KAREN BARNES v. ROAD CARRIERS INC (2025)

ORDER

Plaintiff Karen Barnes filed an unopposed motion to extend the discovery deadline for the purpose of taking depositions and locating disability records. Dkt. 66. At the court's request, the parties filed a joint advisory to inform the disposition of that motion. Dkts. 76 (order), 77 (advisory). The motion will be granted.

When a party asks to extend a deadline before it has passed, the court may do so for “good cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). But when a party asks to extend a deadline after it has expired, the party must show not only good cause, but also that it “failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Id. R. 6(b)(1)(B); see Graham v. HRchitect, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-743, 2017 WL 3216609, at *1 (E.D. Tex. July 28, 2017). To establish good cause, the movant must show that it could not reasonably have met the deadline despite its diligence. S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing good cause to modify a scheduling order under Rule 16(b)). When a party asks to extend time for discovery, the court considers (1) the explanation for the party's failure to meet the deadline, (2) the importance of the discovery, (3) any potential prejudice in allowing the discovery, and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure that prejudice. Buttermilk Sky of TN LLC v. Bake Moore, LLC, No. 4:20-CV-327, 2021 WL 1737240, at *1 (E.D. Tex. May 3, 2021). To determine whether an extension is justified by excusable neglect, the court considers four factors: “(1) the danger of prejudice to the non-movant; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the movant's reasonable control; and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Graham, 2017 WL 3216609, at *1.

The parties assert that they have shown good cause and excusable neglect. They argue that they “were not able to complete discovery by the November 30, 2024, deadline due to scheduling conflicts and other delays, including third party discovery, outside of [their] control.” Dkt. 77 at 3. They add that neither party could “unilaterally schedule depositions on dates the other side was unavailable,” nor could the defendants control when third parties responded to their subpoenas for Barnes's disability records. Dkt. 77 at 4–5. Additionally, the parties assert that the extension will not cause prejudice, even though it would result in a new trial setting, because both parties agree to the extension and would benefit from conducting further discovery.

The court finds that the defendants would not be prejudiced if the motion were granted, given that the defendants are unopposed to the relief sought and would benefit from additional discovery of their own. That weighs heavily in favor of granting the motion. The court also agrees that the defendants could not control when the third parties responded to the subpoenas. That likewise weighs in favor of granting the motion.

Other considerations, including delays on both sides, cut the other way. But weighing all of the factors together, and because the parties have agreed on a suitable schedule for discovery and other pretrial matters, the court finds that the parties should be granted leave to conduct the discovery identified in their joint status report.

It is ORDERED that the motion, Dkt. 66, is GRANTED. The court will separately set new deadlines in a third amended scheduling order. Any further extension request will be disfavored.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 24th day of February, 2025.

Bill Davis United States Magistrate Judge