JOYCE v. LEE DUDEK (2025)

ORDER

Before this Court is Plaintiff Joyce L. R.’s (“Plaintiff”) objection to Magistrate Judge Little's report and recommendation (Dkt. No. 20, “R&R”) recommending affirmance of the agency decision being reviewed. I reach the same conclusion as Judge Little ² on the specific grounds set forth below.

Plaintiff in this Social Security appeal posits that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) committed reversible error by failing to provide a clear, specific, and supported basis for rejecting her allegations about her standing and walking limitations, as required by Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ declined to offer any explanation as to how the activities he cited were purportedly found to be inconsistent with an inability to engage in prolonged or frequent standing and walking. In her own words, Plaintiff contended that:

the ALJ erred by rejecting Plaintiff's allegations—that her shortness of breath causes limited capacity for standing/walking—without complying with the standards and procedures that govern the analysis of subjective allegations under SSR 16-3p. Specifically, the ALJ impermissibly failed to “clearly articulate[ ]” legally valid and factually “specific reasons” for rejecting this particular allegation, thereby committing legal error. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2 (alteration in original).)

A review of the administrative record, however, confirms that the ALJ indeed applied the correct legal standard. Further, the ALJ's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence of record. See Noreja v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 952 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing the substantial evidence standard). What is more, the applicable regulation provides that the ALJ should consider activities of daily living (“ADL”) in evaluating a claimant's credibility. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(1); Bainbridge v. Colvin, 618 F. App'x 384, 388 (10th Cir. 2015). The ALJ did just that when he found that Plaintiff's ADLs—including “attending to her personal care and hygiene, managing appointments, living with others, preparing simple meals, shopping, attending church, driving, performing some light household chores, and managing her finances”—were activities similar to those necessary for maintaining employment. (R. 26.)

Plaintiff contends that Judge Little committed error in her judicial review by not applying the correct legal standard in her R&R. (See, e.g., Dkt. No. 21 (“[T]he question before th[is] Court is only whether the ALJ failed to comply with the governing standards and procedures in reaching the decision under review.”).) For Plaintiff's benefit—and this is not to suggest that Judge Little was wrong—I have reviewed the administrative record independently. Doing so, and even applying the parameters of administrative review which Plaintiff suggests, I cannot say that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence of record.

As a reviewing court, I am not at liberty to reweigh the administrative evidence nor to act as appellate factfinder. White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 908 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a reviewing court may not “reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for the [Commissioner's]” (second alteration in original)); see also Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[The reviewing court] may not ‘displace the agenc[y's] choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Zoltanski v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004))).

The Commissioner's decision denying disability benefits to Plaintiff is AFFIRMED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Commissioner initially refers to Judge Little as “the magistrate.” (Dkt. No. 22 at 1.) The proper manner of referring to a United States Magistrate Judge is exactly that, or she can be referred to, as I do, as “Judge.” See Coriz v. Rodriguez, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1051 n.2 (D.N.M. 2018) (“A December 1, 1990 Act of Congress changed the title of federal Magistrate Judges from ‘Magistrate’ to ‘Magistrate Judge.’ Thus, although some state courts ․ have judicial officers called a ‘magistrate,’ the proper way to address and refer to federal Article I judges ․ is ‘United States Magistrate Judge.’ ”); see also Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); H.R. Rep. No. 734, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1990), reprinted at 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6877; Dena H. Palermo, Update: A Magistrate Judge By Any Other Name Is Still a Federal Judge, The Federal Lawyer, Vol. 72, Issue 1, p. 25 (Winter 2025) (“Congress adopted the title of United States Magistrate Judge to reflect the role [magistrate judges] play in reviewing the burgeoning caseloads in the United States District Courts and the corresponding burdens on district judges. Thus, magistrate judges are judges of the district court ․” (citation omitted)); Peter G. McCabe, A Brief History of the Federal Magistrate Judges Program, The Federal Lawyer, Vol. 61, Issue 4, p. 50 (May/June 2014) (“In 1990, the title of U.S. Magistrate was changed after years of debate․ This immediately brought a great deal of prestige to the position and clearly emphasized its judicial role.”). Hence, this Court expects the Commissioner and his legal counsel to henceforth refer to magistrate judges under their correct judicial title.

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ United States Circuit Judge, Sitting by Designation