GONZALEZ v. MAYORKAS (2025)

ORDER AND OPINION

In August 2020, Plaintiff Elias Gonzalez Jr. filed a Form I-130 Petition to have the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services recognize his spouse, Plaintiff Martha Carolina Chavez Aguero, as the beneficiary of certain immigration rights and benefits. Gonzalez is a United States citizen; Chavez is a citizen of Mexico.

USCIS denied the petition on the grounds that Chavez had previously attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the country's immigration laws. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Gonzalez and Chavez filed this lawsuit against Defendants Merrick B. Garland, Norma A. Limon, Alejandro Mayorkas, and Ur Mendoza Jaddou, in their respective official capacities, seeking review of the USCIS's denial under the Administrative Procedures Act.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), followed by a motion for summary judgment. Based on the record and the applicable law, the Court concludes that while it possesses subject matter jurisdiction and that Plaintiffs allege viable causes of action, the summary judgment record demonstrates that the claims fail as a matter of law.

I. Allegations and Summary Judgment Facts 1

A. Plaintiffs' Allegations

In January 2019, Gonzalez and Chavez married. The following year, Gonzalez filed a Form I-130 Petition for an Alien Relative, requesting that USCIS recognize Chavez as the beneficiary of immigration benefits, such as a visa, based upon her marriage to Gonzalez.

In August 2021, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny the I-130 Petition. USCIS informed Gonzalez that under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), the agency could not approve the petition if “the Attorney General has determined that the alien has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.” (Notice, Doc. 1–1, 3) USCIS explained that for Section 1154(c) to bar an I-130 Petition, “there must be ‘substantial and probative evidence’ of such an attempt or conspiracy and the derogatory evidence must be contained in the alien's file.” (Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i))) The agency communicated that its review of the record had led it to conclude that the Section 1154(c) bar applied to Chavez, for the following reason:

On October 30, 2019, the beneficiary [i.e., Chavez] was entered into removal proceedings based on providing a fraudulent divorce decree between herself and ex-husband, Anibal Ruiz Martinez and entering into a fraudulent marriage with her ex-husband, Joel E. Ribera to gain legal permanent resident status in violation of the immigration laws of the United States.

(Notice, Doc. 1–1, 3) Having noted its probable decision, USCIS advised Gonzalez that he had 30 days to submit “additional information, evidence or arguments to support the petition.” (Id.)

The following month, Gonzalez, through counsel, submitted a response to the agency. Gonzalez challenged the relevancy of USCIS's conclusion that Chavez had previously entered into a fraudulent marriage: “Our position is how is that relevant to the approval of the I-130 if the current marriage is Bona fide.” (Ltr., Doc. 1–2) He submitted evidence regarding the legitimacy of his marriage to Chavez. But as to USCIS's conclusion about Chavez's marital history, Gonzalez noted only that he was “not commenting on that allegation.” (Id.)

On September 30, USCIS denied the I–130 Petition. USCIS found that Section 1154(c) barred the petition “because on October 30, 2019, [Chavez] was entered into removal proceedings based on providing a fraudulent divorce decree between herself and ex-husband, Anibal Ruiz Martinez and entering into a fraudulent marriage with her ex-husband, Joel E. Ribera in order to gain legal permanent residence status in violation of the immigration laws of the United States.” (Decision, Doc. 1–3, 3) USCIS noted that Gonzalez had “failed to submit evidence to show that [Chavez's] prior marriage(s) was not entered into for the primary purpose of evading immigration law.” (Id.) As explained in the communication, USCIS's decision would become final unless Gonzales filed an administrative appeal within 30 days to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Gonzales did not file such an appeal.

B. Summary Judgment Record

Defendants move for summary judgment on various grounds. In support of their Motion, they submit the administrative record related to Gonzalez's I–130 Petition, which includes numerous documents concerning Chavez's prior marriages and the I–130 Petition that Joel Ribera filed in 2006. They also rely on the record concerning Gonzalez's I–130 Petition, the facts of which appear largely undisputed. In reviewing an administrative agency decision, the Court considers the record as a whole, including any facts that “fairly detract” from the agency's factual determinations. Knapp v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 796 F.3d 445, 453 (5th Cir. 2015).

