VILLAMIL v. FAYRUSTIN LLC (2024)

ORDER REQUIRING PARTIES TO FILE RULE 7.1(a)(2) DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS

Plaintiffs have moved to remand the above-captioned case to state court.¹ Because the Court needs more information before it can evaluate whether the Court may validly exercise jurisdiction over this case, the Court ORDERS the parties to file disclosure statements specifying their respective states of citizenship.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Although Plaintiffs’ operative pleading isn't a model of clarity,² the Court interprets the Complaint to allege that three people—Alicia Delgado Villamil, Mercedes Hernandez Delgado (hereinafter “Decedent”), and a minor named R.A.V. Jr.—got hurt in a car crash.³ Plaintiffs claim that the driver of the other vehicle (Defendant Denis Fayrustin) caused the crash as a result of his own negligence.⁴ Plaintiffs further contend that Defendant A-Star Trans Corp d/b/a Your Trusted Solutions LLC is vicariously liable for Fayrustin's negligence because Fayrustin allegedly caused the crash while acting within the course and scope of his employment with A-Star.⁵

Besides seeking damages for her own injuries, Villamil also seeks damages for R.A.V.’s injuries in her capacity as the minor child's legal representative.⁶ Villamil also seeks damages for Decedent's injuries in her capacity as one of four representatives of Decedent's estate.⁷

Three other individuals who (as far as the Court can tell from Plaintiffs’ pleadings) weren't involved in the crash have also joined Villamil's lawsuit solely in their capacities as representatives of Decedent's estate—not in their own personal capacities.⁸ The Court will call those three Plaintiffs the “Estate Representatives” to differentiate them from Villamil, who (unlike the Estate Representatives) is litigating this case in her individual capacity as well as in her separate capacity as a representative of Decedent's estate.⁹

B. Procedural Posture

After Plaintiffs filed this case in state court,¹⁰ A-Star removed it to federal court.¹¹ A-Star insists that the Court may exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the diversity jurisdiction statute,¹² which (subject to various conditions and exceptions the Court needn't discuss here) authorizes federal courts to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions between “citizens of different States.”¹³

An action is between “citizens of different States” for diversity jurisdiction purposes only if the parties are completely diverse—that is, only if “all persons on one side of the controversy” are “citizens of different states than all persons on the other side.”¹⁴ According to A-Star, all four Plaintiffs are citizens of Texas, Defendant Fayrustin is a citizen of Florida, and A-Star is a citizen of Florida and Ohio.¹⁵ A-Star therefore maintains that all of the Plaintiffs are citizens of different states than the Defendants—and, thus, that the Court may exercise diversity jurisdiction over the case.¹⁶

Plaintiffs have moved to remand the case back to state court.¹⁷ They contend that A-Star didn't file its Notice of Removal within the statutory time limit,¹⁸ and that the Court must remand the case for that reason alone.¹⁹

Notably, Plaintiffs haven't raised any arguments for remanding the case other than their timeliness challenge.²⁰ Plaintiffs don't, for instance, explicitly challenge A-Star's assertion that the parties are completely diverse.²¹ In fact, in the parties’ Joint Rule 26 Report, Plaintiffs explicitly “submit that complete diversity of citizenship exists.”²²

II. DISCUSSION

However, before the Court decides whether A-Star removed the case within the applicable time limit (which is a non-jurisdictional issue),²³ the Court must first answer the antecedent jurisdictional question of whether the parties are in fact completely diverse as A-Star insists. The Court is obligated to consider that question sua sponte—even though Plaintiffs appear willing to concede it.²⁴ For the following reasons, though, the Court doesn't currently have the information it needs to make that determination.

A. The Court Lacks the Information it Needs to Determine Plaintiffs’ Citizenship

1. Villamil's Citizenship for the Purposes of Her Individual Capacity Claim

For one thing, the Court can't yet determine Plaintiff Villamil's state of citizenship to the extent she's litigating this case in her own personal capacity.²⁵

Villamil is a natural person (i.e., an individual).²⁶ So, to the extent Villamil has sued Defendants on her own behalf, her state of citizenship is her state of domicile ²⁷ —i.e., the state where she maintains “a fixed residence with the intent to remain there indefinitely.”²⁸

Plaintiffs allege in their pleadings that Villamil “reside[s] in El Paso County, Texas.”²⁹ From the fact that Villamil resides in Texas, A-Star infers that Villamil is also a Texas citizen.³⁰

That inference isn't necessarily warranted, however. As the Fifth Circuit has cautioned, “citizenship and residence ․ are not synonymous terms.”³¹ Merely residing in a state doesn't necessarily make someone citizen of that state; that person must also possess the intent to remain there indefinitely.³²

Thus, the mere fact that Plaintiffs’ pleadings identify Villamil as a Texas resident doesn't guarantee that she's a Texas citizen.³³ To evaluate whether the parties are completely diverse, the Court must also know where Villamil is domiciled—i.e., where she intends to remain indefinitely. The docket doesn't currently contain that information,³⁴ so Plaintiffs must provide it.³⁵

2. Villamil's Citizenship in Her Capacity as R.A.V.’s Legal Representative

As noted, Villamil isn't just pursuing this case in her own personal capacity; she's also asserting claims in her capacity as the legal representative of R.A.V., a minor child.³⁶ The Court must consider whether that fact makes Villamil a citizen of any state other than that of her own domicile.

The diversity jurisdiction statute provides that “the legal representative of an infant” like R.A.V. “shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as th[at] infant.”³⁷ Courts have generally concluded—and this Court agrees—that when an individual plaintiff pursues a lawsuit both in her personal capacity and in her capacity as someone else's legal representative, that plaintiff is a citizen of both:

(1) her own state of domicile; and

(2) the state of domicile of the person whose interests she's representing in the lawsuit.38

Villamil is therefore a citizen of both her own state of domicile and R.A.V.’s state of domicile.³⁹ Because Plaintiffs’ pleadings don't identify R.A.V.’s state of domicile,⁴⁰ however, the Court can't yet determine whether the parties are completely diverse.

3. Plaintiffs’ Citizenship in Their Capacity as Representatives of Decedent's Estate

Unlike Villamil, the Estate Representatives aren't pursuing claims against Defendants in their individual capacities; they're litigating this case solely in their capacity as representatives of Decedent's estate.⁴¹

The diversity jurisdiction statute specifies that “the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the decedent.”⁴² It therefore doesn't matter where the Estate Representatives themselves are domiciled;⁴³ what matters for jurisdictional purposes is where Decedent was domiciled at the time of her death.⁴⁴

The Estate Representatives’ allegation that they “reside in ․ Texas” thus tells the Court nothing about their citizenship.⁴⁵ The Court instead needs to know where Decedent was domiciled when she died. But the docket doesn't contain that information either.⁴⁶

Not knowing where Decedent was domiciled also prevents the Court from assessing Villamil's citizenship. As noted, Villamil's pursuing claims in her individual capacity, on behalf of R.A.V., and on behalf of Decedent's estate.⁴⁷ Villamil is therefore a citizen of:

(1) her own state of domicile;

(2) R.A.V.’s state of domicile; and

(3) the state where Decedent was domiciled when she died.48

Because the Court doesn't currently have any of that information, it can't determine whether the parties are completely diverse.

B. The Court Lacks the Information it Needs to Determine Defendant A-Star's Citizenship

Nor, for the following reasons, does the Court currently have the information it needs to determine Defendant A-Star's citizenship.

1. A-Star's Citizenship in its Capacity as a Corporation

A-Star is a corporation.⁴⁹ With an exception not relevant here,⁵⁰ a corporation is a citizen of both:

(1) “every State ․ by which it has been incorporated;” as well as

(2) “the State ․ where it has its principal place of business.”51

a. A-Star Must Clarify its Place of Incorporation

The docket contains conflicting information about A-Star's state of incorporation. In its Notice of Removal, A-Star represented to the Court that it was incorporated in Ohio.⁵² In its Answer, however, A-Star admitted Plaintiffs’ allegation that A-Star was incorporated in Florida.⁵³ Thus, to conclusively determine A-Star's citizenship, the Court needs A-Star to clarify whether it is incorporated in Ohio, Florida, or both.

b. A-Star Must Clarify Where it Maintains its Principal Place of Business

Nor does the record unequivocally establish A-Star's principal place of business. A corporation's principal place of business is its “nerve center”—i.e., “the place where [the] corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities.”⁵⁴ Ordinarily, the nerve center is “the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters.”⁵⁵

Although A-Star's Notice of Removal states that A-Star “is based in ․ Florida,” it's not clear whether that means that A-Star maintains its headquarters in Florida.⁵⁶ Thus, the Court also needs A-Star to clarify where it maintains its principal place of business.

2. A-Star's Citizenship to the Extent it “Does Business as” an LLC

Further complicating matters is the fact that A-Star purports to “do business as” a limited liability company (“LLC”) named Your Trusted Solutions LLC.⁵⁷ It's unclear how an entity organized as a corporation can “do business as” an LLC, which is a completely different form of business association.⁵⁸

But assuming arguendo that A-Star can do business as an LLC, the legal standards governing an LLC's citizenship are completely different than those that apply to corporations. Unlike a corporation, “the citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of all of its members.”⁵⁹ Where an LLC maintains its principal place of business is therefore irrelevant,⁶⁰ as is the state in which the LLC is organized.⁶¹ A-Star thus bears the burden to “specifically allege the citizenship of every member of [the] LLC.”⁶²

A-Star hasn't done so. Although A-Star's Notice of Removal states that “Your Trusted Solutions LLC[ ] is a Florida domestic limited liability company with its principle [sic] place of business in Miami, Florida,”⁶³ neither the LLC's state of organization nor the place it maintains its principal place of business has any bearing on its citizenship for the reasons stated above.⁶⁴ And although A-Star insists that “[n]o member of the LLC is a citizen of the State of Texas,”⁶⁵ merely “asserting that ․ no members [of an LLC] are citizens of a certain state[ ] is insufficient.”⁶⁶ A-Star must instead affirmatively “name—and identify the citizenship of—every” member of the LLC.⁶⁷

C. The Court Lacks the Information it Needs to Determine Defendant Fayrustin's Citizenship

Nor does the Court have the information it needs to conclusively determine Defendant Fayrustin's citizenship. Plaintiffs allege in their pleadings that Fayrustin resides in Florida,⁶⁸ but they do not allege that Fayrustin is also domiciled in Florida.⁶⁹ Thus, just as Plaintiffs’ bare allegations about Villamil’s residence didn't suffice to establish her citizenship, Plaintiffs’ bare allegations about Fayrustin’s residence don't establish his citizenship either.⁷⁰

D. The Parties Failed to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(a)(2)

Frustratingly, the Court would already have some or all of that missing information if the parties had obeyed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(a)(2). That Rule provides that where—as here—“jurisdiction is based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a),” each party to the case “must, unless the court orders otherwise, file a disclosure statement” “with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response, or other request addressed to the court.”⁷¹ That disclosure statement “must name—and identify the citizenship of—every individual or entity whose citizenship is attributed to that party.”⁷²

1. Plaintiffs Should Have Filed Disclosure Statements Identifying R.A.V.’s and Decedent's States of Citizenship

As noted, R.A.V.’s citizenship is attributed to Villamil for jurisdictional purposes,⁷³ and Decedent's citizenship is attributed to both Villamil and the Estate Representatives.⁷⁴ Plaintiffs therefore needed to file Rule 7.1(a)(2) disclosure statements “nam[ing]” and “identify[ing] the citizenship of” R.A.V. and Decedent when they first appeared in this case.⁷⁵ Plaintiffs didn't file any such disclosure statement at that time,⁷⁶ so the Court orders them to do so now.

2. A-Star Should Have Filed a Disclosure Statement Naming and Specifying the Citizenship of Each of Your Trusted Solutions LLC's Members

Likewise, if it's true that A-Star “does business as” an LLC,⁷⁷ then A-Star would take on the citizenship of each of the LLC's members.⁷⁸ A-Star therefore needed to file a Rule 7.1(a)(2) disclosure statement identifying the name and citizenship of each of Your Trusted Solutions LLC's members at the time A-Star removed the case.⁷⁹ A-Star didn't do so then, so the Court orders A-Star to do so now.

