BRIDGETT WRIGHT v. CEDRIC LAMAR RICHARDSON (2024)

OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINT

What began as a simple property sale has spiraled into a jumbled saga of conspiracy. Bridgett Wright inherited a house and then agreed to sell it to Cedric Richardson for $449,000. Their agreement stipulated that if the appraisal was lower, Richardson would pay $5,000 more than the appraised value, capped at $449,000. The house appraised at $405,000, and Richardson tried to pay $410,000 as they agreed, but Wright refused to honor her promise. What followed was years of litigation, with Wright losing at every level of the Michigan courts and being directed to sell her property to Richardson. To date, she still refuses.

Now here in federal court, tangled in a web of her own design, Wright asserts a vast conspiracy to defraud her that involves lawyers, real-estate agents, mortgage companies, and even a state judge. This Court must now decide whether Wright's grievances hold any water. But the record—teeming with motions to dismiss, requests for default judgments, and other procedural wranglings—reflects a case that stretches the bounds of plausibility, serving as a cautionary tale of how far some will go to avoid fulfilling a contractual obligation.

As explained below, Wright's entire case will be dismissed.

I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of the defendants' motions to dismiss, Wright's allegations must be accepted as true, with all reasonable inferences drawn in her favor. See Waskul v. Washtenaw Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health, 979 F.3d 426, 440 (6th Cir. 2020).

A. Prelitigation Background

Wright's legal odyssey began with her ownership of 49109 Paloma Drive, Belleville, MI, 48111. This property, which she inherited, became the focal point of what she describes as fraudulent activities. See generally ECF No. 3. Moving to Texas for employment in August 2021, she left her Michigan home susceptible to what she claims were nefarious schemes. Id.

Central to Wright's narrative is a purported conspiracy led by Cedric Richardson and Corene Ford to devalue her property through fraudulent appraisals and liens. Id. Wright's initial dealings with STB Brokerage (trading as Coldwell Banker Weir Manuel) revealed discrepancies indicating broader fraud, she says. Id. Wright signed a purchase agreement in July 2021 to sell the property to Richardson for $449,000, agreeing that if the house appraisal was lower, Richardson would “pay $5,000.00 over the appraised price up to the purchase price of $449,000.00.” Id. at PageID.432. The property appraised at $405,000, leading Richardson to offer $410,000. See generally id. Wright refused and sought to terminate the purchase agreement. Id.

Wright believes Richardson, with Ford's aid, manipulated the appraisal. Id. Ford, an associate broker, allegedly fabricated documents to support this appraisal, which Richardson then used to impose a fraudulent lien. Id. Wright consequently refused to convey title. Id.

B. Background of State-Court Cases

Richardson sued Wright in the Third Circuit Court of Wayne County (Case No. 21-010834-CH) demanding that she honor their agreement. Id. Wright says that Judge David Allen, who presided over the case, acted with bias and procedural irregularities. Id.

Richardson sought specific performance of the purchase agreement and an order compelling Wright to convey title at the agreed price. Id. Wright challenged the appraisal report's accuracy and authenticity; challenged the appraiser's credibility and bias, raised multiple defenses including that Richardson's claim was barred due to fraud, unclean hands, collusion, and conspiracy; and alleged that Richardson had colluded with his agents (including his real-estate agent, Palmer) to defraud Wright and to purchase the property at an artificially deflated price. Id.

Judge Allen granted summary disposition for Richardson, ordering Wright to sell the property for $410,000. Id. Wright's separate lawsuit against Richardson (Case No. 22-004695-CH) was dismissed with prejudice, and Wright was sanctioned for filing a frivolous lawsuit. Id. Wright alleges Judge Allen conspired with Ford to issue orders that violated her due-process rights, including a temporary restraining order, lis pendens, and an injunction without proper hearings. Id.

Wright's appeals to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court were largely unsuccessful, deepening her belief that the judicial system was against her. See Richardson v. Wright, No. 361839, 2024 WL 302155, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2024) (per curiam) (unpublished), appeal denied, 4 N.W.3d 738 (Mich. 2024).

C. Procedural History of Instant Federal Case

On April 18, 2024, Wright filed this federal case alleging fraud, conspiracy, and civil-rights violations. ECF No. 1. She brings the following 13 claims:

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act against all defendants;

2. Civil-Rights Violations (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against all defendants;

3. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) (12 U.S.C. § 2607) against all defendants;

4. Violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.) against all defendants;

5. Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) against all defendants;

6. Misrepresentation related to consumer protection (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)) against all defendants;

7. Civil Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) against all defendants;

8. Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) against all defendants;

9. Bank Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) against all defendants

10. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968) against all defendants;

11. Vicarious Liability and Negligent Supervision against United Wholesale Mortgage (UWM) and Class Valuation;

12. Unlawful Seizure and Denial of Due Process (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against Judge Allen and Ford; and

13. Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices (15 U.S.C. § 45) against Security Mortgage Corporation, Coldwell, Class Valuation, and UWM.

