CUNNINGHAM v. COBB COUNTY GEORGIA (2023)

ORDER

This case is an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from the alleged use of excessive force against Plaintiff by officers (who are sued in their individual capacities) employed by Defendant Cobb County. Plaintiff contends—in part—that this use of force was proximately caused by defective policies and procedures of the Cobb County Police Department, for which the County is allegedly subject to liability under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). (Dkt. 53 at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff also brings federal claims and pendent state tort and constitutional claims against the individual officers. (Id. ¶¶ 21–25, 30–34.)

Defendants ask the Court to bifurcate discovery and trial such that Plaintiff may proceed on his Monell claim only after he proves an underlying constitutional violation by the individual officers. (Dkt. 29-1 at 6.) They say doing so would save the Court and the parties resources and would prevent prejudice to Defendants. (Id. at 8, 11.) Plaintiff counters that the parties have already engaged in lengthy discovery related to all his claims, showing that Defendants' request “appears to have more to do with preventing Plaintiff from furthering his Monell argument than it does with judicial economy.” (Dkt. 30 at 4.) He points out that even if the Court allows the case to proceed against the individual officers but not the County, those officers “will probably still be defended and indemnified by the County,” such that bifurcation “would only delay the inevitable and unnecessarily expand the proceedings rather than shortening them.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff is right.

Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the Court to bifurcate litigation for the convenience of the parties, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize the litigation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). The decision to bifurcate is well within the discretion of the district court. See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). Courts look at “whether separate trials will be conducive to expedition of the litigation and to efficient judicial administration, whether separate trials will avoid prejudice, and whether the issues sought to be tried separately are significantly different.” Compton v. Bach, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Having considered these factors, the Court will not bifurcate this litigation. First, the Court doubts that proceeding in discovery on all of Plaintiff's claims would significantly burden Defendants given that the parties have continuously engaged in discovery (including on the Monell claim) since the case began. To the extent Defendants complain about the breadth of Plaintiff's most recent discovery requests, they may address those issues by way of objections to those requests. And bifurcation certainly would not conserve judicial resources, but rather waste them. Bifurcating discovery (and then, eventually trial) will do nothing but drag out the case—particularly because the parties would likely have to relitigate many of the same issues. See Levesque v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1156288, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2016) (denying bifurcation in part because “[a] piecemeal approach would serve only to delay the resolution of this case with no benefit to outweigh such a delay”). The parties' initial discovery plan did not seek or even suggest the need for bifurcation, so there is no reason that remaining discovery of both Plaintiff's individual and Monell claims cannot be completed on schedule. (Dkt. 15.)

Next, the Court is confident that it can protect against any potential prejudice against Defendants at trial. Defendants fear that “the jury's determination of the individual officers' liability will be improperly influenced by evidence relating to the local government's policies and customs.” (Dkt. 29-1 at 11–12.) But there are plenty of ways to avoid this. For example, the Court can cure any potential prejudice “through limiting instructions during the trial or by bifurcating the case for trial at a later date.” Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 429 F. Supp. 3d 537, 543 (N.D. Ill. 2019); see also Estate of McIntosh v. City of Chicago, 2015 WL 5164080, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 2, 2015) (noting determining prejudice to individual defendants at trial is often “premature and speculative” at the early stages of litigation).

Finally, the issues the jury will have to decide are likely to significantly overlap in “facts, evidence, and witnesses.” Griffin, 261 F.3d at 1301. To prove the County has defective policies or procedures leading to excessive force, Plaintiff will have to prove that the County's officers engaged in excessive force. And he will obviously need to prove the individual officers engaged in excessive force to succeed on his claims against them. The exact extent of the overlap will not become clear until the parties finish discovery. But for now, this factor warrants against bifurcation. See Johnson v. Baltimore Police Dept., 500 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461–62 (D. Md. 2020) (“Whether bifurcation would serve judicial economy depends in part on the extent to which the claims against the Officers and the Monell claim will involve intertwined evidence.”).

The Court DENIES Defendants' Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Discovery of Plaintiff's Monell Claim (Dkt. 29). The Court DENIES AS MOOT the parties' Joint Motion to Stay Discovery (Dkt. 49).

SO ORDERED this 23rd day of January, 2023.

MICHAEL L. BROWN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE