UNITED STATES v. WALDEN (2025)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's motion to dismiss the Indictment on speedy trial grounds. (Doc. 26.) The motion is due to be denied.

BACKGROUND

Walden is accused of using her position as a bookkeeper for Dr. Phillips High School to steal about $150,000. (Doc. 1.)

In August 2022, Walden was scheduled to meet with her principal for an audit. Two days before the audit, Walden told her principal she had to go to Atlanta because her brother was shot. She never returned and was fired for abandonment. (Doc. 30, p. 1.)

Walden was then indicted on June 28, 2023, but she was not immediately located and arrested. (See Doc. 1.) Rather, law enforcement began conducting surveillance to try to locate her in Florida and Georgia. They issued a BOLO and reviewed license plate readers for her car, spoke with her former employer and her child's former daycare, left her voicemails, and reviewed her social media accounts. They also conducted sporadic physical surveillance in the metro Atlanta area. (Doc. 30, pp. 1–6.)

But by March 2024, Walden had still not been found, so the Court held a fugitive status conference to get an explanation from the Government. (Doc. 6.) Law enforcement then renewed their efforts, locating Walden's car at an address in Georgia and surveilling it over three days in April 2024. But they never saw Walden, nor did they knock on the door. (Doc. 30, p. 4.)

Finally, law enforcement located a new phone number for Walden in November 2024 and called it, and her lawyer quickly returned the call and arranged for her self-surrender after Thanksgiving. (Id. at 6.) She was arrested on December 2, 2024. (Doc. 8.) All told, law enforcement conducted physical surveillance on five days through the seventeen months between her Indictment and her arrest. (See Doc. 30, p. 10.)

Walden's first status conference was held on January 10, 2025, at which the Court granted her motion to continue the case for two months, but flagged concern about the speedy trial issue. (See Docs. 20–22.) The Government then filed a report identifying its investigative efforts. (Doc. 23.)

On February 20, 2025, Walden filed the instant motion to dismiss the Indictment on speedy trial grounds. (Doc. 26.) The Government opposed. (Doc. 30.) The Court held an evidentiary hearing on March 10. (Doc. 29.) The matter is ripe.

STANDARDS

The factors involved in determining whether the speedy trial right is violated are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice. United States v. Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)). If the first three factors weigh “heavily” against the government, the defendant need not show actual prejudice because prejudice is presumed. Id. at 1336. If prejudice is presumed, the indictment must be dismissed. Id. at 1340.

ANALYSIS

I. Length of Delay

The Government argues, with no support, that the delay here was not prejudicial. (Doc. 30.) The Court disagrees. To begin, a delay must be “presumptively prejudicial” for a court to examine the other three factors. Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336. Delays between accusation and trial exceeding one year are presumptively prejudicial. Id. Here, more than seventeen months passed between the Indictment in June 2023 and Walden's arrest and arraignment in December 2024.¹ (Docs. 1, 8.) So the delay is presumptively prejudicial and the Court proceeds to the remaining factors. See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336. The Court finds this factor to weigh heavily against the Government, especially given the intervening fugitive status conference notifying the Government of the speedy trial concerns. (See Doc. 6.)

II. Reason for Delay

The Government argues that law enforcement made diligent efforts to find Walden, which she evaded. (Doc. 30, pp. 8–13.) Walden argues the Government was negligent, pointing to: (1) her former employer knew she was in Atlanta as early as August 2022; (2) the home where law enforcement surveilled her car for several days in April 2024 was a relative's house, and she posted a picture outside the house on her social media; (3) there were large gaps in the surveillance dates; and (4) she was employed by a Georgia school district by February 2023, had a Georgia Medicaid card by April 2023, and had a Georgia driver's license by August 2024. (Doc. 26, pp. 8–10.)

Negligence in bringing a case to trial is a reason that is “more neutral” than a deliberate attempt to harm the defense. United States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986). That said, “it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons,” and the longer the delay, the heavier it weighs against the government. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992). “When the government fails to pursue a defendant diligently, its negligence will weigh less heavily when it acted in good faith.” United States v. Vargas, 97 F.4th 1277, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024); see also United States v. Bibb, 194 F. App'x 619, 622 (11th Cir. 2006) (“In the absence of bad faith, however, the district court properly determined that this factor did not weigh heavily against the government.”). The negligence also weighs less heavily “where the defendant was at liberty and outside the jurisdiction where the indictment was returned.” United States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir. 1986).

Here, the Government's investigative efforts were plainly negligent. Walden was living openly in Georgia. Other than not returning to her job in Florida, there is no evidence that she was actively evading law enforcement. Cf. United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2010) (government's inability to arrest defendant because of evasive tactics valid reason for delay). Law enforcement's less than half a dozen attempts at physical surveillance over nearly a year and a half, their failure to knock on the door where they saw her car for multiple days (especially given the nonviolent nature of the crime), and their lack of effort in tracking down fairly common records that would have shown exactly where she was all show a “feeble” interest in bringing the accused to trial. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657, 112 S.Ct. 2686. So the Government's lack of diligence is “worrisome” at the very least, and this factor certainly weighs against the Government. See United States v. Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018). That said, nothing in the record convinces the Court that the negligence rises to the level of bad faith or purposeful delay that would weigh this factor heavily against the Government, given the (at least) sporadic investigative efforts and the fact that Walden was outside the jurisdiction when the Indictment was returned. See Vargas, 97 F.4th at 1288; Bagga, 782 F.2d at 1544; Oliva, 909 F.3d at 1303.

III. Assertion of Right

Walden argues that her counsel's single request for a continuance does not detract from her prompt assertion of the speedy trial right, three months after learning of the Indictment and one month after the Government filed a status report detailing its negligent investigative efforts. (See Doc. 26, p. 11.) The Court agrees.

The weight attached to a defendant's assertion of the speedy trial right differs with the circumstances of the demand. United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2010). When a defendant does not know about an indictment until arrest and then promptly asserts the right after arrest, this factor weighs heavily against the government. See United States v. Taylor, 306 F. App'x 492, 493 (11th Cir. 2009). While a defendant requesting multiple continuances weighs against them, see United States v. Register, 182 F.3d 820, 828 (11th Cir. 1999), a single continuance does not, see United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1042 (D.N.M. 2018).

Here, though Walden's counsel did request a single continuance, it was warranted based on his recent appearance in the case long after the indictment. (See Docs. 21, 22.) Given the relatively short time between Walden learning of the charges ² and her prompt assertion of the right, the Court finds this factor weighs heavily against the Government. See Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 1042 (weighing factor in favor of defendant where counsel was appointed more than a year and a half after indictment, requested a single continuance, and asserted right two months after learning of charges); Taylor, 306 F. App'x at 493.

IV. Prejudice

Finally, Walden does not argue actual prejudice, asserting only presumed prejudice. (Doc. 26, p. 15.) But because only two of the first three factors weigh heavily against the Government, Walden must show actual prejudice. See Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1336. This she cannot do. A defendant may show actual prejudice by: (1) oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern of the defendant; or (3) an impaired defense. United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1996). But she was not incarcerated during the post-indictment delay, she has asserted no anxiety or concern, and her defense in this paper-heavy financial fraud case is likely well-preserved. (See Doc. 30, p. 15.) So in the absence of presumed prejudice or any assertion of actual prejudice, the extraordinary remedy of dismissing the Indictment on speedy trial grounds is unwarranted, despite the Government's worrisome lack of diligence in apprehending Walden. See Vargas, 97 F.4th at 1291 (“[W]e've upheld the district court's findings of diligence where law enforcement officers made similar efforts—like making a visit or two to the defendant's known address and entering his information into the available crime information databases—even though the delay [was several years long].”); cf. Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1339–40 (finding two-year delay intolerable where “there was much more” the government could have done to arrest the defendant, but there law enforcement actually knew the defendant's address and place of employment and he had not moved).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendant's motion (Doc. 26) is DENIED.

2. This case is set for a status conference on Thursday, April 10, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Orlando, Florida, on April 3, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although the relevant period is between indictment and trial, because trial has not yet begun here, the Court uses the arrest date as a reference point.

2.   The Government does not contest that the earliest Walden knew of the Indictment was in November 2024, when she agreed to self-surrender. (See Doc. 30, p. 14.)

ROY B. DALTON, JR., United States District Judge