Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Petitioners, a group of Negroes and whites employed as carmen helpers by respondent railroad, brought this action for damages and injunctive relief against the railroad and respondent union (the bargaining agent for carmen employees), claiming that respondents acted in concert to bar Negroes from promotion wholly because of race. Upholding respondents' contention that petitioners had failed to exhaust their contractual or administrative remedies, the District Court dismissed the amended complaint, despite petitioners' allegations that a formal effort to pursue such remedies would be absolutely futile. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Held:
William M. Acker, Jr., argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Donald W. Fisher argued the cause for respondents. On the brief for respondent St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. was Paul R. Moody. With Mr. Fisher on the brief for respondent Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America were Richard R. Lyman and Jerome A. Cooper. [393 U.S. 324, 325]
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The 13 petitioners here, eight Negroes and five white men, are all employees of the respondent railroad, whose duties are to repair and maintain passenger and freight cars in the railroad's yard at Birmingham, Alabama. They brought this action in the United States District Court against the railroad and the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America, which is the duly selected bargaining agent for carmen employees. The complaint alleged that all of the plaintiffs were qualified by experience to do the work of carmen but that all had been classified as carmen helpers for many years and had not been promoted. The complaint went on to allege the following explanation for the railroad's refusal to promote them:
It is true, as the respondents here contend, that this Court has held that the Railroad Adjustment Board has exclusive jurisdiction, under 3 First (i) of the Railway Labor Act, set out below, 1 to interpret the meaning of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 2 We have held, however, that 3 First (i) by its own terms applies only to "disputes between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44 (1957). In Conley, as in the present case, the suit was one brought by the employees against their own union, claiming breach of the duty of fair representation, and we held that the jurisdiction of the federal courts was clear. In the present case, of course, the petitioners sought relief not only against their union but also against the railroad, and it might at one time have been thought that the jurisdiction of the Railroad Adjustment [393 U.S. 324, 329] Board remains exclusive in a fair representation case, to the extent that relief is sought against the railroad for alleged discriminatory performance of an agreement validly entered into and lawful in its terms. See, e. g., Hayes v. Union Pacific R. Co., 184 F.2d 337 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 942 (1951). This view, however, was squarely rejected in the Conley case, where we said, "[F]or the reasons set forth in the text we believe [Hayes, supra] was decided incorrectly." 355 U.S., at 44 , n. 4. In this situation no meaningful distinction can be drawn between discriminatory action in negotiating the terms of an agreement and discriminatory enforcement of terms that are fair on their face. Moreover, although the employer is made a party to insure complete and meaningful relief, it still remains true that in essence the "dispute" is one between some employees on the one hand and the union and management together on the other, not one "between an employee or group of employees and a carrier or carriers." Finally, the Railroad Adjustment Board has no power to order the kind of relief necessary even with respect to the railroad alone, in order to end entirely abuses of the sort alleged here. The federal courts may therefore properly exercise jurisdiction over both the union and the railroad. See also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
The respondents also argue that the complaint should be dismissed because of the petitioners' failure to exhaust their remedies under the collective bargaining agreement, the union constitution, and the Railway Labor Act. They rely particularly on Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965), and Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The Court has made clear, however, that the exhaustion requirement is subject to a number of exceptions for the variety of situations in which doctrinaire application of the exhaustion rule would defeat [393 U.S. 324, 330] the overall purposes of federal labor relations policy. Thus, in Vaca itself the Court stressed:
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for trial.
[ Footnote 2 ] See, e. g., Slocum v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 339 U.S. 239 .
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
I join in the Court's opinion with one addition and one reservation.
I believe that Richardson v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., 242 F.2d 230 (1957), decided by the Fifth Circuit some years before its decision in the present case, also supports today's holding that the federal courts may grant railroad employees ancillary relief against an employer who aids and abets their union in breaching its duty of fair representation. A contrary result would bifurcate, and needlessly proliferate, litigation.
I think it clear that footnote 4 of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44 (1957), did not - as some of the language in today's opinion, ante, at 328-329, might otherwise imply - address itself to the question now decided, which [393 U.S. 324, 332] is one of first impression in this Court. Conley was a suit against the union only. A careful reading of Hayes v. Union Pacific R. Co., 184 F.2d 337 (1950); the District Court's opinion in Conley, 138 F. Supp. 60 (1955), which relied on Hayes; and this Court's opinion in Conley makes it readily apparent that our disapproval of Hayes had nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction over an employer in a fair representation action. [393 U.S. 324, 333]
A free source of state and federal court opinions, state laws, and the United States Code. For more information about the legal concepts addressed by these cases and statutes visit FindLaw's Learn About the Law.
Citation: 393 U.S. 324
Docket No: No. 38
Argued: November 14, 1968
Decided: January 14, 1969
Court: United States Supreme Court
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)