LEACH v. SOUTH EAST BULLITT VOLUNTEER FIRE AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Thomas E. Leach alleges breach of contract and violation of due process by his former employer, Defendant South East Bullitt Volunteer Fire and Rescue Department, Inc., arising from the Department's termination of his employment. (Docket No. 1) He asserts claims under Kentucky law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id., PageID.7–8 ¶¶ 39–50) The Department moved to dismiss, contending that it could not be held liable under § 1983 because it is a private nonprofit corporation. (D.N. 4) Leach argued in response that discovery was needed to determine whether the Department acted under color of state law for purposes of his § 1983 claim. (D.N. 8) The Court agreed and allowed the parties to conduct limited discovery on that issue, denying the motion to dismiss without prejudice. (See D.N. 18, PageID.66) At the conclusion of the discovery period, the Department renewed its motion to dismiss. (D.N. 26; see D.N. 20) In response, Leach asserts that volunteer fire departments are “agents of the sovereign” under Kentucky law and are therefore subject to liability under § 1983. (D.N. 30, PageID.141) After careful consideration, the Court will deny the Department's motion for the reasons explained below.

I.

Prior to his termination in March 2022, Leach worked for more than thirty years at the Department, a nonprofit firefighter corporation based in Shepherdsville, Kentucky. (D.N. 1, PageID.1–2 ¶¶ 1–3) The Department has partnered with the South East Bullitt Fire District since 1979 to provide “firefighting, rescue, life safety, fire prevention, fire safety education, and accident cleanup services.” (D.N. 26-4, PageID.124)

“Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 478 F. App'x 971, 977 (6th Cir. 2012). Leach asserts that the Department violated his due process rights “when it took an adverse employment action against him without following its own procedures and abrogated the termination hearing process set out in [Standard Operating Procedure] #26.” (D.N. 1, PageID.8 ¶ 44) He alleges that the Department's “actions are fairly attributed to the [s]tate” and that the Department thus “was acting under color of state law.” (Id., PageID.7 ¶ 42) The Department moves to dismiss Leach's complaint, maintaining that its termination of Leach was “its own private action under its policy as a private employer—not as a fire district or similar government entity” and contending that Leach's “theory of liability under § 1983 is inappropriate.” (D.N. 26, PageID.90)

As an initial matter, the Court notes a lack of clarity in the caselaw as to whether action taken “under color of state law” is “a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action,” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981), or merely an element required to state a claim for relief under § 1983. See Chambers v. Sanders, 63 F.4th 1092, 1096 (6th Cir. 2023) (listing “the defendant acted under color of state law” as an element that must be alleged by a § 1983 plaintiff (quoting Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010))); Brown v. Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000, 1002 (6th Cir. 1970) (“The important fact, for the purpose of determining [subject-matter] jurisdiction, is whether the complaint indicated that the conduct of the defendants constituted ‘state action’ within the meaning of [§ 1983].”).¹ There is a similar lack of clarity in the record of this matter. (See, e.g., D.N. 4, PageID.23 (moving to dismiss pursuant to “Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(4)(b)(1)(6)”); D.N. 4-1 (alternating discussion between Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6)); D.N. 26, PageID.99 (asserting that Leach's “§ 1983 claim is improper as asserted against the Department and should be dismissed with prejudice” and that “[w]ithout that claim, this Court is divested of subject matter jurisdiction, as the only remaining claim is Plaintiff's state-law breach of contract claim”)) In this case, the Court finds that the state-action question is most appropriately examined as a required element to state a claim for relief under § 1983.² See Barton v. Neeley, 114 F.4th 581 n.1 (6th Cir. 2024) (“A plaintiff alleging a § 1983 claim must prove two elements: First, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law․” (quotation omitted)). Further, because the parties have submitted evidence, the Court concludes that the instant motion is more properly treated as a motion for summary judgment.³ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (requiring that a motion to dismiss be treated as motion for summary judgment where “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court”).⁴

II.

Before the Court may grant a motion for summary judgment, it must find that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of specifying the basis for its motion and identifying that portion of the record that demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the non-moving party thereafter must produce specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, and must draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Nevertheless, the non-moving party must do more than merely show that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Id. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Instead, the non-moving party must present specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence ․ of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Leach argues that the Department violated his due process rights by allegedly terminating his employment without a hearing. (See D.N. 1, PageID.7–8 ¶¶ 39–46) As the Court explained in its September 26, 2023 Order,

“[i]n order for the conduct of a private party to be considered under the color of state law for purposes of § 1983, the conduct of the party must be ‘fairly attributable to the State’ under one of three narrow tests.” Nance v. Mayfield Plaza Apartments Mgmt., No. 5:22-CV-P164-JHM, 2023 WL 3854911, at *3 (W.D. Ky. June 6, 2023) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)). The public function test “requires that the private entity exercise powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state, such as holding elections, or eminent domain.” Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). The state compulsion test “requires that a state exercise such coercive power or provide such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that in law the choice of the private actor is deemed to be that of the state.” Id. Finally, under the symbiotic relationship test, “the action of a private party constitutes state action when there is a sufficiently close nexus between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.” Id.

(D.N. 18, PageID.65) The Department argues that Leach cannot satisfy any of the tests here. (See generally D.N. 26) Leach did not respond to the Department's arguments regarding the state-compulsion or symbiotic-relationship test (see D.N. 30), thus forfeiting those issues. See Swanigan v. FCA US LLC, 938 F.3d 779, 786 (6th Cir. 2019) (deeming “issues not raised in response to dispositive motions forfeited” (citation omitted)). The Court will therefore consider only the public-function test.

Although governments have traditionally performed many different functions, “very few have been ‘exclusively reserved to the state.’ ” Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). When applying the public-function test, the Court must “engage in a state-specific inquiry as to whether the power at issue has historically been reserved to the state.” Cornett v. Mason Volunteer Fire Co., No. 95-3010, 1996 WL 242035 at *1, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14444 at *5 (6th Cir. May 8, 1996) (unpublished table decision) (citing Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 196 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1995)). For example, when faced with this question in Cornett, the Sixth Circuit found that “a private, non-profit ․ corporation under contract to provide firefighting and emergency medical services” to an Ohio township, id. at *1, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14444 at *2, was not a state actor under the public-function test because Ohio law allowed local entities to employ, contract for, or forgo firefighting services, thus indicating that firefighting was not a function exclusively reserved to the state. Id. at *––––, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14444 at *6.

While the relevant statutory scheme developed by the Kentucky legislature differs slightly from the Ohio law examined in Cornett, it has many similar aspects. Cities in Kentucky may have their own fire departments and personnel. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 95. But areas outside of cities or areas that are not covered by city fire service may be organized into tax districts called fire-protection districts and volunteer fire department districts.⁵ See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 75.010, 75.020, 75.040. And fire prevention districts, fire protection districts, municipal corporations, volunteer fire departments, volunteer fire prevention units, volunteer fire protection units, and counties in Kentucky may contract with each other “for the furnishing or receiving of fire protection services ․ where such fire protection is not otherwise provided by some division of government or governmental agency.”⁶ Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 75.050. Thus, firefighting initially does not seem to be a “ ‘power[ ] which [is] traditionally exclusively reserved to the [Commonwealth]’ of [Kentucky]” under the Sixth Circuit's public-function test, since local government options for the provision of firefighting services was the only public-function factor considered in Cornett. See 1996 WL 242035 at *2, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14444 at *6.

But “as Flagg Brothers states, the state action question remains fact specific even where the exclusivity of the public function is at issue. Lower courts must therefore consider the history, tradition, and local law surrounding volunteer fire departments before concluding whether they are state actors.” Yeager v. City of McGregor, 980 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court will examine other factors specific to Kentucky beyond Cornett’s focus on local government options for the provision of firefighting services. See, e.g., Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Dep't, 607 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1979) (utilizing a multifactor test to determine that Connecticut's volunteer fire departments were state actors). Further, unpublished appellate decisions “carry no precedential weight” and “have no binding effect on anyone other than on the parties to the action.” Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1996). As noted above, Cornett is an unpublished table decision. “Because relevant binding caselaw is limited, the [C]ourt will consider persuasive published ․ case law from other jurisdictions.” Purnell v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, No. 05-CV-73384-DT, 2007 WL 421828, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2007).

In Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., the Fourth Circuit found that a volunteer fire department in Maryland was a state actor for purposes of § 1983. 218 F.3d 337, 349 (4th Cir. 2000). The court considered five factors in reaching its conclusion: (1) whether firefighting is historically the province of the state; (2) the scope of the fire department's authority and protection, including sovereign immunity and police powers; (3) whether the state funds the fire department; (4) whether the state regulates the fire department; and (5) whether the state and its courts view the fire department as a state actor. Id. Leach argues that Goldstein’s “thorough” analysis provides appropriate factors for an examination of Kentucky's volunteer fire departments. (See D.N. 30, PageID.146) And while the Department acknowledges the value of Goldstein’s fact-specific inquiry (see D.N. 26, PageID.93), it asserts that “[a]n analysis under the Goldstein factors yields the ․ conclusion ․ that the Department is not a state actor” (id., PageID.95).

“Kentucky has a longstanding tradition of treating firefighting as a governmental function ․” Caneyville Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Green's Motorcycle Salvage, Inc., 286 S.W.3d 790, 799 (Ky. 2009) (collecting cases) (considered in context of immunity). Taxes were levied as early as the nineteenth century to support organized fire services in various Kentucky cities, and “the development of fire departments in Kentucky has arisen out of the common need of public service and grown alongside government legislation, regulation, and financial support of these entities.” Id. These considerations support the conclusion that firefighting was historically the Commonwealth's province. See id. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of a finding that the Department is a state actor.⁷ Id.

The broad scope of the Department's authority and protection also points towards a finding that it is a state actor. First, the Department's Articles of Incorporation note that the Department's purpose is “promoting public safety by rendering [firefighting] services, by rendering fire prevention services and education therefor, and by providing rescue services.”⁸ (D.N. 26-2, PageID.105) This comprehensive scope of authority is reinforced by the Department's bylaws, which state that the Department's purpose is to “further the common good and general welfare of the people of the community,” with the power “to do any and all lawful acts which may be necessary or convenient to [e]ffect the public purposes for which the [Department] is organized.” (D.N. 26-3, PageID.110) In addition, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 75.070 limits the liability of volunteer fire departments and their personnel for “any omission, act of commission, or negligence while answering an alarm, performing fire prevention services, or other duly authorized emergency services.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 75.070(1). And “[b]y statute when on a fire scene[,] a paid firefighter is designated to have the authority to arrest.”⁹ (D.N. 30-1, PageID.153); see also Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 345 (considering the statutory authority given to members of a volunteer fire company when analyzing the second factor).

Moreover, the Department receives significant financial support from public funds, further indicating that it functions as a state actor. In response to Leach's interrogatories, the Department noted that it “receives the tax dollars as awarded by the district board every year.” (D.N. 30-1, PageID.154) As the contract between the Department and the District makes clear, “the Department furnishes fire protection and related services for the District within the [s]ervice area[,] and in return the District pays to the Department the net proceeds of the tax revenues levied, assessed, and received by the District under [Ky. Rev. Stat. §] 75.040.” (D.N. 26-4, PageID.121) The Department is also “recognized and certified by the Fire Commission” to receive volunteer fire department aid, reimbursement for equipment losses, and low-interest loans, pursuant to Ky. Rev. Stat. § 95A.262(2), (8), and (14). (Id., PageID.123) While “ ‘receipt of state funds alone is insufficient to transform private actions into state actions,’ ” substantial state funding is still a factor that “weighs in favor of a finding of state action.” Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 347 (quoting Haavistola v. Cmty. Fire Co. of Rising Sun, Inc., 6 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 1993)).

The Department is also heavily regulated by state agencies. For instance, all firefighter applicants and current firefighters must “complete and maintain all training requirements mandated by the Kentucky Fire Commission and [Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §] 95A.230.” (D.N. 26-3, PageID.112; see also D.N. 30-1, PageID.155) The Department disclosed during discovery that the Kentucky Fire Commission annually audits the Department's financial and training records and has “done so since around 2021.” (D.N. 30-1, PageID.154) “Prior to that, the reports were made to the Department of Local Government,” another Kentucky state agency. Id. Furthermore, while the Department is an independent entity, it is contractually prohibited from merging, consolidating, liquidating, or dissolving “without the prior written consent of the District.” (D.N. 26-4, PageID.123)

Finally, Kentucky and its courts appear to consider the Department a state actor. The Kentucky Supreme Court has observed that “[i]t is incontrovertible that fire departments perform a paradigmatic function of the government in keeping the popul[ace] and its property safe from fire. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to think of a more representative government function.” Caneyville, 286 S.W.3d at 799. And the legislature's extension of sovereign immunity to volunteer fire departments was upheld in Caneyville, where the Kentucky Supreme Court found that it was “bound to construe [Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §] 75.070 as acknowledging the governmental immunity of fire departments and the official and qualified official immunity of firefighters.”¹⁰ 286 S.W.3d at 808. In a later decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court found that questions remain about “whether the fire department's actions—namely, training, supervision, hiring, and retention—were governmental as opposed to proprietary functions entitling the department to immunity.” Upper Pond Creek Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Kinser, 617 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Ky. 2020). Nevertheless, “[t]he [Commonwealth's] decision to bring such [entities] beneath its sovereign-immunity umbrella is powerful evidence that, at least in some circumstances, they act on its behalf.”¹¹ Minges v. Butler Cnty. Agr. Soc., 585 F. App'x 879, 880 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Thus, “[t]he context-specific nature of the state-action question suggests [the Court] should not so hastily declare that [volunteer fire departments] cannot be sued under § 1983,” id. at 881, and this factor “militates in favor of [a] finding of state action.”¹² Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 347.

The Department argues that even if volunteer firefighting is a public function in Kentucky, such state action is not at issue in this matter, which arises from the Department's termination of Leach's employment. (See D.N. 26, PageID.95) In support, the Department cites primarily statutory-immunity caselaw and the language of § 75.070.¹³ (Id., PageID.96) While the Department correctly notes that Kentucky law specifically extends immunity where firefighters are actively responding to an emergency situation, see § 75.070, Kentucky courts have not yet answered whether that immunity extends to “training, supervision, hiring, and retention.” Upper Pond, 617 S.W.3d at 335. The Court therefore declines to “conceptually sever firefighting from personnel decisions.” Dushane v. Leeds Hose Co. #1, 6 F. Supp. 3d 204, 209–10 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[P]ersonnel decisions are integral to [a volunteer fire department's] firefighting function because they are necessarily decisions about who will, and who will not, fight fires.”); see also Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 23 (finding a firefighter's dismissal to constitute state action “by virtue of [the volunteer fire department's] function and its relationship to the [t]own”); Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 348 (finding a volunteer fire department to be a state actor where a firefighter challenged his termination). But see Judka v. Emmel, No. 1:24-CV-531, 2025 WL 1550739 at *8–9, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102573 at *19 (M.D. Pa. May 30, 2025) (“[I]nternal disciplinary decisions of a private volunteer organization do not become state action—even if the organization itself is heavily involved in a state function.”).

In sum, the Court concludes that the Department, as “a volunteer fire department in the [Commonwealth] of [Kentucky], is a state actor” for purposes of § 1983 and will deny the Department's converted motion for summary judgment without prejudice. See Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 348; see also Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 23 (“In view of the circumstances, and in light of the exclusively governmental nature of the function performed by the [volunteer fire department], we hold that the actions of the Department were ‘state action.’ ”).

III.

For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby

ORDERED as follows:

(1) The Department's motion to dismiss (D.N. 26) is converted to a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) and is DENIED.

(2) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), this matter is REFERRED to U.S. Magistrate Judge Colin H. Lindsay for resolution of all litigation planning issues, entry of scheduling orders, consideration of amendments thereto, and resolution of all non-dispositive matters, including discovery issues. Judge Lindsay is further authorized to conduct a settlement conference in this matter at any time.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See also Manohar v. Massillon Cmty. Hosp., No. 99-3481, 2000 WL 302776 at *1, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4867 at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 17, 2000) (“Although [the plaintiff] ․ was not entitled to relief under § 1983 because there was no state action, it is clear that the district court did have jurisdiction over his § 1983 complaint.” (citations omitted)); Tracy v. Ehrke, No. 86-1878, 1987 WL 37379 at *1, 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6171 at *2 (6th Cir. May 13, 1987) (concluding that the “plaintiff failed to allege state action, as is required to establish federal subject[-]matter jurisdiction under § 1983”); Lovelace v. McCracken Cnty., No. 5:22-CV-98-BJB, 2023 WL 6392442, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 29, 2023) (“[S]tate action isn't a jurisdictional question, ․ but it is a required element of a § 1983 claim ․” (emphasis removed) (citing Boykin v. Van Buren Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007))).

2.   Recent Sixth Circuit decisions also affirm examination of state action as a jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., Hall v. Board, No. 24-3797, 2025 WL 2639656, at *6 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of private parties in § 1983 action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477 (6th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)). But these cases involve sua sponte dismissals where “allegations of [the] complaint [were] totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple, 183 F.3d at 479; see also Liu v. Runyan, 46 F. App'x 253 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of § 1983 action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to allege defendant was a state actor); Pridgen v. Fontaine, No. 3:10-CV-384-H, 2010 WL 3735706 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 17, 2010) (same). Here, the state-actor question cannot be determined from the pleadings alone (see D.N. 18) and the Court is not acting of its own accord (see D.N. 4; D.N. 26).

3.   For instance, the Department filed its bylaws (D.N. 26-3) and its contract with the District for fire protection services (D.N. 26-4) in the record, while Leach has attached the Department's answers to his interrogatories (D.N. 30-1) and also cited to the Department's exhibits in his response (see generally D.N. 30).

4.   Rule 12(d) further requires that “[a]ll parties ․ be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” That requirement is met here because the parties were allowed to conduct discovery and submit renewed briefing and evidence on the state-actor issue. (See D.N. 18; D.N. 20)

5.   Under Kentucky law, fire-protection districts and volunteer fire department districts may be considered special-purpose government entities unless “the higher of [the district's] annual receipts from all sources [and] annual expenditures” is “less than one hundred thousand dollars.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 65A.010; see also Ky. Rev. Stat. § 65A.010(9)(a) (listing the requirements for entities to be considered special-purpose government entities).

6.   Here, the Department is a volunteer fire department organized as a nonprofit entity (D.N. 26-2) that maintains a fire service contract with The Southeast Bullitt Fire Protection District (D.N. 26-4).

7.   Although Leach did not provide an expert to testify about the extent of Kentucky's historical involvement in firefighting, unlike the plaintiff in Goldstein (see D.N. 26, PageID.94; D.N. 30, PageID.147), the Court does not find this dispositive, given the extensive discussion in Caneyville of state and municipal involvement in Kentucky's firefighting history.

8.   Relatedly, in Minges, the Sixth Circuit found that an agricultural society's role in educating the public served a governmental function, and that it was thus “well within the realm of reason to think of [such] conduct as state action.” 585 F. App'x at 880.

9.   The Department argues that this authority is irrelevant because no employees of the Department actually exercise it. (See D.N. 31, PageID.169–70) Nevertheless, the statute is relevant to the scope of the Department's authority and protection. See Goldstein, 218 F.3d at 349.

10.   The Kentucky Court of Appeals later followed this reasoning in Wilson v. England, 705 S.W.3d 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 2024), concluding that since a volunteer firefighter acted within the scope of his discretionary authority, he was therefore entitled to qualified official immunity.

11.   Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 75.070 explicitly designates volunteer fire departments and their personnel as “agent[s] of the Commonwealth of Kentucky” and limits their liability as previously discussed.

12.   Additionally, this Court previously found that volunteer firefighters are state actors for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Fairrow, No. 4:20-CR-00013-JHM, 2021 WL 5140946, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 3, 2021) (citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504–06, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978)).

13.   The Department also cites cases making this distinction in the context of private corrections facilities. (See D.N. 26, PageID.95 (citing Bell v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 122 F. App'x 219, 223 (6th Cir. 2005); George v. Pacific-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1230 (9th Cir. 1996)))

David J. Hale, Chief Judge