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Statement by Mr. Justice SHIRAS:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the court of claims, dismissing the petition of Charles De Arnaud, in which he sought for a judgment in his favor against the United States for the sum of $100,000, for services the petitioner alleged he had rendered as a 'military expert,' employed for 'special and important duties,' by Gen. Fremont, for and on behalf of the United States.
The facts of the case, as found by the court below, are as follows: [151 U.S. 483, 484] The claimant is a native subject of Russia, residing in the United States. The following is a translation of the provisions of the law of Russia according to citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such government in its courts:
The claimant came to this country about the year 1860, and was, prior to that time, an officer in the Russian army, where he served in the Crimean war as lieutenant of engineers, and was serving as such when the armistice was concluded between Russia and the contending allies.
In the year 1861 John C. Fremont was a major general in the United States army, in command of the western department of Missouri. In the month of August, 1861, he entered into an agreement with the claimant, by which the claimant was employed by him to go within the Confederate lines, make observations of the country in the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, to observe the position of the rebel forces, the strategic positions occupied by them, and advise him (Gen. Fremont) of the movements necessary to be made by the Union forces to counteract the movements of the enemy, [151 U.S. 483, 485] and to facilitate the advance of our troops, and aid them in attacking and repulsing the Confederate forces.
In consequence of that arrangement he did go within the Confederate lines, and, agreeably to what he was instructed to do, brought back to Gen. Fremont full information of the kind desired, maps of the country, of various roads, the number of troops, their stations, condition, and, as far as he could judge and find out, their projected movements.
He was absent on that business a number of days, came back, and reported in St. Louis about the 12th of August, 1861, to Gen. Fremont, who was so satisfied with the information that he brought, with the intelligence and sagacity he displayed in collecting it, and the usefulness of his information, that he (Fremont) then made an arrangement for him to continue in the service of the department. About the 12th of the month of August, 1861, he again left for the country occupied by the Confederate forces to collect information. The most important part of the services rendered by him was in the beginning of the next month, ( September,) when, with the information that he had collected, he was returning to report to Gen. Fremont a movement of the Confederate forces upon Paducah. On reaching Cairo he found that he had only time to report to Fremont by telegraph, and reported forthwith personally to Gen. Grant, informing him that troops were advancing upon Paducah, and that it was necessary to move immediately in order to occupy the place. Gen. Grant did move instantly, and took possession of Paducah, Ky., solely on information given by the claimant, and to the effect that the rebels were moving upon that city with a large force.
The claimant was paid $600 on the following orders and receipts:
J. C. Fremont,
[Signed duplicate]
On January 6, 1862, the claimant presented his claim to the war department, and it was reported upon by the quartermaster as follows:
M. C. Meigs,
A. H. Foote,
U. S. Grant,
J. C. Fremont,
President Lincoln folded the letters together, and wrote on the back of Gen. Grant's letter the following:
A. Lincoln.'
Thereafter, on the next day, January 14th, the secretary of war made the following indorsement on said claim:
The claimant was thereupon paid, under protest, by said disbursing clerk of the war department, out of appropriation for 'contingencies of the army,' $2,000, and gave the following receipt:
At the time of giving the receipt in full, January 14, 1862, he was not in a state of dementia, and was able to comprehend the terms of the receipt; but the effects of his wounds in the head were beginning to affect him mentally, and he was in a condition of nervous apprehension, and unnaturally desirous of securing his personal safety by setting out of the country, and he accepted the money paid by the war department in order that he might do so.
While engaged in the military service of the government, as aforesaid, he received a wound in his head in the fall of 1861, from which afterwards, in the same year, he became insane, and did not recover prior to February, 1886.
About September 4, 1886, the claimant presented his claim to the treasury department, without naming the specific amount claimed, but incidentally claimed $50,000, because he was told by Gen. Fremont that during the Mexican war one McGoffin, a secret agent, had been paid that sum. The auditor reported to the second comptroller as follows: [151 U.S. 483, 490] 'Act of July 17, 1861, appropriated $200,000 'for contingencies of the army,' (12 Stat. 263.)
The second comptroller made the following indorsement thereon:
The claimant was informed of the action of the comptroller by the following letter:
On January 12, 1889, the second auditor transmitted all the papers on file in his office to the second comptroller, stating that his views had been fully expressed in previous communications hereinbefore set out. The comptroller made a recommendation to the secretary of the treasury that the case be transmitted to the court of claims, which was accordingly done by the following letter of transmission:
Judges of the Court of Claims:
H. J. Lauck and H. O. Claughton, for appellant.
Asst. Atty. Gen. Dodge and Conway Robinson, for the United States.
Mr. Justice SHIRAS, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
The court below, passing by other grounds of defense, dismissed the petition upon the proposition that it disclosed a case within the ruling of this court in the case of Totten v. U. S.,
That was a case where one Lloyd asserted that, under a contract with President Lincoln, he was to proceed south, and ascertain the number of troops stationed at different points in the insurrectionary states, procure plans of forts, and gain such other information as might be beneficial to the government of the United States, and report the facts to the president, for which services he was to be paid $200 a month.
The court of claims found that Lloyd had performed the services mentioned; but, the members of that court being equally divided in opinion as to the authority of the president to bind the United States by the contract in question, the court decided against the claim, and dismissed the petition.
On appeal, this court found no difficulty as to the authority of the president in the matter. As commander in chief of the armies of the United States he was undoubtedly authorized to employ secret agents to enter the rebel lines, and obtain information respecting the strength and movements of the enemy; and it was also said that contracts to compensate such agents are so far binding upon the government as to render it lawful for the president to direct payment of the amount stipulated out of the contingent fund under his control. [151 U.S. 483, 493] But the court was of opinion that the service stipulated for in the contract was a secret service; the information sought was to be obtained clandestinely, and was to be communicated privately; the employment and the service were to be equally concealed; and the court held that a secret service, with liability to publicity in a suit subsequently brought against the government, would be impossible; that, as such services are sometimes indispensable to the government, its agents in those services must look for their compensation to the contingent fund of the department employing them, and to such allowance from it as those who dispense that fund may award; that the secrecy which such contracts impose precludes any action for their enforcement; that the publicity produced by an action would itself be a breach of a contract of that kind, and thus defeat a recovery.
The counsel of the appellant do not impugn the doctrine of the Totten Case, but they contend that the court of claims erred in the present case in treating the contract and services of Arnaud as being of a character that brings the case within such doctrine. It is denied that Arnaud's functions were those of a spy, but were those of a 'military expert.'
If it were necessary for us to enter in the question thus suggested, it might be difficult for us to point out any substantial difference in character between the services rendered by Lloyd and those rendered by Arnaud; but the record discloses other defenses so plainly applicable that we are relieved from considering whether the new-fangled term 'military expert' is only old 'spy,' 'writ large.'
On January 6, 1862, after the claimant had performed all the services described in his petition, he presented a claim to the war department in the following form:
On this claim the quartermaster general, on January 9, 1862, indorsed the following:
Thereafter, on January 14, 1862, the secretary of war made the following indorsement on said claim:
The claimant was thereupon paid by said disbursing clerk of the war department $2,000, and gave the following receipt:
In the absence of allegation and evidence that this receipt was given in ignorance of its purport, or in circumstances constituting duress, it must be regarded as an acquittance in bar of any further demand. Baker v. Nactrieb, 19 How. 126; U. S. v. Child, 12 Wall. 243. [151 U.S. 483, 495] No further or other claim was made by the petitioner until September 4, 1886,-a period of 24 years. Even, therefore, if the claimant was not effectually barred by his voluntary acquittance, his claim was assuredly barred by the statute of limitations, which provides that every claim against the United States, cognizable by the court of claims, shall be forever barred unless the petition, setting forth a statement thereof, is filed in the court or transmitted to it by the secretary of the senate or the clerk of the house of representatives, as provided by law, within six years after the claim first accrues. Rev. St. 1069.
In Finn's Case, in many respects resembling the present one, this court construed and applied that statute in the following terms:
The claimant cannot avail himsel of the saving clause in the statute suspending its operation in favor of idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and persons beyond the seas, because such suspension is only in favor of those laboring under the specified disabilities at the time the claim accrued; and it is conceded that plaintiff's mental incapacity did not begin until after his claim had accrued.
Nor can it be successfully claimed that a disability subsequently arising would suspend the operation of the statute. See Bauserman v. Blunt,
In no view that we can take of this case can we find any just foundation for a claim against the government, and the judgment of the court below, dismissing the claimant's petition, is accordingly affirmed.
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Citation: 151 U.S. 483
No. 550
Decided: January 29, 1894
Court: United States Supreme Court
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FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
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