KASPAROV PTE LTD v. ZACHERL (2025)

Order

Both Plaintiff Kasparov, Pte Ltd. and Defendant Joseph Zacherl have moved to compel supplemental discovery responses from each other. In one motion, Zacherl asks the court to require Kasparov to produce documents and information possessed by third parties, additional metadata, and information on its document preservation efforts. In the other motion, Kasparov asks the court to overrule two objections that appear repeatedly in Zacherl's discovery responses.

With respect to Zacherl's motion, the court will grant it in part. Kasparov has not shown that its document preservation efforts are irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case, so Zacherl is entitled to those documents. But the record does not support the conclusion that Kasparov has withheld metadata or has control over the wallet-related documents possessed by third parties, so the court denies that portion of the motion.

And with respect to Kasparov's motion, the court will fully grant it. Zacherl's objection that requests dealing with matters not explicitly mentioned in the pleadings go beyond the scope of discovery is baseless. And he has waived the remainder of his challenged objections by either not raising them or not stating them with the specificity required by the Federal Rules.

The parties will have 14 days from entry of this order to supplement their responses. The court will award fees and costs as provided in Rule 37 to each party.

I. Background

This case involves claims that Zacherl and others improperly denied Kasparov access to two of its cryptocurrency wallets. Several discovery disputes have arisen between the parties that require the court's attention.

Zacherl motion focuses on three things. First, he asks the court to require Kasparov to obtain and produce documents from five individuals: Taiyang Zhang, Titantian Kullander, Bainy Zhang, Benjamin Wang, and Susruth Nadimpalli. According to Zacherl, these individuals, collectively, the Signatories, were authorized signatories for one or both wallets, meaning they had access to and control of the wallets’ contents. The Signatories were all at one time affiliated with Kasparov, but the company claims that they no longer perform regular functions for it. In response to a request from Zacherl, Kasparov asked the Signatories ¹ to turn over their electronic devices so they could be searched for responsive documents. They declined to do so but conducted their own search for responsive documents and provided what they found to Kasparov. The company then produced those documents to Zacherl.

Zacherl believes their production was inadequate and asks the court to compel Kasparov to hire a forensics and collections consultant to image the Signatories’ servers and devices, collect responsive ESI from those sources, and produce all responsive communications between the Signatories that he is not included on. Zacherl Mot. ¶¶ 1 & 3. After reviewing the parties’ filings, the court requested, and the parties provided, supplemental briefing on whether documents that the Signatories possess could be considered to be in Kasparov's possession, custody, or control.

Second, Zacherl asks the court to require Kasparov to provide certain metadata information as required by the parties stipulated agreement on the exchange and production of electronically stored information. He says that they failed to provide Custodian and Duplicate Custodian metadata as the stipulation requires.

And finally, Zacherl's motion seeks a supplemental response from Kasparov to an interrogatory dealing with its document preservation efforts. The company responded to this request with a laundry list of objections and provided no meaningful information in response.

For its part, Kasparov seeks supplemental responses to two interrogatories and a slate of requests for production of documents. It asks the court to overrule several of Zacherl's objections, which it claims violate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or are otherwise inadequate.

II. Discussion

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow parties to “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For discovery, the scope of “relevance is broadly construed ‘to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’ ” Mainstreet Collection, Inc. v. Kirkland's, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 238, 240 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund., Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978)).

The Rules also allow a requesting party to move to compel if the responding party's discovery responses are incomplete or inadequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The party resisting or objecting to discovery “bears the burden of showing why [the motion to compel] should not be granted.” Mainstreet Collection, 270 F.R.D. at 241. To meet this burden, the non-moving party “must make a particularized showing of why discovery should be denied, and conclusory or generalized statements fail to satisfy this burden as a matter of law.” Id.

With these requirements in mind, the court turns to Zacherl's motion.

A. Zacherl's Motion to Compel

Zacherl's motion focuses on three categories of documents or information. The first category includes documents and metadata from the wallets’ signatories. The next category involves the production of metadata. And the final category relates to Kasparov's document preservation efforts.

1. Responsive Materials Possessed by the Signatories

Zacherl wants the court to compel Kasparov to produce documents in the Signatories’ possession, arguing that those documents are within its possession, custody, or control. Kasparov disagrees and explains that it has no ability to compel the Signatories to provide more documents or information. Ultimately, the court finds Kasparov's position persuasive.

Rule 34 requires a party to produce responsive, non-privileged documents that are in its “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1). The requirement that a party produce responsive documents within its control means that sometimes a responding party will need to produce documents possessed by third parties. See Poole ex rel. Elliott v. Textron, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 501 (D. Md. 2000). Courts typically consider whether the responding party “has a legal right to control or obtain” responsive documents in a third-party's possession to determine whether the responding party has control over those documents. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 420, 423 (N.D. Ill. 1977). Some courts also look at whether the responding party has the “practical ability” to obtain responsive documents from a third party. Ultra-Mek, Inc. v. Man Wah (USA), Inc., 318 F.R.D. 309, 311–13 (M.D.N.C. 2016). Whatever test applies, the “party seeking production of documents bears the burden of establishing the opposing party's control over those documents.” Prodigious Ventures, Inc. v. YBE Hosp. Grp., LLC, No. 5:14-CV-433-F, 2016 WL 1248806, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 25, 2016)

Zacherl has not met his burden to show that documents possessed by the Kasparov Signatures are within Kasparov's legal control. There is nothing in the record establishing that Kasparov has the legal right or ability to obtain documents from the Signatories. So he is not entitled to documents from the Signatories under the traditional understanding of “control” under Rule 45.

But Zacherl claims that Kasparov has control over the documents because it has the practical ability to require the Signatories to produce the documents. In support of this assertion, he notes the Signatories provided some documents in response to Kasparov's request.

This court has been skeptical of the practical ability test since the Federal Rules and federal law provide other mechanisms to obtain documents from non-parties. See Bleecker v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 726, 739 (E.D.N.C. 2000). Other courts have examined the practical ability test's pedigree and found it severely lacking. Robinson v. Moskus, 491 F. Supp. 3d 359 (C.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2020) (reviewing the test's history and concluding that courts created it “out of whole cloth, without reasoning or citation to any case which actually mentions or uses it.”). And, however the test came to be, it appears to have strayed from its initial focus, which was “under what circumstances does a party ‘control’ documents within the context of corporate affiliations and ownership.” Id.

But even if the court assumes that the practical ability test should apply, Zacherl still would not be entitled to the relief he seeks. Nothing in the record establishes that Kasparov can coerce the Signatories into complying with a request to produce documents.

That coercive ability is the hallmark of the control described in Rule 34. For example, in In re Folding Carton, the court found that the fact that a party could withhold compensation from a non-party former employee who possessed responsive documents was “clearly an indicia of control.” 76 F.R.D. at 423. Similarly, a corporation was found to have the practical ability to obtain documents from a former executive when that executive planned “to continue his service [to the company] as a consultant.” In re Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 236 F.R.D. 177, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

Kasparov's earlier effort to obtain documents from the Signatories demonstrates that it lacks control over them. Zacherl asserts that the Signatories did not fully respond to Kasparov's request. Id. He claims that they only produced “a subset [of responsive documents] that was handpicked by the [Signatories] themselves[.]” Id. So it appears that to the extent they cooperated, the Signatories did so voluntarily, not because they felt compelled to comply. The fact that Kasparov had to rely on the willingness of non-parties to obtain the limited set of documents it produced undermines Zacherl's argument that it has control over the Signatories.

The remainder of the record also demonstrates that Kasparov lacks the practical ability to obtain documents from the Signatories. Taiyang Zhang, Kasparov's Executive and Director, has explained that the still-living signatories no longer perform “regular functions” for the company and the company did not maintain custody of their computers after their work concluded. So Kasparov lacks the ability to threaten to withhold compensation or future business from the Signatories if they failed to comply with its request to produce documents. And Zhang added that the Signatories did not have employment contracts with the company and are under no obligation to produce documents to it. This precludes the company from threatening legal action if the Signatories would decline to turn over their servers and devices for inspection.

Since Kasparov has presented evidence that it lacks the ability to require the Signatories to produce documents, Zacherl “must make an adequate showing to overcome the assertion.” Suh v. HCA – The Healthcare Co., No. 7:02-CV-00166, 2010 WL 11622621, at *3 (E.D.N.C. June 8, 2010) (quoting Golden Trade v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).

Zacherl attempts to do so by noting that the Signatories produced some documents in response to Kasparov's request. But, as discussed, that does nothing to show that Kasparov can make the Signatories do anything more than what they wish to. Zacherl also notes that the affidavits claim the Signatories no longer engage in “regular functions” for the company, which suggests that they may do work for the company on an irregular basis. This argument is too speculative to overcome Zhang's sworn statement. But should discovery uncover the nature and extent of an ongoing relationship between Kasparov and the Signatories, Zacherl may renew his motion.

So the court concludes that Kasparov has shown that documents possessed by the Signatories are not within its possession, custody, or control. Thus Zacherl is not entitled to an order requiring production of those documents. The court denies this portion of Zacherl's motion.

2. Compliance with ESI Stipulation

Zacherl next argues that Kasparov violated the terms of the parties’ ESI stipulation. That stipulation requires the parties to include a specified set of metadata fields, including Custodian and Duplicate Custodian, as part of its ESI production. He claims that Kasparov only produced custodian metadata for 8 of 1,637 documents it produced. The company responds that it processed ESI in accordance with the stipulation and did not intentionally remove any metadata from the documents it produced. And it produced a declaration from its ESI vendor to that effect. As a result, it argues that there is nothing for the court to compel it to produce.

As the record currently stands, the court sides with Kasparov on this point. Zacherl has provided no reason to doubt the sworn statements by Kasparov's ESI vendor that it did not remove metadata from its ESI production. Should discovery turn up different facts, Zacherl may renew his motion. But at this point the court denies this portion of Zacherl's motion.

3. Interrogatory Six

Zacherl also asks the court to compel Kasparov to supplement its response to an interrogatory dealing with its document preservation efforts. The interrogatory asks for “all steps taken by or on behalf of Kasparov to preserve and retain documents and electronically stored information relevant to this action[.]” Interrog. 6, D.E. 64–13 at 3. In addition to that general request, it also seeks the “dates and recipients” of any preservation or retention notices, the sources of any retained or preserved documents and ESI, and how and when the materials were retained. Id.

Kasparov raised several objections in response to this request. It claimed that the interrogatory was objectionable because it was overbroad, required a narrative response of events that occurred over several years, sought privileged information, and sought irrelevant materials that were not “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Resp. to Interrog. 6, D.E. 64–13 at 3–4. It then said that it had taken “the reasonable steps necessary to preserve documents that were within it [sic] possession and reasonably anticipated to be potentially relevant to this lawsuit.” Id.

In response to Zacherl's motion, Kasparov incorporated its objections but provided no additional support for its refusal to provide more information. It does not explain why the request is overbroad, why the attorney-client privilege applies to the information sought, or why the fact that the interrogatory may require a long or detailed response makes it objectionable. And it cites no case law in support of its objections. Yet it “asks the Court to sustain [its] objections.” Resp. in Opp'n at 5.

The lack of a substantive argument in support of its position dooms Kasparov's attempt to withhold this information. The Fourth Circuit has explained that “ ‘[i]t is not the obligation of this court to research and construct legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel,’ and ‘perfunctory and undeveloped arguments ․ are waived.’ ” Steves & Sons, Inc. v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 988 F.3d 690, 727 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Judge v. Quinn, 612 F.3d 537, 557 (7th Cir. 2010)). By failing to properly develop arguments in support of its objections, it has waived them.

But even if it had attempted to develop an argument in support of its objections, those arguments would not likely have been persuasive. To begin with, its objection that discovery is not reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence is baseless. The 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure deleted that language from the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendments. That provision had “been used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery.” Id. So Kasparov cannot rely on that objection to withhold discovery.

What's more, this court has recognized that “[d]ocument retention polices are generally discoverable.” PCS Phosphate Co., Inc. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 2015 WL 8490976, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 10, 2015) (citing cases). Kasparov has provided no reason to depart from this general rule.

Nor does the request appear to seek information that is protected by the attorney-client privilege. Even if Kasparov established that all the elements of the attorney-client privilege are present, the interrogatory does not seek the content of an attorney-client communication. It seeks the steps Kasparov took to preserve and retain documents and ESI. The attorney-client privilege only protects the contents of communications, it does not make factual information that may have been conveyed between attorney and client immune from discovery. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584 (1981); In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 604 (4th Cir. 1997); Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia v. S.S. Mount Dirfys, 537 F. Supp. 55, 56 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege protects only communication not facts within the client's knowledge[.]”).

Nor would privilege allow Kasparov to withhold the date and recipient of a litigation hold letter. The date and recipients of communications are regular features of privilege logs disclosed to opposing parties. See NLRB v. Interbake Foods, LLC, 637 F.3d 492, 502 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a privilege log should include “the nature of each document, the date of its transmission or creation, the author and recipients, the subject, and the privilege asserted.”). So there is no basis to conclude that this information is privileged. In any event, the privilege does not protect the fact that an attorney-client communication occurred. See Hermann v. Hewlett Packard Enters. Co., 2024 WL 4647715, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2024) (“[T]he Court has difficulty accepting that identifying the individuals to whom a litigation hold or document preservation notice was sent and when each was sent would be privileged or protected work product (even if the litigation hold letter or notice itself might be).”).

And there is no basis to conclude that this interrogatory is objectionable because it may require a detailed response of events over an extended period.

So, lacking a valid objection to withhold discovery, Kasparov must provide the requested information.

4. Request for Attorney's Fees

Zacherl requests that the court order Kasparov to pay the fees and costs he incurred in connection with this motion. Under the Federal Rules, when a court partially grants a motion to compel, it may “apportion the reasonable expenses for the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(C). If Zacherl wishes to recover those expenses, he must meet and confer with opposing counsel no later than 7 days after entry of this order. If the parties cannot agree on the amount he is entitled to recover, Zacherl should submit a memorandum of no more than 10 pages outlining the expenses he seeks to recover no later than 14 days after entry of this motion. The memorandum should include all the information required by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent for the court to assess the request. Kasparov may file a response of no more than 10 pages no later than 14 days after Zacherl files his request.

B. Kasparov's Motion to Compel

In its motion, Kasparov asks the court to overrule several objections in Zacherl's written discovery responses and compel him to respond. Zacherl responds that the court should deny the motion because Kasparov failed to comply with its meet-and-confer obligations and because its discovery requests exceed the scope of discovery. The court concludes that Kasparov made a sufficient attempt to resolve this matter without court intervention. It also concludes that Zacherl's objections are either unfounded or waived due to lack of specificity. Thus the motion to compel will be granted.

The Federal Rules require that if a party wishes to object to an interrogatory or a request for production of documents, they must do so with specificity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2)(B) (“The grounds for objecting to an interrogatory must be stated with specificity.”) & 34(b)(2)(B) (requiring a party to “state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons”). It has long been the rule in this district that “ ‘[m]ere recitation of the familiar litany that an interrogatory or a document production request is overly broad, burdensome, oppressive, and irrelevant’ does not suffice as a specific objection.” Mainstreet Collection, 270 F.R.D. at 240 (quoting Momah v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). If a party fails to object or fails to do so with the necessary specificity, it waives the objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4) (“Any ground not stated in a timely objection is waived unless the court, for good cause, excuses the failure.”); Silicon Knights, Inc. v. Epic Games, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 503, 533 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (citing cases). With this standard in mind, the court turns to the disputed objections.

In each of the discovery responses at issue, Zacherl begins his objections with the same language. He objects to the discovery response “on the grounds that there are no allegations in the [First Amended Complaint] regarding” the subject of the request. See, e.g., Resp. to Interrog. 4, D.E. 76–3 at 17. And based on that objection, repeatedly claims that the discovery requests seek documents or information that are “not relevant to any party's claims or defenses, and is overbroad, unduly burdensome[,] and not proportional to the needs of the case.” Id.

This is not a persuasive objection. The scope of discovery is not limited to matters specifically identified in a pleading. Instead, it is limited to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Rule 26’s Advisory Committee Notes recognize this distinction. The Notes explain that a “variety of types of information not directly pertinent to the incident in suit could be relevant to the claims or defenses raised in a given action ․ Similarly, information that could be used to impeach a likely witness, although not otherwise relevant to the claims or defenses, might be properly discoverable.” Id. Rule 26 Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 Amendments Subsection (b)(1). So the fact that a discovery request relates to a matter that is not mentioned in a pleading does not, by itself, render the material irrelevant for discovery purposes or make the request otherwise objectionable. Thus, the court overrules this objection in each discovery response at issue.²

Perhaps aware of this shortcoming, Zacherl's response brief includes a broader relevancy-based argument. But Zacherl did not include this type of objection in his responses. His relevance-based objection (and his objection that the requests are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the case's needs) relied on the fact that the subject of the request was not mentioned in the First Amended Complaint. He has waived any other relance-based objection.

Zacherl also often objects that a word or phrase in a discovery request is “vague and ambiguous.” See, e.g., Resp. to Interrog. 4, D.E. 76–3 at 17 (claiming the term “oral agreements” is vague and ambiguous). But simply claiming that a word or phrase in a discovery request is vague or ambiguous does not comply with the requirement that objections to interrogatories and requests for production be made with specificity. See Canales v. OPW Fueling Components, No. 5:22-CV-00459, 2025 WL 553623, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 19, 2025); Hager v. Graham, 267 F.R.D. 486, 493 (N.D.W. Va. 2010) (explaining that “a general objection on vagueness, ambiguity, broadness, and excessive burden without more does not comply with the requirements of” the Federal Rules). A party must provide some explanation for why the term is vague or ambiguous. By failing to provide that explanation, Zacherl has waived the objection.

The court also disagrees that the challenged terms are so vague or ambiguous that Zacherl could not provide at least some response. To explain why, a brief digression on the meanings of these terms and principles of textual interpretation is necessary. A term is “vague when it admits of borderline cases.” Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 11 (2015). For example, “[t]he word ‘tall’ is vague when used to refer to human height, because there is no bright-line cutoff for tallness.” Id. An ambiguous term is one that “has more than one sense (or semantic meaning). Id. An example of an ambiguous term is the word “cool,” which “has several distinct senses, one related to temperature (the room is cool), another related to temperament (he kept his cool), and yet another sense related to personal style (she was a cool chick).” Id. And some terms can be both vague and ambiguous: “cool is ambiguous and vague in each of the senses specified in this paragraph.” Id.

Yet even terms that are vague or ambiguous (or both) almost always have a discernable meaning when considered in context. There would be no question that most NBA players will qualify as tall in comparison to the general public. And if someone asked on a winter day if it was cool outside, it would be unlikely that the response would involve a discussion about the temperament or style of a favorite actor.

And the fact that terms that are vague or ambiguous (or both) typically have a discernable meaning has implications for responding to discovery. The Federal Rules require parties to respond to interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the extent they are not objectionable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) (“Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.”); 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.”). And the Rules also obligate parties to make a good-faith determination about the portions of a request that are objectionable and those which are not. Id. Rule 26(g)(1)(B).

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rules 33 and 34 explain how these provisions should operate. For example, an objection to a request for production “may state that a request is overbroad, but if the objection recognizes that some part of the request is appropriate the objection should state the scope that is not overbroad.” Rule 34 Advisory Committee Notes to 2015 Amendments. And with respect to interrogatories, if “an interrogatory seeking information about numerous facilities or products is deemed objectionable, but an interrogatory seeking information about a lesser number of facilities or products would not have been objectionable, the interrogatory should be answered with respect to the latter even though an objection is raised as to the balance of the facilities or products.” Rule 33 Advisory Committee Notes to 2015 Amendments.

Determining the meaning of text is a familiar task to attorneys. And that task is no different when interpreting and responding to discovery requests. Sometimes the discovery requests will include definitions, which are “a very strong indication” of a term's meaning. See Antonin G. Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 228 (2012). But absent definitions provided by the drafter (or a valid reason to disregard those definitions), an attorney's “prime directive ․ is to apply the meaning that a reasonable reader would derive from the text[.]” See William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law 33 (2016). And in that endeavor “the ordinary meaning (or the ‘everyday meaning’ or ‘commonsense’ reading) of the ․ text is the anchor for” interpreting the meaning of a discovery request. See id. at 34–35 (citation modified).

Determining the ordinary meaning of a word requires consideration of more than just “the literal or dictionary definition of words” because those definitions “will often fail to account for settled nuances or background conventions that qualify the literal meaning of language and, in particular, of legal language.” See John Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2392–93 (2003). As with all written language, the meaning of terms in a discovery request must be considered in context. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism? 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 348 (2005) (“[N]o ‘textualist’ favors isolating statutory language from its surrounding context”). And while there can be many sources of context, see Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 511–13, 143 S.Ct. 2355, 216 L.Ed.2d 1063 (2023) (Barrett, J., concurring), among the most relevant sources of context for discovery requests will be the claims and defenses in the case, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (defining the scope of discovery to matters relevant to the claims and defenses in the case).

The upshot of this digression is that when considering if the language of a discovery request is vague or ambiguous, an attorney must make a good-faith effort to discern the ordinary meaning of the terms used in a request. In doing so, the attorney should consider, among other things, any definitions provided by the requesting party and the case's claims and defenses. If the attorney believes that reasonable people could disagree about whether a term, interpreted in good faith, could include edge cases or could be susceptible to more than one meaning, the attorney should object, briefly explain their interpretation of the term, and respond based on their interpretation. This process honors the Federal Rules’ requirements, allows for production of at least some documents or information, and sets the stage for a productive meet-and-confer process before discovery motions are filed.

That process does not seem to have been followed here. Zacherl regularly objected to discovery requests as vague or ambiguous without trying to explain the basis for the objection. And he did not make any effort to determine the meaning of the terms used and respond to the requests to the extent they are not objectionable. As a result, Zacherl has waived these objections and may not rely on them in responding to Kasparov's requests.

So Zacherl must supplement his responses to provide any documents or information that were withheld based on the waived objections. To the extent there are other objections that have not been overruled, Zacherl may continue to rely on them. But Zacherl must fully respond to the requests to the extent that they are not objected to. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3) (“Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.”); 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection to part of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest.”). And if Zacherl is relying on one of his remaining objections to withhold documents, he must explicitly say so. Id. Rule 34(b)(2)(C) (“An objection must state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection.”).

Kasparov asks the court to award it the fees and costs it incurred in connection with this motion. If the court grants a motion to compel, it “must” require the responding party, or their attorneys, to pay the movant's “reasonable expenses incurred” in connection with the motion, “including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). If Kasparov wishes to recover those expenses, it must meet and confer with opposing counsel no later than 7 days after entry of this order. If the parties cannot agree on the amount it is entitled to recover, Kasparov should submit a memorandum of no more than 10 pages outlining the expenses it seeks to recover no later than 14 days after entry of this motion. The memorandum should include all the information required by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent for the court to assess the request. Zacherl may file a response of no more than 10 pages no later than 14 days after Kasparov files its request.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part Zacherl's motion to compel. D.E. 62. Kasparov shall supplement its response to Interrogatory 6. The court also grants Kasparov's motion to compel. D.E. 75. Zacherl must supplement his responses to Interrogatories 4 and 6 and Requests for Production 16–28, 38–43, 46–50, and 54. Unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties or ordered by the court, the supplementation must occur within 14 days from entry of this order. Any requests for attorney's fees must be submitted as discussed above.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Since Kullander passed away in November 2022, it directed its requests to Kullander's widow. But for ease of reference this opinion will still refer to Kullander as one of the Signatories.

2.   In a few instances, Zacherl included an additional relevance-based objection. See. Resp. to Request for Prod. 25, D.E. 76-5 at 21; Resp. 28, D.E. 76-5 at 22; Resp. 39, D.E. 76-5 at 28, Resp. 40, D.E. 76-5 at 29; Resp. 49, D.E. 76-5 at 34-35; Resp. 54, D.E. 76-5 at 37. These objections were not challenged by Kasparov and thus are not overruled. The court, however, expresses no opinion on the validity of these objections.

Robert T. Numbers, II, United States Magistrate Judge