DUDLEY v. SMICK (2023)

MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Clinton Deonard Dudley (“Plaintiff”) is a pretrial detainee confined at Cambria County Prison and initiated this action pro se against Defendants Counselor Smick, Counselor Fox, Lieutenant Fox, Warden Christian M. Smith, Officer Levernight, Officer Turk, Lieutenant Anderson, Lieutenant Apply, Delozier (accounting), Deputy Warden Patterson, Deputy Warden Descavish, Deputy Warden Rozum (individually referenced or collectively “Defendants,” where necessary) alleging violations of his civil rights.

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 24). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 25, 30, 31). The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

For the reasons below, the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) denied in part and granted in part.

II. BACKGROUND

At all times relevant to the original complaint, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the Cambria County Prison. Plaintiff initiated this action pro se on October 3, 2022, and proceeds in forma pauperis. The original complaint was filed on October 19, 2022. (ECF No. 8). Because Plaintiff filed three documents purporting as separate complaints, the Court issued a Memorandum Order requiring Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint using the court approved form: Pro Se 14 (rev. 12/16). (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff then filed the operative Amended Complaint on December 30, 2022. (ECF No. 17).

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint reads:

I was locked in a cold cell that contained no heat. Half of my inmate funds are being taken[.] Cambria County staff refused to allow me to contact an attorney ․ I was mased and forced to the ground. While the struggle was going on my face was slammed into the floor and restrained ․

Am. Compl. at pp. 3, 8. The events giving rise to these allegations appear to have taken place in or around February 2022. Id.

Given the leniency afforded to pro se litigants in discerning their purported causes of action,² the Court interprets Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as asserting these claims against Defendants:³

(1) a Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-excessive force;

(2) a Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-conditions of confinement (cold cell);

(3) a Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-deductions from inmate account; and

(4) a First Amendment access to the courts claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-denied contact to an attorney.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in its entirety under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges,” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013); U.S. ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (“petition prepared by a prisoner ․ may be inartfully drawn and should be read ‘with a measure of tolerance’ ”).

The applicable inquiry under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “ ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).

The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully․ Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).

When considering a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff has a right to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Scheuer, 416 U.S. 232 A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).

If a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, then the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Even so, a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2004), as amended (Mar. 8, 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

IV. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to establish discernable civil rights violations and argue that the only facts or even references by name to any of the twelve Defendants were Officer Turk, Lieutenant Anderson, Officer Levernight, Counselor Smick, and Lieutenant Apply. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 18-26; 17, 24). Alternatively, if Plaintiff has asserted plausible civil rights violations, then Defendants argue that the qualified immunity doctrine applies. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 27-32). Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's request for a specific sum of unliquidated damages should be stricken from the Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 33-38). Each argument is addressed in turn.

a. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To establish a prima facie case under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a person acting under color of law deprived him of a federal right. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). He must also show that the person acting under color of law “intentionally” violated his constitutional rights or acted “deliberately indifferent” in violation of those rights. See, e.g., Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843–44 (1998); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (citing Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1971)); see also Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2000). In this regard, a plaintiff “must portray specific conduct by [ ] officials which violates some constitutional right.” Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015). By doing so, a plaintiff must show a defendant's “personal involvement” by adequately alleging either (1) the defendant's personal involvement in the wrongful conduct; or (2) the defendant's actual knowledge and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222 (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). “Although a court can infer that a defendant had contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be actual, not constructive.” Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222. (citations omitted).

b. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims based on violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Count I- Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant Anderson, Lieutenant Apply, Officer Levernight, and Officer Turk took part in “masing” him, forcing him to the ground, and slamming his face into the floor upon his refusal of a 24-hour lock-in. (ECF No. 17 at p. 8). Defendants characterize Plaintiff's refusal as “defiant” conduct and maintain that the correction officers resorted to actions that were proper and necessary, not unreasonable. (ECF No. 25 at p. 6).

A pretrial detainee's excessive force claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause which “protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015) (citations omitted). The applicable standard in this context “is solely an objective one.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. In other words, “a pretrial detainee can prevail by providing only objective evidence that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” Id. at 398. For example, “the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 397 (discussing non-exhaustive examples to highlight potentially relevant objective circumstances). Additionally, courts “must judge the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective and with the knowledge of the defendant officer ․ [and] take account of the legitimate interest in managing a jail, acknowledging ․ that deference to policies and practices needed to maintain order and institutional security is appropriate.” Id. at 399-400.

At this stage of the proceedings, there are sufficient facts to support a viable claim of excessive force such that Plaintiff's substantive due process rights were violated. Although the factual allegations remain sparce, discovery may reveal whether the alleged use of excessive force was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective or excessive in relation to a legitimate purpose. Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim as against Lieutenant Anderson, Lieutenant Apply, Officer Levernight, and Officer Turk.

Count II- Conditions of Confinement (Cold Cell)

Plaintiff next alleges that Officer Levernight, Lieutenant Anderson, and Lieutenant Apply placed him in a prison cell for six days that had no heat and vents blowing cold air. (ECF No. 30 at p. 2). He also alleges that during this time no blankets were provided to him. (ECF No. 17 at p. 8). Defendants maintain that a cold cell does not amount to a constitutional violation. (ECF No. 25 at p. 4).

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees against “punishment[,]” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)), and provides at least as much protection as the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment standard used to analyze conditions of confinement for convicted persons. Bell, 441 U.S. at 545. Thus, if the condition violates the Eighth Amendment, then it also violates a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.⁴

Courts must consider whether the condition amounts “to punishment [before] adjudication of guilt in accordance with law.” Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 158. But “[n]ot every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to ‘punishment’ in the constitutional sense[.]” Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. A constitutional violation exists if the conditions of confinement are not reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39. “In assessing whether the conditions are reasonably related to the assigned purposes, [courts] inquire as to whether these conditions ‘cause [inmates] to endure [such] genuine deprivations and hardship over an extended period of time,’ that the adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned for them.” Union Cty. Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 542). An actionable constitutional deprivation is sufficiently stated if denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,” and unsafe conditions, unsanitary, and inadequate do not appear reasonably related to a legitimate, non-punitive governmental objective. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347.

Taken as true, Plaintiff's allegation against Officer Levernight, Lieutenant Anderson, and Lieutenant Apply supports a reasonable inference that the cold cell conditions were implemented as punitive measures or lacked any reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. At this stage in the proceedings, the factual allegations alleged are enough to establish that the conditions Plaintiff faced, as a pretrial detainee at Cambria County Prison, violated his substantive due process rights. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim as against Officer Levernight, Lieutenant Anderson, and Lieutenant Apply.

Plaintiff's response also argues that

While the plaintiff was on security risk status Patterson, Descavish, Rozum (PRC) should have reviewed the plaintiff within 72 hours per the inmate handbook “to ensure the plaintiff was receiving appropriate basic living standards. [sic] (PRC) shouldn't have deviated from administrative policy.

(ECF No. 30 at p. 2).⁵ In reply, Defendants argue that a violation of administrative policy is not evidence of a constitutional violation. (ECF No. 31 at p. 2). Defendants are correct.

Prison policies and regulations do not have the force of law and, if violated, are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bullard v. Scism, 449 F. App'x 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2011) (allegations that prison regulations are violated are not actionable). To the extent that Plaintiff intended to bring constitutional claims related to Deputy Warden Patterson, Deputy Warden Descavish, and Deputy Warden Rozum's alleged violation of internal prison policies and regulations, these claims are not legally recognized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and are dismissed with prejudice as amendment would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002), 293 F.3d at 108.

Count III- Deductions from Inmate Account

Plaintiff alleges that “Cambria County Prison [deducted money from his prison account without informing him] of money owed and how the debt was accumulated.” (ECF No. 30 at p. 2). Plaintiff also alleges that “[he] sent multiple requests to Accounting.” (ECF No. 17 at p. 9). Defendants maintain that Plaintiff has failed to identify which Defendants his claim is against. (ECF No. 25 at p. 8).

To prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove:

(1) that he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest; (2) that this deprivation was without due process; (3) that the defendant subjected the plaintiff, or caused the plaintiff to be subjected to, this deprivation without due process; (4) that the Defendant was acting under color of state law; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered injury [because of] the deprivation without due process.

Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1113-14 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court of Appeals has established that inmates have a property interest in funds held in prison accounts. Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d Cir. 1997). “Thus, inmates are entitled to due process with respect to any deprivation of this money.” Id. (citing Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1061 (1997)). Additionally, the Court of Appeals has explained that “[a]t a minimum, federal due process requires inmates to be informed of the terms of the [relevant] Policy and the amount of their total monetary liability [ ].” Montanez v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir. 2014). Although Montanez reviewed procedural due process rights in the context of withdrawals made by the Department of Corrections, its discussed rational equally extends to a county prison.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is unclear. Plaintiff has named no Defendants as to this claim and only provides, for example, “[he] believes Cambria County Prison has taken around $4,000 from [him] in the past 7 years. [And he] sent multiple requests to Accounting and multiple grievance[s] w[ere] filed as well.” (ECF No. 17 at p. 9). Therefore, Defendants Motion to Dismiss is granted as there is not enough to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation. That said, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend to cure this deficiency with factual specificity.

c. Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on a violation of his access to the courts claim

Count IV- Denied Contact to an Attorney

Plaintiff alleges that he was served with a forfeiture notice from the Attorney General's Office seeking to enforce a $13,780 forfeiture. He also alleges that Counselor Smick and Counselor Fox violated his access to the courts because they denied him contact with an attorney to discuss the forfeiture and condemnation notices he received. (ECF No. 17 at pp. 7-9). Plaintiff specifically alleges that “the Counselor” gave him only the option of calling family or an attorney. (ECF No. 17 at p. 8). Defendants maintain there is no constitutional violation and argue that the basis for Plaintiff's cause of action cannot be issues relating to contact with the attorneys’ handling the forfeiture. (ECF No. 31 at p. 2).

Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees retain a right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996); see also Prater v. City of Phila., 542 F. App'x 135, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). To establish a denial of access to the courts claim, a plaintiff must show: “that [he] suffered an ‘actual injury’ in that [he] lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim”; and that [he] ha[s] “no other ‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial of access suit.” Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)). The complaint “must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must describe the ‘lost remedy.’ ” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205-06 (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17).

The Court must construe Plaintiff's pleading liberally to do substantial justice and finds there to be a factual issue best developed through discovery. It is plausible that the alleged risk of forfeiture is an actual injury and that no other recompense other than the present denial of access suit exists. Christopher, 536 U.S. at 415. At this stage of the proceedings, even though the forfeiture and condemnation notice(s) and his alleged request(s) and denial(s) remain unclear, such factual allegations raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a plausible claim for relief. Therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's access to the courts claim is denied to permit the development of an appropriate record as against Counselor Smick and Counselor Fox.

d. Qualified Immunity

The Court next addresses the qualified immunity doctrine. See Hunter, 502 U.S. at 229 v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (underscoring resolving immunity questions “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”).

Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The analysis of qualified immunity has two inquires: whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the injured party, “show [that] the [government official]’s conduct violated a constitutional right”; and whether the right was clearly established “in light of the specific context of the case, [and] not as a broad general proposition.” Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic, 841 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). A court may decide these inquiries in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

A right is “clearly established” when “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175 (emphasis in original) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). That is, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175 (emphasis in original) (quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664).

As the Court explained above, it finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts sufficient to support his claims of excessive force, conditions of confinement, and access to the courts. The remaining inquiry of qualified immunity is thus whether those rights were clearly established “in light of the specific context of the case.” Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 174. Other than their argument that Plaintiff failed to set forth constitutional violations, Defendants maintain that “at most the allegations are negligence or mistakes.” (ECF No. 25 at pp. 10-11).

“The standard for qualified immunity ․ ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments by protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175 (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991)). But with such an exacting standard, “it is not surprising that some degree of specificity in the law is required before a right is said to be ‘clearly established.’ ” Zaloga, 841 F.3d at 175. In this regard, courts must “consider the state of the existing law at the time of the alleged violation and the circumstances confronting [the defendant(s)] to determine whether a reasonable state actor could have believed his conduct was lawful.” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 253 (3d Cir. 2010).

At this stage, the circumstances confronting Defendants at the time of the alleged violations are factually undeveloped. See, e.g., Thomas v. Indep. Twp. 463 F.3d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 2006) (“qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the immunity is established on the face of the complaint.”). As well, Defendants advance no argument of clearly established law.⁶ See e.g., Phillips, 515 F.3d at 242 n.7 (“[a] decision as to qualified immunity is premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical facts relevant to the immunity analysis.”). The Amended Complaint does not lend itself to an early resolution of the qualified immunity issue. In such an instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained options for courts to consider:

First, a district court may order the plaintiff to reply to the defendant's answer pleading qualified immunity. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 598 (1998). Second, a district court may grant a defense motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) with respect to the conduct of which the plaintiff complains. Id. The district court should avail itself of these options before addressing the immunity question, which sometimes requires complicated analysis of legal issues. Id. If the plaintiff's action survives these hurdles, the plaintiff ordinarily will be entitled to some discovery, but the district court may limit the timing, sequence, frequency, and extent of that discovery under Rule 26. Id. at 598–99. Beyond these procedural tools, summary judgment remains a useful tool for precluding insubstantial claims from proceeding to trial. Id. at 600. The simplified notice pleading rule is made possible by these “pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 & n. 9 (1957). Thus, we charge the district court with the task of utilizing these procedures to protect the substance of the qualified immunity defense. In this regard, we note that the district court has broad discretion to utilize these procedures in a manner that is useful and equitable to the parties. See Crawford–El, 523 U.S. at 600–01.

463 F.3d at 301.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied without prejudice for Defendants to raise this again after discovery is conducted and the record is more fully developed.

e. Specific Unliquidated Damages

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's demand for unliquidated damages of $300,000 must be stricken from his Amended Complaint based on Local Rule 8 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 25 at p. 11). Defendants are correct.

Local Rule 8 states that, except in some cases, “[n]o party shall set forth in a pleading originally filed with this Court a specific dollar amount of unliquidated damages.” See LCvR 8. Because no enumerated circumstances apply here, Plaintiff's demand for specific unliquidated damages is stricken. See Ramsier v. Allegheny Cnty., No. CV 15 - 539, 2016 WL 890603, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2016) (invoking Local Rule 8 to strike the plaintiff's demand for unliquidated damages).

V. CONCLUSION 7

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) is denied in part and granted in part as follows:

The motion is denied as to Count I – excessive force, Count II – conditions of confinement (cold cell), and Count IV – access to the courts. The motion is granted as to Count III – improper deductions from inmate account. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss based on qualified immunity is denied without prejudice for Defendants to raise this again after discovery is conducted and the record is more fully developed.

Plaintiff's demand for specific unliquidated damages is stricken from the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his Amended Complaint as to Count III to include factual specificity as to which Defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. The second amended complaint must be filed by December 27, 2023. Plaintiff is cautioned that this opportunity to file a second amended complaint is not an invitation to enlarge the lawsuit by filing new allegations not related to the claims in the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is further cautioned that the inclusion of new allegations and claims unrelated to those set forth in the Amended Complaint will be considered a failure to comply with an Order of Court and will result in the dismissal of the second amended complaint. If Plaintiff does not file a second amended complaint, then the case will proceed only as to Counts I, II, and IV. An appropriate Order follows.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The court must liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings and “apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name.” Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[because] this is a § 1983 action, [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the [United States] Constitution [or laws of the United States].”).

3.   The Amended Complaint does not list Counts; for convenience, the Court characterizes Plaintiff's allegations into four Counts.

4.   The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide “humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). For allegations of violations of non-medical conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must prove that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference that deprived him of “ ‘the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.’ ” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1991) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).

5.   Because Plaintiff is a prisoner appearing pro se, the Court will treat the additional factual allegations contained in his response as though they were included in the Amended Complaint. Baker v. Younkin, 529 F. App'x 114, 115 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Lewis v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 878 F.2d 714, 722 (3d Cir. 1989)).

6.   “[C]learly established rights are derived either from binding Supreme Court and Third Circuit precedent or from a ‘robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals.’ ” James v. New Jersey State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Bland v. City of Newark, 900 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2018)) (citation omitted); D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62 (2018) (“To be clearly established, a legal principle must ․ [be] dictated by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority[.]” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

CYNTHIA REED EDDY, United States Magistrate Judge.