MELANIE FIGUEROA v. SANTA ROSA COUNTY SHERIFF DEPARTMENT (2024)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT DANIELS'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint on November 9, 2023. ECF No. 74. The 22-count Complaint alleges various claims against five Defendants—the Santa Rosa County Sheriff's Office, Bob Johnson in his official capacity as Sheriff of Santa Rosa County, then-Deputy David Daniels in his individual capacity, Camelot Schools, and the School Board of Santa Rosa County. Four separate motions to dismiss have been filed, ECF Nos. 78, 79, 80, and 81, and Plaintiffs have responded to each. ECF Nos. 83, 84, 85, and 86. Only one of these motions—the one brought by Defendant Daniels, ECF No. 78—is addressed in this Order.

Two of the Plaintiffs in this case, B.F. and C.B., are minor children. Through section 1983, B.F. and C.B. allege that Defendant Daniels, in his individual capacity, violated Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and to be free from excessive force.¹ Plaintiffs seek damages and prospective injunctive relief to remedy the alleged constitutional deprivations.

Defendant Daniels moves to dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiffs' Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) under the theory that Defendant Daniels is entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 78. Further, Defendant Daniels argues that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective injunctive relief against him. For the reasons below, Defendant Daniels's motion is GRANTED in part and denied in part.

I

This Court accepts the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P., 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). “To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A ‘claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Plaintiff's allegations must amount to ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In a motion to dismiss, this Court is usually bound by the four corners of a complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). If it considers materials outside the complaint, such as attachments to the motion to dismiss, this Court “generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275–76 (11th Cir. 2005). But that is not always the case. “[T]he court may consider a document attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim and (2) undisputed.” Id. at 1276.

In his motion, Defendant Daniels incorporates by reference four digital files captured by Defendant Daniels's bodyworn camera. ECF No. 77-1–77-4. These materials do not merit converting his motion into one for summary judgment. First, the incident captured by bodyworn camera is central to Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs repeatedly reference the footage in their Complaint, and several factual allegations which form the basis of the excessive force claims are drawn directly from the footage. Second, Plaintiffs do not challenge the authenticity of the footage. The footage is, therefore, undisputed. See Taylor, 400 F.3d at 1276. For these reasons, this Court considers these materials in addition to Defendant Daniels's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 78, and Plaintiff's response, ECF No. 83.

A

This Court proceeds by stating the facts in the light most favorable to each Plaintiff. First, B.F. At the time of the incident from which this complaint arises, B.F. was eight years old and in the second grade at Camelot Elementary School in Santa Rosa County, Florida. Camelot Elementary is a school that provides alternative education services for students with disabilities. B.F. is a student with disabilities and qualifies for Exceptional Student Education (ESE) under the following exceptionalities: Autism Spectrum Disorder, Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. At the time of the incident, B.F. stood 4 foot 3 inches tall and weighed approximately ninety pounds.

On December 8, 2021, B.F. became upset while in class. B.F. hit two other students and a teacher with his hand. B.F. was removed from his classroom and placed in a “Serenity Room.” Defendant Daniels, who was then employed as a school resource officer at Camelot, was summoned to the Serenity Room by Camelot teaching staff. When Defendant Daniels arrived, B.F. was in the Serenity Room with a Camelot teacher. B.F. pedaled a stationary bicycle while the teacher and Defendant Daniels antagonized B.F., repeatedly asking him why he hit the teacher. B.F. did not respond. B.F. asked Defendant Daniels, “are you mad at me?” and Defendant Daniels said “yes.” Defendant Daniels then turned off the body camera feed. During this interaction, B.F. remained calm and compliant.

The body camera footage resumed an hour later in the hallway just outside of the Serenity Room. The footage captured Defendant Daniels grabbing B.F., placing his hands behind B.F.'s back, and taking B.F. down to the floor. Defendant Daniels then forcibly applied handcuffs while placing his knee on B.F.'s back. B.F. cried in pain. Shortly after taking B.F. to the ground, Defendant Daniels explained to another Camelot teacher that B.F. “needs to know there are consequences.” B.F. remained handcuffed on the floor, crying, for approximately three minutes. During that time, B.F. told Defendant Daniels that Defendant Daniels was hurting him. B.F. alleges that Defendant Daniels “confirmed that he knew that the handcuffs were not meant for children” and “he had to ‘synch’ [sic] the cuffs down on [B.F.'s] wrist.” ECF No. 74 at 69. The handcuff tightening caused B.F. pain.

After leaving B.F. on the ground with the Camelot teachers standing nearby, Defendant Daniels walked outside to move his patrol vehicle. Defendant Daniels then returned to the Serenity Room, where B.F. was seated in a chair, one arm free from the handcuffs. Defendant Daniels grabbed B.F., picked him up from his chair, and forcibly re-applied the handcuffs. Defendant Daniels and a Camelot instructor then carried B.F. by his armpits out to the marked police car. B.F. made no overt action to harm himself or Defendant Daniels at any time. Further, he had no access to a weapon. While confined in the back of the patrol vehicle, B.F. cried and begged for Defendant Daniels to “give [him] one more chance.” At one point, B.F. again freed one arm from the handcuffs. In response, Defendant Daniels grabbed him by the shoulder, shook him, and forcibly reapplied the handcuffs. B.F. remained in the back of the police car for over forty minutes before he was transported to West Florida Hospital. At the hospital, employees reported that B.F. did not meet criteria for admission under the Baker Act,² and he was released.

B

Next, C.B. Like B.F., C.B. is a minor child with disabilities who in 2021 qualified for Exceptional Student Education under Autism Spectrum Disorder and Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. In 2021, C.B. was ten years old and in the fourth grade at Camelot Elementary. He stood approximately 4 foot 11 inches tall and weighed 119 pounds.

On November 10, 2021, C.B. had a bad day at school. He was removed from his classroom at Camelot after he threw water on a teacher, stepped on a cup, refused to take his medications, struck a teacher, and attempted to close a door on a teacher. C.B. was placed in the Serenity Room. Camelot called C.B.'s parents in order to send C.B. home but was unable to reach them. Failing that, they summoned Defendant Daniels. When Defendant Daniels arrived, C.B. was attempting to patch a hole in the wall in the Serenity Room. A teacher accused C.B. of punching a hole in the wall. C.B. explained that there was already a hole in the wall, and his punch made it bigger.

After about six minutes of watching C.B. attempt to put the damaged drywall back in place,³ Defendant Daniels turned off his body camera. When Defendant Daniels turned his body camera back on, C.B. was attempting to exit the Serenity Room. Defendant Daniels pushed C.B. to prevent C.B. from leaving the room. C.B. walked toward the back wall, growling in frustration. Defendant Daniels told C.B. that “when I'm involved, things change” and “this is your last chance.” C.B. made no attempt to flee, hit, or resist Defendant Daniels as he approached. Defendant Daniels then grabbed C.B., turned him around, and handcuffed his hands behind his back. Defendant Daniels told a nearby Camelot employee, “I'm going to Baker Act him.” In response, C.B. said, “I am not going to struggle.” Defendant Daniels then walked C.B. through the school out to his patrol vehicle. C.B. did not cry, scream, resist, or make any attempt to flee during the walk.

Once in the patrol vehicle, C.B. became upset, crying and hyperventilating. C.B. repeatedly told Defendant Daniels he did not want to go to jail. Defendant Daniels told C.B., “I hope this is a learning situation for you ․ this is exactly what will happen next time you put your hands on people.”

After sitting in the patrol vehicle for twenty minutes, C.B. was moved to another vehicle for transportation to West Florida Hospital. At the hospital, employees reported that C.B. did not meet criteria for admission under the Baker Act, and he was released.

II

Now to the merits. Defendant Daniels argues that qualified immunity shields him from individual liability. ECF No. 78 at 9. Qualified immunity is a shield from liability for government actors, prohibiting “civil damages for torts committed while performing discretionary duties unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right.” Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Although ‘the defense of qualified immunity is typically addressed at the summary judgment stage of a case, it may be ․ raised and considered on a motion to dismiss.’ ” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Ctny., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002)). Further, the Supreme Court has stressed that because it is not only a shield from liability but also an immunity from suit, qualified immunity should be addressed at the earliest possible stage of a case. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).

An official asserting qualified immunity must first prove that he or she was acting within the scope of his or her “discretionary authority at the time of the alleged constitutional violation.” Morris v. Town of Lexington, 748 F.3d 1316, 1321 n.15 (11th Cir. 2014). In this case, Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant Daniels acted within his discretionary authority when he handcuffed and transported B.F. and C.B. The burden, therefore, shifts to Plaintiffs to establish (1) a violation of a constitutional or statutory right and (2) that the right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (citations omitted).

B.F. and C.B. have each invoked two federally protected constitutional rights—the Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force. This Court will address Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity for each alleged violation, as to each Plaintiff, below.

A

This Court begins with Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity from the unreasonable seizure claims as to B.F. and C.B. This Court will discuss each Plaintiff in turn.

i.

First, Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity from B.F.'s unreasonable seizure claim. B.F. must (1) point to factual allegations that state a plausible unreasonable seizure claim and (2) show that the right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred.

On the first prong, B.F. argues that his seizure violated the Fourth Amendment because Defendant Daniels lacked probable cause to detain him pursuant to the Baker Act. B.F. further argues that the seizure was unreasonable under the modified school reasonableness standard articulated in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). In Richmond v. Badia, the Eleventh Circuit remarked that school seizures are ordinarily analyzed under the modified school reasonableness standard articulated in T.L.O. See 47 F.4th 1172, 1181 n.1 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing T.L.O. and noting “we usually review school seizures under a less exacting reasonableness standard”). However, in Richmond, the parties argued for using the probable cause standard for arrests, and, as a result, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the seizure under that standard. Here, in contrast, Defendant Daniels seized Plaintiffs pursuant to the Baker Act, not pursuant to a criminal statute. Thus, it is not clear whether the standard in T.L.O. or the Baker Act standard would apply in this case. But under either standard, B.F. has plausibly alleged a constitutional violation.

First, the Baker Act standard. An officer making an arrest pursuant to the Baker Act must have “reason to believe that the person has a mental illness and because of ․ [his] ․ mental illness ․ [t]here is a substantial likelihood that without care or treatment the person will cause serious bodily harm to ․ herself or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior.” Khoury v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 4 F.4th 1118, 1126 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting § 394.463(1)(b)(2), Fla. Stat. (2023)). Further, “a belief about some likelihood that without treatment a person might cause some type of harm at some point—does not meet this standard.” Id. (emphasis in original). In assessing whether an officer is protected by qualified immunity, the inquiry is whether the officer had “arguable probable cause” for the arrest. In the Baker Act context, “arguable probable cause exists if a reasonable officer, knowing the information [the officer] possessed, could have believed that probable cause existed to involuntarily commit [the Plaintiff].” Id. at 1126.

For several reasons, this Court finds that a reasonable officer could not have believed that B.F. presented a risk of “serious bodily harm” to himself or others. First and most importantly, B.F. was an eight-year-old child. Standing under five feet tall and weighing ninety pounds, B.F. could not have posed a credible threat of serious harm to the adults in the room. Although he may have been capable of harming another child of his size, when Defendant Daniels became involved, B.F. had already been removed from his classroom. No other children were present. Further, B.F. had no access to a weapon of any kind and made no threats toward any of the adults. According to B.F., he was not being combative, threatening, or aggressive. On the contrary, when Defendant Daniels arrived, B.F. was engaged in de-escalation by quietly pedaling a stationary bicycle in the “Serenity Room,” a place presumably designed for that very purpose.⁴ It is not enough that Defendant Daniels may have believed that B.F. may attempt to cause someone harm in the future. The standard requires more—namely, a belief that it is substantially likely the person will cause serious harm. B.F.'s behavior as alleged simply does not rise to that level. Accepting these allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to B.F., as this Court must, Defendant Daniels did not have arguable probable cause to detain B.F. pursuant to the Baker Act.

Next, this Court considers the allegations under the reasonableness standard from T.L.O. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment's “prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials.” 469 U.S. 325, 333 (1985). Recognizing the “substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools,” id. at 340, the Court in T.L.O. adopted a limited “special needs” exception to the traditional probable cause requirement. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (recognizing that “special needs” beyond ordinary law enforcement purposes exist in the public school context). Under this modified reasonableness test, “first, one must consider ‘whether the action was justified at its inception;’ second, one must determine whether the [seizure] as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’ ” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). Further, the standard requires that the means to carry out the search is “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342. Although T.L.O. dealt with searches carried out by school officials, the Eleventh Circuit has applied T.L.O. to seizures by law enforcement officers working in schools. See Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e apply the reasonableness standard articulated in [T.L.O.] to school seizures by law enforcement officers.”) (cleaned up).

Applying T.L.O. to the allegations—and, again, taking them as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to B.F.—the seizure of B.F. was unreasonable because it was not justified at its inception. When Defendant Daniels arrived at the Serenity Room, B.F. had already been removed from his classroom and was already engaged in de-escalation. B.F. alleges that Defendant Daniels responded by antagonizing B.F. and, eventually, handcuffing him while pinning him to the floor.

Further, while the modified reasonableness test in T.L.O. is an objective inquiry, “actual motivations” of officers may be considered when a seizure occurs under a “special needs” doctrine. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (concluding that “actual motivations do matter” under a special needs search) (citation omitted). Here, Defendant Daniels explained to a Camelot employee that B.F. “needs to know there are consequences.” He makes no mention of B.F.'s need for psychiatric treatment or that B.F. was clearly in danger or endangering those around him. Instead, Defendant Daniels's stated purpose was to teach B.F. a lesson. This Circuit has held that teaching a lesson is not a permissible reason for handcuffing a young child. See Gray, 458 F.3d at 1307 (finding a seizure unreasonable where the officer's reason for handcuffing a nine-year-old child “was simply to punish her and teach her a lesson”).

Even if the seizure, as alleged, was justified at its inception, it also failed T.L.O.'s second prong. Pinning a disabled eight-year-old child to the floor, handcuffing him, carrying him by the armpits, shaking him, and locking him in the back of a police cruiser is excessively intrusive in light of B.F.'s age and the nature of the “offense”—namely, non-injurious hitting earlier in the day.

As a result, B.F. has sufficiently alleged a violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, thus satisfying the first prong of his qualified immunity burden.

This Court now turns to the second prong of B.F.'s qualified immunity burden—whether that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. A plaintiff may illustrate that a constitutional right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred by (1) pointing to a “materially similar case [that] has already been decided[,]” (2) showing that a “broader, clearly established principle should control the novel facts in this situation,” or (3) showing that the conduct so obviously violates the constitution that prior caselaw is unnecessary. Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005).

B.F. identifies Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic as a materially similar case that “clearly establishes” this particular constitutional violation. 458 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2006). In Gray, a nine-year-old child made verbal threats against her gym teacher and refused to follow the teacher's instructions. In response, a school resource officer escorted the child from the gym into the hallway. No teacher requested the officer's assistance. The officer then placed the child in handcuffs and tightened the handcuffs until they caused pain. The officer kept Gray in handcuffs for “not less than five minutes.” Id. at 1301. The officer in that case testified that he handcuffed the child for the purpose of investigating a misdemeanor—threatening a teacher. He also stated that his purpose in using handcuffs was “to impress upon her the serious nature of committing crimes that can lead to arrest” and “to persuade her to get rid of her disrespectful attitude.” Id. at 1301, 1306. In holding the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, though there was no caselaw directly on point, “[e]very reasonable officer would have known that handcuffing a compliant nine-year-old child for purely punitive purposes is unreasonable.” Id. at 1307. The Court reached its decision after finding that by the time the officer became involved, “there was no indication of a potential threat to anyone's safety.” Id. at 1306. In its conclusion, the Court emphasized that the handcuffing was “excessively intrusive given Gray's young age and the fact that it was not done to protect anyone's safety.” Id. at 1306.

Defendant Daniels argues that Gray is not sufficiently factually similar to this case to consider the law “clearly established.” Defendant Daniels points out that unlike the officer in Gray, he did not intervene on his own. He was summoned by school staff. Further, in this case, B.F. had engaged in physical violence, not simply verbal threats. Specifically, B.F. had struck students and staff earlier in the day. Defendant Daniels also argues that he did not handcuff B.F. in order to teach him a lesson, but instead did it in the course of carrying out a Baker Act detention.

This Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Gray is a materially similar case that is close enough to the present facts for the violation to be “clearly established.” This Court need not infer whether Defendant Daniels handcuffed and transported B.F. for punitive purposes because Defendant Daniels said so himself on camera. Specifically, Defendant Daniels said B.F. “needs to know there are consequences.” ECF No. 83 at 5. Gray may not be identical to this case in every respect, but that is not the standard. The facts here—including the age and size of the child, the punitive purpose of the detention, the officer's use of handcuffs without a safety threat—are sufficiently analogous to put Defendant Daniels on notice that his conduct runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.

Alternatively, even if Gray was not a “materially similar” case, its underlying principle is sufficient to put Defendant Daniels on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional. The principle identified by the Eleventh Circuit in Gray is that an officer violates the Constitution when he handcuffs a child who poses no physical threat purely to teach that child a lesson. If it is clearly established that handcuffing a compliant child for punitive purposes runs afoul of the Constitution, so too is forcefully and painfully handcuffing a child, carrying the child out to a patrol car, and transporting the child to a mental health facility for punitive purposes.

Accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, based on the facts before this Court at this stage, Defendant Daniels is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to B.F.'s unreasonable seizure claim.

ii.

Second, Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity from C.B.'s unreasonable seizure claim. C.B. must (1) point to factual allegations that state a plausible unreasonable seizure claim and (2) show that the right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred.

On the first prong, C.B. has alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible unreasonable seizure claim. Since B.F. and C.B.'s incidents were similar, much of the above analysis applies to C.B. First, Defendant Daniels had no arguable probable cause that C.B. needed to be committed to a mental health facility under the Baker Act. C.B. was separated from other students in the Serenity Room when Defendant Daniels carried out the seizure, thus unable to cause another student harm. Though C.B. was throwing a tantrum, there is no evidence that he attempted to cause serious injury to himself or others. Further, after a brief attempt to run past Defendant Daniels, C.B. stopped resisting. Like the child in Gray, he complied with instructions during and after the handcuffing. While C.B. had acted out earlier in the day, none of his actions came close to causing anyone injury, let alone the serious injury required for a Baker Act detention. As a result, no reasonable officer could have believed that C.B. was at risk of seriously injuring himself or others.

For the same reason, Defendant Daniels's seizure of C.B. was not “justified as its inception.” The nature of C.B.'s offense was a tantrum in response to being asked to take his medication, as well as arguable property damage from punching a hole in the wall of the Serenity Room. This behavior as alleged is more severe than B.F.'s behavior and as a result presents a slightly closer call than B.F.'s claim. However, the facts still come out in C.B.'s favor. While some measure of control is required in a school setting, T.L.O. teaches that the level of intrusion must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified” it. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (quotation omitted).

As he did as to B.F.'s unreasonable seizure claim, Defendant Daniels argues that the purpose of the detention was to initiate psychological screening in response to a threat of serious harm. And, as with B.F., this Court may look to the officer's actual motivation for this “special needs” purpose. Based on Defendant Daniels's statement to C.B. that he “hope[s] this is a learning situation” and that “this is what will happen” if C.B. engages in this behavior again, it is reasonable, for purposes of Defendant's motion to dismiss, to infer that Defendant Daniels's purpose in seizing C.B. was punitive. The lesson from Gray is that an officer cannot seize a child to punish them. Further, the Eleventh Circuit found the seizure was unreasonably intrusive when the child was placed in handcuffs for five minutes. Here, in contrast, Defendant Daniels handcuffed C.B., marched him out to a police cruiser, and placed him inside the cruiser for over twenty minutes. Defendant Daniels then transported C.B. to a mental health facility. This is a more significant intrusion than the intrusion in Gray for the same alleged purpose—punishment. Therefore, C.B. has plausibly alleged a violation of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

As for the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, this Court now must determine whether C.B.'s constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the right was clearly established under the second means identified in Mercado—namely, by pointing to a “a broader, clearly established principle controls the novel facts.” 407 F.3d at 1159. At the time of the incident, it was a clearly established principle that a seizure by a school resource officer must, at minimum, be “reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Gray, 458 F.3d 1295, 1305 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342). Based on Defendant Daniels's own words, this Court can reasonably infer that Defendant Daniels seized C.B. to teach C.B. a lesson. Teaching a lesson is not a permissible objective under the Fourth Amendment. After the principle in Gray was published, no reasonable officer could have believed that he was authorized to seize and handcuff a child for even five minutes in order to teach that child a lesson. It follows that it is unreasonable to handcuff that child for over twenty minutes for the same purpose.

As a result, this Court finds that at this stage, Defendant Daniels is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to C.B.'s unreasonable seizure claim.

B

This Court now turns to Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity from B.F. and C.B.'s excessive force claims. Like it did with the unreasonable seizure claims, this Court will discuss each Plaintiff in turn.

i.

First, Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity from B.F.'s excessive force claim. B.F. must (1) point to factual allegations that state a plausible excessive force claim and (2) show that the right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred.

On the first prong, B.F. argues that Defendant Daniels's decisions to forcibly handcuff him (to the point of causing wrist pain) while pinning him against the ground and then to keep him handcuffed inside a vehicle for forty minutes constituted an excessive use of force. This Court agrees. Claims alleging excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard. See Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009). Under this standard, a court asks “whether the officers' actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotation omitted).⁵ In assessing the reasonableness of the force used, a court must “balance the risk of bodily harm to the suspect against the gravity of the threat the officer sought to eliminate.” Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). While each inquiry is fact-specific, relevant factors to examine include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396).

The first Graham factor weighs in B.F.'s favor. While B.F. allegedly struck other students and teachers earlier in the day, he was a child whose physical strikes are unlikely to amount to serious injury. The second factor weighs in B.F.'s favor for the same reason. A small eight-year-old with no access to weapons could not pose a serious threat to an able-bodied adult. B.F. had no access to weapons. At the time of this incident, he had been removed from his classroom and was surrounded by three adults—two Camelot employees and Defendant Daniels. The third factor is a closer call, because B.F. twice wriggled free of the handcuffs. However, the facts as alleged still favor B.F. It is reasonable for this Court to infer that wriggling free from the handcuffs was not an attempt to escape detention as a whole, but B.F.'s response to the handcuffs causing severe pain.⁶ Indeed, when B.F.'s arm was freed, he did not attempt to run away from Defendant Daniels or Camelot staff, nor did he try and strike any of the adults present. Instead, B.F. remained seated where he was and pleaded for “one more chance.” Therefore, it is reasonable for this Court to infer that B.F. removing his arm from the handcuff was an effort to alleviate his pain—not an escape attempt. Since the Graham factors all weigh in B.F.'s favor, this Court finds that the force used was excessive in light of Defendant Daniels's need to control the situation.

This Court now turns to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—namely, whether the right was clearly established at the time of the incident. While there is no case law from the Supreme Court, Florida Supreme Court, or Eleventh Circuit that directly mirrors the facts here, there were “broader, clearly established principle[s]” that should have put Defendant Daniels on notice that his conduct ran afoul of the Constitution. Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159. At the time of the incident, the law was clearly established that an officer's use of force must be tailored to meet the particulars of each case. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. It was also clearly established that police use of force in a school setting must be reasonable under the circumstances and cannot be excessively intrusive. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42. Further, the reasoning in Gray sends a message to all reasonable officers that handcuffing for a punitive purpose is excessively intrusive when not done for safety reasons.

In the alternative, this Court finds that even in the absence of relevant principles underlying controlling case law, this case “fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously violates [the C]onstitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1159. In other words, it would be clear to every reasonable officer that the force Defendant Daniels used was excessive under the circumstances. As discussed above, the need to apply force at all was minimal. B.F. was a small child who at no time attempted to harm Defendant Daniels or the other adults. He had no access to weapons and no ability to leave the Serenity Room area. Even if B.F. had tried to cause harm, he would likely not have been physically capable. Further, once B.F. was locked inside the police cruiser, the need to continue applying force—including shaking him—was eliminated. In other words, it would be obvious to a reasonable officer that pinning an unarmed, mentally disabled, ninety pound second-grader to the ground, tightening the handcuffs until the child loses circulation, and then carrying the child outside by his armpits to sit in the back of a police cruiser for nearly an hour, coupled with shaking that child by his shoulder when he cries—is an excessive use of force.

Thus, at least for purposes of Defendant Daniels's motion to dismiss, the law was clearly established. As a result, Defendant Daniels is not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to B.F.'s excessive force claim at this time.

ii.

Next, Defendant Daniels's claim of qualified immunity from C.B.'s excessive force claim. C.B. must (1) point to factual allegations that state a plausible excessive force claim and (2) show that the right was clearly established when the violation in question occurred. On the first prong, C.B. argues that Defendant Daniels' decision to handcuff him and keep him handcuffed inside a locked police cruiser for twenty minutes was an excessive use of force. After reviewing the Complaint and the bodyworn camera footage, this Court does not agree. Defendant Daniels is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to C.B.'s excessive force claim.

As for the first Graham factor, the “crime” at issue in C.B.'s case amounted to a temper tantrum from a child who did not want to take his medication—throwing a cup on the ground, stomping on it, running away, and punching the Serenity Room wall. However, even Plaintiff acknowledges—and the footage supports—that C.B. also attempted to close a door on Camelot staff and attempted to run away from both Defendant Daniels and Camelot staff. As a result, the need for force to control the situation was greater for C.B. than it was in B.F.'s case. In other words, this factor weighs slightly in Defendant Daniels's favor.

The second Graham factor is a close call but ultimately weighs in C.B.'s favor. Although C.B. was a bit older and a bit larger than B.F., he was still a ten-year-old child who could not pose a serious threat to an able-bodied adult without access to a weapon. Like B.F., C.B. had already been removed from his classroom and was surrounded by other adults when Defendant Daniels arrived.

The third factor weighs in Defendant Daniels's favor. C.B. attempted to push past Defendant Daniels and run away after he had run away from Camelot staff. ECF No. 78 at 14. Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to C.B., his attempt to escape from Defendant Daniels necessitated some measure of force in order to keep C.B. in the room.

Even taking all of C.B.'s factual allegations as true—and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor—Defendant Daniels did not apply more force than the situation called for. The bodyworn camera shows that Defendant Daniels handcuffed C.B. with considerably little physical force. C.B. was not pinned to the ground, nor was he carried outside. Defendant Daniels instead applied handcuffs in a reasonable manner, with no pulling, twisting, or shaking. C.B. then walked himself out to the patrol vehicle without incident. While inside the patrol vehicle, Defendant Daniels remained calm and did not apply any additional force to C.B. This Court cannot say that these measures were excessive in light of Defendant Daniels's need to control the situation he confronted.⁷

Because this Court finds that C.B. has not plausibly stated a constitutional violation as to his excessive force claim, it need not determine whether the right was clearly established. Instead, this Court concludes that Detective Daniels is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to C.B.'s excessive force claim.

III

This Court now turns to Defendant Daniels's standing argument. Plaintiffs request prospective injunctive relief against Defendant Daniels in his individual capacity. Defendant Daniels argues that, because he is no longer employed as a law enforcement officer, Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a likelihood of future injury and lack Article III standing to pursue injunctive relief against him. This Court agrees.

“A party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and immediate—as opposed to merely conjectural or hypothetical—threat of future injury.” Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 1994). Further, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998).

Here, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged they suffered constitutional violations by Defendant Daniels. However, Plaintiffs have not alleged a real, immediate threat of future injury from this Defendant. As a result, Plaintiffs' request for prospective injunctive relief fails.⁸ Defendant Daniels's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' request for prospective injunctive relief as to him is due to be granted.

IV

In sum, Defendant Daniels's motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint is DENIED with respect to B.F.'s unreasonable seizure and excessive force claims. The motion is also DENIED as to C.B.'s unreasonable seizure claim. Defendant Daniels's motion is GRANTED with respect to C.B.'s excessive force claim, and as to both Plaintiffs' requests for prospective injunctive relief.

This Court pauses to reiterate that qualified immunity should be addressed at the earliest possible stage of a case. At the same time, at the motion to dismiss stage, the facts before this Court are limited and must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. Under this narrow set of facts, three of Defendant Daniels's qualified immunity defenses fail. However, this conclusion might change at a later stage of litigation.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Daniels's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 78, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2. The motion is GRANTED insofar as Plaintiffs request for injunctive relief against Defendant Daniels is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of Article III standing.

3. The motion is GRANTED insofar as Defendant Daniels is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to C.B.'s excessive force claim.

4. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

5. This Court's Courtroom Deputy is directed to set this case for a telephonic status conference to ascertain how the parties wish to proceed in light of this Order.

SO ORDERED on March 4, 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint lists Counts I and II as claims “for Violation of Due Process Rights to Be Free From Unreasonable Search and Seizures and Excessive Force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” ECF No. 74 at 63, 73. Defendant Daniels argues that the unlawful seizure claims subsume the excessive force claims under the rationale of Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., 445 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). However, in that case, the plaintiff argued that because his arrest was unlawful, any amount of force used to effect that arrest would necessarily be “excessive force.” See id. at 1332. That is not the argument Plaintiffs make here. Here, Plaintiffs argue both that Defendant Daniels did not have the authority to detain them and that the manner of arrest was excessive. This Court, therefore, treats these as two separate constitutional claims because the inquiries are “separate and independent, though the evidence may overlap.” Richmond v. Badia, 47 F.4th 1172, 1181 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007)).

2.   Throughout this Order, “the Baker Act” refers to Florida's Mental Health Act, sections 394.41 et seq., Florida Statutes (2023).

3.   Defendant Daniels argues that C.B. was not attempting to fix anything but instead “was actively trying to make the hole in the wall larger.” ECF No. 78 at 27. However, on the bodyworn camera video, C.B. says he is “putting it back.” At this stage, Defendant Daniels is asking this Court to review facts not before it and, further, to resolve those facts in the light most favorable to Defendant Daniels. This is not allowed at the motion to dismiss stage.

4.   In Defendant Daniels's motion to dismiss, he introduces new facts that allegedly occurred between Defendant Daniels's body camera turning off and turning on again. However, at the motion to dismiss stage, these facts are not before this Court. While additional information may come to light at summary judgment, this Court cannot consider facts outside the operative complaint and the undisputed video evidence at the motion to dismiss stage.

5.   This Court recognizes that Graham is not a perfect analogue, because there was no “arrest” pursuant to a criminal statute in this case. Instead, there was a detention pursuant to the Baker Act. However, the parties rely on Graham standards and this Court therefore analyzes the incident under Graham. Further, the Eleventh Circuit has applied Graham to Baker Act detentions. See, e.g., Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015).

6.   Should this inference be called into question, this Court implores a reviewing court to review the bodyworn camera footage, which demonstrates B.F.'s hand losing circulation and becoming discolored as a result.

7.   To be clear, this Court earlier found that at this stage, C.B. has sufficiently alleged that the seizure was not reasonable under the circumstances. This Court's conclusion regarding the force used does not impact its conclusion regarding the legality of the seizure.

8.   To be clear, this Court's conclusion does not impact Plaintiffs' ability to seek monetary damages or other relief for Defendant Daniels's alleged constitutional violations. Further, it does not impact Plaintiffs' ability to seek injunctive relief against the other Defendants.

Mark E. Walker Chief United States District Judge