In June 2006, Chavez and Joel Ribera filed a Declaration of Informal Marriage in Hidalgo County, Texas, where they attested under penalty of perjury that they had lived together as husband and wife since May 2004. The following month, Ribera, a United States citizen, filed a Form I-130 Petition, requesting that USCIS recognize Chavez as the beneficiary of immigration rights as his spouse. In the filing, Ribera reported that in 2000, Chavez had previously married Anibal Ruiz, and represented that the marriage had ended in divorce in May 2002, submitting an unauthenticated Mexican divorce decree reflecting that year. Ribera also reported that Chavez had no children.

In November 2006, USCIS approved the I–130 Petition. Two years later, and based on her marriage to Ribera, Chavez filed a Form I–751 Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence, which USCIS approved. In this petition, Chavez recorded that she had two children, born in November 2004 and February 2006. Despite the inconsistent records concerning her children, in November 2009, USCIS adjusted Chavez's status to lawful permanent resident.

About four years elapsed. Then, in 2013, Santos Botello-Ramirez pled guilty to the crime of conspiring to knowingly and unlawfully entering into false marriages for the purposes of evading the immigration laws, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c). (United States v. Botello-Ramirez, Criminal No. M-12-cr-1053-1, Indictment, Doc. 19; Botello-Ramirez, Judgment, Doc. 55; Am. Judgment, Doc. 32–12, 6–15) Botello ran a scheme through which foreign nationals paid her to arrange false marriages with United States citizens to ultimately qualify for legal permanent resident status.

For reasons that the record does not disclose, USCIS began investigating whether an association existed between Botello and Chavez's 2006 marriage to Ribera. In January 2014, the USCIS Mexico City Field Office received copies of a Mexican divorce record reflecting that Chavez had not divorced Ruiz (i.e., her first husband) until April 2005, controverting the 2002 divorce decree that Ribera had previously submitted with his I–130 Petition. Based on the April 2005 divorce date, Chavez would have remained married to Ruiz when she purportedly married Ribera in 2004.

In 2017, USCIS interviewed Chavez at her home. She proved unable to answer any questions about her marriage to Ribera and did not know his whereabouts. USCIS “determine[d] that [Chavez] was living with common-law husband for three to four years and that the marriage between [Chavez] and [Ribera] was entered to evade immigration laws.” (Notice of Removal, Doc. 32–12, 19)

In January 2020, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Chavez on the grounds that she had procured her lawful permanent resident status through marriage fraud. The administrative record does not reflect the status of those removal proceedings.

II. Procedural History

In October 2021, Gonzalez and Chavez filed this lawsuit against the Defendants, alleging a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. They allege that in denying Gonzalez's I–130 Petition, USCIS “violated the governing statute and regulations, is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, and not otherwise in accordance with the law.” (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 19) They also allege that the basis of USCIS's decision was “improper” because Chavez's “file does not contain substantial and probative evidence that she attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws.” (Id. at ¶ 23) The agency, according to Plaintiffs, “failed to permit Plaintiffs' [sic] the opportunity to examine and rebut adverse evidence in violation of 8 CFR § 103.2(b)(16),” which violated their due process rights. (Id. at ¶¶ 24–25)

In September 2024, Defendants filed their First Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30).² Two months later, they filed their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33).

III. Standards of Review

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

When considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a trial court must dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the Court is without the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Griener v. United States, 900 F.3d 700, 702 (5th Cir. 2018). In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the Court may consider: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). The party seeking the federal forum bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A plaintiff's complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must set forth “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A court considers only the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint and must accept them as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Powers v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020). “To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations but still must state sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim on its face.” Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., Texas, 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021).

C. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governs summary judgment motions. “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Cases challenging an agency decision under the Administrative Procedures Act “are often resolved at summary judgment because whether an agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious is a legal question that the court can usually resolve on the agency record.” Amin v. Mayorkas, 24 F.4th 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Gulf Restoration Network v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 452 F.3d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that the district court functions as “a reviewing court” exercising a “narrowly defined duty of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of rationality”); Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada v. Shalala, 173 F.3d 438, 441 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that in challenges under the APA, the district court “sits as an appellate tribunal” resolving, based on the agency record, whether the agency acted in an arbitrary and capricious matter). The court considers “whether the agency acted within its authority, adequately considered all the relevant factors, and provided a reasoned basis for its decision.” Milena Ship Mgmt. Co. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Yogi Metals Grp. Inc. v. Garland, 567 F. Supp. 3d 793, 798 (S.D. Tex. 2021), aff'd, 38 F.4th 455 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that when applying a summary judgment analysis, the district court “reviews the record only to determine whether the agency acted within its authority, whether the agency explained its decision, whether the record supports the facts on which the agency relied, and whether the agency relied on the factors intended by Congress”).

IV. Analysis of the Amended Motion to Dismiss

In their motion, Defendants present two central arguments: (1) that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Gonzalez did not exhaust his administrative remedies by appealing the denial of the I-130 Petition to the BIA; and (2) that Plaintiffs do not present a viable cause of action because Section 1154(c) categorically bars USCIS from approving petitions on behalf of persons who have committed marriage fraud. The Court addresses the jurisdictional argument first, as it must. See Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 871 F.3d 380, 384 (5th Cir. 2017) (“The court must address challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case.”)

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendants contend that because Gonzalez did not appeal USCIS's denial of the I-130 Petition to the BIA, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. Based on the governing law, the Court disagrees.

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and absent jurisdiction conferred by statute, lack the power to adjudicate claims.” Louisiana Real Est. Appraisers Bd. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 917 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2019). Under the APA, district courts possess subject matter jurisdiction to review “final” agency actions. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Herman, 176 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 704). Courts consider an agency action final when it marks “the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking process” and determines legal “rights or obligations.” Louisiana State v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 834 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 2016).

Under certain circumstances, an agency's decision is not final unless the plaintiff has exhausted all available administrative remedies. However, “an appeal to ‘superior agency authority’ is a prerequisite to judicial review only when expressly required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before review and the administrative action is made inoperative pending that review.” Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993) (emphasis in original); see also Amin, 24 F.4th at 389 (“[C]ourts cannot require administrative appeal when not required by statute or regulation”.).

In the present matter, the parties agree that 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii) governs. That provision provides that “[c]ertain unfavorable decisions on applications, petitions, and other types of cases may be appealed” to the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). The use of “may” rather than “shall” in a statute or regulation typically denotes an optional decision and not a mandatory requirement. See, e.g., Maine Cmty. Health Options v. United States, 590 U.S. 296, 310, 140 S.Ct. 1308, 206 L.Ed.2d 764 (2020) (“Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a requirement.”); Whatley v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 32 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 1994) (“The term ‘may’ is permissive; it neither indicates nor requires an exclusive means of action—it is discretionary.”). Applying the generally-understood meaning of “may,” the Court concludes that Section 103.3(a)(1)(ii) allows, but does not require that a petitioner appeal the denial of a I-130 Petition to the BIA before presenting the matter to a federal court.

No language within Section 103.3(a) supports a contrary interpretation. In contrast, in cases in which courts have mandated that the plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review, courts have applied statutory language that expressly created such a requirement. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 336.9(d) (“A USCIS determination denying an application for naturalization under section 335(a) of the Act shall not be subject to judicial review until the applicant has exhausted those administrative remedies available to the applicant under section 336 of the Act.”); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d) (“A court may review a final order of removal only if-(1) the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right, requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a court can review a final order of removal ․”). These statutory provisions unambiguously require that the individual exhaust administrative remedies before presenting the matter to a federal court. In the present case, Section 103.3(a)(1) contains no such language.

While the Fifth Circuit has not addressed this issue, at least two other circuit courts have concluded that an individual may challenge a USCIS denial of a I–130 Petition without having appealed the decision to the BIA. See Schreiber v. Cuccinelli, 981 F.3d 766, 786 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[A]s construed by Darby, § 10(c) of the APA provides only that the district court could not decline to review the USCIS's otherwise final agency action because Mr. Schreiber did not exhaust an optional appeal to the BIA.”); Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 498 (6th Cir. 2006) (“In contrast to orders of removal, the INA does not require aliens to appeal denials of spousal immigration petitions to the BIA before seeking relief in federal court.”); see also Sofiane v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. CIV.3:09-CV-01860JCH, 2010 WL 1882267, at *6 (D. Conn. May 10, 2010) (“[T]he court concludes that [the plaintiffs] are not obligated to appeal their claim to the BIA before seeking judicial review in this forum.”). While these authorities do not bind the Court, they contain persuasive reasoning.

In their Amended Motion, Defendants rely on the Fifth Circuit's decision in Cardoso v. Reno, 216 F.3d 512 (5th Cir. 2000). (See Am. Mot., Doc. 30, ¶ 11 (citing Cardoso and secondary authorities)). In that case, three aliens filed a federal lawsuit after an immigration judge denied their applications for an adjustment of status. As to one of the plaintiffs (Aurora Moran), the United States had not initiated removal proceedings when she filed her lawsuit. The Fifth Circuit first noted that the applicable statute–8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1999)–expressly required the exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial review. Then, because Moran could seek review of the immigration judge's decision in any future removal proceedings, the Fifth Circuit concluded that she had not exhausted her administrative remedies. See Cardoso, 216 F.3d at 518. In other words, the immigration judge's denial did not represent a final administrative decision. More recently, the Fifth Circuit has invoked Cardoso for the proposition that a district court “does not have subject matter jurisdiction to review a status-adjustment decision by the USCIS under either the APA or the INA because the alien retains the right to de novo review of that decision in his final removal proceedings.” Elldakli v. Garland, 64 F.4th 666, 671 (5th Cir. 2023); see also Velasquez v. Nielsen, 754 F. App'x 256, 261 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying Cardoso and concluding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the denial of an adjustment of status application).

These authorities govern as to an individual's lawsuit seeking review from the denial of a request for an adjustment of status. But in the present matter, Plaintiffs do not seek review of such a decision. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge USCIS's denial of Gonzalez's I–130 Petition, which did not involve an adjustment of status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i), “any citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is entitled to classification by reason of a relationship,” such as a spouse, may file a petition with the Attorney General requesting “such classification.” If the I–130 Petition proves successful, the beneficiary–here, Gonzalez's wife–may later seek lawful permanent residency. That subsequent filing, such as through a Form I-485, would constitute a request for an adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (describing process and eligibility for adjustment of status). But the initial I–130 Petition would not request a status adjustment, and this distinction renders Cardoso and similar authorities inapplicable.

Indeed, the crux of the Cardoso decision–i.e., that the alien retained the ability, within subsequent removal proceedings, to challenge the denial of an adjustment of status–proves inapplicable to the I–130 petitioner. Upon the denial of a status adjustment request, the applicant possesses no right to a direct administrative appeal. Instead, the applicant “retains the right to renew his or her application” within removal proceedings, if the United States later initiates this process. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). The applicant of a I–130 Petition, of course, would have no such recourse, as the applicant must be a United States citizen, against whom no removal proceedings would ever arise. Instead, the unsuccessful petitioner of a I–130 Petition may immediately appeal the denial to the BIA or seek recourse in federal court.

As no authority required Gonzalez to appeal USCIS's denial of his I-130 Petition before bringing this lawsuit, his failure to do so presents no jurisdictional barrier. Thus, the Court concludes that it possesses subject matter jurisdiction to consider Plaintiffs' APA claims.

B. Analysis under Rule 12(b)(6)

In addition to presenting a jurisdictional challenge, Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs' allegations fail to present a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs' contention [ ] that a prior fraudulent marriage and visa application should not bar the granting of a subsequent visa application by one who participated in the prior fraud but who is now in a legitimate marriage [ ] is not tenable as a matter of law.” (Am. Mot., Doc. 30, 3) In addition, Defendants assert that to the extent that Plaintiffs challenge USCIS's finding that Chavez had previously engaged in a fraudulent marriage, such a claim would fail “as a matter of law” because review of the decision would be “on the record,” and the Plaintiffs tendered “no evidence” to the agency to “counter the overwhelming evidence of fraud in a prior marriage.” (Id. at 4)

In their Response, Plaintiffs “challenge both the factual basis for the fraud determination and USCIS's legal interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).” (Resp., Doc. 31, 4) The Court addresses each argument in turn.

1. Application of Section 1154(c)

Defendants initially challenge Plaintiffs' argument that even if Chavez engaged in a previous fraudulent marriage, this personal history would not bar the I–130 Petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).

The Complaint renders unclear whether Plaintiffs maintain this legal theory. To be sure, Gonzalez advanced this argument in his response to USCIS's Notice of Intent to deny the petition: “Our position is how is that [i.e., a finding of a prior fraudulent marriage] relevant to the approval of the I-130 if the current marriage is Bona fide.” (Ltr., Doc. 1–2) In their Complaint, however, Plaintiffs do not present such a direct challenge, alluding only that USCIS's decision “violated the governing statute and regulations.” (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 19; see also Response, Doc. 31, 4 (“[Plaintiffs] challenge both the factual basis for the fraud determination and USCIS's legal interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).”)) In any event, the Court agrees that to the extent that Plaintiffs advance a claim on the same position that Gonzalez presented in his response to USCIS's Notice of Intent, the argument would fail.

Section 1154(c) contains unambiguous language regarding the impact of a finding that the intended beneficiary of a I–130 Petition had previously engaged in a fraudulent marriage:

[N]o petition shall be approved if (1) the alien has previously been accorded, or has sought to be accorded, an immediate relative or preference status as the spouse of a citizen of the United States or the spouse of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws, or (2) the Attorney General has determined that the alien has attempted or conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.

8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). The introductory phrase, “no petition shall be approved,” leaves no room for discretion if either of the two enumerated circumstances apply. Applying this provision, the Fifth Circuit has written that “[t]he language of subsection (1) requires the Attorney General to deny an application if the alien has previously sought to be accorded immediate relative status by entering into a sham marriage.” Mangwiro v. Johnson, 554 F. App'x 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit further explained that subsection (1) covers aliens who previously sought an immigration benefit based on a fraudulent marriage and subsection (2) broadly covers “not only individuals who engaged in such previous attempts, but also those who are presently attempting to evade the immigration laws.” Id. Other circuit courts have similarly concluded that any form of marriage fraud will categorically bar a I–130 Petition. See Mestanek v. Jaddou, 93 F.4th 164, 167 (4th Cir. 2024) (writing that Section 1154(c) “applies not only to a petition predicated on a fraudulent marriage, but also to any future petitions filed on behalf of the same beneficiary, regardless of merit”); Iyawe v. Garland, 28 F.4th 875, 879 (8th Cir. 2022) (explaining that Section 1154(c) “bars approval of an I-130 petition if the noncitizen previously sought immigration benefits through a fraudulent marriage or attempted or conspired to do so, even if the current marriage is bona fide or if the noncitizen was never prosecuted for the past conduct”) (emphasis added); Thawatchai Foythong v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1051, 1053 (6th Cir. 2014) (“The statute imposes a one-strike rule, meaning that, after one prior finding of a sham marriage, the immigration authorities must reject all future efforts at an adjustment of status based on marital status.”).

Plaintiffs present no authority reaching or supporting a different conclusion. And not surprisingly, they do not focus their Complaint or their Response to the Motion to Dismiss on such a position. To the extent that they continue to advance such a legal theory, it fails.

2. Viability of Causes of Action

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs' allegations do not present a claim upon which relief can be granted because the administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting USCIS's decision and the Plaintiffs tendered no evidence to the agency to “counter the overwhelming evidence of fraud in a prior marriage.” (Am. Mot., Doc. 30, 4)

In order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the APA, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the agency acted contrary to law. See Fort Bend Cnty. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 59 F.4th 180, 196 (5th Cir. 2023) (remanding APA case back to district court after finding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously). An agency acts contrary to law if it “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Sierra Club v. United States Env't Prot. Agency, 939 F.3d 649, 664 (5th Cir. 2019). As illustrative examples, district courts reviewing the denial of a I–130 Petition have granted the requested relief after concluding that the agency ran afoul of these principles. See, e.g., Anyaso v. Mayorkas, 716 F. Supp. 3d 642, 644 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (finding that “the USCIS, despite its yearslong investigation, did not rely on a sufficient quantum and quality of evidence to support its decision” to deny a I–130 Petition); Valdivia v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 809, 816 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (granting summary judgment for plaintiffs when the record contained no substantial and probative evidence to support the USCIS's finding of a sham marriage); Simko v. Bd. of Immigr. Appeals, 156 F. Supp. 3d 300, 313 (D. Conn. 2015) (concluding that the agency failed to comply with Tawfik when denying a Form I-130 Petition); Singh v. Bardini, No. C-09-3382 EMC, 2010 WL 2292320, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 2010) (granting relief based on the agency's failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)). Although these courts resolved the matters at the summary judgment stage, they demonstrate the type of successful challenges that an individual can advance against an agency upon the denial of a I-130 Petition.

Turning to the current matter, Plaintiffs have challenged USCIS's denial of Gonzalez's I–130 Petition on three separate grounds: (1) the agency “failed to reach an independent conclusion” regarding Chavez's alleged prior fraudulent marriage, in violation of Matter of Tawfik, 20 I & N Dec. 166 (BIA 1990); (2) no substantial evidence supported the decision; and (3) USCIS did not afford Plaintiffs “the opportunity to examine and rebut adverse evidence in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16).” (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶¶ 23–25) Although Plaintiffs provide cursory treatment for each of these grounds, their allegations narrowly suffice to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For example, if Plaintiffs can demonstrate that the record shows that USCIS failed to consider contrary evidence that undermined USCIS's finding of marriage fraud, Plaintiffs would prevail. See e.g., Gomez v. Garland, No. 1:21-CV-01701, 2022 WL 2954165, at *3 (N.D. Ohio July 26, 2022) (vacating the denial of a I-130 Petition as arbitrary and capricious because the agency failed to consider probative evidence demonstrating the prior marriage's validity). As a result, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs allege viable causes of action that survive the motion to dismiss.

V. Analysis of Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that USCIS's denial of Gonzalez's I–130 Petition was “clearly supported by substantial and probative evidence in the administrative record.”³ (MSJ, Doc. 33, 9) They highlight portions of the administrative record supporting USCIS's conclusion that Chavez had previously engaged in marriage fraud, which would automatically bar the I–130 Petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c). And they contend that “the entire case under review is a ‘question of law’ that must be resolved in favor of Defendants.” (Id. at 2) Taken as a whole, these arguments directly challenge each of Plaintiffs' claims. As previously noted, Plaintiffs advance three challenges to USCIS's denial of the I-130 Petition: (1) USCIS failed to reach an independent conclusion regarding the alleged marriage fraud, in violation of Tawfik; (2) no substantial and probative evidence supported the decision; and (3) USCIS did not provide Gonzalez an opportunity to examine and rebut adverse evidence. Applying the governing law, the Court concludes that the administrative record conclusively negates each of these claims.

Under the APA, a district court can review USCIS's denial of a I–130 Petition based on a finding that the intended beneficiary previously engaged in marriage fraud. See Ayanbadejo v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Determinations regarding the validity of marriage for I–130 petition purposes are not discretionary within the meaning of § 1252(a)(2)(B), and thus are subject to review by courts.”) The court applies a deferential review, not weighing the evidence, but instead reviewing the agency's findings to determine if substantial evidence supports them. Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff must demonstrate that the agency's finding was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. (citing Shell Offshore Inc. v. Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622, 627 (5th Cir. 2001)). “An action is arbitrary and capricious ‘if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Sierra Club v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 939 F.3d 649, 663–64 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the plaintiff must show “not only that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but [ ] that the evidence compels it.” Orellana-Monson, 685 F.3d at 518 (emphasis in original). At the same time, while a court affords some deference to an agency's decision, the court can “disregard the agency's findings when it ignores relevant evidence without explaining and justifying its decision to do so.” N.L.R.B. v. E-Sys., Inc., Garland Div., 103 F.3d 435, 439 (5th Cir. 1997).

In addition, a court does not overturn an administrative decision “unless the substantial rights of a party have been affected.” Jones v. Colvin, 638 F. App'x 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988)). Even if a court determines that a procedural error affected the agency action, the error will not warrant reversing the agency's decision unless “such improprieties would cast into doubt the existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision.” Alexander v. Astrue, 412 F. App'x 719, 722 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988)).

Applying these principles, and based on its review of the administrative record, the Court concludes that substantial and probative evidence supported USCIS's denial of the I-130 Petition, and that USCIS engaged in no procedural error in reaching its findings. As an initial matter, USCIS complied with applicable procedural regulations. After receiving Gonzalez's I–130 Petition, USCIS collected and reviewed relevant documents, and then interviewed Chavez and Gonzalez. Based on the collected evidence and the interview, USCIS issued its Notice of Intent to Deny the petition, communicating to Gonzalez that the agency had found that Section 1154(c) prohibited the approval of the I–130 Petition because Chavez had previously been “entered into removal proceedings based on providing a fraudulent divorce decree between herself and ex-husband, [Ruiz] and entering into a fraudulent marriage with her ex-husband, [Ribera] in order to gain legal permanent resident status in violation of the immigration laws of the United States.” (Notice of Intent, Doc. 33–8, 2) USCIS informed Gonzalez that he had 30 days “to submit additional information, evidence or arguments to support” his I–130 Petition. (Id.) Within that time period, Gonzalez presented his response, attaching numerous documents concerning his current marriage to Chavez, but declining to address USCIS's comments regarding Chavez's prior marriages. In essence, Gonzalez declined the opportunity to rebut the preliminary findings that USCIS had reached concerning Chavez's marital history. About a week later, USCIS issued its decision, denying the I–130 Petition based on “a thorough review of your petition, the testimony provided during your interview, and the record of evidence.” (Decision, Doc. 33–10, 1)

Through this process, USCIS satisfied its obligations to consider the relevant evidence and to provide the petitioner an opportunity to submit evidence in support of the petition. Plaintiffs allege that USCIS blindly accepted the prior findings concerning Chavez's previous marriages and failed to reach an “independent conclusion” concerning her marital history. (Compl., Doc. 1, 5) As to this argument, the Board of Immigration Appeals provides the applicable standard:

[T]he district director may rely on any relevant evidence, including evidence having its origin in prior Service proceedings involving the beneficiary, or in court proceedings involving the prior marriage. Ordinarily, the district director should not give conclusive effect to determinations made in a prior proceeding, but, rather, should reach his own independent conclusion based on the evidence before him.

Matter of Tawfik, 20 I. & N. Dec. 166, 168 (BIA 1990). In other words, USCIS can rely on the underlying evidence contained within prior immigration proceedings, but should not automatically adopt the ultimate decision from those proceedings. In the current matter, the administrative record confirms that USCIS did not merely adopt a prior finding that Chavez engaged in marriage fraud. Rather, USCIS reviewed the record from those proceedings and then communicated to Gonzalez its preliminary decision that agreed with those findings. USCIS explained the applicable standard, citing to Tawfik, and accurately described the type of evidence that USCIS considers when determining the validity of a finding of a prior fraudulent marriage. Then, after providing Gonzalez an opportunity to submit additional evidence in support of his petition, USCIS considered the entire record and arrived at its final decision. This approach complied with applicable regulations and with Tawfik. And nothing in the administrative record suggests that USCIS failed to analyze the relevant evidence or failed to reach its own independent conclusion based on the evidence before it.

As for that review, the Court concludes that substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the agency's finding that Chavez previously engaged in marriage fraud. Various documents in that record cast significant doubt on Chavez's previous marriages. For example, in the 2006 I-130 petition that Ribera filed, he presented a Mexican governmental record reflecting that Chavez divorced Ruiz in May 2002. Ribera represented to USCIS that he and Chavez had been married since May 2004. However, an authenticated Mexican governmental record showed that she did not divorce Ruiz until April 2005. The conflicting documents naturally raised significant doubt regarding the representations concerning Chavez's prior marriages. And the agency did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by giving credence to a divorce decree that Mexican government officials authenticated and that reflected a 2005 divorce date. In addition, when USCIS interviewed Chavez in 2017, she was living with Gonzalez and could not provide any information regarding Ribera's whereabouts or answer questions about her marriage to him. Taken together, this information provided more than substantial and probative evidence to support the agency's determination that Chavez engaged in marriage fraud, rendering her permanently ineligible for immigration benefits under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c).⁴

Plaintiffs also allege that USCIS failed to provide them with “the opportunity to examine and rebut adverse evidence in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16).” (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 25) The administrative record, however, also undermines this claim.

Federal regulations require that when USCIS intends to deny a I–130 Petition “based on derogatory information considered by the Service and of which the applicant or petitioner is unaware,” the agency must advise the petitioner of its inclination and offer “an opportunity to rebut the information and present information in his/her own behalf before the decision is rendered.” 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(16)(i). While the Fifth Circuit has not construed the parameters of this requirement, other circuit courts have concluded that a general notice of intent to deny a petition, with an opportunity to present controverting evidence, suffices. See Smith v. Garland, 103 F.4th 1244, 1255 (7th Cir. 2024) (finding that USCIS satisfies the requirement by issuing a notice of intent to deny that “provides enough information” to permit the petitioner to formulate a rebuttal); Diaz v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 499 F. App'x 853, 856 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming the denial of a due process claim under Section 103.2(b)(16) when the notice stated that the denial was “based on the discrepancies at the interview”).

In the present matter, USCIS issued an unambiguous Notice of Intent to Deny, informing Gonzalez of the preliminary findings that USCIS believed barred the I–130 Petition. In his response, Gonzalez chose to not present any rebuttal information to controvert a finding that Chavez had previously engaged in marriage fraud. His decision naturally led to USCIS reaffirming its preliminary findings. But Plaintiffs cannot now argue that USCIS failed to provide them with the opportunity to rebut those preliminary findings. USCIS's Notice of Intent to Deny satisfied the regulatory requirements as a matter of law.

Finally, even if USCIS had failed to comply with Tawfik or other procedural requirements–and the record does not support such a finding–no information before the Court suggests that any such error would have affected Plaintiffs' substantial rights. The administrative record contains substantial evidence supporting USCIS's finding that Chavez previously engaged in marriage fraud. And even in their response to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs present no evidence calling that finding into question. In the absence of any controverting evidence, and the legal effect of such a finding under Section 1154(c), Plaintiffs, as a matter of law, cannot prevail on any cause of action seeking to overturn USCIS's denial of the I–130 Petition.

VI. Conclusion

For these reasons, it is:

ORDERED that the Defendants' First Amended Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) is DENIED; and

ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 33) is GRANTED.

The Court will separately issue a Final Judgment in accordance with this Order and Opinion.

FOOTNOTES

2.   In March 2022, the Defendants filed their initial motion to dismiss. After briefing and at least two hearings on the motion, the Court ordered the Defendants to file an amended motion, which they did. The arguments that Defendants present in their Amended Motion to Dismiss largely mirror those that they presented in their initial motion.

3.   Defendants also reiterate their argument that “Plaintiffs' argument that [Chavez's] prior marriage fraud is irrelevant to her eligibility for the visa petition submitted by Mr. Gonzalez, Jr., is plainly and manifestly contrary to law.” (MSJ, Doc. 33, 9) The Court agrees, for the reasons previously explained in this Order and Opinion. (See supra, Sec. IV(B)(1))

4.   In December 2024, Plaintiffs submitted what amounts to a sur-reply in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and in which they make representations regarding Chavez's marital history. (Pl.'s Resp. to Reply, Doc. 38) Plaintiffs did not seek leave to file the brief, which by itself warrants the Court disregarding the filing. In any event, Plaintiffs cite to no basis in the administrative record for their factual assertions. And even if they had submitted evidence outside of the administrative record, which they do not, the Court could not consider it. See Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 391 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001) (“It is a bedrock principle of judicial review that a court reviewing an agency decision should not go outside of the administrative record.”).

Fernando Rodriguez, Jr., United States District Judge