BILL CANNON v. HISTORICAL DESIGN INC (2025)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Bill Cannon brought this action against defendant Historical Design, Inc. (“Historical Design”) alleging copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. of the Copyright Act. See Complaint, filed October 9, 2024 (Docket # 1) (“Compl.”). Historical Design has defaulted and Cannon seeks a judgment against it for statutory damages and costs.¹ For the following reasons, Cannon should be awarded a judgment of $5,400.00 in damages plus $2,484.80 for attorney's fees and other costs.

I. BACKGROUND

Cannon is “a professional photographer by trade,” Compl. ¶ 10, and the owner of the photograph at issue in this case, see id. ¶ 16 (providing the U.S. Copyright Office registration number).

Historical Design is the owner and operator of a website which “is a key component” of Historical Design's “popular and lucrative commercial enterprise.” Id. ¶¶ 18-20. Around September 2018, Historical Design displayed Cannon's photograph on its website alongside a picture of a gold bracelet. Id. ¶ 22; Infringement, filed October 9, 2024, annexed as Exhibit 2 to Compl. (Docket # 1-2) (“Screenshot”).

On March 23, 2022, Cannon discovered his photograph on the website. Compl. ¶ 25. On March 1, 2023, Cannon, through his counsel, “served a letter seeking to address the complaints contained [in the complaint] concerning Defendant's infringement of Plaintiff's rights-protected work.” Id. ¶ 48. Historical Design failed to respond to this letter. Id. ¶ 49.

Cannon filed the instant complaint on October 9, 2024, see id., and on October 25, 2024, Cannon served Historical Design. See Affidavit of Service, filed October 28, 2024 (Docket # 10).

On January 10, 2025, Cannon obtained a certificate of default against Historical Design. See Clerk's Certificate of Default, dated January 10, 2025 (Docket # 18). On the same day, Cannon filed a motion for a default judgment. See Mot. On June 10, 2025, Judge Rearden granted Cannon's motion for a default judgment and then referred the matter for an inquest. See Order, filed June 10, 2025 (Docket # 27); Amended Order of Reference to a Magistrate Judge, filed June 10, 2025 (Docket # 28).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In light of defendant's default, Cannon's properly pleaded allegations in the complaint, except those related to damages, are accepted as true. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ancient common law axiom that a defendant who defaults thereby admits all well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint.”) (citation and punctuation omitted); Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In light of [defendant's] default, a court is required to accept all ․ factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor.”).

As to damages, “[t]he district court must ․ conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999). This inquiry requires the district court to: (1) “determin[e] the proper rule for calculating damages on ․ a claim” and (2) “assess[ ] plaintiff's evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule.” Id.

Cannon bears the burden of establishing his entitlement to the amount sought. See Trs. of Local 813 Ins. Tr. Fund v. Rogan Bros. Sanitation Inc., 2018 WL 1587058, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018). In the case of a default where the defendant has never appeared, “a court may base its determination of damages solely on the plaintiff's submissions.” Id. (citing Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989)). While a court must “take the necessary steps to establish damages with reasonable certainty,” Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997), a court need not hold a hearing “as long as it ensure[s] that there [is] a basis for the damages specified in a default judgment,” Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40.

Here, the Court's Scheduling Order notified the parties that the Court might conduct the inquest into damages based upon the written submissions of the parties, but that a party may seek an evidentiary hearing. See Scheduling Order, filed June 17, 2025 (Docket # 29), ¶ 3. No party has requested an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, because plaintiff's submissions provide a basis for an award of damages, no hearing is required.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Liability

To establish a claim of copyright infringement, Cannon “must show: (i) ownership of a valid copyright; and (ii) unauthorized copying of the copyrighted work.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) and Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Cannon has shown both of these elements. As to ownership, the photograph at issue was registered with the U.S. Copyright Office, see Compl. ¶ 16, and Cannon has provided the Certificate of Registration, see Certificate of Registration, dated September 29, 2016, annexed as Ex. 2 to Cannon Decl. (Docket # 20-2). As to unauthorized copying, Cannon has not granted Historical Design a license or right to use the photograph, has not assigned any of its exclusive rights in the copyright to Historical Design, and has not otherwise given permission or authorization to Historical Designs. Compl. ¶¶ 55-56. Nonetheless, Historical Design's website displayed Cannon's work. See Screenshot; Photograph, filed October 9, 2024, annexed as Exhibit 1 to Compl. (Docket # 1-1). Accordingly, Cannon's allegations are sufficient to establish liability. See, e.g., Redinger v. Art of Edibles, 2021 WL 3193313, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2021) (unauthorized display of photograph on website sufficient to establish copyright liability), adopted by 2021 WL 3188398 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2021).

B. Statutory Damages

“[A]n infringer of copyright is liable for either” actual damages or statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)-(2). Here, Cannon has elected to recover statutory damages. See Mem. at 10. Where a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages, it may recover “with respect to any one work, ․ no[ ] less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). However, if the court finds the “infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). In order to “prove that a copier's infringement was willful[, a copyright holder] must show that the infringer ‘had knowledge that its conduct represented infringement or ․ recklessly disregarded the possibility.’ ” Bryant v. Media Right Prods., Inc., 603 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1382 (2d Cir. 1993)). “Courts frequently infer willfulness where a defendant defaults.” Hounddog Prods., L.L.C. v. Empire Film Grp., Inc., 826 F. Supp. 2d 619, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases).

“No proof of actual damages or, in fact, any damages, is necessary for the award of statutory damages.” Hollander Glass Texas, Inc. v. Rosen-Paramount Glass Co., Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 554, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (citation omitted), adopted by 2019 WL 416327 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2019). In awarding statutory damages, courts in this Circuit examine:

(1) the infringer's state of mind; (2) the expenses saved, and profits earned, by the infringer; (3) the revenue lost by the copyright holder; (4) the deterrent effect on the infringer and third parties; (5) the infringer's cooperation in providing evidence concerning the value of the infringing material; and (6) the conduct and attitude of the parties.

Bryant, 603 F.3d at 144 (citation omitted). These factors are commonly referred to as the “Bryant factors.” The court has “wide discretion” in determining an appropriate award of statutory damages. See Fitzgerald Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Baylor Publ'g Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1116 (2d Cir. 1986); accord Noble v. Crazetees.com, 2015 WL 5697780, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2015) (citations omitted).

Here, Cannon seeks an award of $5,400.00. See Mem. at 11. The Court turns next to the Bryant factors.

As to the first Bryant factor, defendant's state of mind, defendant's default is sufficient to support a finding that it acted willfully. Accord Zuru (Singapore) PTE., LTD. v. Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab. Companies, Partnerships, & Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A Hereto, 2023 WL 2747055, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2023), adopted by 2023 WL 2986932 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2023); see Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Pitsicalis, 2020 WL 3564485, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2020) (“With respect to the first factor, by virtue of their default, [defendants] are deemed to be willful infringers.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted), adopted by 2020 WL 4261818 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020).

As to the second and third factors, we cannot determine from the record the full extent of the expenses saved or the profits earned by defendant. However, Cannon provides a screenshot from Getty Images, providing an estimate of the price of licensing Cannon's photograph for one year. Price A Rights-Managed Image, annexed as Ex. 4 to Cannon Decl. (Docket # 20-4) (“Getty Price Estimate”). Courts have found that estimates from Getty Images “result[ ] from reasonable parameters” and “provide[ ] a sufficient basis from which to evaluate the fairness” of damages “without a hearing.” Pasatieri v. Starline Prods., Inc., 2021 WL 3492143, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2021) (cleaned up). Thus, the “estimate from the Getty Images price calculator here provides adequate evidence of a comparable licensing fee.” Id. (cleaned up). Getty Images estimates that the price of licensing Cannon's photograph is $1,080.00. See Getty Price Estimate. As the infringement continued for a minimum of 3.5 years, see Compl. ¶ 22 (Historical Design displayed photograph on its website starting September 2018); id. ¶ 25 (Cannon observed photograph on the website on March 23, 2022), Cannon lost the opportunity to collect, at a minimum, three-and-a-half years of licensing fees, which potentially could have amounted to $3,780.00.

As to the fourth factor, deterrence, “courts have repeatedly emphasized that defendants must not be able to sneer in the face of copyright owners and copyright laws.” Tu v. TAD Sys. Tech. Inc., 2009 WL 2905780, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009) (quoting New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enterprises, Inc., 1991 WL 113283, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A heightened award is reasonable in light of “the need to send a signal to these defendants, as well as others, that they will pay a substantial price for willfully infringing the intellectual property rights of others.” Telebrands Corp. v. HM Imp. USA Corp., 2012 WL 3930405, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2012), adopted by 2012 WL 3957188 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012).

As to the fifth factor, “[t]he fact that this case proceeded by default establishes ․ that there was no participation, much less cooperation, by Defendants.” AW Licensing, LLC v. Bao, 2016 WL 4137453, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2016). This factor similarly supports a heightened award. Accord Zuru (Singapore) PTE., LTD., 2023 WL 2747055, at *4.

Looking at the factors collectively, Cannon's requested damages amount of $5,400.00 is reasonable as it represents less than two times the lost revenue from a licensing fee for a comparable photograph. Courts in this Circuit typically permit a multiplier of “between three and five times the cost of the licensing fees the defendant would have paid.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Prana Hosp., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 184, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); accord Korzeniewski v. Sapa Pho Vietnamese Rest. Inc., 2019 WL 312149, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2019), adopted by 2019 WL 291145 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2019).

Accordingly, plaintiff's request for an award of $5,400.00 is reasonable.

C. Injunctive Relief

Cannon seeks injunctive relief against Historical Design. See Mem. at 19-20. Specifically, Cannon seeks to enjoin Historical Design “from displaying the Photograph on its Website or in any alternative medium under the Defendant's control.” Id. at 20.

“A court may issue an injunction on a motion for default judgment provided that the moving party shows that (1) it is entitled to injunctive relief under the applicable statute and (2) it meets the prerequisites for the issuance of an injunction.” Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Lalaleo, 429 F. Supp. 2d 506, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Off-White LLC v. 6014350, 2020 WL 6478544, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2020), adopted by 2021 WL 5014821 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021). As explained in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), to obtain a permanent injunction, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

Id. at 391 (citations omitted); accord Experience Hendrix, L.L.C, 2020 WL 3564485, at *13.

In this case, the eBay factors weigh in favor of granting Cannon an injunction. “First, courts routinely find the harm suffered by plaintiffs in copyright cases to be ‘irreparable’ on the theory that lost sales or diminished reputation can be difficult if not impossible to measure.” Broad. Music, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d at 195 (citing Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 87 F. Supp. 3d 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). “The Court is similarly satisfied here that there is no practical way of determining the actual damages sustained by plaintiffs as a result of defendants’ infringement, and that the harm endured is one that plaintiffs ‘should not be expected to suffer.’ ” Id. (citing Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 81 (2d Cir. 2010)); see Mem. at 20 (“Plaintiff has no ability to adequately quantify his injury.”). Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of Cannon's request.

As to the second factor, “[c]ourts in this Circuit have consistently found monetary damages inadequate where the defendant poses a significant threat of future infringement.” Id. (collecting cases). Here, given Historical Design's failure to appear in this lawsuit and failure to respond to Cannon's March 1, 2023, letter, Compl. ¶¶ 48-49, along with its willingness to infringe on Cannon's copyright in the first place, there is a significant threat of future copyright infringement. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Little City Cider Co., LLC, 2025 WL 1883625, at *6 (D. Vt. July 8, 2025) (“Defendants’ failure to appear in this lawsuit, as well as the fact that Defendants’ infringement occurred after Plaintiffs attempted multiple times to enter a license agreement with them, show a threat of continuing infringement.”).

As to the balance of hardships, “it is axiomatic that an infringer of copyright cannot complain about the loss of ability to offer its infringing product.” WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 287 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). On the other hand, requiring Cannon “to commence litigation for each future violation would pose a considerable hardship.” Broad. Music, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d at 196. Thus, the balance of hardships weighs heavily in favor of granting a permanent injunction.

Finally, injunctive relief will advance the public's “compelling interest in protecting copyright owners’ marketable rights to their work ․” WPIX, Inc., 691 F.3d at 287.

Thus, Cannon is entitled to a permanent injunction “enjoining Defendant from displaying the Photograph on its Website or in any alternative medium under the Defendant's control.” Mem. at 20.

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Cannon seeks attorneys’ fees in the amount of $2,160.00 and costs in the amount of $469.80. Mem. at 20. A court has the authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs to the prevailing party in a copyright suit under 17 U.S.C. § 505. Section 505 provides:

In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as part of the costs.

Here, such fees and costs are appropriate to compensate Cannon for the expenses involved in retaining an attorney to litigate this case to default. See, e.g., All-Star Mktg. Grp., LLC, 775 F. Supp. 2d at 628-29 (citing cases); Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Vroom, 186 F.3d 283, 289 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming award of attorneys’ fees and costs where there was willful infringement). We address Cannon's request for attorneys’ fees and costs in turn.

As the Second Circuit noted in Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008), “[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Id. at 186 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).

1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

The rate to be set for Cannon's attorneys should be “what a reasonable, paying client would be willing to pay.” Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n, 522 F.3d at 184. Any such rate must be “in line with those [rates] prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984)). Because the fee applicant bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested, it is incumbent upon the applicant to “produce satisfactory evidence ․ that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11; accord Ortiz v. City of New York, 2016 WL 4532983, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016). The Court may also “rely on its own familiarity with prevailing rates in the District.” Noble, 2015 WL 5697780, at *9 (citing A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 82 (2d Cir. 2005), and Miele v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conference Pension & Ret. Fund, 831 F.2d 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1987)).

Here, one partner, one associate, and four paralegals worked on the case. See Time Billing Record, filed January 10, 2025, annexed as Exhibit 4 to Vera Decl. (Docket # 21-4) (“Billing Record”), at 2. Partner Craig B. Sanders has been practicing law for over 30 years and is “managing member” of his firm. Vera Decl. ¶¶ 20-21. He seeks an hourly rate of $750.00. Id. ¶ 20. In light of Sanders’ extensive experience and because his hourly rate has not been contested by defendant, we find his hourly rate to be reasonable in this case. See, e.g., River Light V, L.P. v. Lin & J. Int'l, Inc., 2015 WL 3916271, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2015) (hourly rates of $725, $725, and $720 for partners with evident “skill and expertise” who performed “impressive[ly]”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pamdh Enters., Inc., 2014 WL 2781846, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 19, 2014) (citing cases awarding $400 to $735 hourly for partners).

Attorney Joshua D. Vera is an associate who has been practicing law for approximately four years. Vera Decl. ¶ 18. He seeks an hourly rate of $250.00. Id. ¶ 17. This rate is in line with or less than rates typically approved for associates in this district. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 201-02 ($372 for seventh-year associate); Beastie Boys, 112 F. Supp. 3d at 56 ($461 and $505 for second- and fourth-year associates); River Light V, L.P., 2015 WL 3916271, at *12 ($500 and $450 for seventh- and fifth-year associates); Lane Crawford LLC v. Kelex Trading (CA) Inc., 2013 WL 6481354, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2013) ($350 for attorney with 16 years’ experience litigating intellectual property law cases). Accordingly, we find his hourly rate to be reasonable.

Cannon seeks an hourly rate of $150.00 for paralegals Julie Busch, Arielle Marra, Laura Costigan, and Ronald Li. See Billing Record at 2. While this rate may have been awarded in other cases, where, as here, “plaintiffs have failed to provide evidence showing that a paralegal has special qualifications in the form of formal paralegal training, licenses, degrees, or certifications or longer paralegal experience, courts have typically awarded fees at the lower rate of $100-per-hour for that paralegal.” A.B. v. New York City Dep't of Educ., 2021 WL 951928, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2021) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court awards an hourly rate of $100.00 for each of the paralegals.

2. Reasonable Number of Hours Expended

Cannon must also establish that the number of hours for which it seeks compensation was reasonable. Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Ass'n, 522 F.3d at 186. In evaluating whether claimed hours are reasonable, a court considers “not whether hindsight vindicates an attorney's time expenditures, but whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.” Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992). “Because attorney's fees are dependent on the unique facts of each case, the resolution of this issue is committed to the discretion of the district court.” Clarke v. Frank, 960 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1992). In exercising this discretion, the district court should look “to its own familiarity with the case and its experience with the case and its experience generally as well as to the evidentiary submissions and arguments of the parties.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Di Filippo v. Morizio, 759 F.2d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 1985)).

Additionally, it is well-established that “any attorney ․ who applies for court-ordered compensation in this Circuit ․ must document the application with contemporaneous time records ․ specify[ing], for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.” N.Y. State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d Cir. 1983).

In support of their application for attorneys’ fees, Cannon's attorneys submitted copies of their invoices showing the date on which services were performed, the hours expended, and a description of the work done. See Billing Record. They have also attested that these records are based on contemporaneous time entries. See Vera Decl. in Further Support. This satisfies the contemporaneous time records requirement. See, e.g., Cruz v. Local Union No. 3 of the Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34 F.3d 1148, 1160-61 (2d Cir. 1994); Johnson v. Kay, 742 F. Supp. 822, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).

When reviewing such records, courts must make “a conscientious and detailed inquiry into the validity of the representations that a certain number of hours were usefully and reasonably expended.” Lunday v. City of Albany, 42 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam). “The critical inquiry is ‘whether, at the time the work was performed, a reasonable attorney would have engaged in similar time expenditures.’ ” Angamarca v. Pita Grill 7 Inc., 2012 WL 3578781, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2012) (quoting Grant v. Martinez, 973 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1992)).

The billing record indicates that six individuals worked on the present litigation, Sanders, Vera, Busch, Marra, Costigan, and Li. See Billing Record at 2. Together, they worked for 8.2 hours. Id. The billing record “provide[s] detailed descriptions of the tasks completed.” Mei Chun Poon v. Apple NYC Corp., 2019 WL 75674, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019). 8.2 hours is an appropriate amount of time to investigate a complaint, draft it, file it, obtain service on the defendant, and file a motion for a default judgment. Accordingly, we find the hours requested to be reasonable.

Thus, attorneys’ fees — after having adjusted the rate for the paralegals — should be awarded as follows:

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3. Costs

Cannon also seeks a reimbursement of costs of $469.80, which consists of $405.00 in filing fees and $64.80 in service fees. Mem. at 19-20. Section 505 allows the prevailing party to recover its “full costs” incurred in protection of its copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 505. Here, Cannon seeks the filing fee and a modest amount for service of process, both of which are reflected in the billing record. See Billing Record at 1-2. Such expenditures are appropriately awarded as costs and therefore should be allowed. See, e.g., Reiffer v. NYC Luxury Limousine Ltd., 2023 WL 5052034, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2023).

Accordingly, Cannon should be awarded $469.80 in costs.

* * *

Thus, Cannon should receive an award as follows:

$5,400.00 in statutory damages

$2,015.00 for attorneys’ fees

$469.80 in costs

Total: $7,884.80.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Cannon's application for damages (Docket # 19) should be granted. Judgment should be entered against Historical Design in the amount of $7,884.80. In addition, a permanent injunction should issue enjoining defendant from displaying the photograph on its website or in any other medium under the defendant's control.

Counsel for plaintiff is directed to serve this Report and Recommendation on Historical Design via U.S. mail at its last known address and to file proof of service on the docket within 7 days.

PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file any objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (b), (d). A party may respond to any objections within 14 days after being served. Any objections and responses shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. Any request for an extension of time to file objections or responses must be directed to Judge Rearden. If a party fails to file timely objections, that party will not be permitted to raise any objections to this Report and Recommendation on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Notice of Motion, filed January 10, 2025 (Docket # 19) (“Mot.”); Declaration of Bill Cannon in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Historical Design, Inc., filed January 10, 2025 (Docket # 20) (“Cannon Decl.”); Declaration of Joshua D. Vera in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment Against Defendant Historical Design, Inc., filed January 10, 2025 (Docket # 21) (“Vera Decl.”); Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, filed January 10, 2025 (Docket # 22) (“Mem.”); Statement of Damages, filed January 10, 2025 (Docket # 23); Declaration of Joshua D. Vera in Further Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment, filed August 15, 2025 (Docket # 32) (“Vera Decl. in Further Support”).

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN United States Magistrate Judge