REUBEN RANKE v. WILLIAM FEDERSPIEL (2024)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT DARNELL JACKSON ON THE BASIS OF JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

I. Recommendation

The Court should dismiss all claims against Defendant Judge Darnell Jackson because he has absolute judicial immunity with respect to the causes of action alleged against him.

II. Report

A. The claims against Judge Jackson

Plaintiff brings religious discrimination and related retaliation and policy claims in connection with allegedly being deprived of Kosher meals at the Saginaw County Jail (SCJ) while he was a pretrial detainee. (ECF No. 1.) With respect to the Chief Circuit Court Judge of Saginaw County, Defendant Jackson, he alleges in Count 6 (“Lack of Policy”) that Judge Jackson “has ministerial authority and a duty to ensure that the Saginaw County Sheriff's office had appropriate policies and procedures in place at the SCJ to protect the rights of all inmates[,] including a religious food policy.” (Id. at PageID.14-15, ¶ 72.) He further alleges that Judge Jackson bears responsibility for the lack of a policy or procedure relating to religious meals because he “gave final approval to” and signed the SCJ Inmate Guide, which he refers to as an “inaction” and a “glaring, unjustified and inexcusable failure to write a religious food policy[.]” (Id. at PageID.15-16, ¶¶ 74-84.)

B. Screening

After reviewing the pleadings in connection with a status conference held on January 9, 2024, and learning that Plaintiff was not prepared to dismiss Judge Jackson on the basis of judicial immunity, the Court issued an order requiring Plaintiff to show cause why Judge Jackson should not be dismissed on this basis. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff timely responded (ECF No. 19) and Defendant replied (ECF No. 20).

Civil complaints filed by a pro se prisoner who, as here, has been granted in forma pauperis status (ECF No. 9), are subject to the screening requirements of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b) “at any time.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 865-66 & n.3 (6th Cir. 2000); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997) (affirming that § 1915(e)(2) remains applicable throughout the litigation process), abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915 seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious or repetitive lawsuits.’ ” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).¹

To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the statute, which requires district courts to screen and to sua sponte dismiss complaints that are frivolous, fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Neitzke, 490 U.S at 328-29. The Court is similarly required to dismiss a prisoner complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Although it was not required to do so here, the Court afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to explain while why his claim should escape dismissal in light of judicial immunity.

C. Analysis

“A long line of [the Supreme] Court's precedents acknowledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991). “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.” Id. at 11 (citations omitted). It is “overcome in only two sets of circumstances[,]” namely, “non-judicial actions” and “actions ․ taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted).

In his response to the show cause order, Plaintiff concedes that “[under the Eleventh Amendment] Judge Jackson cannot be sued in his official capacity in federal court.” (ECF No. 19, PageID.56.) He also concedes that “Judges have absolute immunity so long as they were performing judicial functions.” (Id.) He claims, “[h]owever [that] Judge Jackson is also being sued in his individual capacity, and that is allowed.” (Id.) This is generally incorrect, except in those limited circumstances where, as explained above, the actions in question were either nonjudicial actions or were taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. In fact, judges are generally immune from suit for money damages in their individual capacities. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991).

Plaintiff further notes that “immunity is grounded in ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.’ ” (ECF No. 19, PageID.57 (quoting from the headnotes of Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 221 (1988)). Fair enough. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229. But it does not follow, as Plaintiff argues, that “immunity does not attach” if Judge Jackson's “actions took place outside of the courtroom.” Judges perform many judicial functions outside of the courtroom, including writing opinions in chambers, in libraries and at home, performing weddings, and (for federal judges) performing off-site naturalization ceremonies, even at major league baseball games and at national parks or monuments. The relevant question is not the location of the judge, but rather, whether the act is “judicial” in nature, based upon “the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). Here, the function is not only “normally” performed by a judge ? but as required by Michigan law, infra. ? it must be performed by a judge. And the “nature of the act itself” relates to detainees and prisoners who are under the ultimate control of the state court.

Finally, Plaintiff points out that he “alleged that Judge Jackson gave final approval to the Saginaw County Jail Inmate Guide as indicated by his signature and therefore took responsibility for its content and lack of content” and that these actions “are administrative, not judicial[,]” thereby depriving him of judicial immunity. (ECF No. 19, PageID.58.)

None of these arguments are well taken. Michigan statutory law states:

The sheriff of any county may prescribe rules and regulations for the conduct of prisoners in his custody, which rules and regulations shall be submitted to the circuit judge or judges in said county or circuit for approval, and upon the endorsement of such judge or judges the said rules and regulations shall be deemed to be effective as far as this act is concerned: Provided, That in counties located in any judicial circuit having more than 1 circuit judge, where 1 of said judges shall be designated as presiding judge, the approval and endorsement of said rules and regulations by said presiding judge shall be sufficient to place said rules and regulations in force and effect.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 51.281. The requirement that the rules and regulations for the conduct of a prisoner in the custody of the county sheriff must be endorsed by a judge of that county imposes a duty on the judicial officer that is not merely “administrative” as opposed to “judicial” (in Plaintiff's words), and in any case, is a function and duty which is grounded in the judicial office itself, i.e., it is performed by a judge by virtue of the fact that he or she is a judge. As Defendant points out, it is a governmental function that only a judge can perform, and this is so not only because the Michigan Legislature said so, but because the rules themselves not only apply to the conditions in which those detained by the court are jailed, but also regulate such things as how inmates are to be attired when they appear in court (ECF No. 20-1, PageID.95, § 27 (“Inmates are to appear in Court in the jail uniform” although judge may approve civilian clothes for trial)) and also tie compliance with the rules to the potential of “reduction in sentence” for “good behavior[.]” Mich. Comp. Law 51.282-283. It is eminently logical why a judicial officer would have to approve rules and regulations which: (1) govern the treatment of its detainees and convicted criminals; (2) regulate courtroom appearances ² ; and, (3) may be used to reduce sentences ³ . There is no mystery here as to why Judge Jackson would be undertaking such a function, i.e., reviewing, signing or endorsing the Inmate Guide: because he is a judge, unquestionably performed in the capacity of a judicial function. Moreover, whether the judge reviews, endorses or signs these rules and regulations in the courtroom, in chambers, at the County Jail, in the Sheriff's office, at the judge's home, or in the bleachers at the judge's daughter's basketball game is completely irrelevant.

D. Conclusion

Plaintiff has failed to show cause as to why Defendant Judge Darnell Jackson should not be dismissed from this case on the basis of absolute judicial immunity. For all the reasons stated herein, all claims against him should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

III. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation, but are required to file any objections within 14 days of service, as provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2) and Local Rule 72.1(d). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 144 (1985); Howard v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508 (6th Cir. 1991). Filing objections that raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity will not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(d)(2), any objections must be served on this Magistrate Judge.

Any objections must be labeled as “Objection No. 1,” and “Objection No. 2,” etc. Any objection must recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later than 14 days after service of an objection, the opposing party may file a concise response proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d). The response must specifically address each issue raised in the objections, in the same order, and labeled as “Response to Objection No. 1,” “Response to Objection No. 2,” etc. If the Court determines that any objections are without merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indeed, Plaintiff is no stranger to this Court, having filed three other cases, all but one of which have been assigned to Judge Edmunds and two of which are pending before her and the Undersigned (Case Nos. 11-cv-15712, 11-12763, 21-11610).

2.   See Barret v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 256 n.11 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966)) (a judge acts in a judicial capacity when exercising control over his or her courtroom).

3.   Defendant further posits that since Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, and not a prisoner at SCJ, and therefore could not be seeking a reduction in sentence based on the Inmate Guide, Judge Jackson's review of the rules for good behavior sentence reduction are entirely inapplicable to Plaintiff's case anyhow. (ECF No. 20, PageID.66.)

Anthony P. Patti UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE