COHEN v. KEY AUTOMATIVE OF FLORIDA LLC (2024)

ORDER

In this wrongful death action, Hadari Cohen, the personal representative of the Florida-probated estate of Shirley Cohen, sues (Doc. 1-1) Key Safety Systems, Inc., and Key Automotive of Florida, LLC, for designing and manufacturing a defective airbag inflator that allegedly caused Shirley's death in Jerusalem, Israel. After an earlier order (Doc. 49) denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, the defendants move (Doc. 98) to apply Israeli substantive law to this action. Cohen responds (Doc. 100), and the defendants move (Doc. 101) for leave to reply.

Any conflict-of-laws analysis must first address if “a conflict actually exists.” Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1171 (11th Cir. 2009). A “true conflict” (as opposed to a “false conflict”) exists if two states possess conflicting policy interests in the outcome of the litigation. Tune v. Philip Morris Inc., 766 So. 2d 350, 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). This Florida action presents a “false conflict” because applying Florida tort law in Florida to a business involved in a Florida litigation advances Florida's policy, but applying Israel's compensation law to the same dispute advances no Israeli policy. Tune, 766 So. 2d at 352.

The defendants prefer Israeli compensation law, which demands that Shirley's estate pursue payment exclusively from Shirley's private insurer in Israel. In other words, applying Israel's compensation law results in the dismissal of this action. The parties agree that Israel's policy intends to relieve a plaintiff from the burden of proving negligence, to increase the efficiency of Israeli courts, and to prevent an increase in insurance premiums by limiting an insurance company's exposure to litigation. However, Shirley's estate opposes this motion and willingly incurs the burden of proving negligence under Florida law. Israel's courts remain unaffected by the parties’ litigating under Florida law, and no insurance company is a party in this action. Disregarding the earlier order's conclusion that Israel's compensation law inadequately resolves this dispute,¹ the defendants offer nothing to show how Israel's policy suffers by applying Florida law. No “true conflict” of laws exists in this action.

But even if a “true conflict” exists, Florida's choice-of-law rules favor applying Florida law to this action.² Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Commc'ns Grp., Inc., 485 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). In a personal injury action, Florida resolves a conflict of laws by applying the “most significant relationship” test from the Second Restatement of Conflicts of Laws. Bishop v. Fla. Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980). The test considers the place where the injury occurred; the place where the conduct that caused the injury occurred; the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and the place where a relations between the parties “is centered.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971).³

Although the law of the state where the injury occurred typically governs, “it is equally true” that “the state where the injury occurred may have little actual significance” and “[o]ther factors may combine to outweigh the place of injury as a controlling consideration, making the determination of applicable law a less mechanical, and more rational, process.” Bishop, 389 So. 2d at 1001; Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1990). Any preference for applying substantive law of the state in which the injury occurred “all but disappears” if the conflict of law “involves the issue of damages in wrongful death actions.” Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1297 (11th Cir. 1999). As the defendants acknowledge, applying Israel's compensation law “simply requires dismissal of Plaintiff's claims in light of the [c]ompensation [l]aw's exclusive framework.” That is, applying Israel's compensation law appears to ensure that Shirley's estate recovers nothing from the defendants.

The defendants manufactured in Florida ⁴ the airbag inflator that allegedly caused Shirley's death. No Israeli resident is a defendant in this action, and applying Florida law distresses no “international system.” As examined earlier, Israel possesses no “competing interest” in this litigation, and Florida — the jurisdiction in which the action was filed, in which Shirley's estate was probated, and in which the airbag inflator was manufactured — possesses the predominant interest in deterring behavior that might injure Floridians and in fairly compensating Floridians for their injuries. Pycsa Panama, S.A. v. Tensar Earth Techs., Inc., 625 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1226 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (Gold, J.), aff'd, 329 Fed. Appx. 257 (11th Cir. 2009); Judge, 908 F.2d at 1570 (concluding that applying Florida law “significantly further[s]” Florida's wrongful death rule in a case in which a Florida resident, as personal representative of her sister, sued the defendants for an allegedly defective automobile design). Section 6 factors favor applying Florida law.

This action presents an atypical, singular circumstance. Key Automative of Florida, LLC — a company that regularly and continuously conducts business in Florida; that selected, operates under, and advertises a name that includes “of Florida”; that is registered with Florida's Secretary of State; that established an agent for service of process in Florida; that maintains business facilities in Florida; and that procures inclusion of the company's Florida-produced product, specifically the product that allegedly caused the death in Israel of the deceased in this action, in automobiles sold around the world, including in automobiles sold and operated in Florida and subject in all respects to Florida law — moves (Doc. 98) to apply Israeli compensation law, instead of Florida personal injury law, in an action brought in Florida by a Florida resident who was appointed by a Florida court applying Florida law to serve as the Florida personal representative of the deceased. Stated differently, a defendant sued in Florida — in an action based on a death attributable to a product created in Florida by the defendant's Florida business — attempts to renounce Florida law, that is, the normally applicable law of the forum, which is the defendant's chosen and regular place of business, and to apply a foreign nation's markedly different law.

The defendants artfully assemble selected passages from many (quite distinguishable) decisions and from other authority and present an arguably plausible claim, but the defendants can cite no case, and likely none exists, that in the sum of the circumstances attending this action choses the foreign law. Although the analysis of “true” and “false” conflicts of law and the analysis of the factors prescribed by the Restatement arrive at the same result, the defendants’ request is unprecedented and unreasonable, whether judged by the rules of law or with the counsel of common sense.

CONCLUSION

The defendants’ motion (Doc. 98) to apply Israeli substantive law is DENIED, and the defendants’ motion (Doc. 101) to reply is DENIED AS MOOT.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on August 30, 2024.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Citing the earlier order (Doc. 49 at 6–8), the defendants argue that “this Court already acknowledged” that Florida tort law and Israeli compensation law “conflict with regards to both liability and damages.” (Doc. 98 at 8, n. 2) But the order emphasizes that dismissing the action for for um non conveniens in favor of Israel would force Shirley's estate to pursue payment against a private insurer and would preclude Shirley's estate from recovering in tort against the defendants. The earlier order supports the conclusion that a “false conflict” exists in this action because the tort litigation against the defendants in Florida fails to bar Shirley's estate from pursuing payment against an insurer in Israel.

2.   As noted in Tune, 766 So. 2d at 352, “a comprehensive conflict-of-law analysis is only required in cases which involve a true conflict.” This order summarizes the “true” or “false” conflict analysis only to emphasize that the defendants’ motion warrants denial.

3.   Also, Section 6 of the Second Restatement lists the following factors as important choice of law considerations in all areas of law:(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,(b) the relevant policies of the forum,(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,(d) the protection of justified expectations,(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

4.   The defendants manufactured the airbag inflator in Florida, shipped the inflator to Italy for incorporation “into an airbag module,” and eventually imported the inflator into Israel. But the defendants concede that this “contact” with Florida is a neutral factor. (Doc. 98 at 13)

STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE