GARRETT v. EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS INC (2025)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REGARDING FINAL JUDGMENT

As Defendant Experian acknowledges, it mixed Plaintiff Brendon Garrett's credit file with his twin brother's file. Claiming the mix-up harmed him, Garrett sued under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). ECF No. 1. Both parties moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 67, 71. After a hearing, and having carefully considered the parties’ arguments and the cited record portions, I conclude Experian is entitled to summary judgment.¹

I.

A court should grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “A complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At this stage, the court views the facts the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Chavez v. Mercantil Commercebank, N.A., 701 F.3d 896, 899 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that on cross-motions for summary judgment, “the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party on each motion”).

II.

Garrett has a twin brother, and Experian (like TransUnion and Equifax) combined the brothers’ information into a single file. ECF Nos. 72 at 1, 65-2 at 33. Experian then published Garrett's inaccurate consumer report to several potential creditors. ECF No. 74-2 at 11-12. Later, potential creditors either denied Garrett credit or gave him unfavorable credit terms. ECF Nos. 70-5, 70-8.

As a consumer reporting agency, Experian must “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy” when preparing credit reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Garrett's claim is that Experian had unreasonable procedures, which led to the credit mix-up. To succeed on this claim, Garrett must show that (1) Experian's report contained inaccurate information, (2) the procedures used to prepare and distribute the report were not reasonable, and (3) he suffered damages. Losch v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC (Losch I), 995 F.3d 937, 944 (11th Cir. 2021). The parties agree Experian included errors in Garrett's file. So the case turns on the reasonableness of Experian's procedures and whether Garrett suffered damages.

Experian contends its procedures were reasonable—or more specifically that Garrett points to no evidence from which a jury could conclude otherwise. Experian separately contends Garrett has shown no damages. I agree with Experian on both points, which constitute independent reasons to grant Experian summary judgment.

A.

There are some areas of agreement. The parties agree Garrett has the burden of showing unreasonableness. They also agree that the statutory provision at issue—15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)—does not impose strict liability; even reasonable procedures will not prevent all credit-reporting errors. See Williams v. First Advantage LNS Screening Sols. Inc., 947 F.3d 735, 745 (11th Cir. 2020) (applying § 1681e(b) and noting that “[t]he FCRA does not make consumer reporting agencies strictly liable for all inaccuracies, but instead creates a private right of action for negligent or willful violations of the FCRA”). And they agree that in most cases, the reasonableness of a consumer reporting agency's procedures “will be a jury question.” Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991). The disagreement centers on whether there is sufficient evidence here to allow a jury to find unreasonableness.

Garrett cannot succeed because he points to no evidence from which a jury could conclude Experian acted unreasonably. Instead, he relies principally on the outcome. He says because there were mixed-up files, there must have been something Experian could have done differently. But he never says what that something is. And if simply showing a mix-up were sufficient to prove unreasonableness, the statute would effectively provide for strict liability.

Even if there were some conceivable circumstance in which a particular mix-up could be proof of unreasonableness, that is not the situation here. Here, as all agree, the brothers’ information was remarkably similar. The brothers had nearly identical first names: Brendon and Brandon. They had nearly identical middle names: Lavantia and Travantia. They had the same last name. They had the same birthday. They had nearly identical SSNs: all but the last digits matched. They shared a residence for years. In other words, this is not a situation in which any reasonable consumer reporting agency would have known these were two different people. Indeed, as Garrett alleged in his complaint and acknowledged at the hearing, all three major consumer reporting agencies mixed the brothers’ files. (Garrett sued all three, but the other two settled. See ECF Nos. 1, 28, 37.)

In his briefing, Garrett seemed to argue it would be unreasonable to assign a record to a credit file without a perfect SSN match. See ECF No. 75 at 16. But at the hearing, his counsel disclaimed any such argument. Regardless, I conclude as a matter of law that a policy is not unreasonable simply because it allows records to be associated with an individual's credit file with one SSN digit off, particularly when there are other matching indicators.

Garrett also argues that there are millions of twins. That is surely so, but it proves nothing. Garrett points to no similar problems with other sets of twins. Indeed, Garrett points to no problems with Experian's policies at all—other than the combining of his and his brother's files. This is not enough to survive summary judgment.

Garrett's expert report does not help either. In connection with his own summary-judgment motion (but not in response to Experian's), Garrett relied on his expert's opinion that Experian acted unreasonably. See ECF No. 65-5 at 4. But, like Garrett, the expert jumps to the conclusion—saying Experian acted unreasonably—skipping over what Experian should have done. This is not like Williams, in which the expert identified specific procedures other reporting agencies employed that would have prevented the problem. 947 F.3d at 743.² Here, the expert points to no specific procedures other agencies use—or that Experian should have used. Instead, he repeats the error-proves-unreasonableness argument underlying Garrett's claim. See ECF No. 65-5 at 2 (“The case of Plaintiff Brendon Lavantia Garrett demonstrates that Experian has failed and continues to fail to adopt and/or follow procedures to prevent inaccuracies caused by ‘Mixed Files.’ ” (cleaned up)). He also asserts that Experian “cannot identify any discernable procedures to prevent Mixed Files unless or until the consumer notifies Experian he or she is a victim of a Mixed File,” id. at 3, but that puts the burden on the wrong party.³ Last, to the extent the expert would simply announce that the policies are unreasonable, such a statement would not be admissible evidence and must be disregarded here. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”); Fed. R. Evid. 702 (expert testimony admissible only if “based on sufficient facts or data” and only if it “will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”); see also Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1212-13 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[A]n expert may offer his opinion as to facts that, if found, would support a conclusion that the legal standard at issue was satisfied, but he may not testify as to whether the legal standard has been satisfied.”).

Garrett had the burden of pointing to evidence from which a jury could conclude “the procedures [Experian] took in preparing and distributing the report weren't ‘reasonable.’ ” Losch I, 995 F.3d at 944. Garrett has not done so, and that dooms his claim.⁴

B.

Next, even if Garrett had offered evidence from which a jury could find Experian's policies unreasonable, his claim would still fail because he has shown neither actual damages nor willfulness. This is an independent reason why Experian is entitled to summary judgment.

A plaintiff can recover damages for negligent or willful FCRA violations. See Losch I, 995 F.3d at 944. For willful violations, statutory damages are available. But to recover for a negligent violation, a plaintiff needs actual damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (willful violations); 15 U.S.C. § 1681o (negligent violations); see also Pedro v. Equifax, Inc., 868 F.3d 1275, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017). Thus, regardless of the reasonableness inquiry, Garrett cannot succeed without presenting evidence of willfulness or actual damages. He has presented evidence of neither.

To establish willfulness, a plaintiff must show that the consumer reporting agency acted either knowingly or recklessly. Pedro, 868 F.3d at 1280. Garrett points to no evidence that Experian acted knowingly. He argues Experian's procedures show the company knew of mixed-file problems yet declined to use stricter matching requirements. ECF No. 75 at 26. But that argument looks to the wrong kind of “knowledge.” The question is not whether Experian knew this type of error was possible; it is whether Experian knowingly violated the statute. And there is no evidence of that. Indeed, the undisputed evidence is that when notified of the combined file, Experian promptly fixed it.

Garrett points to no evidence of recklessness, either. A consumer reporting agency acts recklessly when its reading of the statute “shows that the company ran a risk of violating the law substantially greater than the risk associated with a reading that was merely careless.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 69, 127 S.Ct. 2201, 167 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2007). Here, even assuming Experian's procedures violated the FCRA, Garrett cannot show that Experian's view of the law's requirements was unreasonable. Like Safeco, “[t]his is not a case in which the business subject to the Act had the benefit of guidance from the courts of appeals or the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) that might have warned it away from the view it took.” 551 U.S. at 70, 127 S.Ct. 2201. In short, Garrett points to no evidence of willfulness.

Thus—and again assuming for argument's sake that Experian's policies were unreasonable—Garrett could recover only if he suffered actual damages. He argues he suffered damages in two distinct ways: from emotional distress and from three specific credit events. But he offers no evidence showing Experian caused any actual damages.

The parties agree that, as a general matter, emotional-distress damages are cognizable.⁵ The problem for Garrett is that he identifies no evidence showing any emotional distress from the credit mix-up itself. The only evidence he points to is deposition testimony that the mix-up “put [him] in a bind on [his] bills and stuff,” meaning he had to borrow, and that he consequently felt “[s]ad, disappointed really because being a man, [his] job is to take care of [his] family and [he] felt like [he] couldn't take care of [his] family because all of those things were holding [him] back.” ECF No. 65-1 at 123. But even accepting that Garrett felt sad and disappointed, the sadness and disappointment—in Garrett's own telling—were from the credit denials. This was thus not like Benjamin v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., in which the plaintiff testified that “seeing the inaccurate reporting ․ caused irritation, frustration, and loss of sleep.” 561 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1343 (N.D. Ga. 2021). Garrett offers no evidence that the erroneous Experian report itself—or Garrett's knowledge of the mix-up—caused any emotional distress.⁶ Therefore Garrett can succeed only if he shows actual damages flowing from credit decisions that relied on the erroneous file. See Marchisio v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 919 F.3d 1288, 1304 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]here must be a causal connection between the violation and the emotional harm.”).

Garrett points to three specific credit events: (1) the denial of a CapitalOne credit card, ECF No. 70-5, (2) the denial of a Home Depot credit card, ECF No. 74-3, and (3) unfavorable terms on his truck loan, ECF No. 70-8. But he has not provided evidence connecting any of these to Experian's actions.

Starting with the credit cards, the denial letters say the denials were based on insufficient income; they do not connect the denials to debt levels or delinquent accounts. ECF No. 70-5 at 2 (CapitalOne); ECF No. 74-3 at 2 (Home Depot). Garrett suggests the denials were centered on his debt-to-income ratio, ECF No. 75 at 24, meaning debt was a factor. But he offers only speculation for this. He offers no evidence suggesting the decisions were based on anything other than what the lenders said they were based on: income. Moreover, the CapitalOne letter says its decision was “[b]ased on your credit report from one or more of the agencies on the back of the letter,” which were Experian, Equifax, TransUnion, and LexisNexis. ECF No. 70-5; see also id. at 2 (noting reliance on Equifax credit score). So it would be speculative to conclude Experian's report made the difference. And the Home Depot letter did not even mention Experian as a source. It said the denial was “because the income you provided does not meet required thresholds.” ECF No. 74-3 (emphasis added).

That leaves Garrett's truck loan. Garrett claims he could have secured a lower interest rate but for Experian's erroneous credit report. ECF No. 75 at 23-24. But the lender relied on an Equifax credit report, not Experian's. ECF No. 70-8 at 24; ECF No. 70-7. The lender did review an Experian report after determining the interest rate, but its corporate representative testified the Experian report did not affect the rate. ECF No. 70-8 at 40. Garrett offers no contrary evidence. He offers nothing (save speculation) suggesting that absent Experian's error, he would have secured better loan terms.⁷

III.

Experian is entitled to summary judgment. Because the other two defendants have settled, I would ordinarily direct entry of final judgment. However, I have determined Garrett's stipulation dismissing his claims against Equifax was ineffective. That stipulation did not include a signature from TransUnion. ECF No. 36. To be effective, the stipulation required a signature of all parties that had appeared—even parties (like TransUnion) that had been removed from the case by a previous stipulation. See City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hosp. Holdings, L.P., 82 F.4th 1031, 1038 (11th Cir. 2023) (explaining that because “all means all․ a Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) stipulation also requires the signature of a party that appeared but has already been removed from an action”); id. at 1035 n.1 (noting that signature required even from defendant that “had already been dismissed from the lawsuit through a stipulation of voluntary dismissal”). Therefore, despite my order acknowledging dismissal, ECF No. 37, the claims against Equifax technically remain pending. See id., 82 F.4th at 1034 (noting that stipulations without signatures by all parties “were ineffective, and the claims they purported to dismiss remain pending before the district court”). With some claims still pending, final judgment cannot yet issue.

Nonetheless, because it is obvious the parties intended to allow dismissal of all claims against Equifax, and because such a dismissal would not seem to prejudice any party, I will treat the earlier stipulation (ECF No. 36) as a motion pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). Any party objecting to entry of an order granting the construed motion must file a notice setting out its objection within seven days. Absent objection, the court will grant the motion, after which all claims will be resolved and judgment can issue. The parties may also file an amended stipulation of dismissal as to Garrett's claims against Equifax, complete with signatures of all parties.

Conclusion

Experian's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 71) is GRANTED. Garrett's motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 67) is DENIED as moot. Experian's Daubert motion (ECF No. 79) is DENIED as moot.⁸ Any party objecting to dismissal of claims against Equifax must file a notice setting out its objection within seven days.

SO ORDERED on May 27, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Parties must cite “particular parts of materials in the record” to support factual assertions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), and “[t]he court need consider only the cited materials.” Id. R. 56(c)(3). In my discretion, I decline to consider materials not pinpoint cited in the parties’ papers or addressed in this order. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(F).

2.   Incidentally, it was the same expert (Evan Hendricks) Garrett uses here. ECF No. 65-5 at 2.

3.   He also suggests (vaguely) that Experian should have insisted on perfect SSN matching before assigning records. ECF No. 65-5 at 5 (“Experian continues to disregard the importance of using the SSN as a tool to ensure accuracy. Instead, Experian unreasonably assumes a one-digit difference in an SSN can readily be disregarded—even when there are discrepancies in first name, middle name and address.”). But as noted above, Garrett disclaimed any argument that Experian should never assign credit records to credit files with a single differing SSN digit.

4.   One final point: Garrett's claim is that Experian should have learned of the mix-up on its own. There is no dispute that once Garrett notified Experian of the issue, Experian corrected it. This is quite different, then, from a case in which a consumer reporting agency refused to correct an issue it knew of. Once notified of a potential error, a consumer reporting agency “is in a very different position than one who has no such notice.” Losch I, 995 F.3d 937 (quoting Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 286-87 (7th Cir. 1994)). “That's because ‘once a claimed inaccuracy is pinpointed, a consumer reporting agency conducting further investigation incurs only the cost of reinvestigating that one piece of disputed information.’ ” Id. (quoting Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also Hammoud v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 52 F.4th 669, 676 (6th Cir. 2022) (“Given the sheer amount of data maintained by these companies, we know that consumers are ‘in a better position ․ to detect errors’ in their credit reports and inquire about a fix.” (quoting Henson, 29 F.3d at 285)).

5.   In its motion, Experian argued a plaintiff could not rely on his own “self-serving” testimony to support emotional damages. ECF No. 71 at 23. It wisely withdrew this argument at the hearing. Cf. United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 858-59 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A non-conclusory affidavit which complies with Rule 56 can create a genuine dispute concerning an issue of material fact, even if it is self-serving and/or uncorroborated.”).

6.   The parties debate whether Garrett even knew of the error or had ever seen his Experian report. At his deposition, he denied ever having seen his Experian credit report, ECF No. 65-1 at 48, 80, 88, but through a purported “errata” sheet, his counsel tried to substantively change that unhelpful testimony. ECF No. 74-1. The briefs argue about whether this was a proper use of the errata process or a sham affidavit. But I need not address the issue, because with or without the errata-sheet changes, the outcome is the same.

7.   Garrett also suggests that any publication to a third party is sufficient to constitute actual damages. ECF No. 75 at 23. But he confuses principles of Article III standing with necessary elements of an FCRA claim. In TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, the Supreme Court explained that publishing defamatory information to third parties constitutes a “concrete injury” necessary for Article III standing. See 594 U.S. 413, 433, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 210 L.Ed.2d 568 (2021). But that does not change the need for actual damages to sustain an FCRA negligence claim. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a).

8.   At the hearing, Experian's counsel confirmed the Daubert motion was directed at trial and not summary judgment.

Allen Winsor, United States District Judge