NDANGO NELSON GWAPADINGA v. FESCUM INC (2022)

ORDER

Plaintiffs Ndango Nelson Gwapadinga and Louis Ndifor, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated employees, bring this suit against their former employer Fescum, Inc. and its owner for failing to pay them D.C.’s minimum hourly wage, overtime premium pay, and travel reimbursement, and for failing to compensate them for time spent in mandatory training. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4–8, 10–14, Dkt. 19. The employees allege that Fescum violated the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (Count 1), D.C.’s Minimum Wage Revision Act (Minimum Wage Act) (Count 2), D.C.’s Wage Payment and Wage Collection Law (Wage Payment Law) (Count 3), and D.C.’s Municipal Regulations (Count 4). See id. ¶¶ 48, 60, 66, 71.

Before the Court is Fescum's motion to dismiss Count 3 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Dkt. 20. According to Fescum, the Minimum Wage Act is D.C.’s “exclusive remedy” for the employees’ claims, so the Wage Payment Law claim based on the same set of facts must be dismissed. Def.’s Mem. at 2–3, Dkt. 20-1. The Court disagrees.

Both statutes provide underpaid employees with a civil cause of action. See D.C. Code § 32-1012 (civil cause of action for Minimum Wage Act violation); id. § 32-1308 (civil cause of action for Wage Payment Law violation). And each statute explicitly references the other. The Minimum Wage Act provides that “[a] civil action may be commenced according to, and with all the remedies provided under, § 32-1308 [the Wage Payment Law].” Id. § 32-1012(a). The Wage Payment Law, in turn, provides that “a person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter [or] the Minimum Wage [ ] Act” “may bring a civil action ․ against the employer or other person violating this chapter [or] the Minimum Wage [ ] Act.” Id. § 32-1308(a)(1)(A). There is no indication that either civil cause of action precludes the other.

Fescum's arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. They primarily rely on a prior opinion of another judge in this district which held that D.C.’s Minimum Wage Act was “the proper avenue” to recover unpaid overtime and accordingly dismissed a Wage Payment Law claim based on the same facts. Def.’s Mem. at 4–5; see Driscoll v. George Washington Univ., 938 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2013). Driscoll reasoned that recovery under the Minimum Wage Act was “more restrictive” than the Wage Payment Law; “[i]t would therefore frustrate legislative intent—and effectively render the [Minimum Wage Act]’s restrictive provisions a nullity—for this Court to conclude that ․ [the plaintiff] can proceed under either or both statutes.” Driscoll, 938 F. Supp. 2d at 23. Amendments to both laws have superseded that reasoning. Most importantly, the D.C. Council added into the statutory text that, for violations of the Minimum Wage Act, “[a] civil action may be commenced according to section 8 of the Wage Payment Act.” Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014, D.C. Law 20-157 (Act 20-426). Another amendment further clarified that in such actions “all the remedies provided under” the Wage Payment Act would be available. Wage Theft Prevention Clarification and Overtime Fairness Amendment Act of 2016, D.C. Law 21-266 (Act 21-684). It is plainly no longer the case that the D.C. Council intended the Minimum Wage Act's enforcement scheme to displace that of the Wage Payment Law.¹

For the foregoing reasons, it is

ORDERED that the defendants’ partial Motion to Dismiss Count III is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The same is true of the other cases Fescum cites. See Def.’s Mem. at 5–6. Thompson v. Digicon Corp., 107 F. Supp. 3d 49 (D.D.C. 2015), largely adopted the reasoning in Driscoll. Id. at 41. The complaint in that case was filed in September 2014, see id., No. 14-cv-1597, Dkt. 1—before the amendments described. Thompson was thus governed by the same version of the Wage Payment Law, and a substantially similar version of the Minimum Wage Act, as Driscoll. See D.C. Code § 32-1308 (Aug. 3, 1956); id. § 32-1012 (Dec. 24, 2013). Finally, although Rodriguez v. Adams Rest. Grp., 308 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (D.D.C. 2018), followed Driscoll’s holding, the issue was not fully briefed and the Court failed to take into account the statutory amendments.

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH United States District Judge