UNITED STATES v. RICHARDSON (2025)

Order

Recently, the court issued a warrant for Defendant Anthony Lee Richardson's arrest because he allegedly violated his supervised release conditions. Richardson was eventually arrested and taken into custody. At his initial appearance, the United States asked the court to hold a detention hearing to determine whether Richardson should be held in custody until his revocation hearing. Defense counsel objected to that request, arguing that there is no statutory authority for the court to detain a defendant accused of violating his supervised release conditions.¹

This is a curious argument since it appears to contradict the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under those rules, when a person is held in custody or otherwise appears to address an alleged violation of supervised release conditions, the court “may release or detain the person under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) pending further proceedings.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(6). That statute provides that detention is required “unless the judicial officer finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Courts regularly apply this standard when determining whether to release or detain defendants who have allegedly violated their supervised release conditions. See United States v. Winchester, 335 F.R.D. 82, 86–87 (M.D.N.C. 2020); United States v. Blackwell, No. 1:07-CR-385–1, 2018 WL 2454133, at *2 (M.D.N.C. May 29, 2018)

But Richardson claims that despite the language of the Federal Rules, federal courts lack the authority to detain defendants facing revocation of their supervised release. This argument is based on the reasoning of United States v. Mercado, No. 3:13-CR-181, 2025 WL 297429 (D. Conn. Jan. 24, 2025).

In Mercado, the court rejected the United States’ request to hold a detention hearing for a defendant who allegedly violated his supervised release conditions. The court began its analysis by pointing to the Non-Detention Act, which provides that “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” Id. at *1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)). It then rejected the United States’ argument that Congress authorized the defendant's detention under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) or 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Id.

Beginning with 18 U.S.C. § 3143, the court noted that its language does not apply to defendants on supervised release. That statute deals with release or detention of “a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of sentence[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a). It then concluded that Mercado, who had completed a 120-month sentence, fell outside the statute's language. Id. at *1–6.

In connection with that discussion, the court also rejected the Government's argument that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allow it to pursue detention under § 3143(a). Id. at *2. Rule 46 provides that “Rule 32.1(a)(6) governs release pending a hearing on a violation of probation or supervised release.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 46(d). And Rule 32.1 provides that when a person has their initial appearance for a supervised release violation a judicial official “may release or detain the person under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1). Id. Rule 32.1(a)(6). But this argument was unpersuasive to the Mercado court, “because all that rule accomplishes is to cite to the authority granted by section 3143(a), and because Rule 32.1 cannot, by implication, expand the categories of persons to whom the statute applies.” Mercado, 2025 WL 297429, at * 2.

The court also rejected the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) authorized the defendant's detention. That statute deals with modification of supervised release conditions or revocation of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). The court found that the statute did not authorize the defendant's detention because, while it mentions the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, it does not authorize pre-revocation detention or incorporate Rule 32.1(a). Mercado, 2025 WL 297429, at *7. So the court ordered that Mercado would remain at liberty pending his revocation hearing. Id.

Richardson now asks the court to adopt Mercado’s reasoning and reject the United States’ attempt to detain him. Mercado, however, is a district court case from another judicial district, thus it not is not binding on this court. So whether this court should adopt its holding depends on the persuasiveness of its reasoning. For the reasons discussed below, its reasoning lacks persuasive effect because it fails to fairly interpret the applicable rules and statutes.

To begin with, even if the court were to adopt Mercado, it would not lead to Richardson's release. Instead, doing so would deprive him of the only avenue available to obtain release before his revocation hearing.

Federal law provides that “a person on supervised release ․ may be arrested” if there is probable cause to believe that the person has violated the terms of their supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3606(a). A court with supervision over a releasee may then issue a warrant for the releasee's arrest, and a probation officer or United States Marshal may execute that warrant. Id.

That is exactly what happened here. The court determined that there was probable cause to believe Richardson violated the terms of his supervised release and issued a warrant or his arrest. Mot. for Revocation of Supervised Release, D.E. 77; Arrest Warrant, D.E. 78. He was then taken into custody and brought before the court.

So at the time of his initial appearance, Richardson was held in federal custody pursuant to an act of Congress that authorized the arrest of those who are believed to have violated the terms of their supervised release. Thus the Non-Detention Act, assuming it applies in this circumstance,² does not prohibit the United States from holding him in custody.

Given that Richardson was validly in custody, what legal authority authorizes his release? The Supreme Court has explained that the Constitution does not provide a right to bail. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–50 & 750–55 (1987). Instead, it is Congress that determines “the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country.” Id. at 545.

Of course, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, enacted under the Rules Enabling Act, authorize Richardson's release. They provide that a judicial official “may release or detain” a releasee who has been arrested “under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) pending further proceedings.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(6) (emphasis added). But if, as Mercado posits, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) does not apply to supervised releasees and Rule 32.1(a)(6) cannot adopt that statute's standard in the supervised release context, then there is no mechanism to allow Richardson release ahead of his revocation hearing. So while Richardson would be correct that the United States is not entitled to a detention hearing, his victory would be pyrrhic since he would no longer have the ability to seek release before his revocation hearing occurs.

This court, however, does not find Mercado’s reasoning persuasive. The common understanding of Rule 32.1(a)(6) is that it requires courts to apply the standard set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) to determine whether a supervised releasee should be released or detained until their revocation hearing occurs. A contrary interpretation, like the one advanced in Mercado, would render Rule 32.1(a)(6) a nullity. Principles of statutory interpretation, which apply with equal force when interpreting the federal rules, counsel against interpretations that would deprive a text of all meaning. And the court declines to do so here.

The general rules of statutory interpretation apply to interpretation of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Melvin, 948 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2020). As a result, the court must “start with the rule's plain language.” United States v. Davis, 679 F.3d 190, 196 (4th Cir. 2012). Its analysis of the text “is ‘aided by’ the established canons of statutory construction.” United States v. Thorne, 548 F. Supp. 3d 70, 117 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 112 (2014)). And “the court may, if necessary, look beyond the text to other traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including a Rule's structure, purpose, and legislative history.” Id. (cleaned up).

The Rule's text provides that after a supervised releasee has been arrested, a judicial official “may release or detain the person under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) pending further proceedings.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(6). The question for the court is just how much of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) does Rule 32.1(a)(6) incorporate? If, as Mercado held, it incorporates the entire statutory provision, then it would not apply to a supervised releasee as they are not a person who has been found guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of a sentence. But if it only incorporates the standard for detention under that statute, then it could apply to a supervised releasee.

Mercado’s construction of Rule 32.1(a)(6) cannot be the correct one because it renders that portion of the rule meaningless. Given that a supervised releasee is, by definition, someone who has completed their federal sentence, someone arrested for allegedly violating the terms of their supervised release will never fall within § 3142(a)(1)’s terms. Mercado’s reasoning deprives the rule of all legal force. Applying this construction would violate the “ ‘cardinal principle of statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ ” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)).

Moreover, a construction of Rule 32.1(a)(6) that applies the standard from § 3143(a)(1) to supervised releasees is consistent with the remainder of that subsection. After noting that a supervised releasee can be released or detained as provided in § 3143(a)(1), the rule explains that “[t]he burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the person will not flee or pose a danger to any other person or to the community rests with the person.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(6). This additional language reinforces the conclusion that Rule 32.1(a)(6) is applying § 3143(a)(1)’s standard to supervised releasees.

For these reasons, the court declines to adopt Mercado’s reasoning. Instead, it concludes that the best interpretation of the text of Rule 32.1(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) requires courts to apply that statute's standard to determine whether a person arrested for a supervised release violation should be released pending their revocation hearing. See United States v. Loya, 23 F.3d 1529, 1531 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Phillips, No. CR21–030, 2025 WL 484706 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2025). Richardson's detention hearing will be set by separate order before the presiding district judge.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The court overruled this objection on the record. This opinion expands on the basis for the court's ruling.

2.   There is substantial doubt about whether the Non-Detention Act applies in this context. See Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the Non-Detention Act does not limit the inherent powers of federal courts to confine those who violate its orders). Since the Richardson was lawfully detained pursuant to a congressionally authorized warrant, the court need not delve into this matter further.

Robert T. Numbers, II, United States Magistrate Judge