PETER KLEIDMAN v. ALLISON DANNER (2024)

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Pro se plaintiff Peter Kleidman filed this lawsuit against Chief Justice Guerrero of the California Supreme Court; Justices Danner, Wilson, and Bromberg of the California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District; and Justices Currey and Collins of the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District (the “state defendants”) and against the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (the “federal defendant”). Mr. Kleidman seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of his constitutional rights. For the following reasons, the Court grants the state and federal defendants' motions to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Kleidman asserts several causes of action against the state and federal defendants arising from his prior litigation in both state and federal court.

Counts 1 and 2 are primarily asserted against the federal defendant. In Count 1, Mr. Kleidman alleges a due process violation against the Ninth Circuit based on the Ninth Circuit's affirmance of the federal district court's decision upholding the Second Appellate District's adverse ruling in Kleidman v. RFF Family Partnership, 2018 WL 3359142 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2018) (“RFF”). See Kleidman v. Willhite, 2020 WL 5824163 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 29, 2020) (“Willhite I”) (upholding the state appellate court's ruling); aff'd as modified sub nom. Kleidman v. California Ct. of Appeal for Second App. Dist., 2022 WL 1153932 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2022) (“Willhite II”) (affirming the federal district court's decision). In RFF, California's Second Appellate District upheld the trial court's judgment, including an award of attorney's fees, against Mr. Kleidman in a breach-of-contract case that he brought against a loan provider.

In Count 2, Mr. Kleidman alleges that the Ninth Circuit misconstrued the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in dismissing his appeal in Willhite II and requests that this Court grant injunctive relief enjoining the Ninth Circuit from applying its interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.¹

Mr. Kleidman asserts Counts 3 through 5 against the state defendants. In Count 3, Mr. Kleidman asks this Court to vacate the Second Appellate District's ruling in RFF so that he can re-litigate his claims on appeal. Counts 4 and 5 involve the Sixth Appellate District's ruling in Kleidman v. Feeva Technology, 2023 WL 3331301 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (“Feeva”). In Feeva, the Sixth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Kleidman's complaint alleging fraud against the defendant and upheld a costs award against Mr. Kleidman. Alleging violations of due process and other rights afforded by the California constitution, Mr. Kleidman requests that this Court reverse the Sixth Appellate District's ruling in Feeva and remand the case for further proceedings.

Counts 6 and 7 are asserted against both the state and federal defendants. In Count 6, Mr. Kleidman contends that the Rule of Interpanel Accord (“RIA”)—in particular, the law-of-the-circuit doctrine that requires Ninth Circuit panels to follow the precedents set by prior panels while permitting panels to depart from decisions issued in other circuits—is unconstitutional and requests that this Court issue a declaration that the RIA violates constitutional due process and equal protection. In Count 7, Mr. Kleidman claims that a statutory amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that serves to immunize state jurists from liability for official acts violates the Petition Clause of the Constitution.

The gravamen of Mr. Kleidman's complaint is that the state and federal defendants engaged in acts of judicial misfeasance when deciding various cases brought by Mr. Kleidman such as by misinterpreting the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and violating his constitutional right to due process.

The state and federal defendants move to dismiss this case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review either the Ninth Circuit's decisions and jurisprudence or final state court judgments. The defendants separately argue, with respect to Counts 6 and 7, that Mr. Kleidman fails to plead a legally cognizable injury conferring him with Article III standing to pursue those claims. For the following reasons, the Court agrees and grants the state and federal defendants' motions.²

LEGAL STANDARDS

A complaint that fails to establish a federal district court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). An attack on jurisdiction “can either be facial, confining the inquiry to allegations in the complaint, or factual, permitting the court to look beyond the complaint.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003). A facial attack assumes the truth of the plaintiff's allegations but asserts they are “insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Thus, such an attack may be adjudicated by the district court as it would resolve a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). By contrast, a factual Rule 12(b)(1) motion can attack “the substance of a complaint's jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency, and in doing so rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly brought before the court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS

I. This Court Cannot Review the Ninth Circuit's Decision (Counts 1–2).

Federal district courts lack the authority to review Ninth Circuit jurisprudence. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (noting that “[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court” but not providing for review by district courts); Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Ct. for Dist. of Nev., 828 F.2d 1385, 1393 n.19 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Needless to say, a district court has no such authority to ‘review’ any ruling of a court of appeals.”). As the federal defendant argues, “[i]n essence, Plaintiff wants this Court to sit as the Supreme Court, with the power to declare a Ninth Circuit decision void, to dictate the controlling law that the Ninth Circuit must follow, and to ‘remand’ to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings.” Dkt. No. 48, at 9–10.

Given the hierarchy of Article III courts, this Court cannot vacate the Ninth Circuit's decision in Willhite II to affirm the district court's prior dismissal of Mr. Kleidman's complaint in Willhite I, whether or not there is merit to Mr. Kleidman's allegations in Counts 1 and 2. See Ins. Grp. Comm. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 329 U.S. 607, 612 (1947) (“When matters are decided by an appellate court, its rulings, unless reversed by it or a [higher] court, bind the lower court.”). Mr. Kleidman's petition for a panel rehearing and rehearing en banc were both denied, as was his petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Dkt. No. 48, at 13. Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Ninth Circuit's judgment, the Court is barred from granting Mr. Kleidman the injunctive and declaratory relief he seeks in Counts 1 and 2. This Court must therefore dismiss Counts 1 and 2.

II. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars Counts 3–5.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “precludes a United States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under a congressional grant of authority” if the action seeks to “overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 291–92. “A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Kleidman v. RFF Family Partnership, LP, 2023 WL 4495327, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2023) (citing Olson Farms, Inc. v. Barbosa, 134 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (analyzing a Rooker-Feldman challenge under Rule 12(b)(1)).

It is for this reason that the Ninth Circuit, exercising de novo review over the district court's decision (in Willhite I) to uphold the adverse state court ruling in RFF, affirmed the district court's refusal to grant review of the state appellate court's judgment. As explained above, this Court lacks the authority to overturn any decision issued by the Ninth Circuit, so it cannot reverse the judgment rendered against Mr. Kleidman in Willhite I and affirmed in Willihite II—which the Court would have to do in order to remand the state appellate justices' dismissal of his appeal in RFF for further review, as Mr. Kleidman requests in Counts 1–3. This Court is also bound to follow the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as the Ninth Circuit did, and that doctrine bars the Court from reviewing either the RFF decision, which Count 3 seeks, or the state appellate court's adverse ruling in Feeva, which Counts 4–5 seek.

On all three counts, Mr. Kleidman asks this Court to set aside the final decision of a state court, a quintessential act of “appellate” jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court explained in Rooker and Feldman, this Court's “original” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not encompass such claims. Nor does it matter that Mr. Kleidman complains about the manner in which those decisions were reached rather than their substantive merit. Appellate courts (unlike this one) regularly review the procedures employed in reaching the decision on appeal and reverse or vacate on the basis of such procedural errors. See, e.g., In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Given the questionable features of the fee provision here, the court was required to examine the negotiation process with even greater scrutiny than is ordinarily demanded, and approval of the settlement had to be supported by a clear explanation of why the disproportionate fee is justified and does not betray the class's interests. Because the district court did not provide such explanation, we must vacate the Approval Order and remand for further consideration.”).

To be certain, the Supreme Court held in Exxon Mobil Corp. that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply in cases involving parallel litigation—that is, a district court may exercise jurisdiction over claims being simultaneously litigated in both state and federal court, and may do so even after the state court decision has become final. See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292 (holding that “neither Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court”).³ But Mr. Kleidman is not seeking to pursue in this lawsuit any of the claims that were asserted in RFF or Feeva, let alone any claims that were simultaneously pending in both those state lawsuits and this federal lawsuit. Instead, he asks this Court to review and set aside the decisions reached in RFF and Feeva. Absent an applicable congressional grant of appellate jurisdiction, cf., e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (authorizing federal habeas review of state prisoners' petitions), this Court lacks the jurisdiction to provide such relief.

III. Mr. Kleidman Lacks Standing to Assert Counts 6–7.

To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must plead “(1) ․ an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339–40 (2016); see also Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Because standing and mootness both pertain to a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, they are properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).”).

Counts 6 and 7 ask this Court to review the constitutionality of the Ninth Circuit's Rule of Interpanel Accord and Congress's decision to limit the availability of injunctive relief for claims against state judicial officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Kleidman fails to establish a legally cognizable injury conferring him with Article III standing to assert either claim.

As a prior district court considering a challenge by Mr. Kleidman to another Ninth Circuit rule noted, “The mere existence of [the Ninth Circuit] rule, which may or may not be applied to Plaintiff in the future, is not sufficient to create a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III.” Kleidman v. Willhite, 2020 WL 5823278, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2020) (report and recommendation adopted in Willhite I) (citing Stoianoff v. Montana, 695 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983)). Here, any harm Mr. Kleidman might suffer as a result of the Rule of Interpanel Accord is entirely speculative because Mr. Kleidman will be harmed by the Rule only if a series of hypothetical future events occur. First, Mr. Kleidman must file an appeal with the Ninth Circuit. Second, the panel assigned to consider his appeal must rely upon prior Ninth Circuit panel precedent rather than, e.g., Supreme Court precedent.⁴ Third, Mr. Kleidman must be unsuccessful in seeking en banc or Supreme Court review of the panel's decision. Fourth, and finally, the panel's decision must be incorrect. This connection between Mr. Kleidman's purported future injury and the Rule of Interpanel Accord is far too attenuated and speculative to establish his Article III standing to challenge that Rule.

Likewise, Mr. Kleidman cannot establish Article III standing to challenge Section 1983's restrictions on the availability of injunctive relief targeting state judicial officials. See Kleidman v. Collins, 2022 WL 17224724, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2024) (holding that Mr. Kleidman did not have standing to bring a claim like Count 7 in a different lawsuit because “Defendants never applied the Section 1983 limitation to him in the underlying state court action”). By his own admission, those restrictions could harm Mr. Kleidman only if this Court were to find merit in his claims while declining to exercise its discretionary authority to award declaratory relief. That theory fails in the first instance because his claims against the state judicial officers are barred by Rooker-Feldman. And even were it otherwise, whether the Court would deny declaratory relief after finding merit in any claims against the judicial officers is entirely speculative.⁵

Because he has not alleged a concrete injury-in-fact arising from the RIA or Section 1983's limits on enjoining state judicial officers, Mr. Kleidman lacks standing to bring Counts 6–7. See, e.g., Schmier v. United States Ct. of Appeals for the Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the “speculative loss of some alleged right in citing and relying on an unpublished decision someday” did not establish a legally cognizable injury).⁶

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court grants the state and federal defendants' motions to dismiss Mr. Kleidman's complaint. The Court orders the Clerk to close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’ ” Lance v. Davis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).

2.   Defendants also argue that Mr. Kleidman fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Because the Court dismisses the case under Rule 12(b)(1), it need not address that argument.

3.   As the Supreme Court noted, “[d]isposition of the federal action, once the state-court adjudication is complete, would be governed by preclusion law” instead of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 293.

4.   Mr. Kleidman is free to argue on appeal that the panel assigned to his case should not rely upon prior panel precedent because doing so, in his view, violates the Constitution.

5.   As with his arguments about the Rule of Interpanel Accord, Mr. Kleidman would be free to argue, in any future proceedings presenting such a risk under Section 1983, that the Constitution requires the issuance of declaratory relief.

6.   Defendants also argue that many of the claims in Mr. Kleidman's complaint are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. Because the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Mr. Kleidman's claims for the reasons discussed above, it need not address this argument.

P. Casey Pitts United States District Judge