ECF No. 3.¹

The docket has since been muddied with a slew of filings. Wright filed a motion for an emergency preliminary injunction. ECF No. 11; see also ECF Nos. 12; 17. But the docket lacked proof of service, prompting directions to file it for each defendant by July 9, 2024, or to face sua sponte dismissal. ECF No. 14. Wright filed certificates of service for Palmer, Ford, Judge Allen, Class Valuation, and UWM. See ECF Nos. 18; 19. Judge Allen and Ford filed motions to dismiss. ECF Nos. 10; 16; see also ECF Nos. 31; 32; 34; 38; 42; 51. Wright sought to add two more defendants, ECF Nos. 25; 26, and obtained entries of default against Palmer, ECF No. 23, UWM, ECF No. 24, and Class Valuation, ECF No. 30. Palmer and UWM request that those entries be set aside. See ECF Nos. 36; 40; 47; 52; 61; 62. Wright also filed motions for default judgments against Class Valuation, Palmer, and UWM. ECF No. 37; see also ECF No. 45. And Wright filed motions for alternate service, ECF No. 33, extended service time, ECF No. 49, and an expedited ruling, ECF No. 50.

II. ANALYSES

A. All the Clerk's Entries of Default Will be Set Aside

“The court may set aside an entry of default for good cause ․” FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c). But, first, this Court “must establish whether service of process was proper” because proper service is required for personal jurisdiction. Lu v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 22-1253, 2022 WL 13983546, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 2022) (citing Canaday v. Anthem Cos., 9 F.4th 392, 395 (6th Cir. 2021)). “[I]f service of process was not proper, the court must set aside an entry of default.’ ” Id. (quoting O.J. Distrib. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 352 (6th Cir. 2003)).

For Class Valuation and UWM, both LLCs, service must be either (1) sufficient under the law of the forum state or (2) personally served on an authorized officer or agent, as well as mailed in certain circumstances. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(h)(1). The law of the forum state, Michigan, requires in relevant part either (1) personal service on a registered agent or (2) personal service on “a member or other person in charge” and “registered mail, addressed to the registered office of the limited liability company.” Mich. Ct. R. 2.105(H)(1)–(2).

Wright failed to perfect service of process on Class Valuation. Class Valuation's registered agent was National Registered Agents, Inc. See Mich. Dep't of Licensing and Regul. Affs., Search for a Business Entity, https://cofs.lara.state.mi.us/SearchApi/Search/Search (searching for “Class Valuation”). But Wright served “Claire Barret,” who Wright claims was “authorized.” ECF No. 19 at PageID.32. True, Rule 4(h)(1)(B) permits service upon an “agent authorized by appointment or by law.” But Wright has identified no such law or authorization. Moreover, Barret is not an officer or agent of Class Valuation; she is merely the billing point of contact, and two other people are listed as the Director and the President. See Class Valuation, https://www.classvaluation.com/incenter/ [https://perma.cc/7QNM-ZXQ9]; see also In re Saucier, 366 B.R. 780, 784 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (defining officers and agents for service purposes). There is no good cause for Wright's failure to serve Class Valuation, see Harris v. City of Cleveland, 7 F. App'x 452, 456 (6th Cir. 2001), nor do the relevant factors justify additional time for her to do so, see Perlick Corp. v. Glastender, Inc., 622 F.Supp.3d 557, 559 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (citing United States v. Oakland Physicians Med. Ctr., 44 F.4th 565, 569 (6th Cir. 2022)). And service was improper under Michigan law because Barret was not a manager or agent or charge of the office or business, service was not mailed, and there was a registered agent. See Mich. Ct. R. 2.105(H).

The same reasoning applies with respect to UWM. UWM is an LLC. Wright served process on Kate McMillin who is not among UWM's officers or agents. See UWM, https://www.uwm.com/our-leadership [https://perma.cc/RE6T-UAMS]. UWM's resident agent at the time of service was The Corporation Company. See Mich. Dep't of Licensing and Regul. Affs., Search for a Business Entity, https://cofs.lara.state.mi.us/SearchApi/Search/Search (searching for “United Wholesale Mortgage”), which was not served. The relevant factors do not warrant an extension for Wright to try again. See Perlick, 622 F.Supp.3d at 559 (citing Oakland Physicians, 44 F.4th at 569). And service was improper under Michigan law for the same reasons. See Mich. Ct. R. 2.105(H).

Accordingly, UWM's motion to set aside the clerk's entry of default will be granted, the Clerk's entry of default against Class Valuation and UWM will be set aside, and Wright's motion for default judgment against Class Valuation and UWM will be denied. See Temple v. Sector 7 LLC, No. 2:23-CV-11521, 2024 WL 1715119, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2024) (“No default, no default judgment.” (citing Shepard Claims Servs. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986))).

The same applies to Palmer. Palmer argues that she was improperly served and that she has substantive defenses against the allegations, including contesting the validity of the claims on the merits. See generally ECF No. 40. These defenses, if substantiated, could potentially lead to a different outcome, thereby meeting the requirement for a meritorious defense. Palmer also contends that her failure to respond was due to confusion and inadvertence—not willful neglect—and no evidence suggests that Palmer acted to delay or to obstruct the proceedings.

To overcome Palmer's arguments, Wright must “show that the delay will result in the loss of evidence, increased difficulties in discovery, or greater opportunities for fraud and collusion.” Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617, 621 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing INVST Fin. Grp. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., 815 F.2d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1987)). But Wright focuses on her general financial and emotional harm and the defendants' financial instability rather than providing concrete examples of how setting aside the default would directly and significantly disadvantage her in the ongoing legal proceedings. See ECF No. 47 at PageID.969–70.

Because Wright's arguments lack merit, Palmer's motion to set aside the default will be granted, and Wright's motion for default judgment will be denied.

B. Judge Allen's Motion to Dismiss

Judge Allen claims judicial immunity and that Wright's complaint fails under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 10. He is correct on both issues.

Judges have absolute immunity from lawsuits for acts performed in their judicial capacity. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871); accord Leech v. DeWeese, 689 F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir. 2012).

Wright alleges bias and procedural misconduct by Judge Allen. See generally ECF No. 3. But his actions were within his judicial duties, including ruling on motions, issuing orders, and presiding over hearings. See Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1121 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988)); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.605 (1961) (“Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.611 (1961) (“Circuit courts have jurisdiction and power to make any order proper to fully effectuate the circuit courts' jurisdiction and judgments.”). Wright's uncorroborated claims do not negate judicial immunity. Judge Allen's motion to dismiss is granted, and he is dismissed from the case.

C. Sua Sponte Dismissal of All Wright's 13 Claims

Ford has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. ECF No. 16. Based on a thorough review of the record and law, Wright fails to state a plausible claim for relief for any of her 13 claims.² Therefore, all the defendants will be dismissed.³

A complaint fails if it does not support recovery under any legal theory. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers” (citation omitted)).

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform (15 U.S.C. § 1639e) and Consumer Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1639c) against all defendants

Wright brings claims under §§ 1639e and 1639c of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. She alleges “Defendants presented a misleading mortgage preapproval letter alongside a misrepresented full price sales agreement from Coldwell Banker, to manipulate [Wright] into [a] disadvantageous real estate transaction with Cedric Richardson.” ECF No. 3 at PageID.442. Wright says the date of the fraud was July 18, 2021. Id. at PageID.426–27.

a. Wright's § 1639e claim is time-barred

There is a one-year limit to bring a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1639e. Milord v. Duran, No. 1:13-CV-05451, 2013 WL 5592622, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2013) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e)). Thus, Wright had to file her § 1639e claim by July 18, 2022. But she filed it on April 18, 2024. ECF No. 1. So it is dismissed.

b. Wright does not adequately address § 1639c's requirements

Wright fails to state a claim for relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1639c because she does not adequately address the specific requirements mandated by the statute.

Reasonable Determination of Ability to Repay (15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1)). A creditor must make a reasonable and good-faith determination, based on verified and documented information, that the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan at the time it is consummated. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1). But Wright does not specifically allege that the creditors failed to determine her or Richardson's ability to repay any loans. See generally ECF No. 3. Although Wright mentions fraudulent and deceptive actions, she does not provide facts demonstrating that the creditors ignored or failed to verify anyone's financial information to determine repayment ability. There are no detailed allegations about the creditors' assessment or lack of assessment regarding anyone's income, debts, or financial obligations.

Verified and Documented Information (15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4)). A creditor must verify the amounts of income or assets relied upon to determine repayment ability by reviewing reliable third-party documents, such as tax returns, payroll receipts, financial-institution records, etc. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4). But Wright does not provide specific allegations that the creditors did not verify her or Richardson's income or assets as required. See generally ECF No. 3. She does not mention whether the creditors reviewed or failed to review anyone's tax returns, W-2 forms, or other financial documentation. Wright's focus is primarily on the alleged fraudulent activities of third parties—not on the creditors' failure to verify and to document her or Richardson's ability to repay a loan.

Consideration of Consumer's Financial Resources (15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3)). The determination of a consumer's ability to repay must include consideration of the consumer's credit history, current income, expected income, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio, employment status, and other financial resources. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(3). But there are no detailed allegations in the complaint that the creditors failed to consider Wright's or Richardson's overall financial situation, including their credit history, income, obligations, debt-to-income ratio, or employment status. See generally ECF No. 3. Wright instead broadly claims fraudulent conduct but does not tie those actions specifically to the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1639c in terms of evaluating her or Richardson's financial situations.

Income Verification (15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4)). Creditors must verify income using IRS transcripts or other reliable third-party documents to ensure the income reported is accurate. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(4). But Wright does not specify that the creditors failed to use IRS transcripts or other reliable third-party documents to verify anyone's income. See generally ECF No. 3. Nor does she address whether the creditors relied on any false documentation provided or whether they failed to perform this verification step altogether.

Nonstandard Loan Requirements (15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6)). For loans that defer repayment of principal or interest, creditors must use a fully amortizing repayment schedule to determine the ability to repay. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6). But Wright does not indicate whether her or Richardson's loan was nonstandard (such as an interest-only or variable-rate loan) thus requiring special consideration under § 1639c. See generally ECF No. 3. Nor does she provide the loan terms or whether the creditors failed to use a proper repayment schedule to assess anyone's ability to repay.

2. Civil-Rights Violations (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against all defendants

Wright's allegations do not satisfy the requirement that the private actors were acting under color of state law.⁴ This is assessed under the four tests recognized by the Sixth Circuit: (1) the public-function test, (2) the state-compulsion test, (3) the symbiotic-relationship or nexus test, and (4) the entwinement test. In re Flint Water Cases, 453 F. Supp. 3d 970, 983 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (citing Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2014)).

Public-Function Test. The public-function test applies when a private entity performs a function that is traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state, such as running elections or operating a municipality. Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 195 (6th Cir. 1995). But the actions Wright alleges, such as conducting real-estate transactions, providing appraisals, and issuing mortgages, see ECF No. 3 at PageID.444–49, are not functions traditionally or exclusively performed by a state, see Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160–61 (1978). Those are commercial activities typically carried out by private entities. See id. Therefore, the defendants' conduct does not satisfy the public-function test.

State-Compulsion Test. The state-compulsion test examines whether the state significantly encouraged or coerced the private party to take a particular action. Ellison, 48 F.3d at 195. But Wright does not allege that Michigan or any state entity significantly encouraged or coerced the defendants to engage in the fraudulent real-estate activities. The actions she describes appear to be independently carried out by private individuals and entities without any substantial influence or coercion from the State. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.444–49. Thus, Wright fails to meet the state-compulsion test.

Symbiotic-Relationship or Nexus Test. The symbiotic-relationship or nexus test requires a close relationship between the state and the private actor, such that the private actor's conduct can be attributed to the state. Ellison, 48 F.3d at 195. But Wright does not demonstrate a sufficiently close relationship between Michigan and the private defendants. Although Wright mentions actions involving a Michigan judge (Judge Allen), he has already been dismissed from the case, see ECF No. 3 at PageID.444–49, so the complaint must demonstrate that the remaining defendants' actions are closely connected to Michigan. Wright's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation by real-estate agents, mortgage officers, and appraisers do not establish a nexus with Michigan sufficient to attribute their actions to it. See Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 363 (6th Cir. 2014) (“There are no allegations in the Amended Complaint to show that the State had any connection to these types of personnel decisions within the [private actors].”). So Wright's claim fails this test too.

Entwinement Test. The entwinement test considers whether the state is so entwined in the management or control of the private entity that the private entity's actions can be considered state actions. Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 363 (6th Cir. 2014). But Wright does not allege that Michigan was involved in the management or control of the private defendants. The actions of the real-estate agents, mortgage companies, and appraisers were carried out as part of private business operations, without involvement from Michigan in its management or policy setting. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.444–49. Wright does not demonstrate that Michigan was entwined with those private entities in a manner that would make their actions attributable to Michigan, failing the entwinement test.

For those reasons, the constitutional claims against the private defendants cannot proceed under § 1983.

3. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) (12 U.S.C. § 2607) against all defendants

There is a one-year limit to bring a claim under 12 U.S.C. § 2607. Egerer v. Woodland Realty, Inc., 556 F.3d 415, 421 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 2614). Like her § 1639 claims, Wright alleges that “[k]ey among these deceitful actions was the use of a deceptive preapproval letter, which falsely represented the buyer's financial capacity to purchase Bridgett s property.” ECF No. 3 at PageID.450. Thus, Wright had to file her § 2607 claim by July 18, 2022. But Wright filed her lawsuit on April 18, 2024. ECF No. 1. Accordingly, her § 2607 claim will be dismissed.

Yet this claim would fail on the merits too. Wright fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 12 U.S.C. § 2607 because she does not (1) allege that any fees, kickbacks, or things of value were exchanged for business referrals in connection with a real estate settlement service, see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(a); (2) describe any splitting of charges among parties for services not actually performed, see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b); or (3) provide details on how payments were made for unearned services or any specific affiliated business arrangements that were improperly handled or undisclosed, see 12 U.S.C. § 2607(c). See ECF No. 3 at PageID.449–51. For these reasons too, Wright's § 2607 claim is dismissed.

4. Violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.) against all defendants

The only allegations Wright makes for this claim are two statements that Judge Allen made during court proceedings. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.451–52. As explained above, Judge Allen is absolutely immune from all claims in this case. See discussion supra Section II.B.

Against the other defendants, Wright fails to state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 3601. To demonstrate a plausible racial-discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act, Wright must allege “(1) that [ ] she is a member of a racial minority, (2) that he or she applied for and was qualified to rent or [to] purchase certain property or housing, (3) that he or she was rejected, and (4) that the housing or rental property remained available thereafter.” Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mencer v. Princeton Square Apts., 228 F.3d 631, 634–35 (6th Cir. 2000)).

Wright does not provide specific allegations that any of the remaining defendants' actions were motivated by discrimination based on her protected characteristics. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.451–53. Instead, she alleges fraud, real-estate misconduct, and judicial bias without linking these actions to any covered discriminatory motive. Id.

Wright does not allege any of the defendants refused to sell or to rent her property based on a protected characteristic. Nor could she—she is the seller.

Wright does not allege that the defendants imposed discriminatory terms, conditions, or privileges on the sale or rental of her property based on a protected characteristic. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.451–53. Her focus is instead on statements made by the presiding judge during judicial proceedings, see id., which are not actionable under the FHA.

Wright does not allege that the remaining defendants made discriminatory statements or advertisements with respect to the sale or rental of her property. See id.; Campbell v. Robb, 162 F. App'x 460, 465 (6th Cir. 2006).

Although Wright alleges coercion, intimidation, threats, and interference, she does not connect those actions to her exercise of her rights under the FHA or to any protected characteristic. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.451–53; Metz v. Herbert, 243 F. Supp. 3d 929, 937 (M.D. Tenn. 2017).

Even if Wright's claims survived every element an FHA claim—which they do not—her claims would be time-barred. There is a two-year limit on FHA claims. Middlebrook v. City of Bartlett, 341 F. Supp. 2d 950, 957 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A)), aff'd, 103 F. App'x 560 (6th Cir. 2004). The remaining defendants' conduct allegedly occurred on July 18, 2021. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.426–27. Thus, Wright had to sue them by July 18, 2023. But she sued them on April 18, 2024, see ECF No. 1, so her FHA claim must be dismissed.

5. Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) against all defendants

Wright next alleges that the defendants, including people and corporations involved in the real-estate sector, engaged in a coordinated scheme to defraud her, thus violating several federal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 1341, the federal mail-fraud statute. ECF No. 3 at PageID.453–54. That claim requires Wright to establish the following elements:

(1) Scheme to Defraud. The existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud, which involves a plan or course of action intended to deceive others to obtain money or property.

(2) Intent to Defraud. The defendant must have the specific intent to defraud.

(3) Use of the Mails. The defendant must use the United States Postal Service or any private or commercial interstate carrier in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.

(4) Material Misrepresentation or Omission. The scheme must involve a material misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact.

Counts v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 606 F. Supp. 3d 678, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (first citing SIXTH CIR. COMM. ON PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §§ 10.01–10.02 (2022); and then citing United States v. Olive, 804 F.3d 747, 753 (6th Cir. 2015)).

Wright's complaint fails all four requirements.

a. Scheme to Defraud

Wright must clearly articulate a scheme involving a plan or course of action intended to deceive or to cheat her out of her money or property. United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 485–86, 488 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 18–19 (2000). Although Wright alleges that the defendants presented a fraudulent preapproval letter and an undervalued property appraisal to mislead her into a disadvantageous real-estate transaction, she does not sufficiently detail how those actions collectively form a cohesive scheme to defraud her specifically. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.453–54. Nor does Wright provide specific details about how each defendant's actions contributed to a unified fraudulent scheme. For instance, Wright mentions the preapproval letter and appraisal, but she does not elaborate on how those documents were used together to defraud her systematically. See id. at PageID.453–54. Wright's allegations do not present a clear, interconnected fraudulent scheme.

b. Intent to Defraud

Wright says the defendants intended to deceive her, but she fails to provide concrete facts showing the defendants' intent. See id. Specific intent to defraud requires more than allegations of unfair or unethical behavior; it requires a clear indication that the defendants knowingly engaged in deceptive practices with the purpose of causing harm or obtaining an unfair advantage. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 n.3 (1999). Merely stating, as Wright does, that the preapproval letter was fraudulent does not establish a collective intent to defraud her.

c. Use of the Mails

Wright mentions various communications and transactions but does not explicitly detail how the mails were used to further the alleged scheme or how they were integral to the scheme. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.453–54. Wright must specify how the defendants used the mail to carry out their fraudulent activities, see Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710–11 (1989), but she did not do so.

Even if the use of mail was not directly intended, Wright must demonstrate that the use of mail was a reasonably foreseeable part of the scheme. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1954). But her allegations lack such details.

d. Material Misrepresentation or Omission

Although Wright alleges fraudulent preapproval letters and undervalued appraisals, she does not describe any material misrepresentations or omissions. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.453–54. Wright must demonstrate that the misrepresentations were substantial and that they directly caused harm to her. See United States v. Daniel, 329 F.3d 480, 487–88 (6th Cir. 2003). She did not do so.

6. Misrepresentation related to consumer protection (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)) against all defendants

Wright has no standing to bring claim under 15 U.S.C. § 45. Wilson v. Bank of Am., No. 3:22-CV-00317, 2023 WL 1930007, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 10, 2023) (“15 U.S.C. § 45 only provides the Federal Trade Commission with enforcement power․” (citing Tacker v. Wilson, 830 F. Supp. 422, 429–30 (W.D. Tenn. 1993))); see also Speerly v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 343 F.R.D. 493, 520 (E.D. Mich. 2023).

7. Civil Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371) against all defendants

Similarly, because 18 U.S.C. § 371 is a federal criminal statute, Wright “has no standing to attempt to enforce th[is] statute[ ] by filing suit under [it].” King v. Fitzgerald, No. 3:22-CV-00095, 2023 WL 181101, at *6 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 13, 2023) (citing Ellison v. Leffler, 30 F.3d 133 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision)); accord Warner v. Bevin, No. 3:16-CV-00422, 2017 WL 88991, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2017) (citing United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App'x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003)).

Even if Wright had standing—she does not—there must be a state actor or “a private party [who] has conspired with state officials to violate constitutional rights.” See Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290–91 (6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). But Wright only mentions private actors: Ford and unidentified “parties not involved in this case.” See ECF No. 3 at PageID.456–57. Nor do her conclusory allegations satisfy the other requirements. See Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011) (requiring “that (1) a ‘single plan’ existed, (2) [the defendant] ‘shared in the general conspiratorial objective’ to deprive [the plaintiff] of [a] constitutional (or federal statutory) right[ ], and (3) ‘an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury’ to [the plaintiff]” (quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985))). Thus, Wright's claim fails.

8. Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343) against all defendants

Wright's wire-fraud claim fails for the same reasons as her mail-fraud claim. See Counts v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 606 F. Supp. 3d 678, 698 (E.D. Mich. 2022) (“[T]he same analysis applies to both.” (citations omitted)).

9. Bank Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) against all defendants

To allege a plausible claim under § 1344, Wright must demonstrate that:

(1) the defendant knowingly executed, or attempted to execute, a scheme to defraud a financial institution;

(2) the scheme involved a material misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact;

(3) the defendant had the intent to deceive or to cheat the bank or financial institution; and

(4) the financial institution was federally insured.

SIXTH CIR. COMM. ON PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS §§ 10.03A–10.03B (2022).

Wright fails all four requirements and therefore fails to state a claim.

a. Scheme to Defraud a Financial Institution

Wright must demonstrate that the defendants engaged in a deliberate plan or course of action designed “to deceive the bank and [to] deprive it of something of value.” Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 469 (2016).

Wright alleges a fraudulent real-estate scheme involving a deceptive preapproval letter and an undervalued property appraisal. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.458–59. But she does not clearly establish how those actions were intended to defraud a financial institution directly, as opposed to defrauding her personally. The alleged scheme appears more targeted at manipulating a real-estate transaction rather than defrauding a bank.

b. Material Misrepresentation or Concealment

The fraudulent scheme must involve misrepresentations or concealment of material facts that could influence the decisionmaking process of a financial institution. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)).

Wright's complaint mentions an allegedly fraudulent preapproval letter and a manipulated property appraisal. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.458–59. But it lacks specific details on how those misrepresentations were material to a financial institution's decisionmaking. For instance, it is not clear how the preapproval letter and appraisal were used to deceive a bank into approving a loan under false pretenses. Wright must detail how those documents directly influenced the financial institution's actions. But she has not done so.

c. Intent to Deceive or to Cheat

Wright must also demonstrate that the defendants acted with the intent to deceive or to cheat a financial institution. See Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2389–90 (2014).

Wright's allegations focus on deceitful practices aimed at coercing her into an unfavorable sale. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.458–59. Although she implies fraudulent intent, she does not adequately demonstrate that the defendants intended to deceive a financial institution. Again, the intent appears to be defrauding Wright, not a bank.

d. Federally Insured Financial Institution

Wright also must demonstrate that the targeted financial institution was federally insured. United States v. Reaume, 338 F.3d 577, 580 (6th Cir. 2003).

But Wright does not identify any specific financial institution that was defrauded or attempted to be defrauded, nor does she say that such institutions were federally insured. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.458–59. This is a critical element that must be explicitly stated to satisfy the statutory requirement.

For all of these reasons, Wright's Bank Fraud claim is dismissed.

10. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968) against all defendants

Wright's RICO claim requires violation of an enumerated predicate offense. See Counts, 606 F. Supp. 3d at 698 (citations omitted). Because all her other claims fail as explained above and below, her RICO claim also fails.

Even if there were some predicate legal violation—which there is not—Wright's RICO claim would fail on the merits. To state a plausible RICO claim for relief under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962, Wright must allege four essential elements:

(1) The defendant conducted or participated in an enterprise's affairs.

(2) An enterprise that is a legal entity or an association-in-fact.

(3) The defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity by committing at least two predicate racketeering acts within ten years.

(4) The violation directly harmed the plaintiff's business or property.

Allstate Ins. v. Lint Chiropractic PC, No. 2:23-CV-10904, 2024 WL 2787789, at *3–7 (E.D. Mich. May 30, 2024) (citations omitted).

Conduct of an Enterprise. Wright alleges that various defendants, including real-estate agents, mortgage companies, and appraisers, participated in a coordinated scheme to defraud her through fraudulent real estate transactions. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.459–61. But Wright fails to adequately demonstrate how each defendant participated in the management or operation of the enterprise. Her allegations are broad and do not specify the roles and actions of each defendant in the supposed enterprise. See id. Statements that defendants were involved in fraud without providing detailed facts showing their management or operational roles are inappropriately conclusory. See Stone v. Kirk, 8 F.3d 1079, 1092 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993)).

Existence of an Enterprise. Wright alleges the defendants formed an enterprise aimed at defrauding her through deceptive real-estate practices. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.459–61. But she provides no detailed description of the defendants' connections, their relationships, or how they collectively pursued the common purpose of the alleged scheme. See id. Without a structured and continuous organization, there is no enterprise. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).

Pattern of Racketeering Activity. Wright mentions fraudulent misrepresentation, false appraisals, and coercion as part of the scheme. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.459–61. But she does not specify the predicate acts with the required particularity. For instance, she provides no specific dates, specific communications, or how those acts constitute fraud under federal statutes like mail or wire fraud. Allstate, 2024 WL 2787789, at *5 (citations omitted). Nor is there a clear connection between those acts to form a continuous pattern of racketeering activity. See H.J. Inc. v. NW. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).

Injury to Business or Property. Wright claims financial losses and emotional distress due to the fraudulent scheme. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.459–61. Although financial losses are mentioned, Wright must clearly link them to the racketeering activities. See Bledsoe v. FCA US LLC, 378 F. Supp. 3d 626, 640 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (citing Wall v. Mich. Rental, 852 F.3d 492, 494 (6th Cir. 2017)). General allegations are insufficient; there must be a direct causal relationship between the illegal activities and Wright's specific injuries. Holmes v. Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). But Wright failed to allege this causal connection adequately.

11. Vicarious Liability and Negligent Supervision against UWM and Class Valuation

These claims depend on Wright's claims brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1639. See ECF No. 3 at PageID.461–62 (“UWM, as the parent company of Class Valuations, ․ negligently supervised its subsidiary, leading to significant violations of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, specifically the sections mandating appraisal independence.”). But those claims were dismissed as frivolous. See discussion supra Section II.C.1. So Wright's claims of vicarious liability and negligent supervision fail. See Mercurio v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, No. 361855, 2023 WL 4981374, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2023) (“The claim of vicarious liability or respondeat superior against the bank is wholly dependent on whether [the employee] committed a tort.” (citing Laster v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 892 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016))).

Moreover, Wright's claim of negligent supervision lacks any plausible allegation that UWM “knew or should have known that [Class Valuation was] an employee [that] had criminal tendencies.” Prime Rate Premium Fin. Corp. v. Larson, 226 F. Supp. 3d 858, 870 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (quoting Gathing v. MERS, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-00007, 2010 WL 889945, at *18 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 10, 2010)).

12. Unlawful Seizure and Denial of Due Process (42 U.S.C. § 1983) against Judge Allen and Ford

These § 1983 claims fail for the same reasons as Wright's other § 1983 claims. See discussion supra Section II.C.2; see also discussion supra Section II.B.

13. Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices (15 U.S.C. § 45) against Security Mortgage Corporation, Coldwell, Class Valuation, and UWM

This claim fails for the same reason as the other claim that Wright brought under 15 U.S.C. § 45: lack of standing. See discussion supra Section II.C.6.

D. Postdismissal Implications

With no claims remaining against any defendant, all Wright's pending motions will be dismissed as moot—including her motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 11; to add STB Brokerage as a defendant, ECF No. 25; to add Pat Ryan as a defendant, ECF No. 26; for alternate service, ECF No. 33; to extend service time, ECF No. 49; and to expedite this Court's rulings, ECF No. 50. See, e.g., Perry v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Prob. Officer, No. 2:23-CV-12694, 2024 WL 3173610, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2024).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant Dawn Palmer's Motion to Set Aside the Clerk's Entry of Default Against Defendant Dawn Palmer, ECF No. 40, is GRANTED.

Further, it is ORDERED that the Clerk's Entry of Default Against Defendant Dawn Palmer, ECF No. 23, is SET ASIDE.

Further, it is ORDERED that Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage's Motion to Set Aside the Clerk's Entry of Default Against Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage, ECF No. 36, is GRANTED.

Further, it is ORDERED that the Clerk's Entry of Default Against Defendant United Wholesale Mortgage, ECF No. 24, is SET ASIDE.

Further, it is ORDERED that the Clerk's Entry of Default Against Defendant Class Valuation, ECF No. 30, is SET ASIDE.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion for Default Judgment, ECF No. 37, is DENIED.

Further, it is ORDERED that Defendant David Allen's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, is GRANTED.

Further, it is ORDERED that Defendant David Allen is DISMISSED.

Further, it is ORDERED that Defendant Corene Ford's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 16, is GRANTED.

Further, it is ORDERED that all the remaining defendants are DISMISSED.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. 3 is DISMISSED.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 11, is DENIED AS MOOT.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion to Add STB Brokerage as a Defendant, ECF No. 25, is DENIED AS MOOT.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion to Add Pat Ryan as a Defendant, ECF No. 26, is DENIED AS MOOT.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion for Alternate Service, ECF No. 33, is DENIED AS MOOT.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion for Extension of Time to Perfect Service, ECF No. 49, is DENIED AS MOOT.

Further, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff Bridgett Wright's Motion for Expedited Ruling, ECF No. 50, is DENIED AS MOOT.

This order is final and closes the above-captioned case.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although Wright's second amended complaint should be stricken for being filed without leave, see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2), leaving the first amended complaint as the operative one, see FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1), that issue will not be addressed because, as explained below, the case will be dismissed for numerous reasons.

2.   Ford also seeks dismissal under the doctrines of Rooker–Feldman and res judicata. See ECF No. 16 at PageID.190–92. But they need not be addressed, because all Wright's claims will be dismissed below. See Shupe v. Rocket Companies, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 3d 647, 670 n.12 (E.D. Mich. 2023) (citing In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 527, 549 n.11 (S.D. Ohio 2000)).

3.   “A district court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants.” Abagninin v. AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742–43 (9th Cir. 2008) (first citing Columbia Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Ahlstrom Recovery, 44 F.3d 800, 802 (9th Cir. 1995); and then quoting Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981)).

4.   The only public actor, Judge Allen, has already been dismissed based on absolute immunity. See discussion supra Section II.B.

SUSAN K. DeCLERCQ United States District Judge