DYER v. COLOPLAST CORP US LLC (2025)

ORDER

In December 2024, Plaintiff Diana Dyer initiated this civil case against Defendants Coloplast Corp. and Coloplast Manufacturing US, LLC (collectively, “Coloplast”), the medical device designer and manufacturer of the Aris Trans-Obturator Sling System (“Aris sling”). Plaintiff had the Aris sling surgically implanted in December 2020 to treat her stress urinary incontinence and pelvic organ prolapse and then surgically removed in November 2021 due to side effects. Now she sues Coloplast for medical negligence and product liability (see Doc. 1).

Four motions are before the Court: (1) Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 30); (2) non-party Michael Hibner, M.D.’s Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena (Doc. 34); (3) Coloplast's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Produce Documents (Doc. 43); and (4) Coloplast's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena, filed in the District of Arizona and transferred here with the parties’ consent (Coloplast Corporation v. Michael Hibner, M.D., 8:24-mc-26-SPF “MC Docket”, Doc. 1). The Court held a hearing on the motions on September 17, 2025 (see Docs. 47-48). After considering the motions, the responses, the supporting documents (Docs. 30, 33-34, 37, 43, 46; MC Docket, Docs. 1, 5, 8), and the parties’ oral arguments, the Court rules as follows.

I. Coloplast's Subpoena to Dr. Hibner and Document Requests to Plaintiff

Dr. Hibner is a pelvic surgeon who runs the Arizona Center for Chronic Pelvic Pain in Scottsdale. He removed Plaintiff's Aris sling in November 2021. Coloplast served a Rule 45 subpoena, issued by the Middle District of Florida, on Dr. Hibner on May 6, 2025, at his Scottsdale clinic. The subpoena demanded that Dr. Hibner produce documents at the Phoenix office of Coloplast's process server by May 30, 2025. At issue are Coloplast's requests 5, 7-10, and 13.¹

5.  Any communications between you and Diana Dyer's Counsel, or members of their office, concerning patient referrals, surgical mesh implants, or expert retention agreements, regardless of whether those communications relate to Coloplast or your treatment of Diana Dyer.

* * *

7.  All documents demonstrating your relationship with Diana Dyer's Counsel, including but not limited to offers, transactions, contracts, and agreements, whether or not those documents relate to Coloplast or your treatment of Diana Dyer.

8.  Communications and documents reflecting the total number of patients you or Your Practice are currently treating under a Letter of Protection (“LOP”).

9.  Communications and documents reflecting the total amount of bills that are currently pending under a LOP for all patients.

10. Letters of protection with Diana Dyer or Diana Dyer's Counsel for any patient, case, or claim.

* * *

13. Communications and documents reflecting your financial relationship with Diana Dyer's Counsel, including but not limited to:

a. Documents, including but not limited to agreements, contracts, and offers, reflecting referrals from Diana Dyer's Counsel to you or Your Practice, including the number of referrals, frequency, and financial benefits.

b. Documents reflecting any patients Diana Dyer's Counsel referred to you.

c. Documents reflecting any cases or claims you referred to Diana Dyer's Counsel.

d. Communications and documents reflecting any benefits, payments, or remuneration to you regarding any patient, case, or claim involving Diana Dyer's Counsel.

e. Documents reflecting any gifts between Diana Dyer's Counsel and you, Your Practice, or your staff.

(Doc. 30, Ex. B at 7-8).

Relatedly, in Coloplast's first request for production, it sought from Plaintiff:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 24: Communications and documents reflecting whether Your Counsel made a referral to, or received any referral from, Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 27: Billing communications or documents reflecting compensation or payments to Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION 28: Communications and documents reflecting the financial relationship between Your Counsel and Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner, including but not limited to:

a. Documents, including but not limited to agreements, contracts, and offers, reflecting referrals from Your Counsel to Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner, including the number of referrals, frequency, and financial benefits.

b. Letters of protection for any patient Your Counsel referred to Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

c. Documents reflecting any patients Your Counsel referred to Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

d. Documents reflecting any cases or claims referred to Your Counsel by Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

e. Communications and documents reflecting any benefits, payments, or remuneration to Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner regarding any patient, case, or claim involving Your Counsel.

f. Documents reflecting any gifts between Your Counsel and Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 31: Communications and documents reflecting whether You were referred to Dr. Lennox Hoyte or Dr. Michael Hibner.

(Doc. 43-4).²

Once Plaintiff initiated this current round of discovery motions, Coloplast agreed to narrow the scope of its requests (both in the subpoena and in the document requests to Plaintiff) to emails, invoices, payments, and contracts between Dr. Hibner (and his practice) and Plaintiff's counsel concerning patients or cases (Doc. 37, Ex. 4; MC Docket, Doc. 8, Ex. 4). Coloplast clarified that it does not seek: documents Dr. Hibner considers to be his expert opinions, communications between Dr. Hibner and patients, or medical records of patients other than Plaintiff (Id.). Coloplast also agreed to limit its document requests to the period from January 1, 2020, through the present, because Dr. Hibner moved from a hospital to private practice in January 2020 and did not serve as both an expert and a treating physician for the same patient until then (see Doc. 37 at 9, n.9 and Ex. 5; MC Docket, Doc. 8, Ex. 5).³

II. Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoenas and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 30) and Dr. Hibner's Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 34)

Plaintiff and Dr. Hibner separately move to quash the subpoena in this Court (Docs. 30, 34). Plaintiff argues the document requests are unduly burdensome to Dr. Hibner, seek protected health information (“PHI”), and seek documents protected by the physician-patient and the attorney-client privilege (Doc. 30). Dr. Hibner endorses these arguments and adds that he was improperly served with the subpoena (Doc. 34). These motions are denied without prejudice.

A threshold issue is whether Plaintiff and Dr. Hibner filed their motions in the wrong court. In opposing the motions to quash (Docs. 33, 37), Coloplast urges the undersigned to deny them outright under Rule 45(d)(3) because Plaintiff and Dr. Hibner should have moved to quash in the District of Arizona, where Dr. Hibner's compliance is required.

Rule 45(d)(3) reads:

Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena.

(A) When Required. On timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a subpoena that:

(i)  Fails to allow a reasonable time to comply;

(ii)  Requires a person to comply beyond the geographical limits specified in Rule 45(c);

(iii) Requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies; or

(iv)  Subject a person to undue burden.

(B) When Permitted. To protect a person subject to or affected by a subpoena, the court for the district where compliance is required may, on motion, quash or modify the subpoena if it requires:

(i)  Disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information; or

(ii) Disclosing an unretained expert's opinion or information that does not describe specific occurrences in dispute and results from the expert's study that was not requested by a party.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)-(B). Under the 2013 amendments to Rule 45, “the district court with jurisdiction to enforce and to quash subpoenas is the ‘court for the district where compliance is required,’ which may or may not be the court that issued the subpoena.” Hunter v. ADP Screening, No. 6:15-cv-845-Orl-31TBS, 2016 WL 7732538, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2016).

Here, Coloplast served Dr. Hibner with the subpoena on May 6, 2025; under Rule 45(d)(2)(B), the deadline for him to object to the subpoena was May 20, 2025. Dr. Hibner did not object to the subpoena or produce any documents. Instead, on May 20, 2025, Plaintiff filed her motion to quash in this Court (Doc. 30). Dr. Hibner followed with his own motion to quash on June 12, 2025 (Doc. 34), also filed here.⁴ But the subpoena seeks compliance in the District of Arizona—the Middle District of Florida clearly is not “the district where compliance is required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3); see Byron v. Avant Healthcare Prof., LLC, No. 6:23-cv-1645-JSS-LHP, 2024 WL 4818494, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2024) (denying without prejudice motion to quash subpoena filed in Middle District of Florida because subpoena requires compliance in California); Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 3:14-cv-1455-J-39JBT, 2015 WL 12862918, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2015) (denying without prejudice motion to quash subpoena because Middle District of Florida was not the district where compliance was required).

Dr. Hibner's motion to quash was also filed too late. Rule 45 permits a court to quash a subpoena “[o]n timely motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A). Courts generally interpret “timely” to mean within the time set in the subpoena for compliance. See F.D.I.C. v. Amos, No. 3:12-cv-548/MCR/EMT, 2017 WL 11682626, at *2 (N.D. Fla. May 16, 2017); cf. Andrews v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 3:06-cv-704-J-32HTS, 2009 WL 10670852, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 7, 2009) (stating that “motion for protective order is generally untimely if it is made after the date the discovery material was to be produced.”). Dr. Hibner not only filed his motion to quash in the wrong court, but he filed it 13 days after his compliance was required. Because Dr. Hibner's arguments are untimely, it follows that Plaintiff lacks standing to argue that the subpoena unduly burdens non-party Dr. Hibner. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. S.E. Floating Docks, Inc., 231 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (“Defendants do not have standing to quash the subpoenas on the grounds of oppression and undue burden placed upon the third parties where the non-parties have not objected on those grounds.”). For these reasons, Plaintiff's and Dr. Hibner's motions to quash the subpoena (Docs. 30, 34) are denied without prejudice.

III. Coloplast's Motion to Compel Dr. Hibner's Compliance with Subpoena (MC Docket, Doc. 1) and Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Produce Documents (Doc. 43)

Next are Coloplast's motions to compel directed to Plaintiff and Dr. Hibner. Rule 45 provides the remedy for an issuing party to seek an order enforcing a subpoena: “At any time, on notice to the commanded person, the serving party may move the court for the district where compliance is required for an order compelling production or inspection.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2)(B)(i). Additionally, Rule 37 permits a party to move for an order compelling discovery from another party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The scope of discovery is found in Rule 26, which provides that a party may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a) (“A party may serve on any other party a request within the scope of Rule 26(b)[,]” including document requests). The factors for the court to consider in assessing relevance and proportionality include “the importance of the issues at stake in the action,” “the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

On June 16, 2025, in the District of Arizona, Coloplast moved to compel Dr. Hibner to comply with the subpoena (MC Docket, Doc. 1). Once that motion was fully briefed, the District of Arizona transferred the case to this Court at Coloplast's request and with Dr. Hibner's consent. See Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) (“When the court where compliance is required did not issue the subpoena, it may transfer a motion under this rule to the issuing court if the person subject to the subpoena consents or if the court finds exceptional circumstances.”). Dr. Hibner responded to the motion to compel (MC Docket, Doc. 5), asserting essentially the same arguments as his motion to quash.

At the outset, Dr. Hibner did not timely object or respond to the subpoena. Also, the Court rejects Dr. Hibner's contention that Coloplast did not properly serve him with the subpoena by leaving a copy with Tiffany Rezende, a physical therapist at Dr. Hibner's practice who, he says, is not authorized to accept service for him. Dr. Hibner submits Ms. Rezende's declaration that she told this to the process server (Doc. 5-8; Doc. 34 at 5-6 and Ex. 2). But this contradicts the process server's sworn statement that Ms. Rezende told him the opposite (see Doc. 34-7). Also, Coloplast served Dr. Hibner at the address Plaintiff listed for him in her Rule 26 Disclosures.

Putting that aside, the weight of authority suggests that Rule 45 does not require personal service but rather a manner of service reasonably designed to ensure actual receipt of the subpoena. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Noland, No. cv-20-00047-PHX-DWL, 2021 WL 2187021, at *3, n.2 (D. Ariz. May 28, 2021); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. SCS Supply Chain LLC, 330 F.R.D. 613, 615 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (substantial recent authority from federal courts in Florida support that Rule 45 does not require personal service ․ [but instead] requires service reasonably calculated to ensure receipt of the subpoena by the witness.”); In re MTS Bank, No. 17-21545-MC, 2018 WL 1718685, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2018) (surveying case law and holding that subpoena was properly served on named person's attorney because facts show that named person received subpoena). Here, Dr. Hibner received the subpoena from Ms. Rezende (see MC Docket, Doc. 5 at 2, “Dr. Hibner has produced documents that he believed were responsive and not protected from disclosure.”). Dr. Hibner was properly served.

Next, the undue burden argument resurfaces, this time advanced by Dr. Hibner, who has standing to raise it in this context. He states: “To require a manual search through nearly 2000 patient files to determine whether there are responsive documents reflecting ‘communications’ between Ms. Dyer's counsel or any other attorney related to, for example, medical records requests that may have been made for some patients’ records, would impose an undue burden on Dr. Hibner and his practice, thus affecting his patients.” (Id. at 13). Coloplast narrowed its requests, however, to emails, invoices, payments, and contracts between Dr. Hibner (and his practice) and Plaintiff's counsel regarding patients or cases. It suggested search parameters (MC Docket, Doc. 8, Ex. 4). In other words, Coloplast does not seek patients’ medical records, a fact that pulls the rug out from under Dr. Hibner's claim that responding to the subpoena requires manually searching every patient file. Coloplast also narrowed the date range to begin in January 2020, when it alleges Dr. Hibner and Plaintiff's counsel's referral arrangement began (Id.). Finally, in a separate pelvic mesh litigation in the Western District of Missouri brought by another of Dr. Hibner's patients, Dr. Hibner testified that he utilizes a medical billing company to generate his legal invoices (Id., Ex. 5). It is likely that Dr. Hibner can obtain the information Coloplast requests from his medical biller without manually searching patient files. The undue burden argument lacks merit.

Dr. Hibner contends that Coloplast seeks PHI that HIPAA and the patient-physician privilege prohibit him from disclosing. This argument fails. First, Coloplast clarified that it does not seek medical records other than those of Plaintiff, who has placed her medical condition at issue and therefore waived the physician-patient privilege; it instead seeks communications between Dr. Hibner and Plaintiff's counsel. Second, Coloplast has safeguards in place to ward against the disclosure of PHI and has confirmed that it does not seek any PHI. The subpoena states: “To the extent any responsive documents may include the name, date of birth, social security number, contact information, or other Protected Health Information of people other than Diana Dyer, that information may be redacted.” (MC Docket, Doc. 1-1, Ex. 3 at 6). If patient-identifying information is redacted, patients’ privacy rights are not violated. Leggieri v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 17-81257-CIV-MIDDLEBROOKS, 2018 WL 8300260, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2018); Christie v. Scott, No. 2:10-cv-420-CEH-DNF, 2011 WL 13294586, at *3, n.1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2011) (“In her Motion to Compel, the Plaintiff argues that no HIPAA violation would occur if measures are taken to redact personal information ․ The Court agrees as long as the requested health information documents are redacted to protect the confidentiality of the patients, the documents are discoverable, and their production does not violate HIPAA.”).

Dr. Hibner's and Plaintiff's final argument—that Coloplast “seeks to enlarge the scope of Section 768.0427(3)(e) of the Florida statutes” (MC Docket, Doc. 5 at 14)—was the primary focus of the parties’ briefs and oral arguments. In resisting discovery, Plaintiff relies on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Worley v. Central Florida YMCA, Inc., 228 So.3d 18 (Fla. 2017). Worley held that a lawyer's referral of a client to a treating physician was a confidential communication protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 25. Worley restricted a defendant's discovery into the financial relationship between a non-party law firm and a plaintiff's treating physician. See Dodgen v. Grijalva, 331 So.3d 679, 684 (Fla. 2021) (“[N]othing in Worley suggests its decision was intended to apply to any witnesses other than those ‘attempting to make [their] patient[s] well.’ ”) (internal citations omitted). Worley did not address expert physicians or hybrid witnesses. See Pitts v. Neptune, 396 So.3d 619, 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024) (“Worley addressed only treating physicians, not hired experts.”).

In opposing Coloplast's motion to compel, Plaintiff argues: “Dr. Hibner's primary role in this case is as a fact witness, and he is best characterized, at most, as a ‘hybrid’ witness.” (Doc. 46 at 3). Plaintiff cites Tillman v. Sweat, 398 So.3d 465 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024) and its explanation of when a treating physician morphs into a hybrid witness: “A treating physician is properly characterized as a hybrid witness when such a witness provides testimony on the plaintiff's medical history and course of treatment, while also offering opinions regarding future medical treatment and permanency.” Id. at 470 (citation and quotation omitted). But Tillman does not carry what Plaintiff asks of it.

In Tillman, the plaintiff intended to call her treating physicians “to offer testimony based in part on their review of ‘any and all medical records pertaining to the care and treatment received by [Tillman].’ ” Id. But “[t]estimony based on records not generated or relied upon in the care and treatment by each treating physician goes beyond the function of a fact witness treating physician and into the realm of an expert witness.” Id. Interpreting Worley, Tillman found that hybrid witnesses (like Dr. Hibner in this case) are subject to financial bias discovery. Tillman, 398 So.3d at 470 (“And because they are hybrid witnesses, they are subject to financial-bias discovery.”).

Even so, Worley does not apply here. In March 2023, the Florida legislature enacted Fla. Stat. § 768.0427 as part of broader tort reform.⁵ Section 768.0427(3) states:

LETTERS OF PROTECTION; REQUIRED DISCLOSURES. In a personal injury or wrongful death action, as a condition precedent to asserting any claim for medical expenses for treatment rendered under a letter of protection, the claimant must disclose:

․

(e) Whether the claimant was referred for treatment under a letter of protection and, if so, the identity of the person who made the referral. If the referral is made by the claimant's attorney, disclosure of the referral is permitted, and evidence of such referral is admissible notwithstanding s. 90.502 [Lawyer-client privilege]. Moreover, in such situation, the financial relationship between a law firm and a medical provider, including the number of referrals, frequency, and financial benefit obtained, is relevant to the issue of bias of a testifying medical provider.

Fla. Stat. § 768.0427(3)(e). The statute defines “letter of protection” as “any arrangement by which a health care provider renders treatment in exchange for a promise of payment for the claimant's medical expenses for any judgment or settlement of a personal injury or wrongful death action. The term includes any such arrangement, regardless of whether referred to as a letter of protection.” Fla. Stat. § 768.0427(1)(d).

In enacting § 768.0427, the Florida legislature effectively abrogated Worley “to provide that there is no lawyer-client privilege when a communication is relevant to the lawyer's act of referring the client for treatment by a health care provider.” Fla. Staff Analysis, H.B. 837 (Mar. 6, 2023); cf. Pais v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 21-20824-CIV, 2023 WL 11878295, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 2023) (declining to apply § 768.0427, but only because the case was filed before March 24, 2023), opinion clarified, 2023 WL 11878297 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 2023). Section 768.0427 “overturns the Florida Supreme Court's 4-3 decision in Worley v. Central Florida YMCA.” Fla. Staff Analysis, H.B. 837 (Mar. 6, 2023); see also Fla. Committee Report, 2023 Fla. House Bill No. 837 (Feb. 25, 2023) (“Essentially, this provision overturns ․ Worley.”). The Florida Practice treatise on Evidence concurs:

Recently enacted Subsection 768.0427(3)(e) eliminates the attorney-client privilege for medical referrals by the claimant's attorney when the referral was subject to a letter of protection if the referral is made by the claimant's attorney. Disclosure of the referral is permitted [and] is admissible along with evidence of such referral notwithstanding [section] 90.502. The enactment of this provision effectively overturns Worley.

§ 502.5 Attorney-client privilege – Matters privileged, 1 Fla. Prac., Evidence § 502.5 (2025 ed.).

But Plaintiff proceeds as if § 768.0427 has minimal reach. In her court filings and responses to Coloplast's discovery, she leans on Rodriguez v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 6:19-cv-1862-Orl-40GJK, 2020 WL 5983395, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 19, 2020), a pre-March 24, 2023 case relying on Worley and finding that documents regarding payments from the plaintiff's counsel to the plaintiff's treating physician and documents referencing their referral relationship were protected by the attorney-client privilege (see Doc. 30 at 5-6). Notably, Rodriguez permitted the defendant to seek discovery regarding any letters of protection, as these fell outside Worley. 2020 WL 5983395, at *3.

Like an afterthought, Plaintiff acknowledges § 768.0427(3)(e) but suggests it “provides only a narrow exception to the attorney-client privilege, allowing the production of an LOP between a plaintiff and that plaintiff's treating physician witness for the purpose of impeaching the witness by showing bias.” (Doc. 30 at 7, citing Worley and § 768.0427). She continues: “[N]o LOP exists between Plaintiff or her Counsel and either of the Treating Physicians as it relates to her injuries or treatment as a result of the events and conduct at issue in this matter.” (Id.). This reasoning, however, leads to the absurd result of § 768.0427(3)(e) functioning to narrow Worley’s holding, which was not the legislature's intent, and ignores the statute's broad definition of “letter of protection.” See Fla. Stat. § 768.0427(1)(d) (an arrangement does not have to be “referred to as a letter of protection” to be considered as such).

Plaintiff's and Dr. Hibner's arguments lack merit. Plaintiff and Dr. Hibner are directed to respond to the document requests as narrowed by Coloplast (see MC Docket, Doc. 8, Ex. 4).

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court ORDERS:

(1) Plaintiff's Motion to Quash Subpoena and Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 30) and non-party Michael Hibner, M.D.’s Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoena (Doc. 34) are DENIED without prejudice.

(2) Coloplast's Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Produce Documents (Doc. 43) and Coloplast's Motion to Compel Compliance with Subpoena, filed in the District of Arizona and transferred here with the parties’ consent (Coloplast Corporation v. Michael Hibner, M.D., 8:24-mc-26-SPF, Doc. 1), as further narrowed by Coloplast, are GRANTED to the extent described above and otherwise DENIED.

(3) Plaintiff and Dr. Hibner shall serve Coloplast with the requested discovery as described in this Order within 14 days.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, October 9, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Dr. Hibner represents that it does not have documents responsive to requests 8-10 and that these requests are moot (Doc. 34). Coloplast retorts that Dr. Hibner relies on too narrow a definition of “letter of protection” and that his financial and referral arrangement with Plaintiff's counsel qualifies under Florida law (Doc. 37). The Court discusses this below.

2.   Dr. Hibner has served as a hybrid witness or expert physician for patient-plaintiffs in numerous pelvic mesh cases, and Plaintiff's counsel represented the plaintiffs in most of these. In June 2022, during his expert deposition in another case, Dr. Hibner testified he had earned $650,000 as an expert in pelvic mesh litigation since 2016 (MC Docket, Doc. 8, Ex. 5).

3.   Coloplast has also agreed not to pursue its subpoena and document requests related to Dr. Hoyte.

4.   Coloplast “does not contend that this Court is an improper forum to rule upon the discovery at issue. If Plaintiff had filed her motion [to quash the subpoena] in the District of Arizona, Coloplast would have asked that court to transfer the motion to this Court as permitted by Rule 45(f).” (Doc. 33 at 8, n.5).

5.   The section applies to causes of action filed after its effective date of March 24, 2023. Plaintiff filed her case on December 11, 2024.

SEAN P. FLYNN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE