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The Attorney General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Letts, for the United States. [269 U.S. 304, 305] Messrs. Mark W. Maclay, and John Tilney Carpenter, both of New York City, for respondent.
Mr. Justice SANFORD delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions involved in this case relate to the construction and constitutionality of the Act of December 26, 1920, c. 4, 41 Stat. 1082 ( Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, 4289 1/4 sss), entitled 'An Act to provide for the treatment in hospital of diseased alien seamen.' It [269 U.S. 304, 309] provides:
The Steamship Company, a Maine corporation, is the owner of a merchant vessel of American registry. On a voyage from New York to the West Indies and return, this vessel carried a seaman who was a citizen of Chile. On returning to New York he was found by the immigration officials to be afflicted with a veneral disease, and on the order of the Commissioner of Immigration was placed in the Public Health Service hospital on Ellis Island for treatment. He was later discharged from the hospital as cured, and admitted into the United States. The Steampship Company having refused to pay the hospital expenses, the United States brought suit against it in the Federal District Court for the amount of such expenses. Judgment was recovered, which was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, on the ground that the Act applied only to seamen on foreign vessels. New York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. United States, 297 F. 159. The case is here on writ of certiorari.
[269 U.S. 304, 310] This decision is in conflict with the earlier decisions in Franco v. Shipping Corporation (D. C.) 272 F. 542, and Castner v. Hamilton (D. C.) 275 F. 203, in which the Act was applied to aliens brought in as seamen on American vessels.
The question of construction presented is whether the term 'alien seamen,' as used in the Act, means seamen who are aliens, as the Government contends, or seamen on foreign vessels, as the Steamship Company contends: that is, whether in applying the Act the test is the citizenship of the seaman or the nationality of the vessel.
We think the term 'alien seamen' is not to be construed as meaning seamen on foreign vessels. The general principle that an alien while a seaman on an American vessel is regarded as being an American seaman in such sense that he is under the protection and subject to the laws of the United States, In re Ross,
It is clear that the term 'alien seamen' as used in the Act means 'seamen who are aliens.' It describes, aptly and exactly, seamen of alien nationality, dealing with them, as individuals, with reference to their personal citizenship; and it has no other significance either in common usage or in law. The Act does not qualify this term by [269 U.S. 304, 311] any reference to the nationality of the vessels. Nor does it use the words 'seamen on foreign vessels' or any equivalent phrase which would have been appropriate had it been intended to describe the seamen on such vessels.
This conclusion is emphasized when the Act is considered in the light of the Alien Immigration Act of 1917, and the legislative history showing the condition it was evidently the intention to correct. United States v. Morrow,
There was, however, no provision expressly authorizing the hospital expenses incurred in the treatment of a diseased alien seaman to be charged to the vessel when it carried freight or the disease could not have been detected at the time that he shipped on the vessel. [269 U.S. 304, 312] In this situation the Department of Labor, in 1919, prepared the draft of the bill which later, with minor changes, became the Act of 1920. In a letter transmitting this draft to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, the Secretary stated that the Department was very anxious to have it enacted into law in order to fix definitely 'the responsibility of steamship lines and vessels for the expenses which arise from the frequent necessity of placing in hospitals alien seamen who, upon arrival at our ports, are found to be afflicted with various diseases, often of a loathsome or dangerous contagious character'; the existing law not being clear upon this matter. The Committee, in reporting the bill,2 set forth this letter from the Secretary, and said:
No substantial doubt is cast upon the purpose of the Act by the incidental statement of the Chairman of the Committee in the course of debate, that the bill applied only to foreign ships, especially since, in the same debate, he described it as referring to 'sick alien seamen,' and stated that it perfected a provision already 'partly in the immigration laws' making the owners of vessels responsible for their medical treatment. 3
In the light of this history, as well as from the face of the Act itself, it is clear that the words 'alien seamen' were used in the same sense as in the Act of 1917, with [269 U.S. 304, 313] which it is in pari materia, that is, as meaning aliens employed as seamen on any vessel arriving in the United States; and that it was intended to extend the provisions of section 35 of that Act by providing that the hospital expenses incurred in treating and such diseased alien should be borne in all cases by the vessel bringing him in, whether carrying passengers or freight, and without reference to the time when the disease might have been detected. And it has been so construed and applied by the Department of Labor.
The Steamship Company, while conceding that the Act as thus construed is constitutional as applied to foreign vessels, contends that as applied to American vessels it is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment in that 'it imposes liability without causation or causal connection.' This contention is without merit. The power of Congress to forbid aliens and classes of aliens from coming within the borders of the United States is unquestionable. The Chinese Exclusion Case,
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed, and that of the Circuit Court of Appeals
Reversed.
[ Footnote 1 ] Act Feb. 5, 1917, c. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 959, 960, 4289 1/4 a-4289 1/4 u).
[ Footnote 2 ] Ho. Rep. No. 173, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
[ Footnote 3 ] 60 Cong. Rec., 66th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, pp. 600, 601.
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Citation: 269 U.S. 304
No. 65
Argued: October 20, 1925
Decided: December 14, 1925
Court: United States Supreme Court
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