UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CHRISTOPHER DAMON SPENCER (2025)

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's pro se Motion for Compassionate Release (“Motion”). ECF No. 149. For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion is MOOT.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 3, 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty to Count One of a multicount indictment. See ECF Nos. 1 at 1-2 (Indictment); 37 at 1 (Plea Agreement). Count One charged Defendant with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute twenty-eight (28) grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). See ECF No. 37 at 1. Pursuant to the then-effective United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”), Defendant was assigned an offense level of thirty-one (31) and a criminal history category of VI. ECF No. 116 at 43 (PSR). This translated to a Guideline range of one hundred eighty-eight (188) to two hundred thirty-five (235) months. Id.

On August 10, 2011, the court sentenced Defendant to two hundred thirty-five (235) months imprisonment with five (5) years of supervised release. ECF No. 57 (Judgment).¹ Since that time, Defendant has filed several motions challenging his conviction and sentence, including two motions for compassionate release. ECF Nos. 112 (First Motion); 139 (Second Motion). The court denied both motions. ECF Nos. 130 (First Motion); 141 (Second Motion). The Fourth Circuit affirmed both decisions. ECF Nos. 135 (First Motion); 147 (Second Motion).

On August 22, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Motion pro se. ECF No. 149. The United States filed a Response in Opposition on November 4, 2024. ECF No. 151. Defendant filed his Reply on January 6, 2025. ECF No. 157. At that juncture, Defendant's Motion became ripe for judicial determination. While the Motion was pending before the court, President Biden commuted Defendant's sentence to expire on May 16, 2025. See ECF No. 158 at 18, 23.

II. Mootness

There is a threshold issue over whether Defendant's commuted sentence renders his Motion moot, which the court raises sua sponte. Wild Virginia v. Council on Env'l Quality, 56 F.4th 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Because mootness implicates [the court's] Article III jurisdiction, [the court has] an obligation to address it sua sponte.”). Mootness flows from the bedrock principle that Article III of the Constitution limits federal judicial power to “Cases” or “Controversies.” Lancaster v. Sec'y of Navy, 109 F.4th 283, 288-89 (4th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). There is no Case or Controversy “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id. at 289 (quoting Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801, 809 (4th Cir. 2013)). When this occurs, an issue becomes “moot,” and the court is without power to decide it. Id.

While it may appear that the commutation of Defendant's sentence renders his Motion moot, the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that: “For mootness to occur, events transpiring while the matter is pending must make it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief to the plaintiff.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added). In this instance, the court could still grant relief by further reducing Defendant's commuted sentence, e.g., to time-served. Cf. id. (“Since mootness depends on the court's ability to grant effectual relief, it follows that mootness hinges on the type of relief sought.” (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983))). Accordingly, Defendant's Motion presents a “live controversy,” and is thus not moot, to the extent he seeks release before May 16, 2025. This conclusion accords with other courts, which have evaluated whether a reduction would be appropriate given the defendant's new commuted sentence. See United States v. Early, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12061, at *1-2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 23, 2025) (“With the president's commutation, I find that no further reduction would be appropriate[.]); United States v. Tatum, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13799, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 27, 2025) (“To the extent that defendant seeks compassionate release before July 16, 2025 [his commuted release date], he has not established adequate grounds for reconsideration.”).

III. MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE

Generally, a sentencing court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, Congress created an exception, commonly known as “compassionate release,” that allows a court to reduce a defendant's sentence if certain conditions are met.² First, the court must determine: “whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” United States v. Malone, 57 F.4th 167, 173 (4th Cir. 2023). If so, the court may then grant a sentence reduction, but only if “the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, to the extent they are applicable, favor release.” Id. The court must conduct this analysis in two discrete steps. See United States v. Osman, 2024 WL 3633573, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2024) (finding that the district court had “impermissibly collapsed the threshold ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ inquiry into its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors”).

A. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

1. Policy Statement

In evaluating whether Defendant has presented an “extraordinary and compelling” reason, the court's findings must be “consistent with” the Policy Statement contained in United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) Section 1B1.13(b). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Policy Statement list several reasons which qualify as “extraordinary and compelling.” See U.S.S.G. §§ 1B1.13(b) (1)-(6). Defendant must therefore show an “extraordinary and compelling” reason under this framework. See United State v. Hart, 2024 WL 3974230, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2024) (Trenga, J.) (“[A] defendant seeking modification of his or her sentence must identify one or more of the enumerated extraordinary and compelling reasons [in the Policy Statement] as a basis for release.”).

Defendant offers nine (9) reasons which he claims are “extraordinary and compelling.” See ECF No. 149 at 1. These boil down to three arguments. First, that the Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Norman, 935 F.3d 232 (4th Cir. 2019), creates a “gross disparity” between the sentence he received and the sentence he would likely receive today. Id. at 6, 9. Second, that Defendant's health conditions and age constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release. Id. at 4-5. Third and finally, that Defendant's rehabilitation, combined with other factors, is “extraordinary and compelling.” Id. at 5. For reasons explained below, the court finds that Defendant's first argument presents an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release.

2. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) and Norman

Defendant argues that the Fourth Circuit's decision in Norman is a change of law which creates a “gross disparity” between his current sentence and the sentence he would likely receive if sentenced today. See ECF No. 149 at 6, 9. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.13(b)(6), a change in the law is extraordinary and compelling if, but only if: (1) “a defendant has received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years,” (2) there has been a “change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive),” and (3) “such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed[.]” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6); see id. § 1B1.13(c) (“Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in the law ․ shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exits under the policy statement.”).

Conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied. Courts have found that a large disparity between a defendant's sentence and their Guideline range if sentenced today suffices to show that a sentence is “unusually long.” See e.g., United States v. Mason, 2024 WL 4667168, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2024) (“[C]onsidering the great disparity between the relative Guideline calculations, the Court will consider Defendant's sentence as ‘unusually long.’ ”). As the court explains below, this is the case here. See infra Section III.A.2. at 8-9. Since Defendant has also been incarcerated for over (10) years, he satisfies the criteria of prong (1).

Defendant also meets the criteria of prong (2). Courts have found that Norman qualifies as a change of law under U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.13(b)(6). See e.g., United States v. Davis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159233, at *7 (July 2, 2024) (Allen, J.) (finding that Norman created a sentencing disparity which was “a textbook example of the extraordinary and compelling reasons that § 1B1.13(b)(6) is meant to address”). Since Defendant has satisfied conditions (1) and (2), the sole question is whether under Norman there is a “gross disparity” between Defendant's sentence and the sentence Defendant would likely receive today.

In Norman, the Fourth Circuit held that conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance is not a “controlled substance offense” pursuant to the career offender Guideline. See Norman, 935 F.3d at 237-39. In its previous Order Denying Defendant's First Motion for Compassionate Release, the court found that for this reason, Defendant's previous conviction for conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base would no longer subject him to the career offender Guideline. See ECF No. 130 at 5-6. The court found that this would reduce Defendant's Total Offense Level to twenty-five (25), and his Guideline range to one hundred ten (110) to one hundred thirty-seven (137) months. See id. at 6. Defendant points out that removing his career offender designation would also make him eligible for a two-point reduction under Amendment 782. See ECF No. 149 at 13. This would further reduce his offense level to twenty-three (23), and his Guideline range to ninety-two (92) to one hundred fifteen (115) months. See id.

While this court has previously found that this constitutes a sentencing disparity, see ECF No. 141 at 6, this was before Defendant's sentence was commuted to expire on May 16, 2025. See ECF No. 158 at 18, 23. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) instructs that the court must examine whether there is a “gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed[.]” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the court will consider the disparity between Defendant's commuted sentence and the sentence he would likely receive today.

Defendant was sentenced on August 10, 2011. ECF No. 57. His commuted sentence will expire on May 16, 2025. ECF No. 158 at 18, 23. Accordingly, defendant's sentence will last one hundred sixty-five (165) months. Assuming that Defendant would once again be sentenced at the top of his Guideline range, Defendant's sentence today would only be one hundred fifteen (115) months. See ECF No. 151 at 8. This creates a sentencing disparity of fifty (50) months. See ECF No. 57 at 2. Courts have held that similar sentencing disparities are “gross.” See United States v. Stewart, 2024 WL 4860809, at *11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 21, 2024) (50 months); United States v. Miller, 2023 WL 7065545, at *4 (D.S.C. Oct. 26, 2023) (30 months); United States v. Shaw, 2021 WL 3007266, at *5 (W.D. Va. July 15, 2021) (22 months).

The United States makes several arguments to the contrary, none of which are availing. First, the United States argues that “the conclusion that Defendant would necessarily receive a shorter sentence today is wholly speculative.” ECF No. 151 at 8. The United States maintains that if Norman were in effect, it would have “negotiated a different plea agreement,” and “recommended a different sentence to fully account for Defendant's criminal conduct.” Id. at 8-9. The United States would have done so, it argues, because several of Defendant's other charges would still subject him to the career offender enhancement even after Norman. Id.

The court declines to rely on the hindsight of a “what-if” scenario in this case. The Policy Statement asks the court to consider the “disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed[.]” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (emphasis added). The court can readily determine Defendant's likely sentence by referencing his current Guideline range. While not foolproof, “the Guideline range ‘anchor[s]’ the sentencing proceeding” and is “the benchmark” for selecting an appropriate sentence. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 498 n.6 (2022) (quoting Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541 (2013)). In contrast, it is difficult for the court to reconstruct the multifaceted considerations which inform a prosecutor's charging decision and the parties' subsequent plea negotiation. For this reason, the court cannot determine with any degree of certainty here whether Defendant would have been charged with and pled guilty to different counts if different law applied.

The United States also contends that, “after full consideration of defendant's individualized circumstances,” ECF No. 151 at 9 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)), Norman does not create a sentencing disparity, and that “a sentencing disparity alone can't dictate the court's analysis,” id. (citing United States v. Moody, 115 F.4th 304, 312 (4th Cir. 2024)). While the court agrees that a sentencing disparity alone should not control the court's analysis, the court has considered Defendant's “individualized circumstances” in finding that Defendant would likely receive a lower sentence today. This is because Defendant's likely sentence is based upon his Guideline range, which accounts for his “individualized characteristics,” i.e., his offense conduct and criminal history. Moreover, to grant the motion the court must still consider whether a sentence reduction is consistent with the Section 3553(a) factors.

Lastly, the United States argues that U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) “exceeds the authority delegated to the Sentencing Commission by Congress[.]” ECF No. 151 at 10. The Sentencing Commission's delegated authority includes the power to promulgate “policy statements regarding application of the guidelines[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2). The United States argues that Section U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(b)(6) exceeds this authority because it is “contrary to § 3582(c) (1) (A)'s text, structure, and purpose,” which the Sentencing Commission is bound to follow. ECF No. 151 at 10; see 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (instructing that the Sentencing Commission's promulgations must be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal Statute”). Under the United States' argument, U.S.S.G. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) is contrary to the statute because it allows courts to consider an intervening change of law in assessing whether the defendant has presented an extraordinary and compelling reason. See ECF No. 151 at 10-14. The court finds this argument unpersuasive, as it runs counter to established precedent.

In McCoy, the Fourth Circuit found that a change of law may be considered when evaluating a motion for compassionate release. See United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2020). The court justified its conclusion by noting that “the very purpose of § 3582(c) (1) (A) is to provide a safety valve that allows for sentence reductions where there is not a specific statute that already affords relief but extraordinary and compelling reasons nevertheless justify a reduction.” Id. at 287 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in Concepcion two years later, finding that: “It is only when Congress or the Constitution limits the scope of information that a district court may consider in deciding whether, and to what extent, to modify a sentence, that a district court's discretion to consider information is restrained ․” Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486-87. The enactment of the Policy Statement, including Section 1B1.13(b)(6), did not upset this view. The Fourth Circuit recently held that:”Concepcion and the latest policy statement serve to confirm and amplify this Court's earlier ruling [in McCoy]. Nonretroactive changes in law remain relevant when a court has to decide whether and how to modify a sentence.” United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 658 (4th Cir. 2024) (citations omitted). If considering a change of law was inconsistent with the “text, structure, and purpose” of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), all three cases would have turned out differently.

For the foregoing reasons, the court FINDS that there is a “gross disparity” between Defendant's current sentence and the sentence Defendant would likely receive today. Because Defendant has demonstrated an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting a sentence reduction, the court need not evaluate whether Defendant's other claims meet this threshold. See Davis, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159233 at *7 n.3 (“Because the Court finds that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons to support [defendant's] requested relief based on intervening change of law, the Court need not consider whether his post-sentencing rehabilitation efforts also constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons.”).³

B. Section 3553(a) Factors

Since Defendant has provided an “extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting a sentence reduction, the court must now assess whether a sentence reduction is consistent with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

The court first considers the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant [.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Defendant provides persuasive evidence of his rehabilitation, including the completion of various programming, positive work reports, and character letters from friends and family. See ECF Nos. 149-2; 149-7. However, as the court noted in its previous Order, Defendant has an extensive criminal history and his offense conduct was serious.⁴ See ECF No. 130 at 9-10. Accordingly, given these competing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) is a neutral factor.

The court also considers:

(2) the need for the sentence imposed–

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court previously found that given the seriousness of Defendant's offense conduct and his history of recidivism, the factors listed in Section 3553(a)(2) would not support a sentence reduction. See ECF No. 130 at 10. This factor has not changed.

Defendant has received a generous commutation which effectively reduced his original sentence of two hundred thirty-five (235) months to one hundred sixty-five (165) months. See supra Section III.A.2. at 9. This translates to a sentence reduction of seventy (70) months, or roughly thirty (30) percent of Defendant's original sentence. Granting a further reduction at this juncture would only serve to discount the seriousness of Defendant's crime. Such further leniency is unlikely to “promote respect for the law,” or “provide adequate deterrence for criminal conduct.” §§ 3553 (a) (2) (A) - (B). For these reasons, the factors listed in § 3553 (a) (2) augur against reducing Defendant's sentence on his Compassionate Release Motion.

The court next examines “the kinds of sentences available” and “the sentencing range established for” Defendant's offense. §§ 3553(a)(3), (4). As the court has noted, “the sentencing range established for” Defendant's offense under current law is shorter than the sentence Defendant is serving. See supra Section III.A.2. at 8 (finding that Defendant's Guideline range would be 92 to 115 months under current law). Defendant's sentence of one hundred sixty-five (165) months exceeds this range by roughly four (4) years. Accordingly, the “sentencing range established for” Defendant's offense and “the kinds of sentences available” supports reducing Defendant's sentence.

IV. Conclusion

Defendant has presented an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. However, the Section 3553(a) factors do not support a sentence reduction beyond his commuted sentence. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is MOOT. Specifically, the court would grant a sentence reduction at this juncture, but such reduction would not be earlier than Defendant's clemency reduction commuting his sentence to expire on May 16, 2025. This clemency reduction of seventy (70) months basically constitutes an overall sentence of one hundred sixty-five (165) months incarceration. Any relief the court would grant would not be effective relief to Defendant.⁵ See Lancaster, 109 F.4th at 289 (“[M]ootness depends on the court's ability to grant effectual relief․”).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Memorandum Order to Defendant, the United States Attorney at Norfolk, and the Bureau of Prisons.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Defendant is currently incarcerated at FCI Otisville. See Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), Find an inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.

2.   The United States concedes that Defendant has met the threshold exhaustion requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). See ECF No. 151 at 4.

3.   Defendant's post-sentencing rehabilitation is considered infra Section III.B. at 14 (“Section 3553(a) Factors”).

4.   Defendant was assessed a Criminal History Category of VI, the highest in the federal system. See ECF No. 116 at 42. His present conviction involved conspiring with others to distribute cocaine base. See id. ¶¶ 7-32. In the instant offense, Defendant was attributed with between one hundred ninety-six (196) and two hundred eighty (280) grams of cocaine base. Id. ¶ 36. To Defendant's credit, there was no indication that he possessed a firearm during his offense. Id.

5.   Under the court's contemplated relief on Compassionate Release of an overall sentence of two hundred ten (210) months incarceration, Defendant would not be released before May 16, 2025.

REBECCA BEACH SMITH SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE