I.R., Plaintiff, v. SHRI KHODIYAR LLC (2024)

ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 105) and Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (Doc. 124). Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and applicable law, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court enters the following order.

I. Introduction

When she was just fourteen years old, Plaintiff I.R. was coerced into prostitution by two men who assaulted, threatened, and abused her. The men who trafficked I.R. set up business at the Americas Best Value Inn in Decatur, Georgia, a hotel owned and operated by Defendant I Shri Khodiyar, LLC. At this hotel, I.R.’s traffickers compelled I.R. to engage in sex with more than 130 men. With this lawsuit, I.R. seeks to hold I Shri Khodiyar, LLC liable for knowingly benefitting from participating in a venture with her traffickers. I.R. brings four claims: (1) a civil beneficiary claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); (2) a claim under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c); (3) a premises liability claim; and (4) a nuisance claim.

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Plaintiff was trafficked, as that term is defined in the TVPRA, and that even if she was, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant participated in the trafficking venture. On the particular facts of this case, the Court is unpersuaded. Plaintiff has presented ample evidence from which a jury could find that Plaintiff was indeed trafficked for sex at Defendant's hotel, and that Defendant knowingly profited by taking part with her traffickers in a common, profit-motivated venture. The Court finds that Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to create triable issues of fact as to the TVPRA claim and as to each of her other causes of action. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.

II. Background

The facts set forth below are derived primarily from the evidence identified in Plaintiff's statement of material facts and from I.R.’s deposition. (Doc. 108, Doc. 110-6.) In violation of the Local Rules, Defendant failed to file a statement of the material facts to which it contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. LR 56.1(B)(1), NDGa. It further failed to respond to Plaintiff's statement of material facts. LR 56.1(B)(3), NDGa. Consequently, the facts asserted in Plaintiff's statement are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by record evidence. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008).

A. I.R. is Trafficked by Bam

Before the incidents that form the subject of this case, Plaintiff I.R. was a straight-A student. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 71:18–25.) She played for her middle school basketball team. (Id. at 71:20–72:11.) She lived with her mother and two siblings. (Id. at 30:19–22.)

In May 2019, when Plaintiff was 14 years old, she was approached by a man who went by “Bam”¹ and lived in her apartment complex. (Id. at 16:25–17:24.) Plaintiff was in seventh grade. (Id. at 72:1–3.) Bam told Plaintiff that she was pretty and gave her his phone number. (Id. at 17:10–12.) Thereafter, Bam took Plaintiff to his apartment and raped her. (Id. at 18:7–10.)

In June 2019, Bam began trafficking Plaintiff for sex at the Americas Best Value Inn in Decatur, Georgia – a hotel owned and operated by Defendant I Shri Khodiyar, LLC. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 1; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 18:20–19:3.) During all relevant times, the hotel was managed and partially owned by Sam Ahir. (Doc. 120, Ahir Dep. at 25:22–26:14; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 8.) Between June 2019 and September 2019, Bam brought Plaintiff to Defendant's hotel on five separate occasions for up to a week at a time. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 1; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 21:2–7.) Bam forced and/or coerced Plaintiff to have sex with approximately one hundred men at Defendant's hotel. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 11; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 129:25–130:8.)

Bam routinely beat and drugged Plaintiff, (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 4, 10; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 46:22–24, 77:4–15, 81:15–22, 91:3–4), and he threatened to kill her and her family if she did not continue to do as he demanded, (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 54:21–55:1, 56:22–24, 76:19–24). Bam told Plaintiff that she “belonged to him.” (Id. at 77:6–15.) He fed Plaintiff dog food and chained her by her ankle to a bedframe when he was not in the hotel room so she would not escape. (Id. at 38:9–39:24, 74:14–18; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 3.)

Plaintiff contends that Ahir and other hotel employees knew that Bam was trafficking her for sex. In support of this assertion, Plaintiff deposed that Ahir saw her chained to the bedframe in Bam's hotel room.² (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 8; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 63:2–18, 64:24–65:15, 68:23–69:12; Doc. 149-1, I.R. Aff. ¶¶ 2–3.) I.R. further asserts that she engaged in commercial sex with between five and eleven men every day, which produced heavy foot traffic outside Bam's hotel room. (Id. at 129:25–130:8; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 11.) On one occasion, that room was four doors down from the hotel lobby. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 58:18–59:3.)³ When asked to describe the condition of the hotel room upon departure following Plaintiff's third stay there, Plaintiff deposed that “[t]here was blood everywhere,” including on the sheets, towels, and floor. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 13; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 67:11–68:7.) The blood was “from [her] behind” from being raped. (Id.) Plaintiff deposed that on the fourth occasion of her stay, Bam beat her with a chain and used her blood to write his name on the wall. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 77:4–15.) The blood was still on the wall when they left the hotel. (Id.)

B. I.R. is Trafficked by Eric Hall

Plaintiff was later “sold” to other traffickers who operated at other hotels. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 100:17–24, 108:8–19.) In November 2020, Plaintiff, 15 years old at the time, was approached by Eric James Hall at a food mart. (Id. at 113:11–114:5; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 15.) Hall told Plaintiff that he had heard about her and that she was worth a lot of money. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 113:11–114:5.) Plaintiff and a woman named Lola were then trafficked for sex by Hall. (Id. at 114:6–115:6.)

In November 2020, Hall took Plaintiff to Defendant's hotel, where she was sold for sex to more than 30 men over several days. (Id. at 129:9–24.) Hall used violence against Plaintiff to ensure she would not escape. He raped, beat, drugged, and threatened to kill her. (Id. at 117:13–19, 118:9–21, 120:8–13.)

Plaintiff had interactions with Defendant's employees while she was trafficked by Hall. The hotel's front desk employees “knew [Plaintiff and Lola] were there” because Plaintiff and Lola would “walk around with[out] any clothes on,” or while wearing lingerie, to solicit customers in the hotel's front-desk area. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 126:1–24; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 20.) Plaintiff testified that hotel employees were “friendly” with Lola and her and would come out from the office to talk to them as they “tr[ied] to get clients.” (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 126:1–13.) On one occasion, one of Defendant's managerial employees approached Plaintiff and Lola and asked to have sex with them. (Id. at 124:11–125:6; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 19.) The employee then went to Plaintiff's hotel room, where Lola had sex with him while Plaintiff was in the room. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 124:11–125:6.) The employee gave Plaintiff and Lola a free night at the hotel in exchange. (Id.) On other occasions, hotel employees would come to the rooms in which Plaintiff was trafficked to see if Plaintiff “needed anything” while she was with “customer[s][.]” (Id. at 127:2–128:2.) When the employees knocked on her door, Plaintiff would sometimes answer the door “naked” and would have adult men in her hotel room. (Id. at 127:4–128:2.)

C. Other Instances of Sex Trafficking and Criminal Activity at Defendant's Hotel

Beyond Plaintiff's testimony, there is additional evidence of sex trafficking and prostitution at Defendant's hotel. Plaintiff, for example, submitted the affidavit of N.D., a woman who states that she was trafficked for sex at Defendant's hotel months before Plaintiff was trafficked there. (Doc. 110-2, N.D. Aff. ¶¶ 2–3; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 25.) N.D. was allegedly forced by her trafficker, Sam Eromoesele, to have sex with Sam Ahir. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 27; Doc. 110-2, N.D. Aff. ¶¶ 3–5.) Other trafficking victims were forced to do the same. (Doc. 110-2, N.D. Aff. ¶ 5.) Ahir would sometimes go with Eromoesele into his hotel rooms while N.D. and other trafficking victims were undressed. (Id. ¶ 4.) Another woman, B.B., submitted an affidavit in which she states that she was also trafficked for sex at Defendant's hotel as a minor at roughly the same time Plaintiff was trafficked there. (Doc. 110-3, B.B. Aff. ¶¶ 2–4; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 28–29.)

There is evidence that, on one occasion in November 2019, Sam Ahir offered a hotel guest a free night at the hotel in exchange for sex. (Doc. 109, Pl. SOMF ¶ 30; Doc. 109-1, Chapman Dep. at 2–3.) The guest refused and made a complaint with Defendant's franchisor. (Doc. 109, Pl. SOMF ¶ 31.)

Additionally, DeKalb County police officers responded to nearly 200 reports of criminal activity at Defendant's hotel from 2014 through November 2020. (Doc. 109-2; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 32.) The criminal activity included prostitution, keeping a place of prostitution, rape, sexual battery, willful killing with a gun, and aggravated assault. (Doc. 109-2.)

Sergeant Calvin King, a former detective in the DeKalb County Police Department's Vice Unit testified that the Americas Best Value Inn is a “problem hotel,” due in part to frequent prostitution there. (Doc. 119, King Dep. at 13:6–16; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 36–38.) Sergeant King personally responded to over 10 incidents involving prostitution at Defendant's hotel and stated that “[a]ny time you get on Listcrawler.com,⁴ you normally have a woman or somebody[ ] posting an ad at that location.” (Doc. 119, King Dep. at 13:6–16; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 36.) Similarly, Officer David Fraser, a former DeKalb County police officer, testified that Defendant's hotel was consistently identified on the department's weekly “patrol as often as possible” (“POAP”) list due to criminal activity, including prostitution. (Doc. 117, Fraser Dep. at 12:25–13:12, 14:12–24 (“That hotel, as long back as I can remember, was always on the list every single week.”); Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 33–34.)

D. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on February 28, 2022.⁵ (Doc. 1.) Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court denied on August 29, 2022. (Doc. 44.) After the parties engaged in discovery, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 105), and that motion is fully briefed. On August 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for sanctions for Defendant's alleged failure to timely produce certain room rental records in discovery. (Doc. 124.) On November 2, 2023, the Court heard argument on both motions.

III. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,” and cannot be made by the district court in considering whether to grant summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); see also Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1282 (11th Cir. 1999).

If a movant meets its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must present evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact or that the movant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, “and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn” in favor of that opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Herzog v. Castle Rock Entertainment, 193 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). A fact is “material” only if it can affect the outcome of the lawsuit under the governing legal principles. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. “If the record presents factual issues, the court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial.” Herzog, 193 F.3d at 1246.

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff asserts four claims against Defendant: (1) a civil beneficiary claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (“TVPRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a); (2) a claim under the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c); (3) a premises liability negligence claim; and (4) a nuisance claim. Defendant seeks summary judgment on all four claims.

A. TVPRA Claim

The TVPRA provides a civil remedy to people who have experienced certain kinds of human trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The statute states:

An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.

Id. Under the TVPRA, a plaintiff may bring either (a) a direct civil claim against the perpetrator of her trafficking or (b) a civil “beneficiary” claim against “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].” Id. In this case, Plaintiff seeks to hold liable Defendant I Shri Khodiyar, a company that allegedly knowingly benefited from sex trafficking in general and from Plaintiff's victimization in particular.

Section 1595(a) requires a plaintiff bringing a TVPRA civil beneficiary claim to satisfy four elements. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant:

(1) knowingly benefited, (2) from taking part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit, (3) that undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff, and (4) the defendant had constructive or actual knowledge that the undertaking or enterprise violated the TVPRA as to the plaintiff.

Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 21 F.4th 714, 726 (11th Cir. 2021). The Court finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient evidentiary showing as to each, required element.

1. Element One: Defendant “Knowingly Benefited”

Plaintiff must first show that Defendant “knew it was receiving some value from participating in the alleged venture.” Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 724. For this element, the Court is concerned not with whether Defendant participated in a venture (that is discussed in the next section), but only with whether Defendant knowingly benefited from the trafficking enterprise – either “financially or by receiving anything of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). At least three judges of this court have found that a hotel's receipt of revenue from room rentals is a financial benefit from a relationship with a trafficker sufficient to satisfy the first element of the TVPRA standard. See, e.g., Does 1-4 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-04278-WMR, 2023 WL 5444261, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2023) (receipt of room rental revenue constituted a “benefit” under § 1595(a)); W.K. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-05263-VMC, 2023 WL 6290523, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2023) (same); D.H. v. Tucker Inn Inc., No. 1:22-CV-3419-JPB, 2023 WL 6538391, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 1, 2023) (same). That Defendant knowingly received such revenue from Plaintiff's traffickers is undisputed. Bam paid Defendant for the hotel rooms in which Plaintiff was trafficked to adult men for sex. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 22:11–23:1; 25:4–13; 78:7–13.) Eric Hall selected Defendant's hotel as the location where Plaintiff was trafficked in November 2020 and directed Lola (another trafficking victim) to pay for it. (Id. at 141:1–19.) Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence as to the first element of her TVPRA claim.

2. Element Two: Participation in a Venture

Beneficiary liability under the TVPRA arises only when the defendant “participat[es] in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has interpreted § 1595(a)’s “participation in a venture” element as requiring the plaintiff to show that the defendant “took part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit.” Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725.

To understand what it means for a defendant to participate in a venture, the Court looks to Red Roof Inns – the only published Eleventh Circuit case discussing the elements of a civil TVPRA beneficiary claim.⁶ In Red Roof Inns, plaintiffs sued the franchisors of hotels at which they were allegedly trafficked for sex. The plaintiffs argued that they satisfied the second TVPRA element because the complaint contained allegations of defendants “financially benefitt[ing] from renting hotel rooms to the [plaintiffs’] sex traffickers,” investigating certain hotels, reading online reviews mentioning prostitution, and controlling the training of employees who were more closely involved in facilitating sex trafficking at the hotels. Id. at 726–27. The Eleventh Circuit found these allegations to be insufficient to show the defendant-franchisors’ participation in a venture. Id. It further held that plaintiffs “provided no plausible allegations that the franchisors took part in the common undertaking of sex trafficking.” Id. And while the Red Roof Inns plaintiffs claimed that the franchisors saw “signs of sex trafficking,” the Eleventh Circuit stated that “observing something is not the same as participating in it.” Id. Thus, under Red Roof Inns, a defendant does not “participate in a venture” when it only financially benefits from renting rooms to traffickers and observes signs of sex trafficking at the hotel. See id. at 726–27.

Although the plaintiffs in Red Roof Inns failed to state a TVPRA claim, the case provides insight into the kinds of allegations that may be considered sufficient to show a hotel operator's participation in a venture. Specifically, in Red Roof Inns, the Eleventh Circuit approvingly cited Ricchio v. McLean, 853 F.3d 553 (1st Cir. 2017), for the proposition that a hotel operator could participate a venture with a sex trafficker when the trafficker “had prior commercial dealings” with the operator, “which the parties wished to reinstate for profit.” 853 F.3d at 555; Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. The operator in Ricchio, for instance, had personally interacted with the trafficker and indicated an intent to “get[ ] this thing [the trafficking operation] going again[.]” 853 F.3d at 555. The operator did so, moreover, “in circumstances in which [the trafficker's] coercive and abusive treatment of [plaintiff] as a sex slave had become apparent to the [operator].” Id. According to Red Roof Inns, the “kinds of allegations” alleged in Ricchio “would establish a hotel operator's participation in a venture with a sex trafficker.” 21 F.4th at 726.

While the plaintiffs in Red Roof Inns brought their TVPRA claims against a hotel franchisor, the Eleventh Circuit recently considered (in an unpublished opinion) how the “participation in a venture” element applies in a case, such as Plaintiff's, against a hotel franchisee. In K.H. v. Riti, Inc., No. 23-11682, 2024 WL 505063 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2024) (per curiam), a plaintiff sought to establish a hotel franchisee's participation in a venture through allegations that: “(1) [defendant] knew or should have known that sex trafficking was occurring at its hotel—based on online reviews, police reports, and visible indicators—yet (2) [defendant] continued to engage in a hotel business relationship with and collect room rental revenue from [plaintiff's trafficker] for approximately four years.” Id. at *3. These allegations were deemed insufficient to show a common undertaking involving risk and potential profit under the TVPRA. Id. The court reasoned that plaintiff's allegations “amount[ed] to contentions that [defendant] financially benefitted from renting hotel rooms to K.H.’s trafficker and that [defendant] observed signs of sex trafficking at the hotel.” Id. at *4. It stated that under Red Roof Inns, “allegations of financial benefit alone are not sufficient[,]” and it reiterated that “observing signs of sex trafficking ‘is not the same as participating in it.’ ” Id. (quoting Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 726). The court further noted that the allegations in Ricchio were “far stronger than just an operator renting rooms to a trafficker.” Id. at *3.

With the foregoing principles in mind, the Court turns to the present case and finds it distinguishable from Red Roof Inns and Riti. Here, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant did much more than just rent rooms to sex traffickers and observe signs of trafficking. As an initial matter, the evidence shows a booming sex trafficking business at Defendant's hotel. At least three traffickers – Bam, Hall, and Eromoesele – sold girls and women for sex at the hotel in the timeframe relevant to this case. Plaintiff alone was trafficked to over 130 men there. There is, additionally, evidence that Defendants’ employees took steps to facilitate the use of Defendants’ premises for trafficking. Managerial employees, for example, would go to the traffickers’ rooms when trafficking victims were with adult male “customer[s],” to see if they “need[ed] anything,” and victims would answer the door while naked. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 126:17–127:3, 127:19–128:2.) Employees permitted Plaintiff and other girls (who were wearing lingerie) to solicit men for commercial sex in the front desk area while the employees were present. (Id. at 126:17–24.) Hotel employees interacted with trafficking victims – including Plaintiff when she was 15 years old – as they solicited men in the front desk area. (Id. at 126:1–24; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 20.)

There is further evidence of Defendant's employees bartering for sex with trafficking victims, and being present in trafficking victims’ rooms while the girls or young women were undressed. A managerial employee solicited Plaintiff and Lola for sex at the hotel and provided free lodging in exchange. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 124:11–125:6.) Trafficking victims were also forced to have sex with the hotel's manager, Sam Ahir. (Doc. 110-2, N.D. ¶ 5.) Sam Ahir would sometimes go with Eromoesele into his rooms while trafficking victims were undressed. (Id. ¶ 4.) There is further evidence that Eric Hall specifically chose to traffic Plaintiff from Defendant's hotel because he knew people there. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 16.) Hall also chose Defendant's hotel because at the hotel where Plaintiff had previously stayed “the owners only allowed [trafficking] for ․ three days before they called the police.” (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 114:6–16.)

Defendant, moreover, facilitated the trafficking operation “in circumstances in which [the traffickers’] coercive and abusive treatment of [plaintiff] as a sex slave had become apparent[.]” Ricchio, 853 F.3d at 555. Similar to the operator in Ricchio who “ignored [plaintiff's] plea for help in escaping from [the trafficker's] custody at the motel” and who likely saw the trafficker “grab” and “kick” the plaintiff to ensure that she would not escape, id., Defendant's part-owner and manager Sam Ahir allegedly saw Plaintiff – 14 years old at the time – chained by her ankle to a bedframe in her trafficker's hotel room. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 8; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 63:2–18, 64:24–65:15, 68:23–69:12; Doc. 149-1, I.R. Aff. ¶¶ 2–3.) On one occasion, “[t]here was blood everywhere” in the hotel room, including on the sheets, towels, and floor, when Plaintiff and Bam left the hotel; and on another occasion, Bam's name was written on the wall with Plaintiff's blood when they left the hotel. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 13; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 67:11–68:7, 77:4–15.)

There was certainly “profit” involved for Defendant and the traffickers alike. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 726. Defendant received consistent cashflow from traffickers renting multiple rooms for multiple nights over several months. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 1, 15; Doc. 110-2, ND Aff. ¶¶ 2–3.) And traffickers profited from operating in an environment that was hospitable to trafficking – one in which hotel employees would, among other things, not call the police, permit trafficking victims to solicit men in hotel common areas, visit traffickers’ rooms to inquire if trafficking victims needed anything, and have sex with trafficking victims. There was also “risk” for Defendant, in that police frequently came to the hotel to investigate allegations of prostitution.

In short, the evidence in this case is “far stronger than just an operator renting rooms to a trafficker.” Riti, 2024 WL 505063, at *3. Plaintiff has presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Defendant did not merely observe signs of sex trafficking but took part in a common undertaking involving risk and potential profit. “[U]nder these circumstances ․ it [i]s reasonably inferable that the [h]otel operator and trafficker were working together ‘to force [plaintiff] to serve their business objective.’ ” Id. (quoting Ricchio, 853 F.3d at 555). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence as to the second element of her TVPRA claim, as other judges in this district have found on similar facts.⁷

3. Element Three: The Enterprise Violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff

The third element of a TVPRA claim requires Plaintiff to provide evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that the venture in which Defendant participated violated the TVPRA as to her. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. Plaintiff argues that she satisfies this element because she was trafficked at Defendant's hotel from June 2019 to September 2019 by Bam, and in November 2020 by Eric Hall.

To determine whether the alleged venture in which Defendant participated violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff, the Court considers the kinds of acts criminalized by Section 1591 of the TVPRA. See Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725 (discussing acts criminalized by § 1591 in analyzing third TVPRA element). Section 1591 is titled “Sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud, or coercion[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (emphasis added). The TVPRA provides different definitions for sex trafficking depending on whether the alleged victim is a minor. Id. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has explained that:

[A] defendant commits the offense of sex trafficking if he (1) knowingly, in or affecting interstate commerce, transports 8 a person (2) knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, either: (i) that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or (ii) that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act[.]

United States v. Walker, 73 F.4th 915, 928 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)) (emphasis in original) (alterations adopted). Under TVPRA element three, Plaintiff must provide evidence from which a jury could infer that the venture in which Defendant participated committed one of these crimes against her. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725.

Defendant appears to argue that Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged trafficking venture violated the TVPRA with respect to Plaintiff's experiences with Eric Hall in November 2020.⁹ (Doc. 131 at 4.) Defendant suggests that Plaintiff was not trafficked by Hall because Hall never forced her to have commercial sex. (Id.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff voluntarily “came to an agreement with Mr. Hall” in which she and her co-victim, Lola, would “act as prostitutes,” and Hall would receive twelve percent of their profits. (Id.) At oral argument, counsel for Defendant doubled down on this argument, stating that Plaintiff, who was 15 at the time, could not have been sex trafficked by Hall because Plaintiff “agree[d] to voluntarily prostitute herself” and could have simply “walked away” from the trafficking enterprise if she was so inclined. (Tr. at 10:11–14, 11:23–12:1.) Thus, Defendant suggests that no TVPRA violation occurred in November 2020 because her decision to engage in commercial sex with adult men was a voluntary one.

It is unclear why Defendant would make such an argument. I.R. was not a “woman,” and this was not an “agreement.” The undisputed facts are that I.R. was 15 years old when she was trafficked by Hall, and he beat, drugged, and threatened to kill her while he sold her into sexual servitude.¹⁰ In addition, no force, fraud, threats, or coercion are necessary to establish a TVPRA violation when a person knowingly transports a person, while knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the person is a minor and will be caused to engage in commercial sex. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1). Defendant does not dispute that Hall knowingly transported Plaintiff, caused Plaintiff to engage in a commercial sex act, and knew, or at least recklessly disregarded, the fact that she was 15 years old at the time.¹¹

Finally, even if Hall did not know or recklessly disregard the fact that Plaintiff was a minor at the time he caused her to engage in commercial sex work, there is undisputed evidence that Hall used force and coercion against Plaintiff, in satisfaction of the first part of the “sex trafficking” definition.¹² In short, on the evidence presented here, a jury could find that the sex trafficking venture in which Defendant participated violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff under § 1591.

4. Element Four: Defendant Had Constructive or Actual Knowledge that the Enterprise Violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff

The final element of a TVPRA beneficiary claim is that the defendant “knew or should have known [that the venture] has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). The Eleventh Circuit has said that this element requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant had “either actual or constructive knowledge that the venture in which [it] participated and from which [it] benefited violated the TVPRA” as to the plaintiff. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725. Knowledge is “awareness or understanding of a fact or circumstance.” Id. (quoting Knowledge, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)). Constructive knowledge is “that knowledge which ‘one using reasonable care or diligence should have.’ ” Id. (quoting Constructive Knowledge, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant had at least constructive if not actual knowledge that the venture in which it participated violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff. The hotel's manager, Sam Ahir, saw the middle-school-aged Plaintiff chained by her ankle to a bedframe in her trafficker's room. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 8; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 63:2–18, 64:24–65:15, 68:23–69:12; Doc. 149-1, I.R. Aff. ¶¶ 2–3.) The hotel's front desk employees “knew [Plaintiff and Lola] were there” as Plaintiff and Lola would “walk around with[out] any clothes on,” or while wearing lingerie, to solicit customers near the front desk. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 126:1–24.) Defendant's managerial employee approached Plaintiff and Lola and solicited sex from them in exchange for a free night at the hotel. (Id. at 124:11–125:6.) Hotel employees came to Plaintiff's room while she was with adult male “customers” to see if she “need[ed] anything,” and Plaintiff would answer the door while naked. (Id. at 127:19–128:2.) The hotel rooms in which Plaintiff was trafficked would sometimes be soiled with blood when she and her traffickers left. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 13; Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 67:11–68:7, 77:4–15.) A steady flow of adult men—up to 11 in one night—would go in and out of Plaintiff's hotel rooms each night she was there. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep at 129:25–130:8; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 11.) One of those rooms was located just four doors down from the hotel lobby. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 58:18–59:3.) Especially considering that Plaintiff was only 14 and 15 years old during the relevant periods, a jury could find that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that Plaintiff was a minor being trafficked for commercial sex.

Prior instances of on-site prostitution and sex trafficking also provide evidence of Defendant's constructive knowledge. Other trafficking victims were allegedly forced to have sex with Sam Ahir just a few months before Plaintiff was trafficked at the hotel. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 25–27; Doc. 110-2, N.D. Aff. ¶¶ 2, 5–7.) Sergeant Calvin King testified that the Americas Best Value Inn is a “problem hotel” due to frequent prostitution there. (Doc. 119, King Dep. at 13:6–16.) Officer David Fraser testified that Defendant's hotel was consistently identified on the DeKalb County Police Department's weekly “patrol as often as possible” list due to its high rates of crime, including prostitution. (Doc. 117, Fraser Dep. at 12:25–13:12, 14:12–24.) And according to data from the DeKalb County Police Department, police responded to many incidents of prostitution, keeping a place of prostitution, and other sex-related crimes at Defendant's hotel in the years leading up to and in between the periods during which Plaintiff was trafficked. (Doc. 109-2.) Considering these circumstances, a jury could find that Defendant knew or should have known that the venture in which it participated and from which it benefited violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff. Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 725.¹³

In sum, Plaintiff has presented unrebutted evidence sufficient to show that Defendant knowingly benefited from participation in a venture with Plaintiff's traffickers and that Defendant had actual or constructive knowledge that the venture violated the TVPRA as to Plaintiff. Two other judges in this district have found similarly when presented with similar facts. See Does 1-4, 2023 WL 5444261, at *4; W.K., 2023 WL 6290523, at *10. Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the TVPRA claim is denied.

B. Georgia RICO Claim

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has violated the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-1 et seq. “The Georgia RICO Act was enacted by the Georgia legislature to impose criminal penalties against those engaged in an interrelated pattern of criminal activity motivated by or the effect of which is pecuniary gain or economic or physical threat or injury, and civil remedies to compensate those injured by reason of such acts.” Najarian Capital, LLC v. Clark, 849 S.E.2d 262, 270 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020) (citations omitted). It provides a civil cause of action to “[a]ny person who is injured by reason of any violation of [O.C.G.A. §] 16-14-4” against the violator. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-6(c); Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4 states, in relevant part, that, “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including money.” O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4(a). To establish a civil RICO claim under Georgia law, a plaintiff “must show that the defendant violated or conspired to violate Georgia's RICO Act and that the RICO violation proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.” Five Star Athlete Mgmt., Inc. v. Davis, 845 S.E.2d 754, 758 (Ga. Ct. App. 2020).

A “pattern of racketeering activity” means “[e]ngaging in at least two acts of racketeering activity in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, or transactions that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics.” O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4)(A); Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728. A “pattern” requires “at least two interrelated predicate offenses.” Brown v. Freedman, 474 S.E.2d 73, 77 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). “[S]uch acts must be linked, but distinguishable enough to not be merely two sides of the same coin.” McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., 817 F.3d 1241, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Racketeering activity” is the “commission, attempted commission, solicitation, coercion, or intimidation of another to commit” certain enumerated offenses known as “predicate acts.” Red Roof Inns, 21 F.4th at 728 (citing O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The relevant predicate act in this case is keeping a place of prostitution. O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(5)(A)(vii) (RICO definitional statute listing predicate acts).

Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's RICO claim, arguing that there is no evidence that Defendant has engaged, or conspired to engage, in any racketeering activity in violation of the Act.¹⁴ The Court disagrees. Plaintiff has presented ample, unrebutted evidence that Defendant has engaged in a pattern of keeping a place of prostitution.

O.C.G.A. § 16-6-10, which defines the offense of keeping a place of prostitution, provides:

A person having or exercising control over the use of any place or conveyance which would offer seclusion or shelter for the practice of prostitution commits the offense of keeping a place of prostitution when he knowingly grants or permits the use of such place for the purpose of prostitution.

“Prostitution” is defined as when a person “performs or offers or consents to perform a sexual act ․ for money or other items of value.” O.C.G.A. § 16-6-9. A defendant keeps a place of prostitution if the defendant knowingly permits its property to be used for prostitution. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-10; see, e.g., Ahn v. State, 631 S.E.2d 711, 712–13 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming a spa owner's conviction for keeping a place of prostitution where she was “keenly aware” of prostitution occurring on site). “Evidence of reputation alone, wholly uncorroborated,” is insufficient to establish a defendant's keeping a place of prostitution. Birdwell v. State, 146 S.E.2d 374, 375 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).

Defendant argues that it did not keep a place of prostitution because it did not know prostitution was occurring on the premises. A reasonable jury could find otherwise.

