SECURITY PEST CONTROL INC v. WELLS FARGO BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION (2020)

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Security Pest Control, Inc.’s (“Security Pest Control”) action against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank National Association (“Wells Fargo”) for conversion of instrument, wrongful deprivation of property, payment on unauthorized signature, negligent hiring/supervision/training, concealment, and conspiracy. (Doc. 36, pp. 6–10, ¶¶ 19–44). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(3)(B), Plaintiff now seeks an order compelling Defendant to produce and/or supplement its responses to various interrogatories, documents, and bank statements. (Doc. 40). Defendant opposes Plaintiff's Motion. (Doc. 42; Doc. 49). For the following reasons, Plaintiff's Motion (Doc. 40) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual allegations relevant to Plaintiff's Motion are summarized as follows.¹ Security Pest Control is a pest control service company. (Doc. 36, p. 2, ¶ 3). Wells Fargo is a banking corporation with a branch in Alexander City, Alabama (“Alexander City Branch”). (Doc. 36, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 4, 7).

In 2016, one of Plaintiff's then-employees, Curtia Moon (“Moon”), began depositing checks, cash, and money orders that rightfully belonged to Plaintiff into her own personal bank accounts. Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10. Moon deposited the items in a variety of ways, including via ATM, through Defendant's mobile deposit application, and in person at Defendant's Alexander City Branch. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). Two of Moon's friends and/or close relatives—Nikisha Marbury and Janice Sweet—worked at Defendant's Alexander City Branch and helped Moon scrupulously deposit the checks and money orders. (Doc. 36, p. 3, ¶ 8). Although the checks and money orders directed Defendant to deposit the items into Plaintiff's bank accounts, Defendant nonetheless deposited the funds into Moon's accounts. Id. at ¶ 9.

In 2019, Plaintiff contacted Defendant's Alexander City Branch and corporate offices to notify Defendant of the improperly deposited items. (Doc. 36, p. 5, ¶ 17). Defendant, however, continued to allow Moon to deposit and use the funds belonging to Plaintiff. Id. Defendant also declined to disclose the ownership or number of the account in which Moon deposited the items. Id. Neither did Defendant reveal the amount of the deposited funds. Id. As a result, Plaintiff lost several hundreds of thousands of dollars. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff demanded the return of the funds, but Defendant refused. (Doc. 36, p. 6, ¶ 23).

Plaintiff initiated the instant action against Defendant. (Doc. 1). In its Second Amendment Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendant for conversion of instrument, wrongful deprivation of property, payment on unauthorized signature, negligent hiring/supervision/training, concealment, and conspiracy. (Doc. 36, pp. 6–10, ¶¶ 19–44).

II. APPLICABLE LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 26 defines the general scope of discovery. Under FRCP 26(b)(1), the scope of discovery includes “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case ․” FRCP 26(b)(1) also provides several factors for a court to consider when defining the general scope of discovery. Id. Those factors include “the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b)(1).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, and the fact is of consequences in determining the action.” In the discovery context, relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978). The question of whether discovery material is relevant is ultimately a fact-specific inquiry. Dees v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Ala., LLC, 524 F. Supp. 2d 1348, 1350 (M.D. Ala. 2007).

A district court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of discovery materials. Id. The general rule is that a court should permit discovery even when the relevance of the requested material is in doubt. Coker v. Duke & Co., Inc., 177 F.R.D. 682, 685 (M.D. Ala. 1998). Based on these principles, the Eleventh Circuit has made clear that a district court has great discretion in defining the scope of discovery under FRCP 26(b)(1) and ruling on a motion to compel under FRCP 37(a)(3)(B). See, e.g., Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996) (“District judges are accorded wide discretion in ruling upon discovery motions, and appellate review is accordingly deferential.”); Williams v. City of Dothan, Ala., 745 F.2d 1406, 1415 (11th Cir. 1984) (noting that “a district court has broad discretion in shaping the scope of discovery under Fed.R.Civ.P.26(b)”).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's Motion seeks an order compelling Defendant to provide various pieces of updated and supplemental discovery material. (Doc. 40). The Motion places the requested material into the following four categories: (1) Plaintiff's Interrogatories Nos. 10 and 11; (2) Plaintiff's First Requests for Production (“RFP”) of Documents Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 28, 29, 31, and 33; (3) all items listed in Plaintiff's Second RFP of Documents Nos. 48–63; and (4) two bank statements. Id. The Court will analyze Plaintiff's Motion based on that organizational framework.

A. Plaintiff's Interrogatory Requests

The first category of disputed discovery material includes Plaintiff's Interrogatories Nos. 10 and 11. Id. Interrogatory No. 10 requests documents describing “with specificity the process a Wells Fargo customer will go through to make an over the counter deposit.” (Doc. 40-1, p. 4, ¶ 10). Defendant argues that over-the-counter deposit information is speculative and irrelevant because most of the items at issue in this case were deposited via ATM or through Defendant's mobile banking application. (Doc. 42, p. 4; Doc. 49, pp. 1–2, ¶ 3). Plaintiff counters that the requested information is relevant because its claims encompass deposits by any means available. (Doc. 43, p. 5).

Defendant's Surreply provides the Affidavit of Carolyn G. Fuller, an employee of Defendant who works as an Operational Risk Consultant in the Regional Services Legal Support Group. (Doc. 49-1). Fuller's Affidavit explains that Moon deposited the majority of items at issue via ATM or through Defendant's mobile banking application. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶ 6). Fuller goes on, however, to state that Moon deposited some of the items at issue in person at “a Wells Fargo Branch.” (Doc. 49–1, p. 3, ¶ 7).

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that the over-the-counter deposits Fuller references occurred at Defendant's Alexander City Branch. (Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). Accordingly, the record suggests that Moon deposited some of the items at issue in person at Defendant's Alexander City Branch and not entirely through automated means. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). The requested information is therefore relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Describing its process for accepting over-the-counter deposits should not be unduly burdensome for Wells Fargo. Thus, Court will grant the Motion with respect to Interrogatory No. 10.

Interrogatory No. 11 requests documents describing “with specificity the process a Wells Fargo customer will go through to make an electronic deposit through [Defendant's] mobile platform.” (Doc. 40–1, p. 4, ¶ 11). As explained above, Fuller's Affidavit suggests that Moon deposited some of the items at issue via Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7). Accordingly, the requested information is relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Again, it is not unduly burdensome for a bank to describe its mobile platform for accepting customer deposits. The Court will therefore grant the Motion as it pertains to Interrogatory No. 11.

B. Plaintiff's First Requests for Production

The second category of disputed discovery material includes several of Plaintiff's First RFP of Documents. (Doc. 40). Specifically, this second category includes Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 28, 29, 31, and 33. Id. The Court will analyze these requests in turn.

i. RFP No. 4

RFP No. 4 seeks documents containing the protocols and procedures for depositing checks into Wells Fargo accounts that were controlling on or after January 1, 2015. (Doc. 40-1, p. 5, ¶ 4). RFP No. 4 specifies that this request includes, but is not limited to, internal procedures relating to “in person deposits, remote deposits, electronic deposits, lockbox deposits and/or mobile deposits.” Id. Again, Defendant argues that the requested information is not relevant because Moon deposited most of the items at issue in this case via ATM or Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 42, pp. 4–5; Doc. 49, pp. 1–2, ¶ 3).

Defendant's argument is unpersuasive because, as set forth above, the record suggests that Moon deposited some of the items at issue in this case in person at Defendant's Alexander City Branch or through Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). Accordingly, the requested information is relevant to Plaintiff's claims.² The Court will therefore grant the Motion as it relates to RFP No. 4.

ii. RFP No. 5

RFP No. 5 seeks “all documents produced in response to any subpoena from the Tallapoosa County District Attorney's Office.” (Doc. 40-1, p. 5, ¶ 5). Defendant “has no objection to producing such documents.” (Doc. 42, p. 5). The Court will therefore grant the Motion with respect to RFP No. 5.

iii. RFP No. 6

RFP No. 6 requests production of “any and all documents [Defendant] produced to any third party in response to a request for information related to Curtia Moon and/or allegations made in the Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 40–1, p. 6, ¶ 6). Defendant interprets RFP No. 6 to require production of documents it provided to the federal government, which it claims are privileged. (Doc. 42, pp. 5–6). Plaintiff, however, clarifies that it seeks documents that Defendant provided to third parties other than the federal government. (Doc. 43, pp. 4–5). Defendant has no objection to producing nonprivileged documents to the extent any exist. (Doc. 42, pp. 5–6). The Court will grant the Motion as it relates to RFP No. 6 to the extent it covers documents other than those produced to the federal government.

iv. RFP No. 7

RFP No. 7 requests “any employee training manuals for the positions available in the Alexander City ․ Branch that were controlling during any time period contemplated by the Amended Complaint.” (Doc. 40–1, p. 6, ¶ 7). Defendant argues that this information is irrelevant because Moon deposited most of the items at issue in this case via ATM or through Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 42, p. 6; Doc. 49, pp. 1–2, ¶ 3).

As explained above, Plaintiff has asserted claims for negligent hiring/supervision/training and conspiracy against Defendant. (Doc. 36). Defendant, in turn, has answered those claims. (Doc. 38). The record also indicates that Moon deposited some items at issue in person at Defendant's Alexander City Branch. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). Accordingly, employment training manuals for the positions available in the Alexander City Branch are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, producing its own employee training manuals is not unduly burdensome for Wells Fargo. The Court will therefore grant the Motion with respect to RFP No. 7.

v. RFP Nos. 8 & 9

RFP Nos. 8 and 9 request certain Wells Fargo employment records. (Doc. 40–1, p. 6, ¶¶ 8–9). RFP No. 8 requests “the employment records for Nikisha Marbury.” Id. at ¶ 8. RFP No. 9 seeks “the employment records of Janet and/or Janice Sweet.” Id. at ¶ 9. Defendant primarily argues that the requested records are irrelevant because Moon deposited most of the items at issue in this case via ATM or through Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 42, p. 6). Defendant further contends that it need not produce the requested records because they contain the confidential and personal information of its employees. Id. at 6–7.

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint alleges that Nikisha Marbury and Janice Sweet worked at Defendant's Alexander City Branch and helped Moon deposit the items at issue in this case. (Doc. 36, p. 3, ¶ 8). Accordingly, the employment records of Marbury and Sweet are relevant to Plaintiff's claims. Moreover, the protective order entered in this case adequately safeguards any confidential or personal information possibly contained in those records. (Doc. 23). Accordingly, the Court will grant the Motion as it pertains to RFP Nos. 8 and 9.

vi. RFP Nos. 28, 29, 31 & 33

RFP Nos. 28, 29, 31, and 33 seek correspondence between Plaintiff, Defendant and/or Moon, along with any correspondence related to the present litigation, exchanged on or after January 1, 2015. (Doc. 40-1, pp. 9–10, ¶¶ 28–29; 31, 33).³ In its Surreply, Defendant states that it has complied with RFP Nos. 28, 29, and 31. (Doc. 49, p. 3, ¶ 5). In its Response to Plaintiff's Motion, Defendant also explains that it “has not located any correspondence responsive to” RFP No. 33. (Doc. 42, p. 7). The Court will therefore deny the Motion as to RFP Nos. 28, 29, 31, and 33.

C. Plaintiff's Second Requests for Production

The third category of disputed discovery material includes all of Plaintiff's Second RFP of Documents. (Doc. 40). Specifically, this second category includes Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 48–63. (Doc. 40-4, pp. 4–6, ¶¶ 48–63). The Court will address these requests in turn.

i. RFP Nos. 48–53

RFP Nos. 48–53 seek documents describing Defendant's employment protocols, procedures, and/or guidelines for: (1) accepting checks and/or money orders; (2) the job duties of a bank teller who receives checks and/or money orders; (3) its mobile banking application; (4) tellers accepting, cashing, and paying deposits; and (5) avoiding or detecting check fraud and/or the Bank Secrecy Act. (Doc. 40-4, pp. 4–5, ¶¶ 48–53).⁴ Defendant contends that this information is irrelevant because Moon deposited most of the items at issue via ATM or through Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 42, pp. 6–7; Doc. 49, pp. 1–2, ¶ 3).

Defendant's argument is unpersuasive because, as discussed above, the record suggests that Moon deposited some items at issue in this case in person at Defendant's Alexander City Branch, as well as via ATM and through Defendant's mobile banking application. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). Accordingly, the requested information is relevant to Plaintiff's claims, and its production is not unduly burdensome to Wells Fargo. The Court will therefore grant the Motion as it relates to RFP Nos. 48–53.

ii. RFP Nos. 54–56

RFP Nos. 54–56 seek various audits of bank accounts related to this litigation that Defendant performed between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2019. (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶¶ 54–56).⁵ Defendant argues that the work-product privilege protects the requested information from production. (Doc. 42, p. 8). Defendant reasons that its legal department created the documents “pursuant to an investigation into the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint.” Id. Plaintiff counters that Defendant waived the work-product privilege by failing to claim the privilege in its original response. (Doc. 43, pp. 10–11). Plaintiff provides no argument, however, that the requested documents are outside the protections of the work-product privilege all together. See id.

Because Plaintiff has provided no opposition to Defendant's assertion that the information is protected by the work-product privilege, the Court assumes for purposes of this Order that the requested information is covered under the work-product privilege and addresses only whether Defendant waived the privilege by failing to assert it. A party does not waive the protections of the Work Product privilege by failing to raise the privilege in its objections to discovery requests. QBE Ins. Corp. v. Griffin, 2009 WL 2913478, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2009) (finding that the failure to timely object to discovery requests based on the work product privilege does not waive that privilege). Thus, the Court will deny the Motion with respect to RFP Nos. 54–56.⁶

iii. RFP Nos. 57 & 58

RFP Nos. 57 and 58 seek documents supporting Defendant's denials of Plaintiff's Requests for Admission Nos. 1 and 2. (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶¶ 57–58).⁷ In its Surreply, Defendant explains that it has provided all documents responsive to RFP Nos. 57 and 58. (Doc. 49, p. 3). The Court will therefore deny the Motion as it pertains to RFP Nos. 57 and 58 as moot.

iv. RFP Nos. 59 & 60

RFP Nos. 59 and 60 seek documents supporting Defendant's denials of Plaintiff's Requests for Admission Nos. 3 and 4. (Doc. 40-4, p. 6, ¶¶ 59–60).⁸ Defendant argues that the requested information is irrelevant because Moon deposited most of the items at issue in this case via ATM or through Defendant's mobile application. (Doc. 42, pp. 8–9). Again, Defendant's argument is unpersuasive because the record indicates that Moon deposited some items at issue in this case in person at Defendant's Alexander City Branch or through Defendant's mobile banking application. (Doc. 49–1, pp. 2–3, ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 36, p. 4, ¶¶ 12–13). Accordingly, the requested information is relevant to Plaintiff's claims, and its production is not unduly burdensome. The Court will therefore grant the Motion with respect to RFP Nos. 59 and 60.

v. RFP Nos. 61 & 62

RFP Nos. 61 and 62 request information about Defendant's expert witnesses. (Doc. 40-4, p. 6, ¶¶ 61–62).⁹ In its Response to the Motion, Defendant explains that it cannot produce the requested information because it has yet to retain an expert witness in this case. (Doc. 42, p. 9). Defendant further notes that it will timely provide the requested information should it retains an expert witness in this case. Id. Plaintiff takes no issue with Defendant's objection so long as Defendant timely supplements Plaintiff's recovery requests should Defendant retain an expert in this case. (Doc. 43, p. 12). Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion as it relates to RFP Nos. 61 and 62.

vi. RFP No. 63

Finally, RFP No. 63 seeks, “[t]o the extent not previously requested, ․ any and all Documents that relate in any way to [Defendant's] defenses in this matter.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 6, ¶ 62). In its Response, Defendant explains that it “has produced all documents responsive to this Request in its possession, custody and control at this time.” (Doc. 42, p. 9). Defendant further emphasizes that it will supplement its production should it obtain or discover additional responsive documents. Id. Accordingly, the Court will deny the Motion as it relates to RFP No. 63.

D. Bank Statements

The fourth and final category of disputed discovery material includes two bank statements. (Doc. 40, p. 1).¹⁰ In its Surreply, Defendant states that it has provided the two missing bank statements. (Doc. 49, p. 3). The Court will therefore deny the Motion with respect to the two bank statements as moot.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for an Order Compelling Discovery Responses (Doc. 40) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Motion is GRANTED with respect to: Plaintiff's Interrogatories Nos. 10 and 11; and Plaintiff's RFP Nos. 4, 5, 6,¹¹ 7, 8, 9, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 59, and 60. Defendant shall produce and/or respond to these discovery requests on or before November 16, 2020.

The Motion is DENIED with respect to RFP Nos. 28, 29, 31, 33, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, 62, and 63; and the two bank statements.

DONE this 2nd day of November, 2020.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The following facts are taken from Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 36). The Court emphasizes that it is merely summarizing Plaintiff's factual allegations to provide context for this Order. The Court is not making any findings of fact.

2.   Alternatively, Defendant argues that it need not produce the requested documents to the extent they predate July 2016 because they would relate to time-barred claims. (Doc. 42, p. 5). Importantly, however, Defendant has not filed a motion to dismiss the claims within Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Thus, the Court declines to decide whether the statute of limitations makes any information at issue in Plaintiff's Motion irrelevant.

3.   RFP No. 28 requests “any correspondence by or between [Defendant] or any employee or agent at the Alexander City Branch ․ and Moon related to the subject matter of this lawsuit from January 1, 2015 through the present.” (Doc. 40-1, p. 9, ¶ 28). RFP No. 29 seeks “any and all correspondence by or between [Defendant] and Curtia Moon.” (Doc. 40-1, p. 9, ¶ 29). RFP No. 31 requests “any and all correspondence by or between [Defendant] and Sandra Booker and/or Security Pest Control.” (Doc. 40-1, p.10, ¶ 31). Finally, RFP No. 33 seeks “all of [Defendant's] correspondence to any third-party (excluding [Defendant's] legal counsel) related to the subject matter of this lawsuit from January 1, 2015 through the present.” (Doc. 40-1, p.10, ¶ 33).

4.   RFP No. 48 requests information about Defendant's “guidelines for accepting checks and/or money orders for deposits which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 4, ¶ 48). RFP No. 49 seeks “copies of documents containing protocols, procedures, and/or [Defendant's] guidelines related to the job duties and functions of the receiving teller which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019.” Id. at ¶ 49. RFP No. 50 requests “documents containing protocols, procedures, and/or guidelines regarding Wells Fargo Mobile which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019.” Id. at ¶ 50. RFP No. 51 seeks “documents containing protocols, procedures, and/or guidelines regarding Wells Fargo Mobile deposit services which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019.” Id. at ¶ 51. RFP No. 52 requests “copies of documents containing employee protocols, procedures, and/or training guidelines for tellers related to accepting, cashing, and paying deposits which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019.” Id. at ¶ 52. Finally, RFP No. 53 seeks “all manuals, guides, materials, or other documents (whether policy, procedural, operational, or otherwise and including cover pages, tables of contents, indexes, and revisions thereto) which were effective between January 1, 2015, and August 1, 2019, concerning or relating in any way to the avoidance or detection of check fraud and/or Bank Secrecy Act policies and procedures.” (Doc. 40-4, pp. 4–5, ¶ 53).

5.   RFP No. 54 requests “all audit reports for Curtia Moon's accounts which were prepared, drafted, and/or finalized between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2019.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶ 54). RFP No. 55 seeks “all audit reports that were prepared between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2019 relating to the branches or operations units where Curtia Moon deposited [Plaintiff's] checks and/or money orders.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶ 55). Finally, RFP 56 seeks “all audit reports that were prepared between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2019 relating to: (a) the handling and/or acceptance of checks and/or Money orders for deposit and/or cashing[;] (b) the avoidance or detection of check fraud and/or Bank Secrecy Act policies and procedures; and (c) the opening and operating of deposit accounts.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶ 56).

6.   Defendant also argues that it need not produce the requested information because Plaintiff “did not define ‘audit report’ in its Second Requests for Production of Documents, so it is unclear what reports Plaintiff is specifically seeking.” (Doc. 42, p. 9). The Court need not address this argument because it concludes that Defendant has not waived the work-product privilege.

7.   RFP No. 57 seeks “all Documents on which [Defendant] base[s its] denial or qualified admission” to Plaintiff's Request for Admission (“RFA”) No. 1. (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶ 57). Plaintiff's RFA No. 1 requests an admission that Defendant “did not call, email, or write [Plaintiff] between January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2019 regarding deposits of checks made payable to [Plaintiff] which were deposited into Wells Fargo accounts owned by Curtia Moon.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 2, ¶ 1). RFP No. 58 seeks “all Documents on which [Defendant] base[s its] denial or qualified admission” to Plaintiff's RFA No. 2. (Doc. 40-4, p. 5, ¶ 58). Plaintiff's RFA No. 2 requests an admission that, “from January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2019, [Plaintiff] was not a Wells Fargo's account holder.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 2, ¶ 2).

8.   RFP No. 59 seeks “all Documents on which [Defendant] base[s its] denial or qualified admission” to Plaintiff's RFA No. 3. (Doc. 40-4, p. 6, ¶ 59). RFA No. 3 requests an admission that, “pursuant to Wells Fargo's Consumer Account Agreement(s) which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019, Wells Fargo was permitted to ‘refuse to accept all or any part of any deposit’ made by Curtia Moon.” (Doc. 40-4, pp. 2–3, ¶ 3). RFP No. 60 seeks “all Documents on which [Defendant] base[s its] denial or qualified admission” to Plaintiff's RFA No. 4. (Doc. 40-4, p. 6, ¶ 60). RFA No. 4 requests an admission that, “pursuant to [Defendant's] Consumer Account Agreement(s) which were effective between January 1, 2015 and August 1, 2019, that [Defendant] had the right to ‘refuse to pay or cash any Item or accept any Item for deposit unless [Defendant] [was] able to verify to its satisfaction that all of the necessary endorsements were present on the Item.’ ” (Doc. 40-4, p. 3, ¶ 4 (fourth alteration in original)).

9.   RFP No. 61 seeks “any and all documents produced by [Defendant] or sent to any expert witnesses related to the subject matter of [the] Amended Complaint, included but not limited to: (a) [c]ommunications related to compensation for the expert's study or testimony; (b) communications that identify facts or data that [Defendant's] attorney provided and that the expert considered in forming the opinions to be expressed; [and] (c) [c]ommunications that identify assumptions that [Defendant's] attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming the opinions to be expressed.” (Doc. 40-4, p. 6, ¶ 61). RFP No. 62 requests “any and all resumes, curriculum vitae and expert reports, opinions, or conclusions of expert witnesses whom [Defendant] ha[s] retained and/or expect[s] to testify on [Defendant's] behalf at the trial of this case.” Id. at ¶62.

10.   The first bank statement relates to the period of October 26, 2018–November 28, 2018. (Doc. 40, p. 1). The second statement relates to the period of December 28, 2018–January 28, 2019. Id.

11.   As set forth above, Defendant is ordered to produce documents in response to RFP No. 6 to the extent it covers documents other than those produced to the federal government. See discussion supra Section III.B.iii.

Stephen M. Doyle, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE