WEIR v. DUFFY (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Unlike in a game of horseshoes or bocce, “close” does not count when it comes to settling litigation, particularly when the U.S. Government is the defendant, and the settlement would open the U.S. fisc. Here, Plaintiff is understandably frustrated that a lengthy settlement negotiation came close but never reached fruition. But still hoping to bring the case to an end short of trial, Plaintiff now moves (1) to enforce a bargain that was reached in principle but that was never approved by an official who held the required settlement authority; (2) for an evidentiary hearing, should the Court decline to enforce this illusive settlement on the present record; and (3) for an award of attorney's fees to cover the costs she has incurred in filing this motion. Dkt. 37. For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that there is no settlement for the Court to enforce, that there is no genuine dispute of material fact to justify an evidentiary hearing, and that there is no arguable basis to award attorney's fees to Plaintiff.

The Court will, accordingly, DENY Plaintiff's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 19, 2020, Plaintiff Elizabeth Weir brought this action against the Secretary of Transportation, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Dkt. 1 (Compl. ¶ 2). Plaintiff alleges, in particular, that she was subjected to “discriminatory and retaliatory actions” when the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), which is a component of the Department of Transportation, “refused to consider her for promotion” to the “K-pay band.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 1). After the Secretary answered the complaint, Dkt. 14, the parties engaged in a lengthy, eight-times-extended discovery process. See Min. Or. Oct. 20, 2023.

On February 12, 2024, ten days before the close of discovery, the parties requested that the Court refer the case to mediation and “vacate all remaining deadlines.” Dkt. 33 at 1. In that filing, the parties indicated that, although they had “agreed upon a settlement framework,” “they would benefit from a formal mediation process [to] assist [them in] reach[ing] agreed upon terms.” Id. at 2. The Court granted the parties’ joint request, referred the case to mediation, and directed that the parties “file a joint state report on or before March 28, 2024, informing the Court of the status of mediation at that time.” Min. Order (Feb. 16, 2024). That same day, counsel for the Secretary, Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) Stephen DeGenaro, sent an email to Plaintiff's counsel, which read as follows: “Subject to seeking and obtaining authority from our supervisory chain, here is our understanding of the terms of the possible settlement.” Dkt. 40-3 at 1. AUSA DeGenaro copied his supervisor, Deputy Chief of the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office, John Truong, on that email. Id.; see also Dkt. 40-1 at 1–2 (Truong Decl. ¶ 1, 5). Plaintiff's counsel, John Karl, promptly responded as follows: “Yes, that works for us.” Dkt. 40-4 at 1.

On February 20, 2024, the parties filed a “Joint Notice of Settlement” with the Court. Dkt. 34. The notice informed that Court that the parties had “reached an agreement in principle that fully resolves all issues in the case.” Id. at 1. But it also cautioned that the settlement was “contingent upon formal execution of a settlement agreement and formal approval of the settlement already negotiated in principle by those officials delegated authority within the U.S. Department of Justice ․ to approve the settlement.” Id. Although Plaintiff seems to suggest that this proviso can be read to say that the “the settlement” had been “negotiated ․ by those officials delegated authority ․ to approve the settlement,” see Dkt. 37 at 4 (bolding portions of this language), the clear meaning of the proviso—as understood by the Court both at that time and now—was that the settlement was “contingent upon ․ formal approval ․ by those officials delegated [approval] authority within the U.S. Department of Justice.” That is what the parties’ filing said, and, in any event, it would make little sense to read the proviso to say that the settlement was contingent on approval by those who had proposed it.

By April 22, 2024, however, the settlement negotiations had broken down. According to the Government, on April 18, 2024, they informed Plaintiff's counsel that the timing of the submission of Plaintiff's leave request was different from that presented in the negotiations. Dkt. 40 at 9–10. As the parties explain it, one of the terms of the proposed settlement was “retirement upon settlement and that Plaintiff [would] be placed on paid administrative leave for retirement processing purposes.” Id. at 10. But Plaintiff indicated that she would not submit her retirement papers until the settlement agreement was signed and that, “as a practical matter,” she “could not submit an accurate application for retirement until the FAA corrected its payroll records to reflect her retroactive promotion and accompanying salary increases.” Dkt. 37 at 5.

This dispute apparently tipped the scales; due to the parties’ disagreement regarding Plaintiff's retirement, the FAA believed the cost of settlement “exceeded the amount that it had authorized due to the unanticipated cost.” See Dkt. 40 at 10. The government, accordingly, proposed a new resolution on April 18, 2024, but Plaintiff rejected that request. Id. As a result, on April 22, 2024, the parties submitted a joint status report, indicating that “Plaintiff believes there is a settlement agreement,” while “Defendant disagrees that there is a settlement agreement.” Dkt. 35 at 1.

On May 1, 2024, the Court held a status conference to discuss the issue. See Dkt. 36 (Hrg. Tr.). At that time, Plaintiff's counsel stated that Deputy Chief Truong represented that he had authority to settlement the matter. Id. at 18 (Hrg. Tr. 18:4–10). When the Court inquired further, however, the following exchange occurred:

THE COURT: Do you have a document where he says that he had the authority or is it just what was in -- did he say that to you orally?

KARL: I'm sorry. Said what?

THE COURT: You said the deputy chief represented that he had authority. Do you have a document in which he —

MR. KARL: No. It was part of our -- Mr. Truong was involved in quite a few of our conversations.

THE COURT: And he told you that he had authority up to 235,000.

MR. KARL: We agreed on a number. And he said, yes, you know, this is the agreement. And then he sends out an email saying we are going to run it up the chain of command so —

THE COURT: Did he say to you, I have authority to approve this, I don't need any sign-offs from anyone up the chain of command?

MR. KARL: We went back and forth so many times. We started off —

THE COURT: I don't need to know the numbers.

MR. KARL: Yes. He said, this is the agreement subject to approval up the chain of command.

THE COURT: That seems like it is not a final approval then.

MR. KARL: Except that he said within our chain of command and nothing about giving the FAA a veto.

Id. at 18-19 (Hrg. Tr. 18:14–19:14) (emphasis added). In light of this factual proffer, the Court expressed skepticism about whether the proposed settlement had been approved by a Department of Justice official who had the requisite settlement authority. Id. at 1921 (Hrg. Tr. 19:15–21:19). But the Court, nonetheless, granted Plaintiff leave to brief “the threshold issue” of whether a material dispute of fact exists that might justify conducting an evidentiary hearing on whether the parties had entered a binding settlement. Id. at 19 (Hrg. Tr. 19:15–19).

On May 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to enforce the putative settlement agreement. See Dkt. 37. The Secretary opposed the motion, Dkt. 40, and Plaintiff replied, Dkt. 42. The motion is now ripe for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts have the authority to enforce settlement agreements in appropriate cases. See Hall v. George Washington Univ., No. 99-1136, 2005 WL 1378761, at *3 (D.D.C. May 13, 2005); Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the parties indeed formed a binding agreement. Samra v. Shaheen Bus. & Inv. Grp., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 483, 493 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted). In a case like this one, moreover, in which the plaintiff contends that the government entered into a settlement requiring it to pay a substantial sum to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must establish that the agreement was approved by a government representative who had the authority to bind the United States. See Colorado Wild Public Lands v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 21-2802, 2022 WL 17250238, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 28, 2022); see also United States ex rel. Morsell v. Symantec Corp., 130 F. Supp. 3d 106, 131 (D.D.C. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In resolving that question, the Court must apply “agency law principles to determine whether [the government attorney] ha[d] authority to bind a principal to a contract.” Colorado Wild, 2022 WL 17250238, at *3. Generally, an agent acts with actual authority to bind the principal when “the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.” A-J Marine, Inc. v. Corfu Contractors, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 168, 175 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.01). In cases involving financial settlements that draw on the public fisc, however, the question whether a government attorney has actual authority to bind the United States typically does not require an inquiry regarding “the principal's manifestations” of authorization because the allocation of settlement authority among Department of Justice officials is detailed in the relevant statutes and regulations, as well as other publicly available Department of Justice guidance.

To start, the Department of Justice controls most, but not all, litigation involving the United States, and that authority includes the authority to decide whether to settle a case. The Department of Justice's organic act provides: “Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.” 28 U.S.C. § 516. The Attorney General, as the head of the Department of Justice, “shall supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party.” 28 U.S.C. § 519. The Attorney General may, of course, delegate that authority to other officers, employes, or agencies of the Department of Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 510 (authorizing the Attorney General to delegate authority to other DOJ employees); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.45.

As relevant here, Civil Division Directive No. 1-15 delegates some of this authority to the ninety-three United States Attorneys, providing that these senior Department of Justice officials may “settle administratively, claims against the United States in all cases in which the principal amount of the proposed settlement does not exceed $1,000,000.” 28 C.F.R. § Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App; see also Dkt. 40-2 at 1 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 2). The United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, in turn, has delegated to the Chief of the office's Civil Division the authority to accept offers of compromise of civil claims against the United States where the settlement offer does not exceed $500,000. See id. at 2 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 4). That authority has been redelegated to the Civil Division's Deputy Chiefs, who are authorized to settle claims in amounts that do not exceed $200,000. See id. (Hudak Decl. ¶¶ 4–5). Both the Chief of the Civil Division of the United States Attorney's Office and the Deputy Chiefs have the authority to reject any compromise offer. Id. Finally, the governing regulations provide that, when an agency is “opposed to the proposed action,” including the “compromise” of a case, the matter must “be submitted for resolution to the Assistant Attorney General [of the] Civil Division.” 28 C.F.R. § 1(e)(1)(iii), Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App.

Here, both Chief Hudak and Deputy Chief Truong have submitted declarations attesting that AUSA DeGenaro was “[a] non-supervisory AUSA in the Civil Division” who “lack[ed] any authority to settle cases without specific approval by a Civil Division supervisory attorney or other Department of Justice official with the appropriate level of settlement authority.” Dkt. 40-1 at 1 (Truong Decl. ¶ 2); Dkt. 40-2 at 2 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 7). Deputy Chief Truong's settlement authority, moreover, was capped at $200,000. Dkt. 40-1 at 1 (Truong Decl. ¶ 3); Dkt. 40-2 at 2 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 5).

III. ANALYSIS

All agree that this is not a case in which the parties had finalized and executed a formal settlement agreement. Instead, Plaintiff maintains that the parties had reached a settlement in principle that was sufficiently definite to bind the parties. In response, the Secretary maintains that the parties never reached a final settlement because, as AUSA DeGenaro made clear to both Plaintiff's counsel and the Court, the settlement required approval from his (and Deputy Chief Truong's) “supervisory chain,” Dkt. 40-3 at 1; see also Dkt. 34 at 1, and that approval never came.

As explained below, the undisputed factual record demonstrates that the Secretary is correct. The Court will, accordingly, deny Plaintiff's motion.

A. Actual Authority

To start, the government has offered uncontroverted evidence that AUSA DeGenaro was (and is) a nonsupervisory attorney who lacks “any authority” to settle cases without specific approval. Dkt. 40-1 at 1 (Truong Decl. ¶ 2) (emphasis added). Recognizing as much, Plaintiff instead focuses on Deputy Chief Truong and asserts that he “represented on numerous occasions that he had settlement authority to resolve the matter.” Dkt. 37 at 9. The uncontroverted evidence, however, establishes two, dispositive facts: First, Deputy Chief Truong's settlement authority was capped at $200,000, which was below the total value of the settlement in principle that Plaintiff seeks to enforce. Second, there is no evidence that Deputy Chief Truong ever stated that he has authority to settle this case.

Both Chief Hudak and Deputy Chief Truong have submitted declarations, under the penalty of perjury, attesting that Deputy Chief Truong's settlement authority was capped at $200,000. See Dkt. 40-1 at 1 (Truong Decl. ¶ 3); Dkt. 40-2 at 2 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 5). Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary, and the Court has no reason to doubt this uncontroverted testimony. It is consistent, moreover, with AUSA DeGenaro's email to Plaintiff's counsel, which copied Deputy Chief Truong and stated that that they—that is, DeGenaro and Truong—were seeking settlement “authority from our supervisory chain.” Dkt. 40-3 at 1 (emphasis added). And that same email asked that Plaintiff's counsel indicate whether the proposed settlement was acceptable, “before we seek authority.” Id. (emphasis added). Finally, Chief Hudak further attests that, “at no point during this litigation,” did he authorize Deputy Chief Truong or AUSA DeGenaro “to accept a compromise in this matter on behalf of the United States as the conditions precedent to any approval—i.e., formal approvals through the Justice Department memorandum process ․ and the execution of an acceptable written settlement agreement—were never satisfied.” Dkt. 40-2 at 4 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 15). Because all agree that the proposed settlement exceeded $200,000 in value, this uncontroverted evidence that Deputy Chief Truong lacked authority to approve settlements of that size should resolve the issue.

Plaintiff, nonetheless, argues in response that Truong had settlement authority because he “participated in many of the settlement discussions, including the final discussions closing the agreement.” Dkt. 37 at 2. It goes without saying, however, that mere participation in settlement discussions—even participation by a mid-level supervisor—does not create any settlement authority that does not otherwise exist. At times, however, Plaintiff seems to go a step further and argue that Deputy Chief Truong stated that he had settlement authority. As discussed below, apparent authority is unavailing in cases that involve the federal fisc. For present purposes, however, the Court will construe this argument as an attack on the veracity of the Hudak and Truong declarations, which assert that Deputy Chief Truong lacked actual authority to settle the case. But even construed in that (generous) manner, the argument fails for lack of any evidentiary foundation.

As noted above, Plaintiff's counsel made a similar representation to the Court at the May 1, 2024, status conference. Yet, when the Court asked Plaintiff's counsel whether Deputy Chief Truong made that representation orally or in a document, counsel backed away from the assertion and, ultimately, conceded that Deputy Chief Truong said just the opposite. Dkt. 36 at 18–19 (Hrg. Tr. 18:11–19:12). Indeed, in the words of Plaintiff's counsel: Deputy Chief Truong “said, this is the agreement subject to approval up the chain of command.” Id. at 19 (Hrg. Tr. 19:9–10). That is precisely the position that the Government has consistently taken, and it is irreconcilable with Plaintiff's contention that Deputy Chief Truong represented that he had settlement authority.

The uncontroverted evidence that is before the Court, moreover, puts the question soundly to rest. To start, Deputy Chief Truong has attested as follows:

At no point during our discussions did I convey to Mr. Karl that I had authority to settle this case. Rather, AUSA DeGenaro and I explained that we need[ed] supervisory approval for any settlement in this case, as indicated in the February 16, 2024, email to Mr. Karl. Specifically, we informed Mr. Karl that we need to “obtain[ ] authority from our supervisory chain.”

Dkt. 40-1 at 3 (Truong Decl. ¶ 13). Notably, Plaintiff's counsel, who participated in those same discussions, has failed to offer his own declaration disputing Deputy Chief Truong's characterization of their discussions. Finally, if any additional evidence was necessary—and, decidedly, it is not—the parties’ “Joint Notice of Settlement” characterizes the state of affairs in exactly the same way that Deputy Chief Truong does in his declaration. See Dkt. 34. at 1 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff's additional arguments fare no better. Plaintiff argues that this Court's decision in Burton v. Adm'r, Gen. Services Admin., No. 89-2338, 1992 WL 300970 (D.D.C. July 10, 1992), is right on point. But, unlike in this case, the AUSA in that case represented that he was authorized by the agency to approve the settlement at issue, and unlike in this case, the Court held in Burton that the AUSA did, in fact, have “actual authority” to settle the case. Id. at *4. That was because “(1) GSA had no requirement at the time that a regional office approve settlement agreements and (2) even if GSA had such a policy, the AUSA received the necessary approvals (and therefore had actual authority).” Colorado Wild, 2022 WL 17250238, at *5 (citing Burton, 1992 WL 300970, at *4–5). And, in any event, Burton never addressed the allocation of settlement authority set forth in the Department of Justice regulations, guidance, and subdelegations. The decision, accordingly, sheds no light on the question posed here.

Attempting a different tack, Plaintiff argues that Deputy Chief Truong and AUSA DeGenaro agreed to a settlement agreement subject to the review by their supervisors, yet—on Plaintiff's telling—it was the FAA that scuttled the proposed settlement. And, along similar lines, Plaintiff contends that because it was the FAA that objected to the proposed settlement, government counsel should have referred the dispute to the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division, as required by 28 C.F.R. § 1(e)(1)(iii), Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App. See Dkt. 37 at 11. Under that provision:

The authority to compromise cases ․ delegated by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section may not be exercised, and the matter shall be submitted for resolution to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, when

(iii) The agency ․ involved [ ] opposed the proposed action․

28 C.F.R. § 1(e)(1)(iii), Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.160(d)(2) (requiring referral of proposed settlements to the Deputy Attorney General or Associate Attorney General when the Assistant Attorney General believes that an agency's opposition merits their attention). Thus, according to Plaintiff, counsel for the FAA had “no option in this case but to refer [it] to the Ass[istant] Attorney General of the Civil Division,” and their failure to do so left the settlement in principle in place. Dkt. 37 at 10-11.

That argument, however, sidesteps the antecedent question of whether there was any need to suspend a delegation of settlement authority and, in essence, to return that authority to the Assistant Attorney General. The “[l]imitation on delegation[ ]” at issue permits an agency, which is opposed to a settlement that an official exercising delegated authority is prepared to approve, to elevate the issue to the Assistant Attorney General for resolution. 28 C.F.R. § 1(e)(1), Pt. 0, Subpt. Y, App. But, here, the Department official with delegated authority to approve the settlement had not proposed to exercise that authority. As Civil Chief Hudak explains in his declaration:

The authority delegated to the U.S. Attorney to accept certain offers of compromise, and correspondingly to me and the Division's Deputy Chiefs, is contingent on the affected agency's concurrence with the proposed compromise. Otherwise, authority to accept an offer of compromise over an affected agency's objection rests with the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division.

Dkt. 40-2 at 2 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 6). Moreover, “without the agency's support,” he “was not inclined to recommend to the Assistant Attorney General of the Civil Division that the Justice Department authorize a proposed settlement over the affected agency's objection,” and he therefore “reject[ed]” the proposed settlement negotiated by the parties. Id. (Hudak Decl. ¶ 14).

As relevant here, this shows that it was Chief Hudak who declined to approve the settlement, and although he considered the FAA's views, he—and he alone—made the decision not to elevate the issue to the Assistant Attorney General. There is nothing inconsistent with that understanding of the relevant events and the Department's representation that the settlement was contingent upon approval “by those officials with delegated [settlement] authority.” Dkt. 34. In short, Chief Hudak declined to approve the settlement because the FAA opposed it, and because, “without the agency's support[,] [he] was not inclined to recommend to the Assistant Attorney General ․ that the Justice Department authorize” it. Dkt. 40-2 at 4 (Hudak Decl. ¶ 14). It is not this Court's role to decide whether he made the right (or the wrong) decision. All that matters is that the Department official with delegated settlement authority declined to approve the settlement.

Plaintiff finally cites an out-of-circuit case, United States v. U.S. Currency in the Sum of Six Hundred Sixty Thousand, Two Hundred Dollars ($660,200.00), 423 F. Supp. 2d 14 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), for the proposition that the government bears the burden of proof. That case involved a claim under federal agency law, rather than District of Columbia agency law, which places the burden on the party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement. Id. at 20 (“The instant matter involves asset forfeiture under the United States Code; thus, the scope of the agent's authority is determined according to federal precedent.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Colorado Wild, 2022 WL 17250238, at *6 (concluding that U.S. Currency has the burden backwards for claims in the District of Columbia); Kilpatrick v. Paige, 193 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (D.D.C. 2002) (placing the burden on the party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement); United States ex rel. Morsell v. Symantec Corporation, 130 F. Supp. 3d 106, 131 (D.D.C. 2015). But, more importantly, the result in this case does not turn on who bears the burden of proof. Here, the relevant facts are either undisputed or uncontroverted, and, under those facts, it is clear that no one with delegated settlement authority approved the settlement.

The Court, accordingly, concludes that the proposed settlement was not agreed to by anyone with actual authority to bind the government. See Symantec, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 131.

B. Apparent Authority

Although Plaintiff does not frame their argument in terms of apparent authority, as noted above, she at least suggests that Deputy Chief Truong acted with apparent authority. Dkt. 42 at 5. That argument fails for two, independent reasons.

First, for the reasons explained above, there is no evidence that Deputy Chief Truong ever suggested or otherwise conveyed that he had authority to approve the settlement. To the contrary, he made clear that settlement was contingent on approval by his supervisor—that is, Chief Hudak. Plaintiff asserts that Deputy Chief Truong “orally represented on numerous occasions that he had settlement authority” in this case, Dkt. 37 at 2, but more than mere unsupported assertion is necessary to create a genuine dispute of material fact, and, here, all of the evidence supports Deputy Chief Truong's unqualified assertion, made under the penalty of perjury, that he never conveyed to Plaintiff's counsel that he “had authority to settle th[e] case.” Dkt. 40-1 at 3 (Truong Decl. ¶ 13). The time has long-since passed for Plaintiff's counsel to offer any evidence, including his own declaration, controverting that testimony. The fact that he has not done so speaks volumes.

Second, even had Deputy Chief Truong given Plaintiff's counsel reason to believe that he had authority to approve the settlement, the doctrine of apparent authority has no place in the present context. Under the doctrine of apparent authority, “when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal's manifestations,” the agent may bind the principal. Restatement (Third) Of Agency § 2.03 (2006). It is well-settled, however, that the “doctrine of apparent authority generally does not apply to dealings with the Government.” United States v. District of Columbia, 669 F.2d 738, 747 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Monument Realty LLC v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 535 F. Supp. 2d 60, 70 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Agreements made by government employees beyond the scope of their actual authority do not bind the government.”); Colorado Wild, 2022 WL 17250238, at *5; Kilpatrick v. Paige, 193 F. Supp. 2d 145, 153 (D.D.C. 2002); Littlejohn v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., No. 90-1724, 1992 WL 122755, at *2 (D.D.C. May 28, 1992). That is because “[w]hatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority.” Federal Crop. Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947). Given that established law, Plaintiff's apparent authority argument—even if supported by the facts—would be unavailing.

C. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

That leaves Plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing. Although a district court “must hold an evidentiary hearing” in the case “[w]hen there is a genuine dispute about whether the parties have entered into a binding settlement,” United States v. Mahoney, 247 F.3d 279, 285 (D.D.C. 2001), this is not such a case. Plaintiff has offered no evidence undermining the Government's description of the relevant events or controverting the Government's persuasive evidence. That evidence includes the emails between the parties, the declarations submitted by Chief Hudak and Deputy Chief Truong, and the parties’ joint representation to the Court in February 2024, indicating that the proposed settlement still required supervisory approval. The record also includes the concession by Plaintiff's counsel, when pressed by the Court, that “the agreement [was] subject to approval up the chain of command.” Dkt. 36 at 19 (Hrg. Tr. 19:910). Because all of this evidence points in the same, undeniable direction, and because Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence that might support a contrary conclusion, there is no dispute of fact for the Court to resolve at a hearing.

The parties, undoubtedly, came close to settling this case. But the governing law and the relevant delegations unambiguously require approval by an official exercising delegated settlement authority before a settlement requiring an outlay of federal funds can be finalized. As the record demonstrates, that never happened here. The parties came close, but close is not enough.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement, for an evidentiary hearing, and for the award of attorney's fees, Dkt. 37, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge