WATSON v. WAKE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM (2025)

ORDER

On October 16, 2024, Tracey Watson (“Watson” or “plaintiff”) filed an amended complaint against the Wake County Public School System (“WCPSS”) and the Wake County Board of Education (“WCBE” or “defendant”) [D.E. 23].¹ Watson alleges (1) race discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“section 1981”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) (“count one”), (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII, section 1981, section 1983, and the First Amendment (“count two”), and (3) a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, section 1981, section 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment (“count three”). See id. at ¶¶ 204–57. On October 25, 2024, Watson filed an affidavit and exhibits totaling more than 300 pages [D.E. 29].²

On November 14, 2024, WCBE moved to dismiss the amended complaint [D.E. 32] and filed a memorandum in support [D.E. 33]. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On April 2, 2025, Watson responded in opposition [D.E. 45]. On April 16, 2025, WCBE replied [D.E. 47]. As explained below, the court grants in part defendant's motion to dismiss and dismisses with prejudice the First Amendment retaliation claim in count two and the racially hostile work environment claim in count three.

I.

Watson is a black female with a background in substitute teaching and library services. See Am. Compl. [D.E. 23] ¶¶ 1, 4. In April 2023, Watson successfully applied for a WCBE substitute teacher position. See id. at ¶¶ 14–15. In May 2023, Watson applied for the Library Media Coordinator position at Sanford Creek Elementary School (“Sanford Creek”). See id. at ¶ 16. On June 23, 2023, Tiffany Rich (“Rich”), the principal of Sanford Creek, told Watson that WCBE would conduct a background check as part of Watson's application. See id. at ¶ 17.

On June 29, 2023, WCBE hired Watson as Sanford Creek's Library Media Coordinator. See id. at ¶ 18. After Watson signed a one-year employment contract, Rich explained that Watson would also be the primary Technology Contact for the school. See id. at ¶¶ 19, 21. On July 9, 2023, Watson told Rich that she was not designated as a Technology Contact in Sanford Creek's human resources system and requested extra pay for taking on additional duties. See id. at ¶ 24.

On July 10, 2023, Rich met with Watson and told Watson that two other white employees also held additional Technology Contact positions and did not receive extra pay for those duties. See id. at ¶¶ 24–25. At that meeting, Watson agreed with Rich that Watson's job responsibilities included overseeing Sanford Creek's inventory of technology. See id. at ¶ 25. Rich also explained to Watson that Watson would serve as the school's “Inventory Contact, iOS Coordinator, CTE Tech,” and “Project Positivity Teacher.” Id. at ¶ 27. In addition to these duties, Watson alleges that Rich placed Watson on a “fixed schedule” where Watson provided “classroom instruction to student[s] ․ [for] 6 hours a day.” Id. at ¶ 30. Watson alleges performing all of these tasks was “nearly impossible.” Id. at ¶ 31. Watson also alleges that two other white co-workers also designated as “Certified Instructional Support / Student Services Personnel were not placed on a fixed schedule.” Id.

On August 22, 2023, Rich went on medical leave and Kevin Hill (“Hill”) became Sanford Creek's interim principal. See id. at ¶ 48. Watson alleges that when Hill evaluated Sanford Creek employees, Hill gave Watson less favorable scores than her white colleagues. See id. at ¶¶ 50-54. On October 5, 2023, Watson asked permission from Hill to send an email to the fifth-grade teaching team, which Hill denied. See id. at ¶ 78. On October 6, 2023, Hill gave Watson a written reprimand for sending an email to the fifth-grade teaching team. See id. at ¶ 79. Watson alleges that a white colleague sent a similar school-wide staff email but did not receive a written reprimand. See id.

Watson alleges numerous differences between how Sanford Creek administration treated her as compared to her white colleagues. Watson alleges that she was occasionally required to allow white colleagues to use her office bathroom. See id. at ¶ 33. Watson alleges that she was required to change her scheduled non-teaching workdays, while white colleagues were not. See id. at 34-37. Watson alleges that, after two weeks on the job, she was told she could no longer send school-wide staff emails, while white colleagues continued to do so. See id. at ¶¶ 38, 78–79. Watson alleges that she had to replace printer ink cartridges, a task previously assigned to a white colleague. See id. at ¶ 40. Watson alleges that Rich compared Watson to a white colleague and “implied” that Watson was not as successful in her position. Id. at ¶ 44. Watson alleges that Sanford Creek leadership provided less support to Watson than her white colleagues. See id. at ¶ 49. Watson alleges that she had to seek her colleagues’ approval for certain events, while her white colleagues did not. See id. at ¶ 140. Watson alleges that her library programs were excluded from school communications to parents, while white colleagues’ programs were included. See id. at ¶ 142. Watson alleges that, despite having a leadership position, she was not treated as a leader because she is black. See id. at ¶ 151. Watson also alleges that she was reprimanded for arriving late to a meeting, while her white colleagues were not. See id. at ¶ 154.

On October 9, 2023, Watson submitted a workplace harassment, discrimination, and retaliation complaint to the WCBE Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources. See id. at ¶ 89. The day Watson submitted her complaint, Hill “started lurking in front of the library [window] eyeballing [Watson] and looking angry.” Id. at ¶ 90. From approximately 11:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M., Watson noticed Hill looking at her at least seven different times through the library window. See id. On October 10, 2023, Watson spotted Hill standing in front of the library nine more times. See id. at ¶ 91. On October 11, 2023, and October 23, 2023, Watson observed Hill around the library throughout the day. See id. at ¶¶ 93–94.

On October 24, 2023, Watson met with Tanisha McCoy (“McCoy”), a WCBE Human Resources employee, to discuss her complaint. See id. at ¶ 96. On October 25, 2023, Rich returned from medical leave. See id. at ¶ 98. On October 26, 2023, Watson sent three emails to McCoy providing information and audio recordings concerning her complaint. See id. at ¶¶ 99–101.

On November 3, 2023, Watson informed Rich and the WCBE that she had “submitted an inquiry with [the] EEOC.” Id. at ¶ 108. On November 9, 2023, Rich reprimanded Watson five times over a six-hour period, removed Watson from certain job duties, and gave Watson different job duties. See id. at ¶ 110. Watson alleges that she was “subjected to heightened levels of supervision, scrutiny, ․ micromanagement, [and] unjustified disciplinary actions, such as warnings and write-ups.” Id. On November 13, 2023, between 6:47 A.M. and 8:50 A.M., Watson sent seven emails to McCoy recounting the events of the past several days. See id. at ¶¶ 111–14. On November 14, 2023, Watson met with McCoy and another WCBE human resources employee to discuss Watson's concerns. See id. at ¶ 117.

On November 21, 2023, Rich called Watson into a meeting to discuss a complaint that a teacher had filed against Watson. See id. at ¶ 118. At this meeting, Watson told Rich that this teacher had been harassing Watson. See id. at ¶¶ 118–23.

On December 7, 2023, Alicia Matthews (“Matthews”), Sanford Creek's Lead Secretary, sent Watson an email asking Watson to stop “bullying” her. Id. at ¶ 127. On December 8, 2023, Watson filed a complaint with the EEOC. See id. at ¶ 124. On December 10, 2023, Watson filed an amended complaint with the EEOC. See id. at ¶ 132. On December 11, 2023, Watson sent Matthews an email rebutting her bullying allegation. See id. at ¶ 129.

On January 4, 2024, Rich called Watson into a meeting to address teacher complaints that Watson was not allowing sufficient access to the library's media center. See id. at 137. On January 5, 2024, Watson complained to WCBE about alleged retaliation and harassment. See id. at ¶ 143. Watson alleges that, after her complaint, students were “being called out of the library to the main office” and her “team suddenly stop[ped] coming to the library to each lunch” with her. Id. at ¶¶ 145, 179. Watson alleges that WCBE withheld an “advanced pay monthly supplement [o]f $126 per month” in retaliation. Id. at ¶ 195. Watson also alleges that WCBE or Sanford Creek employees broke into her vehicle, hacked her home computer, and put her under “constant surveillance” in response to her complaints. See id. at ¶¶ 170–72.

Sometime in January 2024, Rich informed Watson that her contract would not be renewed. See id. at ¶ 156. On February 7, 2024, Rich allegedly gave Watson a “false unsupported negative evaluation.” Id. at ¶ 149. Watson also alleges that, during Sanford Creek's February 2024 celebration of Black History Month, someone placed a book about a black monkey along with a stuffed monkey doll on one of the library's bookshelves. See id. at ¶ 130. On February 25, 2024, Watson sent an email to WCBE concerning her discrimination, harassment, and retaliation complaints. See id. at ¶ 162. On February 29, 2024, Chris Heagarty, a WCBE Member, told Watson that her email was forwarded to the appropriate WCPSS staff. See id. at ¶ 164.

On April 2, 2024, Watson petitioned the WCBE to remove Hill's written reprimand from her personnel file. See id. at ¶ 180. For the next two months, Watson repeatedly asked various WCBE and WCPSS staff members to remove Hill's written reprimand from her file. See id. at ¶¶ 181–200. On April 19, 2024, Watson filed an additional complaint with the EEOC. See id. at ¶ 184. On June 3, 2024, Watson received a letter notifying her that the WCBE had voted not to renew her employment contract and that she would not receive a hearing concerning Hill's written reprimand. See id. at ¶ 201.

II.

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's legal and factual sufficiency. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–80, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–63, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012); Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quotation omitted); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955; Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302. In considering the motion, the court must construe the facts and reasonable inferences “in the light most favorable to [the nonmoving party].” Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted); see Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 192 L.Ed.2d 236 (2015). A court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions, “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano, 521 F.3d at 302 (quotation omitted); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Rather, a plaintiff's factual allegations must “nudge[ ] [her] claims,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, beyond the realm of “mere possibility” into “plausibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief ․ [is] a context specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint does not suffice. Id.

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court considers the pleadings and any materials “attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2016); Thompson v. Greene, 427 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). A court also may consider a document submitted by a moving party if it is “integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity” without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Goines, 822 F.3d at 166. “[I]n the event of conflict between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached ․, the exhibit prevails.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Fayetteville Invs. v. Com. Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of public records. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 201; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

A.

In count one, Watson alleges that WCBE discriminated against her because of her race in violation of Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 204–14. Title VII prohibits an employer from taking adverse employment action against an employee “because of” an individual's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right ․ to make and enforce contracts ․ as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). Section 1981 “protects all persons from racial discrimination in making and enforcing contracts.” Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2017). “To succeed on a § 1981 claim, a plaintiff must ultimately establish both that the defendant intended to discriminate on the basis of race, and that the discrimination interfered with a contractual interest.” Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 305 (4th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff also must show that her race was the “but for” cause of the interference with a contractual interest. Comcast Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 340–41, 140 S.Ct. 1009, 206 L.Ed.2d 356 (2020). The court evaluates these claims under the same pleading standard. See, e.g., Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 2004); Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs, Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 543–45 (4th Cir. 2003); Henry v. Vaughn Indus., LLC, 450 F. Supp. 3d 671, 678 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 2020).

A plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to survive a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 590 (4th Cir. 2024); Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2022); Bing v. Brivo Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020); McCleary-Evans v. Md. Dep't of Transp., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). In order to state a race discrimination claim under Title VII or section 1981, Watson must plausibly allege that WCBE discriminated against her because of her race with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privilege of employment. See, e.g., Kelly v. Town of Abingdon, 90 F.4th 158, 169 & n.6 (4th Cir. 2024); Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299; Bing, 959 F.3d at 616–17; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585–86.

In considering whether Watson plausibly alleged a race discrimination claim, Watson must plausibly allege an adverse employment action. See, e.g., Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346, 355, 144 S.Ct. 967, 218 L.Ed.2d 322 (2024); Herkert v. Bisignano, ––– F.4th ––––, –––– – ––––, 2025 WL 2348704, at *4-6 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2025); Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299; Bing, 959 F.3d at 616–17; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585–86. An adverse employment action does not require a “significant ․ [o]r serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar” change in working conditions. Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355, 144 S.Ct. 967 (quotation omitted). Rather, it requires “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment.” Id.; see Herkert, ––– F.4th at –––– – ––––, 2025 WL 2348704, at *4–6; Yates v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 115 F.4th 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2024), petition for cert. filed, No. 24-6725 (U.S. Mar. 10, 2025); Stratton v. Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 38 n.6 (1st Cir. 2024); Peifer v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 106 F.4th 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2024); Rios v. Centerra Grp. LLC, 106 F.4th 101, 112 (1st Cir. 2024); Cole v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 105 F.4th 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 2024); Milczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 102 F.4th 772, 787 (6th Cir. 2024), reh'g denied sub nom., Mllczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 23-1462, 2024 WL 3205990 (6th Cir. June 17, 2024) (unpublished). Moreover, to “discriminate against means [to] treat worse.” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355, 144 S.Ct. 967 (quotation omitted). An employee need only be “treat[ed] worse” respecting an identifiable term, condition, or privilege of employment based on her protected status, such as race. Id. Thus, an adverse employment action includes a “disadvantageous change to the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of a protected status.” Cole, 105 F.4th at 1114; see Rios, 106 F.4th at 112.

A plaintiff may establish a race discrimination claim in two ways. First, a plaintiff can use direct evidence to show that race discrimination motivated an employer's adverse employment action. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005). Alternatively, if a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of race discrimination, a plaintiff can proceed under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284–85 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The McDonnell Douglas framework consists of three steps: “(1) the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination or retaliation; (2) the burden of production then shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the adverse action; (3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the stated reason for the adverse employment action is a pretext and that the true reason is discriminatory or retaliatory.” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). The McDonnell Douglas framework applies to discipline and termination claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2004); Beall v. Abbott Lab'ys, 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated in part on other grounds by Gilliam v. S.C, Dep't of Juv. Just., 474 F.3d 134 (4th Cir. 2007).

To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Watson must show that (1) she was a member of a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was fulfilling her employer's legitimate expectations at the time of the adverse action, and (4) she was treated differently than a similarly situated employee outside the protected class. See, e.g., Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 2015), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bing, 959 F.3d 605; White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004); Tahir v. Sessions, No. 5:16-CV-781, 2017 WL 1735158, at *4 (E.D.N.C. May 2, 2017) (unpublished), aff'd, 703 F. App'x 211 (4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (unpublished).

To establish a valid comparator, a plaintiff must show that her comparator were “similar in all relevant respects.” Haywood v. Locke, 387 F. App'x 355, 359 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished); see Smith v. Stratus Comput., Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1994); Barski v. Cyberdata Techs., Inc., No. 8:17-CV-3593, 2020 WL 4471827, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 4, 2020) (unpublished); Wilson v. City of Chesapeake, 290 F. Supp. 3d 444, 457–58 (E.D. Va. 2018), aff'd, 738 F. App'x 169 (4th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (unpublished). The comparator must have “dealt with the same supervisor, ․ been subject to the same standards and ․ engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it.” Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992); see Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219, 223–24 (4th Cir. 2019); Haywood, 387 F. App'x at 359; Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511–12 (4th Cir. 1993); Wilson, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 457–58. A comparison between similar employees, however, “will never involve precisely the same set of work-related offenses occurring over the same period of time and under the same sets of circumstances.” Haynes, 922 F.3d at 223 (quotation omitted); see Cook, 988 F.2d at 511; Moore v. City of Charlotte, 754 F.2d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 1985). In the discipline context, “[t]he most important variables ․ and the most likely sources of different but nondiscriminatory treatment, are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.” Moore, 754 F.2d at 1105.

In count one, Watson plausibly alleges race discrimination. See Comcast, 589 U.S. at 340–41, 140 S.Ct. 1009; Kelly, 90 F.4th at 169; Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299; Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 305; Bing, 959 F.3d at 616–17; McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585–86; Jordan, 458 F.3d at 346. Whether count one will survive WCBE's inevitable summary judgment motion is a question for another day. Thus, the court denies WCBE's motion to dismiss count one.

B.

In count two, Watson alleges that WCBE retaliated against her for engaging in protected Title VII activities and complaining about race discrimination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 214–53. To state a claim, Watson must plausibly allege that (1) she engaged in protected activity under Title VII or section 1981, (2) her employer took some action against her that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse, and (3) her employer took the adverse action because of the protected activity. See, e.g., Herkert, ––– F.4th at ––––, 2025 WL 2348704, at *6; Barbour, 105 F.4th at 590; Massaro v. Fairfax Cnty, 95 F.4th 895, 902 (4th Cir. 2024); Cosby v. S.C. Probation, Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707, 718 (4th Cir. 2024); McIver v. Bridgestone Ams., Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 411 (4th Cir. 2022); Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 177 (4th Cir. 2022); Holloway, 32 F.4th at 299–300; Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2021); Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 653 (4th Cir. 2021); Kitlinski v. U.S. Dep't of Just., 994 F.3d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 2021); Wilcox v. Lyons, 970 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2020); Evans v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 183, 195 (4th Cir. 2019); Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 213 (4th Cir. 2019); Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 276 (4th Cir. 2018); Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 327 (4th Cir. 2018); Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217; Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 253 (4th Cir. 2015); DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2015); Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc); Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2013); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–70, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006); Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 384 (4th Cir. 2011).

Title VII protects two kinds of activities: opposition and participation. See Netter v. Barnes, 908 F.3d 932, 937–38 (4th Cir. 2018); Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998). Section 1981 also prohibits retaliation for complaining about race discrimination. See Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. 399, 411, 140 S.Ct. 1168, 206 L.Ed.2d 432 (2020); Comcast, 589 U.S. at 331, 140 S.Ct. 1009; Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 354–55, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013); CBOCS W. Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 452–57, 128 S.Ct. 1951, 170 L.Ed.2d 864 (2008).

“[O]ppositional activity must be directed to ‘an unlawful employment practice’ under Title VII ․” DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 417 (citation omitted); see Netter, 908 F.3d at 937–38; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282; Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259. The opposition clause applies when an employee “opposes not only employment actions actually unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions [she] reasonably believes to be unlawful [under Title VII].” DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 417 (cleaned up); see Netter, 908 F.3d at 937–38; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 282. The participation clause protects employees making a charge, testifying, assisting, or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259.

Under Title VII, material adversity “means [that an employer's actions] well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quotation omitted). Title VII does not redress “trivial harms” or provide a “general civility code for the American workplace.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998). Rather, Title VII's anti-retaliation provision prohibits an employer's actions that “are likely to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and their employers.” White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (quotation omitted); see Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). The court analyzes material adversity from the perspective of an objective, reasonable employee and ignores “a plaintiff's unusual subjective feelings.” White, 548 U.S. at 68–69, 126 S.Ct. 2405; see Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 134–35 (4th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the court must account for the “particular circumstances” surrounding the alleged retaliation. White, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405.

A plaintiff must prove that “the desire to retaliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 352, 133 S.Ct. 2517; see Netter, 908 F.3d at 938; Villa v. CavaMezze Grill, LLC, 858 F.3d 896, 900 (4th Cir. 2017); Guessous, 828 F.3d at 216–17; Foster, 787 F.3d at 249; Huckelba v. Deering, No. 5:16-CV-247, 2016 WL 6082032, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 2016) (unpublished). This causation standard “requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred absent the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360, 133 S.Ct. 2517; see Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217. “Naked allegations of a causal connection between plaintiff's protected activity and the alleged retaliation do not state a plausible Title VII claim.” Huckelba, 2016 WL 6082032, at *3; see McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585–88.

“To establish a causal relationship between the protected activity and the [adverse action], a plaintiff must show that the decision maker was aware of the protected activity at the time the alleged retaliation occurred.” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 124. An employee cannot plausibly allege a but-for causal connection between protected activity and the employer's adverse action without alleging that the decisionmaker who took the adverse action knew that the employee had engaged in protected activity. See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218 (4th Cir. 2007); Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 278 (4th Cir. 2001); Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345; see also Conrad v. CSX Transp., Inc., 824 F.3d 103, 108 (4th Cir. 2016); Gestamp S.C., L.L.C. v. NLRB, 769 F.3d 254, 261–62 (4th Cir. 2014).

Courts consider temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse action. See, e.g., Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74, 121 S.Ct. 1508, 149 L.Ed.2d 509 (2001) (per curiam); Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 133 S.Ct. 2517. An adverse action taken shortly after an employer learned of protected activity typically permits a reasonable inference of causation. See Dowe, 145 F.3d at 657. “A lengthy time lapse between the employer becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action, [however,] ․ negates any inference that a causal connection exists between the two.” Id. (finding three years too long to infer causation); see Breeden, 532 U.S. at 274, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (same for 20 months); Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123, 132–35 (4th Cir. 2025) (same for six months); Cosby, 93 F.4th at 721–22 (same for six years); Massaro, 95 F.4th at 902 (same for 18 months); Roberts, 998 F.3d at 126 (same for three months); Penley v. McDowell Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 876 F.3d 646, 656 (4th Cir. 2017) (same for eight and nine months); Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 803 (4th Cir. 1998) (same for 13 months). A plaintiff can rebut this conclusion by plausibly alleging that his employer's actions taken during the intervening period demonstrate retaliatory animus. See Barbour, 105 F.4th at 593–600; Lettieri v. Equant Inc., 478 F.3d 640, 650 (4th Cir. 2007); King v. Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 151 n.5 (4th Cir. 2003).

Watson plausibly alleges a retaliation claim under Title VII and section 1981. On November 3, 2023, Watson informed Rich that she had filed a complaint with the EEOC against Rich and WCBE for alleged race discrimination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 108–10. Days later, Rich reprimanded Watson six times within a five-hour window, removed Watson from certain job duties, and gave Watson different job duties. See id. Moreover, Watson plausibly alleges that WCBE withheld supplemental pay of $126 per month in retaliation for pursuing her claims against WCBE. See id. at ¶¶ 191–95. Thus, Watson plausibly alleges a retaliation claim.

Watson fails to plausibly allege a retaliation claim concerning Hill's conduct. Watson's perception that Hill “looked angry” and Hill's presence outside the library does not amount to materially adverse action. See, e.g., White, 548 U.S. at 68–69, 126 S.Ct. 2405; Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346, 117 S.Ct. 843; Bryant, 288 F.3d at 134–35. To the extent Watson seeks to plead a retaliation claim based on Watson's coworkers declining to have lunch with her, an alleged vehicle break-in, alleged WCBE surveillance, an alleged hack of Watson's home computer, or meetings called to discuss complaints other teachers and staff filed against Watson, Watson fails to plausibly allege a retaliation claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–70, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Whether count two will survive WCBE's inevitable summary judgment motion is an issue for another day.

C.

In count two, Watson also alleges WCBE declined to renew her employment contract for engaging in protected speech and thereby violated the First Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 214–53. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Watson must plausibly allege that “(1) [she] engaged in protected First Amendment activity, (2) the defendant took some action that adversely affected [her] First Amendment rights, and (3) there was a causal relationship between [her] protected activity and the defendant's conduct.” Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted); see Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. Allen, 416 F. Supp. 3d 550, 563 (E.D.N.C. 2018). A plaintiff “suffers adverse action if the defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First Amendment rights.” Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500 (quotation omitted); see Balt. Sun Co. v. Ehrlich, 437 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff must plausibly allege that the “defendant's conduct resulted in something more than a de minimis inconvenience to her exercise of First Amendment rights.” Balt. Sun Co., 437 F.3d at 416 (quotation omitted); Constantine, 411 F.3d at 500. As for the causal relationship, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “but-for cause.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 399, 139 S.Ct. 1715, 204 L.Ed.2d 1 (2019); see Bhattacharya v. Murray, 93 F.4th 675, 688 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 145 S. Ct. 443, ––– L.Ed.2d –––– (2024). “It is not enough that the protected expression played a role or was a motivating factor in the retaliation; [a plaintiff] must show but for the protected expression the state actor would not have taken the alleged retaliatory action.” Bhattacharya, 93 F.4th at 688 (cleaned up).

Public employees asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim against their employers must proceed under the Pickering-Connick framework. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–46, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571–73, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560–61 (4th Cir. 2011); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. Div., 484 F.3d 687, 692–94 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2007); Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368–69 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). To state a claim under the Pickering-Connick framework, Watson must plausibly allege that (1) she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern, rather than as an employee on a matter of private interest, (2) her interest in speaking on the matter of public concern outweighed the defendants’ interest in providing effective and efficient public service, (3) defendants took some action against her that deprived her of a valuable government benefit or that would tend to chill her protected speech, and (4) a causal relationship existed between her protected speech and the retaliation. See, e.g., Massaro, 95 F.4th at 905–06; Smith v. Gilchrist, 749 F.3d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 2014); Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 373–75 (4th Cir. 2013); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 322–23 (4th Cir. 2003); Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 218 F.3d 337, 351–52, 356 (4th Cir. 2000); McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277–78 (4th Cir. 1998).

Two inquiries guide the scope of constitutional protection accorded to a public employee's speech. “The first requires determining whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); see Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 196–97, 144 S.Ct. 756, 218 L.Ed.2d 121 (2024); Lee, 484 F.3d at 694. If not, “the employee has no First Amendment cause of action based on his or her employer's reaction to the speech.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951. If so, the court proceeds to the second inquiry: “whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public.” Id. This determination requires weighing “the employee's interest in First Amendment expression” against “the public employer's interest in what the employer has determined to be the appropriate operation of the workplace.” Lee, 484 F.3d at 694 (quotation omitted). Employees speaking as citizens on matters of public concern “must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951.

Whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern requires an effort to participate in a larger public dialogue. See Crouse v. Town of Moncks Corner, 848 F.3d 576, 585–87 (4th Cir. 2017); see, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566, 88 S.Ct. 1731 (including writing a letter to a newspaper about a public issue); Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 409–10 (4th Cir. 2016) (including making an online Facebook post concerning a public discussion of an important issue); Robinson v. Balog, 160 F.3d 183, 188 (4th Cir. 1998) (including testifying at a public meeting).

Watson fails to plausibly allege a First Amendment retaliation claim. Watson's amended complaint painstaking chronicles myriad workplace disagreements. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60–72, 75. Watson does not plausibly allege that she attempted to participate in a larger public dialogue. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566, 88 S.Ct. 1731; Crouse, 848 F.3d at 585–87; Liverman, 844 F.3d at 409–10; Robinson, 160 F.3d at 188. Moreover, Watson fails to specify which portion of her voluminous speech prompted WCBE's alleged retaliation. Watson cannot vaguely refer to her protected speech when her amended complaint spans 125 pages. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–70, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Watson fails to plausibly allege a First Amendment retaliation claim. Thus, the court dismisses with prejudice any such claim.

D.

In count three, Watson alleges that WCBE maintained a racially hostile work environment at Sanford Creek in violation of Title VII, section 1981, and section 1983. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 254–57. To demonstrate a hostile work environment claim, Watson must prove that (1) she experienced unwelcome conduct, (2) the conduct was based on a protected characteristic under the relevant statute, (3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere, and (4) the conduct is imputable to the employer. See, e.g., Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Decoster v. Becerra, 119 F.4th 332, 338–39 (4th Cir. 2024); Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson v. Priority Auto. Huntersville, Inc., 70 F.4th 776,781–83 (4th Cir. 2023); Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201, 210–12 (4th Cir. 2022); Chapman v. Oakland Living Ctr., Inc., 48 F.4th 222, 229 (4th Cir. 2022); Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 207–08 (4th Cir. 2019); Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 302 (4th Cir. 2019); Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277; Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 220–21 (4th Cir. 2011); EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P. A., 609 F.3d 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2010); Ziskie v. Mineta, 547 F.3d 220, 224 (4th Cir. 2008); Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Coleman v. Altec, Inc., No. 5:16-CV-954, 2018 WL 4289610, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 7, 2018) (unpublished); Brown v. Wake Cnty. Gov't, No. 5:16-CV-806, 2017 WL 2982971, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 12, 2017) (unpublished). An employee also must show that her protected characteristic was the “but for” cause of the alleged harassment. See, e.g., Gilliam, 474 F.3d at 142.

To determine whether conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the employee's terms and conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment based on a protected characteristic, the court examines the allegations both subjectively and objectively. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). First, the employee must subjectively consider the conduct to be sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter her conditions of employment. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508 (2001); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998); Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277. Second, a court views the conduct from the perspective of a reasonable person in the employee's position to determine whether it is objectively severe or pervasive. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 271, 121 S.Ct. 1508; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82, 118 S.Ct. 998; Decoster, 119 F.4th at 338–39; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson, 70 F.4th at 781–83; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277.

The objective component helps courts “to police the baseline for hostile environment claims.” Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quotation omitted). The court considers all the circumstances, including the “frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367; see Parker, 915 F.3d at 304. The conduct must be severe or pervasive to be actionable. See Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Decoster, 119 F.4th at 338–39; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson, 70 F.4th at 781–83; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277–78. Title VII and section 1981 do not create “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80, 118 S.Ct. 998; see Irani v. Palmetto Health, 767 F. App'x 399, 416 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (unpublished). Rather, the “conduct must ․ amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275; see Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277–81. Simple teasing, sporadic rude language, offhand comments, jokes related to a protected status, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. See White, 548 U.S. at 68–69, 126 S.Ct. 2405; Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275; cf. Chapman, 48 F.4th at 228–34; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277–81. Likewise, mere rude or insensitive treatment cannot sustain a hostile work environment claim. See, e.g., Decoster, 119 F.4th at 338–39; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson, 70 F.4th at 781–83; Bonds, 629 F.3d at 385–86; Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 746–47 (4th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009); see also Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82, 118 S.Ct. 998; cf. Chapman. 48 F.4th at 228–34; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277–81; Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 207–10 (4th Cir. 2014); Freeman v. Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 420–24 (4th Cir. 2014); Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220–22.

“The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.” Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82, 118 S.Ct. 998. “Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context,” will enable courts to distinguish between teasing, distasteful jokes, sporadic rude language, vulgarity, stupidity, offhand comments, and insensitive treatment and “conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive” based on a protected characteristic. Id. at 82, 118 S.Ct. 998; see Decoster, 119 F.4th at 338–39; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson, 70 F.4th at 781–83; Hartsell v. Duplex Prods., Inc., 123 F.3d 766, 772–73 (4th Cir. 1997).

Although hostile work environment claims often involve repeated conduct, an “isolated incident of harassment can amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment, if that incident is extremely serious.” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (quotations and alterations omitted); see Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 496 (4th Cir. 2015); Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220 & n.5. A “supervisor's power and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular threatening character.” Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 763, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998); see Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 278.

Watson fails to plausibly allege a hostile work environment claim based on her race. According to Watson, she was, inter alia, required to allow colleagues to use her office bathroom, change her scheduled non-teaching workdays, replace printer ink cartridges, and refrain from sending school-wide emails. See id. at ¶¶ 33–49, 140–54. Watson also alleges that she was disrespected by her colleagues and not treated as a member of Sanford Creek's leadership team. Watson's allegations do not qualify as a “change in the terms and conditions of employment.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275; see Decoster, 119 F.4th at 338–39; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson, 70 F.4th at 781–83. Moreover, Watson fails to plausibly allege that her race was the “but-for” cause of any of her colleagues’ actions or alleged behavior. See, e.g., Gilliam, 474 F.3d at 142. Watson's repeated use of the conclusory allegation, “unlike white employees,” does not nudge her racially hostile workplace claim from possibility into plausibility. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 554–70, 127 S.Ct. 1955. To the extent Watson alleges that some unidentified person placed a book about a black monkey and a stuffed monkey doll on a bookshelf during Black History Month, such an isolated event from an unknown source does not suffice to plausibly impute the alleged conduct to the WCBE or to create a racially hostile work environment. See White, 548 U.S. at 68–69, 126 S.Ct. 2405; Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275; cf. Chapman, 48 F.4th at 228–34; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277–81. Watson's allegations do not suffice. See, e.g., Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71, 121 S.Ct. 1508; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82, 118 S.Ct. 998; Decoster, 119 F.4th at 338–39; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140–41; Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716–18; Robinson, 70 F.4th at 781–83; Bonds, 629 F.3d at 385–86; cf. Chapman, 48 F.4th at 228–34; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277–81; Walker, 775 F.3d at 207–10; Freeman, 750 F.3d at 420–24; Okoli, 648 F.3d at 220–22; Baqir, 434 F.3d at 746–47. Thus, the court grants WCBE's motion to dismiss count three and dismisses count three with prejudice.

III.

In sum, the court GRANTS in part defendants’ motion to dismiss [D.E. 32] and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the First Amendment retaliation claim in count two and the racially hostile work environment claim in count three. The court also DISMISSES the Wake County Public School System as a defendant.

SO ORDERED. This 26 day of August, 2025.

FOOTNOTES

1.   State law dictates whether a government agency has the capacity to be sued in federal court. See Avery v. Cnty. of Burke, 660 F.2d 111, 113–14 (4th Cir. 1981); Efird v. Riley, 342 F. Supp. 2d 413, 419–20 (M.D.N.C. 2004). Under North Carolina law, the local board of education is the entity with the legal capacity to sue and be sued. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-40. Thus, the court dismisses the Wake County Public School System as a defendant.

2.   Courts give liberal construction to pro se filings. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). A litigant's pro se status, however, “does not absolve [her] from compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” F.D.I.C. v. Anchor Props., 13 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 1994) (cleaned up). To date, Watson has disregarded the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Watson is on notice that future failures to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the court's Local Civil Rules, may result in adverse outcomes. See United States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012); cf. Riggins v. Steel Techs., 48 F. App'x 460, 461–62 (4th Cir. 2002) (unpublished) (per curiam).

JAMES C. DEVER III, United States District Judge