The evidence described above with respect to Plaintiff's TVPRA claim would also allow for a finding that Defendant knowingly permitted its hotel to be used for prostitution at least twice. Plaintiff's testimony, for instance, would support a finding that Defendant's employees had actual knowledge that she and others were being sold for sex at the Americas Best Value Inn. (See supra § IV(A)). Additionally, one of Defendant's employees directly solicited Plaintiff and Lola for sex. (Id. at 124:11–125:6.) Lola allegedly had sex with the employee while Plaintiff was in the room, in exchange for which the two were given a free night's stay. (Id.) Separately, N.D. and other trafficking victims had sex with hotel manager Sam Ahir. (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 25–27; Doc. 110-2, N.D. Aff. ¶¶ 2, 5–7.) A jury could find that these acts of participation in on-site prostitution show that Defendant knew that its premises were being used for such purposes.¹⁵

Evidence that law enforcement officers frequently responded to reports of commercial sex work at Defendant's hotel further bolsters Plaintiff's claim that Defendant knowingly permitted use of its premises for prostitution. As discussed above, Officer David Fraser testified that Defendant's hotel consistently appeared on the DeKalb County Police Department's weekly POAP list due to criminal activity, including prostitution. (Doc. 117, Fraser Dep. at 12:25–13:12, 14:12–24.) On one occasion in September 2020, Officer Fraser responded to a report of a battery at Defendant's hotel committed by a man against a woman who was engaging in commercial sex. (Id. at 12:3–17; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 39–40.) Officer Fraser spoke to the hotel manager about the incident. (Doc. 117, Fraser Dep. at 12:3–13:12, 15:14–23; Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶¶ 40–41.)

The evidence discussed above is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant has engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. See, e.g., Does 1-4, 2023 WL 5444261, at *4 (finding under similar circumstances that “the record would permit a jury to find that the Red Roof Defendants committed or aided in the commission of the predicate act of ‘keeping a place of prostitution’ ”); W.K. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 2023 WL 6290523, at *11 (permitting RICO claim to proceed). Defendant is therefore not entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Georgia RICO claim.¹⁶

C. Negligence Claim

The Court next considers Plaintiff's negligence claim, which she asserts under a premises liability theory. The elements of a negligence claim are (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) causation, and (4) damages. Retail Prop. Tr. v. McPhaul, 857 S.E.2d 521, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). “In a premises liability claim, the owner or occupier of land owes a duty to an invitee ¹⁷ to keep the premises and approaches safe.” Id. However, “[a] property owner is not an insurer of an invitee's safety, and an intervening criminal act by a third party generally insulates a proprietor from liability unless such criminal act was reasonably foreseeable.” Ratliff v. McDonald, 756 S.E.2d 569, 575 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). Georgia law makes clear that “without foreseeability that a criminal act by a third party will occur, the proprietor has no duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent the act.” Id.

Defendant disputes that the third-party criminal acts at issue here were reasonably foreseeable. Specifically, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no evidence of substantially similar prior criminal activity on Defendant's premises. As discussed above, the evidence indicates otherwise. But additionally, Defendant misapprehends the legal standard: the Georgia Supreme Court has stated that there is no “bright-line rule requiring evidence of a ‘substantially similar’ prior crime[.]” Georgia CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael, 890 S.E.2d 209, 224 (Ga. 2023). The foreseeability inquiry is “necessarily case-specific,” and there is no requirement that “specific kinds of evidence must be shown to establish foreseeability[.]” Id. Instead, the relevant question is “whether the totality of the circumstances establish reasonable foreseeability such that the proprietor has a duty to guard against that criminal activity.” Id. at 226. Carmichael also explains that foreseeability in a premises liability case is generally a question for the factfinder:

[A]s a matter of law, the legal duty to keep the premises safe is imposed by statute and has been construed to encompass a duty to protect against foreseeable third-party criminal acts. But whether the third-party criminal acts were foreseeable under the facts of a particular case – thus triggering the duty to protect against them – is a question for the factfinder (unless no rational juror could find the criminal act reasonably foreseeable).

Id. at 222.

I.R.’s negligence claim is further supported by Suresh & Durga, Inc. v. Doe, 894 S.E.2d 602 (Ga. Ct. App. 2023). There, a plaintiff asserted a premises liability claim against the operator of a hotel at which she was trafficked for sex when she was a minor. Id. at 604–05. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that, on the facts presented, a jury could find the third-party criminal acts to be reasonably foreseeable and that the hotel operator breached its duty as to her. Id. at 608–09. Specifically, the plaintiff's injuries were foreseeable based on evidence such as: (a) dozens of police reports documenting crimes, including prostitution, at defendant's hotel in the years preceding plaintiff's stay there; (b) police-officer testimony that the hotel was known for drugs, prostitution, and sex trafficking; (c) testimony from victims of trafficking stating that hotel employees knowingly permitted prostitution to take place on its premises; and (d) testimony from a trafficking victim who stated that the hotel manager was known to purchase sex at the hotel. Id. at 606, 609. In light of this “substantial evidence,” the court held that, “under the totality of the circumstances test, there are disputed questions of fact concerning whether the crime committed against Doe in this case was reasonably foreseeable to Defendant.” Id. at 608.

I.R.’s proffered evidence, as discussed above (see supra § IV(A)–(B)) is similar to that in Suresh & Durga. I.R. too has identified evidence of frequent criminal activity (including prostitution) at Defendant's hotel, and she has shown that Defendant's employees knew of prostitution on its premises. As in Suresh & Durga, I.R. also has evidence that hotel employees engaged in sex with sex workers and/or trafficking victims at the hotel. See Roylston, 660 S.E.2d at 417 (stating that a principal is “charge[d] with [ ] all notice or knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and within the scope of his authority[.]”) (citation omitted).

The Court finds, as the Georgia Court of Appeals did in Suresh & Durga, that Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim. See also, e.g., Does 1-4, 2023 WL 5444261, at *4 (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment as to trafficking victim's negligence claim under similar factual circumstances); W.K. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 2023 WL 6290523, at *12 (same).

D. Nuisance Claim

Defendant did not move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's nuisance claim. It argues, for the first time in its reply brief, that it is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. The Court may decline to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief. See, e.g., Carter v. Howard, No. 1:20-CV-1674-TWT-JSA, 2020 WL 10050792, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 22, 2020) (“As a general rule, federal courts do not consider arguments that are presented for the first time in a reply brief.”). The request for summary judgment is denied on this basis.

The motion for summary judgment on the nuisance claim is also denied on the merits. “A nuisance is anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another and the fact that the act done may otherwise be lawful shall not keep it from being a nuisance. The inconvenience complained of shall not be fanciful, or such as would affect only one of fastidious taste, but it shall be such as would affect an ordinary, reasonable man.” O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1. There is “general agreement that nuisance is incapable of any exact or comprehensive definition.” Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 522 S.E.2d 13, 16 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted) (alteration adopted). But the “hallmark” of a nuisance is “some invasion of the plaintiff's interest in land.” Blondell v. Courtney Station 300 LLC, 865 S.E.2d 589, 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021). “[L]iability for a nuisance arises out of responsibility for the continuance or maintenance of a nuisance in addition to the creation of one[.]” Bailey v. Annistown Rd. Baptist Church, Inc., 689 S.E.2d 62, 72 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) “A business may be a nuisance either by reason of its location or by reason of the improper or negligent manner in which it is conducted.” Rice v. Six Flags Over Ga., 572 S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted).

Defendant's arguments as to Plaintiff's nuisance claim echo those already addressed and rejected in this order. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant created or maintained a dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff's injury. But the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, belies that contention. As discussed at length by now, there is ample evidence from which a jury could find that Defendant fostered an environment that permitted sex trafficking, prostitution, and other criminal activity to repeatedly occur on its premises. The Court incorporates here its discussion of Plaintiff's evidence as to her other claims and finds that such evidence is also sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant created or maintained a nuisance at its hotel. See, e.g., Bethany Grp., LLC v. Grobman, 727 S.E.2d 147, 150 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming denial of summary judgment to apartment complex on nuisance claim where the record showed “repeated instances” of prior crimes on the premises).

V. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 124)

Plaintiff has filed a motion for sanctions relating to Defendant's failure to timely produce certain documents in discovery. (Doc. 124.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant refused to produce documents showing the identities of persons who rented the hotel rooms in which Plaintiff was allegedly trafficked. This matter was discussed at a June 1, 2023, telephonic hearing, at which the Court deemed the requested records relevant and ordered their production. (Doc. 97.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to produce the rental records and has violated Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by “faili[ing] to obey an order to provide or permit discovery.” Plaintiff argues that Defendant's refusal to produce the requested records impedes her ability to show at trial that Bam rented the rooms in which Plaintiff was trafficked at Defendant's hotel. As for the relief requested, Plaintiff asks the Court to instruct the jury that it must deem as true the fact that Bam rented the rooms in which Plaintiff was trafficked on certain dates.¹⁸

Defendant responds that it has not violated any court order, as it has reasonably responded to Plaintiff's discovery requests. Defendant contends that it provided all relevant room rental records and, additionally, that Plaintiff's requested sanctions are disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

The Court heard argument on this matter at the November 2, 2023, hearing. (Doc. 140.) At the hearing, the Court directed Defendant to take the following steps within ten days:

(1) produce to Plaintiff the requested summary reports (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) with no redactions as to room numbers; (2) produce to Plaintiff unredacted versions of the requested detailed reports (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2); and (3) conduct a thorough search for documents responsive to Plaintiff's request relating to Room 202 from August 2019. If no responsive documents are found relating to Room 202 for August 2019, Defendant's counsel shall file a notice on the docket certifying that, to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, no such documents were found.

(Id.) On November 13, 2023, Defendant filed a certificate of service indicating that it made a supplemental discovery production. (Doc. 146.)

The Court considers it necessary to hear from the parties regarding the subsequent production before adjudicating Plaintiff's motion for sanctions. The Court therefore DIRECTS Plaintiff to file a notice within 14 days of the entry date of this order describing the documents produced by Defendant following the November 2, 2023, hearing, and providing her perspective on how such production affects the motion for sanctions. Defendant may file a response within 14 days of the filing of Plaintiff's notice.

Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (Doc. 124) is STAYED pending consideration of Plaintiff's notice and Defendant's response.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth in this order, Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 105) is DENIED. Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (Doc. 124) is STAYED. The parties are DIRECTED to submit a proposed consolidated pretrial order within 30 days.

The parties are reminded that this Court offers litigants a dispute resolution program by which parties may request mediation with a United States Magistrate Judge. If the parties are interested in availing themselves of this procedure, they may file a joint motion requesting that the case be referred for mediation.

SO ORDERED this 18th day of March, 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bam's identity remains unknown.

2.   Plaintiff's statement of material facts contends that Plaintiff made eye contact with Defendant's manager Sam Ahir, (Doc. 108, Pl. SOMF ¶ 8), but the cited portion of the deposition testimony does not quite support the statement. Plaintiff said in deposition that she made eye contact with an employee but does not specifically name Ahir. To clarify matters, I.R. submitted a post-deposition affidavit in which she attests that, “While I was trafficked for sex at Defendant's hotel in July 2019, I made eye contact with a male hotel employee while chained to the bedframe inside Defendant's hotel room.” (Doc. 149-1, I.R. Aff. ¶ 2.) The affidavit then identifies the employee as Ahir. (Id. ¶ 3.)Defendant does not object to the affidavit. Instead, it argues generally that the Court should reject Plaintiff's testimony because it is “self-serving.” (Doc. 131 at 3.) But sworn testimony based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat summary judgment even if it is self-serving. Price v. Time, Inc., 416 F.3d 1327, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Courts routinely and properly deny summary judgment on the basis of a party's sworn testimony even though it is self-serving.”). Defendant, moreover, failed to file a statement of material facts and failed to respond to Plaintiff's facts, which are deemed admitted to the extent they are supported by evidence. That is all to say that I.R.’s testimony that she and Ahir looked at each other while I.R. was chained to the bedframe in one of Defendant's hotel rooms is undisputed on this record.

3.   Other times, however, Defendant would specifically give Bam and other traffickers rooms on the backside of the hotel building. (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 23:7–13; Doc. 110-2, N.D. Aff. ¶ 3.)

4.   Listcrawler.com is a website on which “men and women solicit ․ sex for money” and advertise sexual services. (Doc. 119, King Dep. at 10:24–11:1.)

5.   When the complaint was filed, I.R. was under 18, so her mother was the plaintiff. I.R. is no longer a minor, and on June 1, 2023, she filed an amended complaint in which she is named as the plaintiff. (Doc. 96.)

6.   Defendant's motion for summary judgment does not discuss Red Roof Inns.

7.   See W.K. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-05263-VMC, 2023 WL 6290523, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 14, 2023) (finding that plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence of participation in a venture at summary judgment, where, inter alia, defendants had an ongoing relationship with known pimps and sex workers at the hotel, defendants and their employees were aware that they were profiting from renting rooms to those persons, and employees had sex with a trafficking victim); Does 1-4 v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-04278-WMR, 2023 WL 5444261, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 10, 2023) (finding sufficient evidence of a venture on summary judgment where, inter alia, the defendants regularly saw pimps and sex workers using hotel rooms, booked suspected sex workers in rooms at the back of the hotel, acted as lookouts and notified pimps when police were nearby, and were aware that some sex workers appeared to be underage and physically emaciated).

8.   In addition to transporting, the statute further criminalizes recruiting, enticing, harboring, providing, obtaining, advertising, maintaining, patronizing, and soliciting. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1).

9.   Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff can satisfy this element with respect her experiences with Bam between June and September 2019.

10.   The undisputed facts in this case show that the middle-school-aged plaintiff was chained to a hotel bed, fed dog food, beaten, raped, and sold for sex. The Court thus cannot fathom why Defendant would say that I.R. “agree[d] to voluntarily prostitute herself” (Tr. at 10–12).

11.   Additionally, “the Eleventh Circuit has held that in a prosecution under § 1591(a), the Government need not prove that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the person had not attained the age of eighteen years if the defendant ‘had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim.’ ” A.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., No. 1:20-CV-05231-JPB, 2022 WL 1644921, at *3 (N.D. Ga. May 24, 2022) (quoting United States v. Whyte, 928 F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2019)). Hall and Defendant's employees had a reasonable opportunity to (and actually did) observe Plaintiff while she was being trafficked.

12.   Plaintiff testified that, on one occasion at Defendant's hotel, Hall “made me take ․ Xanax and put a gun to my head and raped me.” (Doc. 110-6, I.R. Dep. at 117:13–19.) On another occasion, Plaintiff said that Hall “beat me and Lola and took our money. And he told us, like, if we left, it'll be a problem.” (Id. at 120:8–13.) Another time, Hall made Plaintiff and Lola sit in the back seat of his car with “one of his old workers,” who had a cut on her face from her forehead down to her jawline. (Id. at 118:9–14.) Hall told Plaintiff and Lola to look at the cut on the woman's face, and “he told us that that was what was going to happen to us if we didn't listen to him. You know, if we try to do anything stupid.” (Id. at 118:15–21.)

13.   See also W.K., 2023 WL 6290523, at *10 (finding sufficient evidence of defendants’ knowledge of a TVPRA violation where, inter alia, commercial sex at the hotel was “obvious” to employees, hotel employees had commercial sex with a plaintiff, and the defendants had an ongoing relationship with plaintiffs’ traffickers); Does 1–4, 2023 WL 5444261, at *3 (finding sufficient evidence that defendants knew or should have known of violations of the TVPRA by, for instance, showing that employees regularly saw pimps and prostitutes at the hotel, management received complaints of prostitution, and employees acted as lookouts for the trafficking operation).

14.   Defendant makes no argument as to the other elements of the RICO claim.

15.   These acts of solicitation were done outside the scope of the employment, such that Defendant cannot be held vicariously liable for them. See Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 580 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Ga. 2003) (“[A]n employer cannot be held liable under respondeat superior for an employee's sexual misconduct when the alleged acts were not taken in furtherance of the employer's business and were outside the scope of employment.”). Nevertheless, the evidence is probative of what Defendant knew for purposes of establishing the predicate acts. If the employees engaged in commercial sex at the hotel, they, of course, knew that commercial sex was occurring there. Their knowledge can be imputed to their employer. See Roylston v. Bank of Am., N.A., 660 S.E.2d 412, 417 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“The law imputes to the principal, and charges him with, all notice or knowledge relating to the subject-matter of the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent and within the scope of his authority[.]”); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Witham, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1375 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (“Where an agency relationship does exist, an agent's knowledge is imputed to the principal pursuant to Georgia law.”).

16.   Defendant argues that even if its employees engaged in racketeering activities, it, as a corporate entity can be liable under the Georgia RICO statute only if those activities were “authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a managerial official who is acting within the scope of his employment [o]n behalf of the corporation.” O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a)(2). The cited statute, O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22, however, provides the circumstances under which a corporation may be criminally liable. Id. (“A corporation may be prosecuted for the act or omission constituting a crime only if ․”) (emphasis added). The Georgia Supreme Court has declined to extend § 16-2-22 to civil RICO claims. See Williams Gen. Corp. v. Stone, 632 S.E.2d 376, 378 (Ga. 2006) (“O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22 does not pertain to civil suits brought under the Georgia civil RICO Act[.]”). Instead, “a corporation is a ‘person’ or an ‘individual’ for the purposes of Georgia RICO and can be civilly liable for the acts of its agents just as any other person would be.” Does 1-4, 2023 WL 5444261, at *6 (citing Williams, 632 S.E.2d at 378). At the summary judgment stage, there is sufficient evidence that Defendant, through its agent-employees, engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity such that it may be held liable under the Georgia RICO statute.

17.   Defendant's motion for summary judgment does not dispute Plaintiff's status as an invitee.

18.   Resolution of the sanctions motion is not a necessary prerequisite to resolution of any of the summary judgment issues. Neither party has suggested otherwise.

SARAH E. GERAGHTY, United States District Judge