UNITED STATES v. LOCUST (2025)

OPINION

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's “Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)” (“Motion”), filed by counsel on December 15, 2023. ECF No. 149; see ECF Nos. 150 (Memorandum in Support); 151 (Exhibits). The United States opposes the Motion. ECF No. 153.

Defendant argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons for reducing his sentence exist under the recently amended policy statement in § 1B1.13 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G”). ECF No. 150 at 8, 16-17. Namely, Defendant cites a sentencing disparity between himself and his codefendant, Louis Pringle; an “unusually long sentence” under U.S.S.G § 1B1.13(b)(6); his youth and addiction at the time of the offense; and his rehabilitation. Id. at 19-26; ECF No. 154 at 9-13 (Defendant's Reply).

For the reasons explained below, the court GRANTS Defendant's Motion and REDUCES his sentence from Life plus three hundred sixty (360) months incarceration, to four hundred twenty (420) months incarceration.

I. Procedural History

A jury found Defendant guilty on twenty (20) counts of a twenty-one (21) count Superseding Indictment, Doc. No. 12, on January 26, 2007. Doc. No. 21 (Special Jury Verdict Form).¹ Of note, Count One charged Defendant with Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and Conspiracy to Distribute Heroin, Cocaine Base, and Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; Count Two charged Defendant with Conspiracy to Import Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963; and Counts Nineteen and Twenty each charged Defendant with Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Doc. No. 12 at 1.

On May 3, 2007, the court sentenced Defendant to a term of Life plus three hundred sixty (360) months imprisonment. Doc. No. 27 at 3 (Judgment). This sentence includes concurrent Life terms on Counts One and Two, and consecutive terms of sixty (60) and three hundred (300) months on Counts Nineteen and Twenty, respectively. Id.² On direct appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence. Doc. No. 39.

At the time of sentencing, a Life sentence plus three hundred sixty (360) months was the mandatory minimum sentence the court could impose, and the Guidelines were restricted to this sentence. See Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) at 1 (Cover Sheet), 48 (Guideline Worksheet D).³ Since his sentencing, Defendant has filed several motions seeking to vacate or reduce his sentence. See Doc. Nos. 41 (Motion to Vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); 61 (Motion citing Guidelines Amendment 750); ECF Nos. 72 (Motion citing Guidelines Amendment 782); 79 (Motion to Reduce Sentence Pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018); 92 (Motion for Reconsideration). None has succeeded. See Doc. Nos. 50; 68; ECF Nos. 73; 86; 94.

Most recently, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Compassionate Release on July 22, 2021. ECF No. 117 (“First Compassionate Release Motion”). In that motion, Defendant argued his sentence should be reduced to time served given the following “extraordinary and compelling reasons”: COVID-19; sentencing disparities caused by the First Step Act; a “trial penalty” imposed on him for refusing to plead guilty; the court's consideration of evidence at sentencing not found by a jury; and his rehabilitation. ECF Nos. 117 at 3-10; 123 at 6, 15-22. Notably, this motion did not address the sentencing disparity between Defendant and Mr. Pringle, and it omitted positive aspects of Defendant's rehabilitation.

The court denied this First Compassionate Release Motion in an Opinion issued on March 16, 2022. ECF No. 127. The Opinion explained that none of Defendant's reasons for release, individually or in combination, were “extraordinary and compelling” under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Id. at 9. Further, the court concluded that Defendant's sentence remained “ ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to achieve the aims of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 33. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the court's judgment. ECF Nos. 130 (Notice of Appeal); 136 (Unpublished Fourth Circuit Opinion).

Defendant filed the instant Motion, through counsel, on December 15, 2023. ECF No. 149. The United States filed a response on March 12, 2024. ECF No. 153. Defendant replied on April 10, 2024. ECF No. 154. The Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion on November 12, 2024. See ECF Nos. 164 (Hearing Minutes); 165 (Hearing Transcript). The Motion is now ripe for decision.

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the court may modify a term of imprisonment if it finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Before the court may consider such a motion, however, the defendant must have “fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant's behalf,” or there must have been a “lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant's facility.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendants may satisfy this exhaustion requirement by “wait[ing] 30 days from the date of their initial request to file a motion in the district court,” even if the warden has already responded to their request. United States v. Muhammad, 16 F.4th 126, 131 (4th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases).

Defendant requested compassionate release from the warden of his facility on August 24, 2023. See ECF No. 150 at 15 & n.11. As more than thirty (30) days passed between when Defendant made his request and filed this Motion, he has satisfied the threshold exhaustion requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

III. Merits

The court may reduce a defendant's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” if “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The Sentencing Commission amended its applicable policy statement, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, on November 1, 2023, to cover motions filed by defendants under § 3582(c)(1)(A). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a); United States v. Davis, 99 F.4th 647, 654-55 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271, 284-86 (4th Cir. 2020)). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating extraordinary and compelling reasons. See United States v. Freeman, 617 F. Supp. 3d 386, 389 (E.D. Va. 2022) (Smith, J.), aff'd, No. 22-6921, 2023 WL 4797316 (4th Cir. July 27, 2023). After a defendant carries this burden, a court may only reduce his sentence “after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

A. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons

Defendant proffers the following extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduced sentence: (1) a sentencing disparity between Defendant and his codefendant Louis Pringle; (2) his “unusually long sentence”; (3) his youth and addiction at the time of the offense; and (4) his rehabilitation. ECF Nos. 150 at 8, 16-29; 154 at 9-17. Considering these reasons, particularly the first and to a lesser extent the third and fourth, the court finds that Defendant has met his burden of showing that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” reducing his Life sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

1. Disparity Between Defendant and Codefendant Louis Pringle

Defendant argues that the disparity between his Life sentence and the three (3) year sentence of his codefendant, Louis Pringle, merits a reduced sentence. ECF Nos. 150 at 19-21; 154 at 9-13. The United States responds that any apparent discrepancy is because, unlike Defendant, “all of his co-conspirators elected to plead guilty and cooperate with the government, and some testified at trial.” ECF No. 153 at 17.

Notably, when this court denied Defendant's First Compassionate Release Motion, it remarked that “every other defendant related to this conspiracy pleaded guilty to only one or two offenses, PSR ¶¶ 4-16, and that accounts, in part, for any discrepancies in addition to varying criminal histories and circumstances of each individual.” ECF No. 127 at 32 n.23. However, this observation did not account for the sentence of (3) years given to Defendant's codefendant, Louis Pringle, in the Eastern District of New York on the same two (2) counts for which Defendant received Life sentences. Accordingly, the court reexamines Defendant's sentence in light of Mr. Pringle's.

a. Factual and Procedural Background

According to Defendant's recounting of the facts, which the United States does not contest, Defendant met Louis Pringle through Pringle's younger brother, Mario.⁴ ECF No. 150 at 12. The Pringle brothers had moved to the United States from Panama, and Mario was a “family friend” of Defendant's. Id. at 12-13. The Pringle brothers are at least twenty (20) years older than Defendant. Id. at 12. When Defendant met Mario Pringle, Defendant was young and homeless, having been kicked out of his house at age sixteen (16) after confronting his mother about her boyfriend's drug use. Id. at 11-12. Mario looked after Defendant during this time and introduced Defendant to Louis Pringle and other persons who became coconspirators with Louis and Defendant. Id. at 12.

Mario eventually left Virginia, and Defendant grew closer to Louis. Id. at 12-13. Defendant also developed an addiction to crack cocaine around this time and started dealing drugs. Id. at 13. Starting in 2002, Defendant began purchasing drugs from Louis Pringle in New York for distribution in Virginia. PSR ¶ 20. These purchases were part of the larger conspiracy for which Mr. Pringle and Defendant were convicted. Mr. Pringle's role in the conspiracy was substantial. Mr. Pringle supplied Defendant with heroin, and occasionally cocaine, from New York for Defendant to sell in Virginia. See id. ¶¶ 20, 22, 24, 30, 34. In that role, Mr. Pringle received at least $6,000 via wire transfers that Defendant directed.⁵ Id. ¶¶ 22, 42, 49. Mr. Pringle also helped organize an attempt to send 598.2 grams of heroin from Panama to the United States. Id. ¶¶ 46-48. Defendant arranged for a courier to travel between Virginia and Panama, and Mr. Pringle provided the heroin to the courier in Panama. Id. The courier was later apprehended by law enforcement at Miami International Airport. Id. ¶ 48.

On November 2, 2006, a Superseding Indictment was returned against Defendant and Mr. Pringle. Doc. No. 12. Before Defendant went to trial, Mr. Pringle's case was transferred to the Eastern District of New York on January 11, 2007. United States v. Pringle, Case No. 1:07cr19, ECF No. 1 (E.D.N.Y.). In New York, Mr. Pringle pled guilty to Counts One and Two of the Superseding Indictment on January 16, 2007. Id., ECF No. 3 (E.D.N.Y.). Meanwhile, in this court in the Eastern District of Virginia, Defendant was convicted by a jury on January 26, 2007. Doc. No. 21. Then, on May 3, 2007, Defendant was sentenced to Life imprisonment plus three hundred sixty (360) months. Doc. No. 27 at 3. This sentence included concurrent Life sentences on Counts One and Two of the Superseding Indictment. Id. Nearly one (1) year later, in the Eastern District of New York, Mr. Pringle received a total sentence of three (3) years on Counts One, Two, and two (2) additional counts from a separate case that did not involve Defendant. United States v. Pringle, Case No. 1:07cr19, ECF No. 6 at 3 (E.D.N.Y.). These two counts were a drug conspiracy charge under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), and a firearm charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Id., ECF No. 6 at 1 (E.D.N.Y.). Mr. Pringle was released from prison on October 17, 2008.⁶

b. Applicable Law

Courts have found that an unwarranted sentencing disparity among codefendants may constitute a sentence of “sheer and unusual length” and qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 1B1.13(b)(5) (the “catch-all provision”). See United States v. Brown, 78 F.4th 122, 131 (4th Cir. 2023) (considering the disparity between the defendant's sentence and codefendants’ sentences in considering the “sheer and unusual length” of defendant's sentence); United States v. Johnson, 2023 WL 5049267, at *10 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2023) (Trenga, J.) (similar). However, even where this theory is premised on a sentencing disparity between a defendant and his codefendant, the codefendant must still be similarly situated to the defendant. See United States v. Millner, 2023 WL 2457094, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 10, 2023) (denying compassionate release motion where codefendants who received shorter sentences were not similarly situated to the defendant).

Thus, to establish a sentencing disparity, the defendant must provide an appropriate comparator. This showing goes to the heart of sentencing. Simply comparing two defendants’ sentences unmoored from the underlying facts is “treacherous because each sentencing proceeding is inescapably individualized[.]” United States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012). “Such individualized treatment is necessary ‘to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’ ” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007)).

The statutory sentencing factors are helpful in identifying an appropriate comparator. See United States v. Omar, 2024 WL 4786143, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2024) (Smith, J.). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6), courts have a duty to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id. (emphasis added). To establish that he has been subjected to an unwarranted disparity then, a defendant must, at the very minimum, show that a codefendant with a similar record who has been found guilty of similar conduct received a lesser sentence for that conduct.

c. Analysis

The court first examines each defendant's relative culpability. Many facts support a finding that Mr. Pringle was at least as culpable as Defendant. For example, at the time Mr. Pringle introduced Defendant to dealing drugs, Mr. Pringle was at least two decades older than Defendant. See ECF No. 150 at 12. Further, Mr. Pringle's role in the conspiracy was intertwined with Defendant's, with Mr. Pringle supplying the drugs Defendant then distributed in Virginia. See supra Section III.A.1.a. at 8-9. Notably, Mr. Pringle's conduct covers “some of the most troubling facts” that this court considered in denying Defendant's First Compassionate Release Motion in 2022. ECF No. 127 at 30. Specifically, as one of Defendant's drug suppliers in New York, Mr. Pringle was involved in “Defendant travel[ing] across state lines to procure dangerous drugs.” Id. Mr. Pringle also helped coordinate the “attempt[ ] to import heroin from Panama.” Id. Additionally, Mr. Pringle's second case in the Eastern District of New York included a conviction for a firearm offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), the same statute as Defendant's Counts Nineteen and Twenty. Compare 1:07cr19, ECF No. 6 at 1 (E.D.N.Y.) (Pringle Judgment), with Doc. No. 27 at 2 (Locust Judgment). Accordingly, possession of a firearm was an element of both Defendants’ offense conduct for sentencing.

But, there are several facts which go the other way. Notably, Mr. Pringle was not Defendant's sole supplier of drugs. PSR ¶¶ 25, 31. Further, there is no indication in the PSR that Mr. Pringle coordinated drug sales in Virginia like Defendant did. See generally id. Still, on balance, the two defendants were convicted of similar, though not identical, conduct on Count One for Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and Conspiracy to Distribute Heroin, Cocaine Base, and Cocaine, and Count Two for Conspiracy to Import Heroin. Compare 1:07cr19, ECF No. 6 at 2 (E.D.N.Y.) (Pringle Judgment), with Doc. No. 27 at 1 (Locust Judgment).

Another factor is Defendant's record, i.e., his criminal history. At sentencing, Mr. Pringle was assigned a criminal history category of III, and Defendant's criminal history category was IV. PSR at 32 (Locust PSR); 165 at 25-26 (Locust Compassionate Release Hearing Transcript). While this may seem like a minor difference, Mr. Pringle is over twenty (20) years older than Defendant, who was twenty-six (26) at the time of his arrest for the present offenses. See PSR at 2; ECF Nos. 3 (Arrest Warrant Returned Executed); 150 at 12. This age gap renders the one category difference in criminal history between Defendant and Mr. Pringle more significant, as it shows that Defendant engaged in more criminal conduct over a shorter period than Mr. Pringle. However, while this and the aforementioned differences are relevant, they are not so great as to render a comparison inapt, especially given the stark sentencing disparity in this case. Accordingly, Defendant has shown that a codefendant with a similar record who was convicted of similar conduct received a lesser sentence. The court will thus examine whether the sentencing disparity in this case is “unwarranted.”

The most pertinent difference between Defendant and Mr. Pringle is that, unlike Defendant, Mr. Pringle pled guilty in the Eastern District of New York and cooperated with the government. See infra Section III.B. at 26-27. Mr. Pringle also testified for the United States in Mr. Locust's jury trial on January 24, 2007. See Doc. No. 31 (Transcript of Locust Trial Proceedings). Cooperation often accounts for sentencing disparities. See, e.g., United States v. Stephens, 2024 WL 1532511, at *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 8, 2024) (declining to find an unwarranted sentencing disparity between defendant and her codefendant, in part because the codefendant pled guilty and testified at defendant's trial). But, a difference in pleading and cooperation is but one factor courts consider in deciding whether a disparity is warranted, and is not dispositive. See, e.g., United States v. Scruggs, 2021 WL 3115819, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. July 22, 2021) (Payne, J.) (reducing noncooperating defendant's Life sentence, in part because his similarly culpable codefendant who pled guilty and cooperated received a two hundred forty (240) month sentence). Here, Mr. Pringle's decision to plead guilty and cooperate certainly warrants some disparity between his sentence and Defendant's. However, it does not warrant Defendant's concurrent Life sentences on Counts One and Two, while Mr. Pringle received a three (3) year sentence on the same counts for similar, but not identical, offense conduct.

The court also recognizes that Mr. Pringle's sentence covered four (4) counts of conviction whereas Defendant's covered twenty (20). However, this does not completely explain the disparity. Defendant's sentences on all other counts except Nineteen and Twenty run concurrent to his Life sentences on Counts One and Two, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, the same counts on which Mr. Pringle received a three-year sentence, see 1:07cr19, ECF No. 6 at 2-3 (E.D.N.Y.) (Pringle Judgment). Thus, despite the differences in counts of conviction, there is still an unwarranted disparity.

In sum, Mr. Pringle and Defendant had in some respects similar, but clearly not identical, records and offense conduct. Mr. Pringle received a three (3) year sentence and was released in 2008. Over sixteen (16) years later, Defendant remains in prison for Life. Although there are relevant differences between the defendants, they do not fully account for such a disparity. Accordingly, the court finds there is an unwarranted sentencing disparity between Defendant's Life sentence and Louis Pringle's three (3) year sentence. That disparity is a strong factor toward finding an extraordinary and compelling reason for reducing Defendant's sentence. However, as the court later notes, this sentencing disparity is less stark when viewed in the full context of each defendant's case. See infra Section III.B. at 26-27.

2. Unusually Long Sentence

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), an extraordinary and compelling reason may exist if the following conditions are met: (i) a defendant has “received an unusually long sentence”; (ii) the defendant “has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment”; and (iii) an intervening change in law “would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6); see Davis, 99 F.4th at 654.

Here, Defendant has served more than seventeen (17) years of his sentence, and thus satisfies the second condition. Doc. No. 27. However, for the reasons explained below, the court does not find that Defendant's sentence is “unusually long.” But before conducting that analysis, the court first reviews how changes in the law would affect Defendant's sentence.

a. Defendant's Sentence and Changes in the Law

Defendant's sentence consists of a total term of Life plus three hundred sixty (360) months imprisonment based on twenty (20) counts of conviction. Doc. No. 27 at 3. The sentences for Counts One, Two, Nineteen, and Twenty, are most relevant here. Counts One and Two carry two (2) concurrent Life terms for conspiracy drug charges under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963. Id. at 1, 3. Counts Nineteen and Twenty carry consecutive terms of sixty (60) and three hundred (300) months, respectively, for drug-related firearm offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Id. at 2-3. The remaining counts run concurrently with the Life sentence on Count One and do not exceed three hundred sixty (360) months. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Count One's Life sentence relied on the United States filing an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, which established that Defendant sustained past convictions that triggered a mandatory Life sentence when he was sentenced in 2007. Doc. No. 16 (Information Certifying Prior Felony Drug Convictions).

When the court denied Defendant's First Compassionate Release Motion in 2022, it examined what sentence he could receive at that time after passage of the First Step Act and U.S.S.G. Amendment 782. See ECF No. 127 at 20-24. First, “Defendant would not be subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment on Count One, or a mandatory twenty-five (25) year consecutive term on Count Twenty.”⁷ Id. at 20. Instead, he would face a mandatory minimum “of ten (10) years on Count One, and consecutive five (5) year terms on Counts Nineteen and Twenty,” for a “total mandatory minimum sentence of twenty (20) years,” i.e., two hundred forty (240) months of imprisonment. Id. Defendant's revised Guidelines range would be four hundred eighty (480) months to Life. Id. at 20-21. Ultimately, the court concluded the revised Guidelines range and intervening changes in sentencing law did not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. Id. at 23-24. This conclusion was based in large part on the court's finding that Defendant's sentence of Life remained within the high end of his revised Guidelines range, and that such a sentence was justified given the seriousness of his offense conduct. Id. at 23.

b. Length of Sentence

Defendant argues his Life sentence is unusually long because it is no longer mandatory; is higher than average as compared to national and circuit-wide sentencing data; is longer than the minimum sentence specified in the government's plea offer before trial; and because his codefendant, Louis Pringle, was sentenced to three (3) years for similar conduct. ECF Nos. 150 at 19-21; 154 at 7-8. The United States responds that “the mere existence of a § 851 enhancement or stacked § 924(c) sentences” is not extraordinary and compelling, and that there is “nothing extraordinary about a sentence imposed in thousands of cases a year.” ECF No. 153 at 15. Section 1B1.13(b)(6) does not define what makes a sentence “unusually long.” To answer this question, some courts have compared the defendant's sentence to the revised Guidelines range after a change in law. See, e.g., United States v. Millner, 2024 WL 1678559, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 18, 2024) (no unusually long sentence in part because defendant's sentence was “at the low end of his suggested guidelines range” that considered purported changes in the law). Courts have also looked at national sentencing statistics to determine whether a sentence is unusually long. See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 2024 WL 112010, at *15 (D. Md. Jan. 10, 2024) (“I shall consider defendant's sentence ‘unusually long’ if it is significantly longer than the average of all sentences imposed nationwide in a given year.”).

Here, although Defendant's Life sentence is no longer mandatory, it remains within his amended Guidelines range of four hundred eighty (480) months to Life. See ECF No. 127 at 20. “[T]he properly calculated Guidelines range” is “the benchmark” for selecting an appropriate sentence. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 498 n.6 (2022). Although this range does not bind a district court, it does “anchor” a sentencing determination. Id. Because Defendant's Life sentence is within his updated Guidelines range, the court cannot say, in this case, that the sentence is “unusually long.”

The court recognizes Defendant's assertion that Life sentences may be less common today than when Defendant was sentenced. ECF Nos. 150 at 20; 154 at 7-8 (citing statistics from the United States Sentencing Commission).⁸ But, the court must balance these aggregated statistics against the obligation to analyze a defendant's individual circumstances when contemplating a sentence reduction. See Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486; McCoy, 981 F.3d at 286. Here, the fact that Defendant's Life sentence remains within his adjusted Guidelines range militates against finding it is unusually long.

Further, the fact that Defendant's sentence is longer than the minimum sentence specified in a government plea offer, which was not accepted by Defendant, does not make the sentence unusually long for a number of reasons. That plea offer, a minimum fifteen (15) year sentence, accounted for only three (3) of the seven (7) counts in Defendant's original Indictment. See Doc. No. 50 at 9 n.7 (Order Denying Defendant's § 2255 Motion). By contrast, his sentence accounts for twenty (20) counts of conviction in the twenty-one (21) count Superseding Indictment. Doc. Nos. 12 (Superseding Indictment); 21 (Special Jury Verdict); 27 (Judgment). Moreover, Defendant's chances of “receiving a fifteen year sentence under the government's plea offer were exceedingly remote,” as explained in an earlier Order from the court. Doc. No. 50 at 9 n.7.

In sum, under these circumstances, the court does not find that Defendant's sentence is unusually long. Defendant thus has not satisfied U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s criteria for showing an extraordinary and compelling reason. Moreover, the court has concluded that there is no “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and the one he would likely receive today. See supra Section III.A.2.a.

3. Youth and Addiction at the Time of the Offense

Defendant also relies on his youth and addiction at the time of his offenses as an extraordinary and compelling reason. ECF Nos. 150 at 25-26; 154 at 14-15. Defendant committed the underlying offenses between the ages of nineteen (19) and twenty-five (25) years old. PSR at 2, ¶ 17. He also contends he was addicted to crack cocaine when he committed his offenses, which the United States does not contest. ECF No. 150 at 24.

The Guidelines do not address youth or addiction as extraordinary and compelling reasons. But as noted above, “any other circumstance,” alone or combined with other circumstances, may be considered as extraordinary and compelling. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5). Under this provision, courts have considered youth or addiction as a factor favoring extraordinary and compelling reasons. See, e.g., McCoy, 981 F.3d at 288 (considering “defendants’ relative youth at the time of their offenses” as one factor in the compassionate release inquiry).

Both Defendant and the United States draw comparisons to McCoy’s analysis of a defendant's youth. ECF Nos. 150 at 24; 153 at 15-16. In McCoy, the defendants were between nineteen (19) and twenty-four (24) years old when they committed their offenses, and they had insignificant criminal histories. 981 F.3d at 278, 286. Similarly, Defendant was between nineteen (19) and twenty-five (25) years old when he committed his offenses. PSR at 2, ¶ 17. But unlike the McCoy defendants, Defendant had a lengthy criminal history at the time of his offense, including three (3) convictions for possessing cocaine and one conviction for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, resulting in a Criminal History Category of IV at sentencing. Id. at 45-47.

Defendant argues these past offenses, as well as those for which he was sentenced, were “driven by” his drug addiction. ECF No. 150 at 8-9. Defendant's PSR indicates that he started using marijuana at age sixteen (16) and crack cocaine at seventeen (17). PSR ¶ 84. His criminal history began around this time too, with two (2) driving offenses at sixteen (16) and his first possession of cocaine offense at seventeen (17). Id. ¶¶ 60-61. Defendant's remaining cocaine offenses occurred between the ages of eighteen (18) and nineteen (19). Id. ¶¶ 65-67. Notably, these drug-related offenses became predicate offenses for his Life sentence on Count One. See ECF No. 127 at 16-18.

Consequently, the “youth” factor is a less persuasive reason for a sentence reduction than it was in McCoy. Nonetheless, the court finds that Defendant's youth and addiction at the time of his offense weighs to a degree in favor of finding an extraordinary and compelling reason.

4. Rehabilitation

Defendant also cites his “commendable rehabilitation” as “extraordinary and compelling.” ECF No. 150 at 26. Rehabilitation alone is not an “extraordinary and compelling reason” for reducing a sentence, but it “may be considered in combination with other circumstances in determining whether and to what extent a reduction in the defendant's term of imprisonment is warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)).

In denying Defendant's First Compassionate Release Motion, the court found that Defendant's rehabilitation efforts were “lackluster at best.” ECF No. 127 at 23-26. For instance, Defendant has accrued twelve (12) disciplinary violations in prison, including one as recently as 2021. ECF No. 153 at 17. Defendant now presents new information about his rehabilitation so that the court “can reconsider its prior determination.” ECF No. 154 at 15.

In Defendant's favor is his completion, in 2017, of the Challenge Program, which he calls “the foremost evidence of [his] character rehabilitation” and which he distinguishes from “the ordinary kinds of educational or vocational training offered by BOP.” ECF No. 150 at 27 & n.18; see ECF No. 151-4 at 8 (Certificate of Completion). Other indicia of Defendant's “positive turnaround” include mentoring other inmates and progress toward a GED and vocational training. ECF No. 150 at 10, 33-34; see ECF Nos. 151-8; 151-9 (letters of support from fellow inmates); 151-4 (certificates from various courses); 151-6 (Education Report). Defendant also appears to have strong family support, as evidenced by several letters from loved ones, as well as testimony from his aunt and cousin at his hearing on November 12, 2024. See ECF Nos. 151-1; 151-10; 151-11; 151-12; 151-13; 165 at 9-23.

Even so, the court cannot overlook Defendant's twelve (12) disciplinary violations. See ECF No. 151-7 (Disciplinary Record). These violations cover misconduct ranging from refusing to obey orders, to assault, and possessing drugs or alcohol. Id. Defendant acknowledges these shortcomings but points out that ten (10) of his infractions predate him starting the Challenge Program in 2015. ECF No. 150 at 28. Since completing the Challenge Program in 2017, Defendant has incurred two (2) violations that his Motion seeks to contextualize. Id. In 2019, Defendant possessed an “unauthorized item,” which he claims, and the United States does not contest, was “a fellow inmate's ‘barber pass’ to get a haircut before his father came to visit.” Id.; see ECF No. 151-7 at 2. The second, and most recent, infraction is more troubling. In 2021, Defendant admitted to fighting another inmate. ECF No. 151-7 at 2. Per Defendant, “[s]houting, pushing, and shoving ensued” while Defendant was in line to make a phone call after inmates had been unable to make calls for a long time due to COVID-19. ECF Nos. 150 at 28; 154 at 13. This behavior cuts against a finding that Defendant's rehabilitation is extraordinary and compelling.

In sum, Defendant's rehabilitation at this juncture may be more than “lackluster,” because he has overcome addiction and mentored others during his time in prison, but his disciplinary record falls short of first-rate. Accordingly, Defendant's rehabilitation to a degree favors a sentence reduction. Nonetheless, when considered alongside Defendant's age and addiction at the time of the offenses, and the sentencing disparity between Defendant and Mr. Pringle, the court does FIND that the totality of the circumstances now present an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for a sentence reduction.

B. Section 3553(a) Factors

A court may only reduce a defendant's sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” The court will examine the relevant factors in turn.

The most persuasive reason for reducing Defendant's sentence is the stark disparity between his life sentence and Mr. Pringle's three-year term of incarceration. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (noting “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). While striking on its face, the court must not let this fact alone cloud its judgment, and must examine this disparity in its full context.

At Mr. Pringle's sentencing, the court noted that a three-year sentence was “lenient by anyone's definition[.]” See ECF No. 166 at 17 (Pringle Sentencing Transcript).⁹ Such a lenient sentence owed to Mr. Pringle's “substantial cooperation,” which the court found was “beyond merely credible,” and showed “an element of character” on the part of Mr. Pringle. Id. The court was also influenced by “the fact that [Mr. Pringle] will be inevitably deported when [he] finish[es] serving this sentence and perhaps then begin, in a way, serving the hardest part of the sentence, which is separation from family.” Id.

Defense counsel acknowledged these facts, even conceding at the hearing on November 12, 2024, that Mr. Pringle's sentence was “excessively low.” ECF No. 165 at 26. As the United States noted, “the answer to an excessively low” or even “incorrect or inappropriate sentence for Mr. Pringle” is not a similarly low sentence for Defendant. Id. at 73. The court agrees to the extent that simply juxtaposing Mr. Pringle's three-year sentence with Defendant's life sentence overstates the point. But still, there is a point to be made. Even given Mr. Pringle's cooperation, the trial judge's admitted leniency, and the differences in culpability and criminal history between the two defendants, including the fact that Defendant was convicted on far more counts than Mr. Pringle, such a disparity is still unwarranted and warrants some reduction in sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

Another relevant factor is “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). This factor is a mixed one for Defendant. On one hand, there is no sugarcoating Defendant's offense conduct. Defendant helped lead a years-long drug conspiracy, was regularly armed, and attempted to import heroin from Panama. ECF No. 127 at 30. On the other hand, Defendant, especially recently, has shown promising signs of rehabilitation and his disciplinary record has improved. See ECF No. 150 at 26-29; see also United States v. Hartwell, 2023 WL 6626144, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2023) (Payne, J.) (compassionate release case applying the principle that “the sentencing court considers the defendant on that day, not on the date of his offense or the date of his conviction” (quoting Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486 (internal quotation marks omitted))). Moreover, Defendant's relative youth and addiction at the time of the offense remains a consideration. See ECF Nos. 150 at 25-26; 154 at 14-15. On balance, this factor does not move the needle far in either direction in determining whether and to what extent a sentence reduction is appropriate.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), which assesses the need for the sentence imposed to “(A) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense ․” is also relevant. Due to the seriousness of Defendant's offense, this factor cuts against granting Defendant a reduction in sentence. Nonetheless, it does not foreclose the possibility entirely. It is one factor the court considers in determining whether and to what extent to grant a reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 570 F. Supp. 3d 346, 355-57 (E.D. Va. 2021) (Doumar, J.) (noting that “drug trafficking ․ and us[ing] firearms in connection” were “some of the most serious offenses” but still finding that “the seriousness of the crime itself [did] not justify Defendant being imprisoned for several life sentences” given other factors).

On balance, the court FINDS that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors support reducing Defendant's sentence. While Defendant's offense conduct was extremely serious and the need for deterrence and protecting the public is great, these factors are slightly outweighed by the need to avoid sentencing disparities, Defendant's youth and addiction at the time of the offense, and Defendant's ongoing rehabilitative efforts. See supra Section III.A.1,3,4.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Defendant has presented an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release, and has demonstrated that a sentence reduction is appropriate under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court FINDS that a reduction of Defendant's sentence is warranted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Compassionate Release, ECF No. 149, and REDUCES Defendant's sentence from Life plus three hundred sixty (360) months incarceration, to four hundred twenty (420) months incarceration, as follows:

• Count One: from Life to three hundred (300) months to be served concurrently with all counts except Counts Nineteen and Twenty;

• Count Two: from Life to three hundred (300) months to be served concurrently with all counts except Counts Nineteen and Twenty;

• Count Eighteen: from three hundred sixty (360) months to three hundred (300) months to be served concurrently with all counts except Counts Nineteen and Twenty;

• Count Nineteen: no change, from sixty (60) months to be served consecutively to all other counts; and

• Count Twenty: from three hundred (300) months to sixty (60) months, to be served consecutively to all other counts.10

This reduction is below Defendant's current guideline range of four hundred eighty (480) months to Life imprisonment, even if he were sentenced today. See ECF No. 127 at 20 (2022 Opinion). Nonetheless, this reduced sentence is appropriate under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for the reasons stated in this Opinion. It accounts for mitigating factors, such as the sentencing disparity between Defendant and Mr. Pringle; Defendant's youth and drug addiction at the time he committed his crimes; Defendant's inconsistent but improving disciplinary record; Defendant's efforts toward rehabilitation; and Defendant's family support. The reduced sentence also reflects the seriousness of Defendant's offenses, provides deterrence, and protects the public from future crimes of Defendant. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1),(2)(A)-(C). The reduced sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

In all other respects, the Judgment entered on May 3, 2007, and filed on May 4, 2007, Doc. No. 27, remains in full force and effect.¹¹

IT IS SO ORDERED.¹²

EXHIBIT A: INDEX

I. Procedural History․––––

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies․––––

III. Merits․––––

A. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons․––––

1. Disparity Between Defendant and Codefendant Louis Pringle․––––

a. Factual and Procedural Background․––––

b. Applicable Law․––––

c. Analysis․––––

2. Unusually Long Sentence․––––

a. Defendant's Sentence and Changes in the Law․––––

b. Length of Sentence․––––

3. Youth and Addiction at the Time of the Offense․––––

4. Rehabilitation․––––

B. Section 3553(a) Factors․––––

IV. Conclusion․––––

FOOTNOTES

1.   Filings available electronically through the court's Electronic Case Filing System (“ECFS”) are assigned “ECF” numbers. Those which preceded the ECFS are assigned “Doc.” numbers.

2.   Defendant received varying terms of imprisonment for the remaining counts of conviction, all of which run concurrently with his Life sentences on Counts One and Two. Doc. No. 27 at 3. These sentences are for sixty (60) months on Counts Three, Four, and Five; two hundred forty (240) months on Counts Six, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Seventeen; three hundred sixty (360) months on Count Eighteen; and one hundred twenty (120) months on Count Twenty-One. Id.

3.   The PSR was uploaded for this proceeding so that counsel has access to it. See ECF No. 159.

4.   The PSR states that Defendant met Louis Pringle through a fellow coconspirator, Ronald Bagley. PSR ¶ 19. However, Defendant points out that Louis Pringle testified to meeting Defendant through Mario Pringle. ECF No. 150 at 12 n.7; see Doc. No. 31 (Transcript of Locust Trial Proceeding).

5.   This figure only accounts for wire transfers addressed to “Luis Pringle” or his alias, “Lucho Pringle.” See PSR ¶ 4. In addition to those transfers, one (1) was sent to “Nuis Pringle,” and three (3) others were sent to “Lois Pringle.” Id. ¶ 22. It is unclear whether these transfers involve misspellings of “Louis Pringle” or if the transfers were sent to persons other than Louis Pringle. Given this uncertainty, this Opinion does not consider these four (4) wires transfers, totaling $1,600, in assessing Mr. Pringle's role in the offense.

6.   BOP, Find an inmate., https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/.

7.   He would also “be subject to a lower mandatory minimum and statutory maximum” on Count Two—a five (5) year minimum and a forty (40) year maximum. ECF No. 127 at 18 n.9.

8.   Those statistics are accessible at United States Sentencing Commission, Interactive Data Analyzer, Sentencing Outcomes, Sentence Length, https://ida.ussc.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Dashboard (last visited March 20, 2025).

9.   Mr. Pringle's sentencing transcript was not originally available electronically. At the hearing which took place on November 12, 2024, Defendant's attorney, William Bristow, represented that he had read Mr. Pringle's sentencing transcript. See ECF No. 165 at 24 (Compassionate Release Hearing Transcript). The court had not received nor reviewed Mr. Pringle's sentencing transcript. After the hearing and at the court's request, Mr. Bristow provided the court a copy of the sentencing transcript on November 26, 2024, with a copy to Peter Osyf, the United States Attorney assigned to the case. See ECF No. 166 (Pringle Sentencing Transcript).

10.   The sentences on Counts Nineteen and Twenty cannot “run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the [Defendant], including any term of imprisonment imposed for the ․ drug trafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii); see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, Application Note 2(A).

11.   The varying terms of imprisonment on Counts Three, Four, Five, Six, Eight, Nine, Ten, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, Fourteen, Fifteen, Sixteen, Seventeen, and Twenty-One are not affected by this Opinion, and they all run concurrently with Counts One and Two. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

12.   An index is attached hereto, as Exhibit A, for reference purposes.

REBECCA BEACH SMITH, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE