private cause of action brought to end a particular discriminatory practice and such an action brought to cut off federal funds. Id., at 28-30. Section 601 is specifically addressed to personal rights, while 602 - the fund cutoff provision - establishes "an elaborate mechanism for governmental enforcement by federal agencies." Supplemental Brief, supra, at 28 (emphasis added). Arguably, private enforcement of this "elaborate mechanism" would not fit within the congressional scheme, see separate opinion of MR. JUSTICE WHITE, ante, at 380-383. But Bakke did not seek to cut off the University's federal funding; he sought admission [438 U.S. 265, 420] to medical school. The difference between these two courses of action is clear and significant. As the Government itself states:
[ Footnote 27 ] See 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976 ed.) (the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) (in particular, the legislative history discussed in Lloyd v. Regional Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277, 1285-1286 (CA7 1977)); 20 U.S.C. 1617 (1976 ed.) (attorney fees under the Emergency School Aid Act); and 31 U.S.C. 1244 (1976 ed.) (private action under the Financial Assistance Act). Of course, none of these subsequent legislative enactments is necessarily reliable evidence of Congress' intent in 1964 in enacting Title VI, and the legislation was not intended to change the existing status of Title VI.
[ Footnote 28 ] Framing the analysis in terms of the four-part Cort v. Ash test, see 422 U.S. 66, 78 , it is clear that all four parts of the test are satisfied. (1) Bakke's status as a potential beneficiary of a federally funded program definitely brings him within the "`class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,'" ibid. (emphasis in original). (2) A cause of action based on race discrimination has not been "traditionally relegated to state law." Ibid. (3) While a few excerpts from the voluminous legislative history suggest that Congress did not intend to create a private cause of action, see opinion of MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ante, at 283 n. 18, an examination of the entire legislative history makes it clear that Congress had no intention to foreclose a private right of action. (4) There is ample evidence that Congress considered private causes of action to be consistent [438 U.S. 265, 421] with, if not essential to, the legislative scheme. See, e. g., remarks of Senator Ribicoff:
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