3. The Court Orders the Remaining Parties to Disclose Their Citizenship

While Rule 7.1(a)(2) unequivocally applies to litigants who derive their citizenship from other entities (such as LLCs and representatives of estates or minor children),⁸⁰ it's less clear whether and how the Rule applies to litigants who don't.

Take Defendant Fayrustin, for instance. Unlike Villamil and the Estate Representatives, Fayrustin is litigating this case in his personal capacity alone.⁸¹ Thus, nobody else's citizenship is “attributed” to Fayrustin; his state of citizenship is his own state of domicile and no one else's.

Or, consider A-Star (to the extent it's defending this lawsuit in its capacity as a corporation rather than an LLC). Corporations typically don't derive their citizenship from any other entity either.⁸² They don't, for instance, take on their shareholders’ citizenship the way that LLCs take on their members’ citizenship.⁸³ Instead, a corporation is usually a citizen of its own state(s) of incorporation and the state where it maintains its own principal place of business.⁸⁴ So, generally speaking, no other entity's citizenship is “attributed” to a corporation either.

By its plain text, however, Rule 7.1(a)(2) requires every party to a diversity case to file a disclosure statement—not just those parties who derive their citizenship from some other entity.⁸⁵ The Court must therefore determine what a party's disclosure statement must contain if there's no other “individual or entity whose citizenship is attributed to that party.”⁸⁶

The most literal reading of Rule 7.1(a)(2) would merely require such a party to file a statement saying something like: “There are no other individuals or entities whose citizenship is attributed to me for diversity jurisdiction purposes.” But that would be pointless. When (for example) a litigant identifies a party as a corporation in its pleading or notice of removal, that by itself almost always suffices to inform the Court that there are no other entities whose citizenship is attributable to that corporation.⁸⁷ Forcing that corporation to file a document saying nothing more than that would therefore serve no practical purpose.

The more sensible option is therefore to read Rule 7.1(a)(2) more flexibly to require every party to a diversity case to disclose whatever facts the Court needs to determine that party's citizenship—which will vary depending on what type of entity the party is and the capacity in which that party is litigating the case. So, for example, Fayrustin is an individual defending this suit in his own personal capacity alone, so there's only one “individual or entity whose citizenship is attributed to” Fayrustin: Fayrustin himself.⁸⁸ Thus, under the more flexible reading of Rule 7.1(a)(2), Fayrustin would have to “file a disclosure statement ․ identify[ing his own] citizenship.”⁸⁹ Villamil, by contrast, isn't litigating this case in her individual capacity alone.⁹⁰ So, under the more flexible reading, Villamil would have to disclose her own citizenship, as well as the names and citizenships of the two “individual[s] ․ whose citizenship is attributed to her” (i.e., R.A.V. and Decedent).⁹¹

That broader reading better serves the entire purpose behind Rule 7.1(a)(2): to give courts and litigants the information they need to determine at the case's outset whether the parties are diverse.⁹² As noted, diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity.⁹³ Thus, for a court to evaluate whether it may permissibly exercise diversity jurisdiction over any particular case, it needs to know every party's citizenship—not just the citizenship of the parties who derive their citizenship from some other entity.⁹⁴ It would therefore make little sense for Rule 7.1(a)(2) to only require LLCs, representatives of decedents’ estates, and individuals suing on behalf of minors and incompetent persons to disclose their citizenship at the beginning of the case, but not corporations or individuals litigating exclusively on their own behalf.

Perhaps for that reason, several courts have adopted that more flexible interpretation of Rule 7.1(a)(2)—albeit without analyzing the issue in depth. That is, several courts have required all parties to a diversity case—as opposed to just those parties whose citizenship is determined with reference to some other entity—to disclose their citizenship at the beginning of the litigation so that the court can meaningfully assess whether subject matter jurisdiction exists.⁹⁵

The Court will therefore adopt that broader reading of Rule 7.1(a)(2) and require every party to this diversity case to file a disclosure statement giving the Court the information it needs to assess whether the parties are completely diverse. However, the Rules Committee may wish to amend Rule 7.1(a)(2) to make clearer whether the reading that this Court adopts today is the one the Committee intended.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court therefore ORDERS Plaintiffs to FILE a disclosure statement by May 2, 2024 that specifies:

(1) Plaintiff Alicia Delgado Villamil's state of domicile—as opposed to just her state of residency;

(2) R.A.V.’s state of domicile; and

(3) Decedent Mercedes Hernandez Delgado's state of domicile at the time she died.

* * *

The Court likewise ORDERS Defendant A-Star Trans Corp d/b/a Your Trusted Solutions LLC to FILE a disclosure statement by that same date specifying:

(1) A-Star's state(s) of incorporation;

(2) where A-Star maintains its headquarters (or otherwise maintains its principal place of business); and

(3) the name and state(s) of citizenship of each of Your Trusted Solutions LLC's members.

In that filing, A-Star SHALL also

(4) clarify how it is “doing business as” an LLC even though it is organized as a corporation; and

(5) analyze whether the citizenship of Your Trusted Solutions LLC's members is attributable to A-Star for jurisdictional purposes.

* * *

Finally, the Court ORDERS Defendant Denis Fayrustin to FILE a disclosure statement specifying his state of domicile by that same date.

* * *

Once the Court has all that information, the Court will determine whether it may validly exercise diversity jurisdiction over this case. If the Court answers that question “no,” it will remand the case. If the Court instead answers that question “yes,” the Court will then rule on the nonjurisdictional timeliness arguments that Plaintiffs raise in their pending Motion to Remand.

“Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand” (ECF No. 5) shall therefore REMAIN PENDING for the time being.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 17th day of April 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mot. Remand, ECF No. 5, at 1–6.All page citations in this Order refer to the page numbers assigned by the Court's CM/ECF system, not the document's internal pagination.

2.   Plaintiffs allege in their First Amended Complaint that Defendant Denis Fayrustin “negligently caused an automobile accident with Plaintiff, which resulted in severe injuries and damages to Plaintiff.” See 1st Am. Compl. at 2 (emphases added). The singular noun “Plaintiff” makes it unclear which one (or more) of the four named Plaintiffs got hurt in the crash. See id. at 1–2.

3.   See id. at 1–2, 4–5.The Complaint doesn't specify whether Decedent died because of injuries she sustained in the crash, or from unrelated causes. See id. at 5 (alleging only that Decedent “suffered ․ [p]hysical pain and suffering and mental anguish, past and future;” experienced “[p]hysical impairment and disfigurement, past and future;” incurred “[r]easonable and necessary medical expenses, past and future;” and sustained “[l]ost wages and/or loss of wage earning capacity” and certain unspecified “[o]ther damages”).

4.   See id. at 3.

5.   See id. at 3–4.

6.   See id. at 1, 4–5.

7.   See id.

8.   See id. at 1, 5.

9.   See id.

10.   See Pls.’ Original Pet., ECF No. 1, at 9–14.

11.   Notice Removal, ECF No. 1.

12.   See id. at 4–6.

13.   See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).See also id. § 1441(a) (providing (subject to various exceptions) that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending”).

14.   E.g., Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 978 F.3d 280, 281 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting McLaughlin v. Miss. Power Co., 376 F.3d 344, 353 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam)).

15.   See Notice Removal at 5–6.

16.   Id. at 6.

17.   See Mot. Remand.

18.   See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (“The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after receipt of the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.”).

19.   See, e.g., Mot. Remand at 3 (“Defendant Fayrustin was served on July 19, 2023. Defendant Fayrustin did not file his notice of removal within 30 days of being served. As such, [A-Star] is barred from removing this case.”); id. at 5 (arguing that Plaintiffs served A-Star's statutory agent on October 3, 2023, and that A-Star's window to remove the case therefore closed on November 3, 2023).A-Star contests Plaintiffs’ assertion that its Notice of Removal was untimely. See generally Resp., ECF No. 7. For the reasons explained below, the Court will not resolve that dispute now. See infra Section II.

20.   See Mot. Remand at 1–6.

21.   See id. at 1–6.

22.   Joint Rule 26 Report, ECF No. 12, at 3.

23.   See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is well settled that § 1446(b)’s thirty-day time limit for removal is a procedural provision, not a jurisdictional one.”).

24.   See, e.g., Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A] court sua sponte must raise the issue if it discovers it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”); Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing that “a party cannot waive” a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction”); Vasquez v. Chris, No. 22-156, 2022 WL 1144827, at *2 (M.D. La. Apr. 18, 2022) (“[T]he Court sua sponte raises the issue of whether it may exercise diversity jurisdiction in this matter, [including] whether the parties are completely diverse ․”).

25.   As the Court explains below, Villamil may also be a citizen of one or more additional states to the extent she's also pursuing claims on behalf of R.A.V. and Decedent. See infra Sections II.A.2–3.

26.   1st Am. Compl. at 1.

27.   See, e.g., MidCap Media Fin., L.L.C. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019).

28.   Amon v. USAA Life Ins. Co., No. 5:23-cv-00005, 2023 WL 7251603, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2023); see also, e.g., MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313 (“Citizenship requires not only ‘[r]esidence in fact’ but also ‘the purpose to make the place of residence one's home.’ ” (quoting Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 424, 59 S.Ct. 563, 83 L.Ed. 817 (1939))).

29.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 2; Pls.’ Original Pet. at 9.

30.   See Notice Removal at 5 (“As stated in the Plaintiff’ [sic] Original Petition, Plaintiffs all resided in El Paso, Texas at the time of the incident in question, at the time the lawsuit was filed, and at the time of filing of this notice of removal. Therefore, [A-Star] contends that Plaintiffs are domiciled in and are citizens of the State of Texas.”).

31.   E.g., MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313 (quoting Robertson v. Cease, 97 U.S. 646, 648, 24 L.Ed. 1057 (1878)).

32.   See supra note 28 and accompanying text.

33.   See, e.g., MidCap, 929 F.3d at 313 (“[A]n allegation of residency alone ‘does not satisfy the requirement of an allegation of citizenship.’ ” (quoting Strain v. Harrelson Rubber Co., 742 F.2d 888, 889 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam))).

34.   See Pls.’ Original Pet. at 9; 1st Am. Compl. at 2.

35.   See infra Sections II.D.1 & III.

36.   See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

37.   28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2).

38.   See, e.g., Cash v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 5:13-cv-00925, 2013 WL 12090090, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2013) (“Cash brings this action both as the representative of her mother's estate and in her own capacity, leading to the conclusion that both her citizenship and her mother's citizenship are relevant for diversity purposes.”); In re Air Crash Disaster, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“In the present case, plaintiffs have asserted causes of action in their individual capacities on behalf of themselves ․ as well as in their capacities as representatives of the decedents’ estates. Therefore, the Court must consider the citizenship of the individual plaintiffs as well as that of the decedents because the legal representative of an estate is deemed to be a citizen of the same state as the decedent.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2))).

39.   The Court recognizes that it's possible—and perhaps even probable—that Villamil and R.A.V. are domiciled in the same state. But the Court can't merely assume that that's true.

40.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 2; Pls.’ Original Pet. at 9.

41.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 5; see also supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.

42.   28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (emphasis added).

43.   See, e.g., Bolhous v. Simon Prop. Grp. (Del.) Inc., No. 4:14-cv-4104, 2012 WL 5286970, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2012) (“When a plaintiff is a representative of a decedent, the plaintiff's citizenship is the citizenship of the decedent at the time of his death; the citizenship of the representative is not relevant to a diversity analysis.”); Hawkins v. Masters Farms, Inc., No. 02-2595, 2003 WL 21555767, at *2 (D. Kan. July 7, 2003) (“Although Plaintiff Hawkins, an individual, is also a citizen of the State of Missouri, her role in this case as Personal Representative of the Estate of Mr. Creal mandates that the court focus on the citizenship of Mr. Creal at the time of his death, not the citizenship of Plaintiff Hawkins herself.”).

44.   See, e.g., Care One at Mercer, LLC v. Moreland ex rel. Moreland, No. 18-cv-497, 2018 WL 2417856, at *1 (D.N.J. May 29, 2018) (“For diversity purposes, the representative of the estate of a decedent is deemed to acquire the citizenship of the decedent at the time of the decedent's death.”).

45.   Contra 1st Am. Compl. at 2; Pls.’ Original Pet. at 9.

46.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 2; Pls.’ Original Pet. at 9.

47.   See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.

48.   See, e.g., Chidester-Roesch v. Camp Douglas Farmers Coop., No. 13-cv-521, 2013 WL 5963017, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2013) (“[B]ecause plaintiff Chidester-Roesch is suing on her own behalf as well as in her capacity as the legal representative of the estates of Dennis Chidester and Carolyn Chidester, it is necessary to determine not only Chidester-Roesch's citizenship, but also the citizenship of the decedents at the time they died.”).See also supra Section II.A.2.

49.   Notice Removal at 5; 1st Am. Compl. at 2.

50.   See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (specifying that in “direct action[s] against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance,” the “insurer shall [also] be deemed a citizen of ․ every State and foreign state of which the insured is a citizen,” as opposed to just the “State ․ by which the insurer has been incorporated” and “the State ․ where the insurer has its principal place of business” (emphasis added)).

51.   Id. (emphases added).

52.   See Notice Removal at 5 (“Defendant A-Star Trans Corp is an Ohio corporation ․”).

53.   See A-Star Answer, ECF No. 11, at 2 (“Defendant admits that it is a Florida corporation ․”).

54.   E.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93, 130 S.Ct. 1181, 175 L.Ed.2d 1029 (2010).

55.   Id. at 93, 130 S.Ct. 1181 (emphasis added).But see id. (noting the possibility that a corporation's headquarters may not qualify as that corporation's “nerve center” if it is “simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings” as opposed to the corporation's “actual center of direction, control, and coordination”); id. at 97, 130 S.Ct. 1181 (“[I]f the record reveals attempts at manipulation—for example, that the alleged ‘nerve center’ is nothing more than a mail drop box, a bare office with a computer, or the location of an annual executive retreat—the courts should instead take as the ‘nerve center’ the place of actual direction, control, and coordination ․”).

56.   See Notice Removal at 5.

57.   See id.

58.   Cf. Reefer Tek LLC v. El Dorado Trailer Leasing, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 1809, 2019 WL 5727315, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2019) (“[Plaintiffs argue] that ․ it is basic that a corporation cannot ‘do business’ as a limited liability company․ [Plaintiffs] have sufficiently established that the Corporation was not registered to do business as the LLC.” (cleaned up)).

59.   E.g., MidCap, 929 F.3d at 314 (cleaned up) (quoting Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., 542 F.3d 1077, 1080 (5th Cir. 2008)).

60.   See, e.g., Warren v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F. App'x 474, 475 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of its members, not its principal place of business.”).

61.   See, e.g., N.K.T. Land Acquisitions, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., No. 1:07-CV-790, 2007 WL 4324109, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2007) (“The state of an LLC's organization ․ is irrelevant in determining its citizenship for diversity purposes.”).

62.   E.g., MidCap, 929 F.3d at 314 (quoting Settlement Funding, L.L.C. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 2017)).

63.   See Notice Removal at 5; Joint Rule 26 Report at 3.

64.   See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.

65.   See Notice Removal at 5; Joint Rule 26 Report at 3.

66.   See, e.g., Middlemen Serv. Pros., LLC v. AION Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:23-cv-01336, 2024 WL 454975, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2024).

67.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text.

68.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 2; Pls.’ Original Pet. at 10; see also Fayrustin Answer, ECF No. 10, at 1 (admitting that allegation).

69.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 2; Pls.’ Original Pet. at 10.

70.   See supra Section II.A.1.

71.   Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2), (b)(1).A-Star did at least file a disclosure statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(a)(1), see Rule 7.1(a)(1) Disclosure Statement, ECF No. 2, which mandates that every “nongovernmental corporate party” to a civil case “file a statement that” either “identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or more of its stock” or “states that there is no such corporation,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(1). But A-Star's compliance with Rule 7.1(a)(1) doesn't satisfy its disclosure obligations under Rule 7.1(a)(2). See, e.g., Efeturk v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 23-cv-2861, 2023 WL 3203914, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2023).

72.   Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2).

73.   See supra Section II.A.2.

74.   See supra Section II.A.3.

75.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2), (b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 advisory committee's note to 2022 amendment (identifying “actions that include as parties a legal representative of the estate of a decedent [or] an infant” as “examples of attributed citizenship” that a party must disclose in its Rule 7.1(a)(2) disclosure statement).See also, e.g., Smith v. Textron Aviation, Inc., No. 23-CV-2291, 2023 WL 7187148, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2023) (ordering plaintiff asserting claims “in her capacity as the legal representative of the estate of [a] decedent” to “file [a] Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2) citizenship disclosure statement” specifying “[t]he citizenship[ ] of the decedent”).

76.   See Mot. Remand (Plaintiffs’ first filing in the case).

77.   But see supra note 58 and accompanying text (questioning that assumption).

78.   See supra Section II.B.2.

79.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2), (b)(1).See also, e.g., Am. Cas. Co. v. Lighthouse Safety, LLC, No. 2:22-cv-301, 2024 WL 1214068, at *7 (D. Utah Mar. 21, 2024) (“[The defendant] must file a Rule 7.1(a)(2) disclosure, identifying—as of the date this action was commenced—every member of the LLC and their respective citizenship ․”).Cf. 1st Nat'l Title Ins. Co. v. Buccaneer Title, LLC, No. 1:23-CV-29, 2023 WL 5944156, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2023) (ordering plaintiff corporation to file amended Rule 7.1(a)(2) disclosure statement clarifying whether “a separate limited liability company” had “citizenship attributable to” the corporation).

80.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2) (requiring parties to “name—and identify the citizenship of—every individual or entity whose citizenship is attributed to that party” (emphasis added)).

81.   See 1st Am. Compl. at 1–3.

82.   But see supra note 50 and accompanying text (identifying a limited exception to that general rule, but noting that it doesn't apply to A-Star).

83.   See, e.g., Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mountain States/Rosen, LLC, 757 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[A] corporation's shareholders’ citizenships are irrelevant to diversity jurisdiction ․ [A] corporation is the citizen of its principal place of business and place of incorporation.”).

84.   See supra Section II.B.1.

85.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2) (“In an action in which jurisdiction is based on diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), a party or intervenor must, unless the court orders otherwise, file a disclosure statement.” (emphases added)).

86.   See id.

87.   See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.But see supra note 50 (identifying a rare circumstance in which another entity's citizenship is attributed to a corporation).

88.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2).

89.   See id.

90.   See supra Sections II.A.1–3

91.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2).

92.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 advisory committee's note to 2022 amendment (“Rule 7.1 ․ is designed to facilitate an early and accurate determination of jurisdiction․ A party suing [a litigant] may not have all the information it needs to plead [that litigant's] citizenship․ [D]isclosure is necessary both to ensure that diversity jurisdiction exists and to protect against the waste that may occur upon belated discovery of a diversity-destroying citizenship.”).

93.   See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

94.   See, e.g., Estate of Anthony v. Penske Truck Leasing, No. 06-cv-0791, 2007 WL 610980, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Feb. 23, 2007) (“The existence of complete diversity cannot be confirmed without knowledge of each and every party's place of citizenship.”).

95.   See, e.g., Cumbee v. Spirit Logistics Network, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-358, 2023 WL 8586696, at *1 n.2, *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 11, 2023) (ordering corporation to “make an appropriate filing in the record detailing its place of incorporation and its principal place of business” and citing Rule 7.1(a)(2) as the source of the Court's authority to do so); Millikin v. TJX Cos., No. 3:24-cv-139, 2024 WL 519770, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2024) (“The Court will [order the individual plaintiff and the corporate defendant] to file their respective Rule 7.1[(a)(2)] disclosures. In completing the disclosures, the parties must identify their citizenship ․ This includes specifying the state(s) of incorporation and principal place of business of any corporation and identifying the citizenship, not residence, of any individual.”); Velocity Cap. Grp. LLC v. Vyvue, LLC, No. 23-CV-4951, 2024 WL 922641, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.) (“In an action based on diversity jurisdiction, Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2) requires parties to file a disclosure statement identifying their citizenship.” (emphases added)), report and recommendation accepted by 2024 WL 923462 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2024).

DAVID C. GUADERRAMA, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE