IN RE: ERIN MICHELLE ROSEBAR (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This appeal asks this Court to set aside a bankruptcy court decision setting aside an earlier bankruptcy court decision issued by a different bankruptcy judge, who had previously served on that same court. The underlying bankruptcy proceeding concluded long ago, when the bankruptcy court dismissed Appellee's bankruptcy petition. But that did not end the matter for present purposes because the bankruptcy court exercised its discretion to retain jurisdiction over an adversary defamation proceeding that had been removed from Superior Court and, after providing the parties with an opportunity to be heard, the bankruptcy court entered a large default judgment against Appellee in that adversary proceeding. In response to Appellee's Rule 60(b) motion, however, the bankruptcy court, with a new bankruptcy judge presiding over the matter, vacated that default judgment, declined to retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding, and remanded the case to Superior Court. Most significantly, that decision concluded that the prior bankruptcy court judge, who entered the default judgment, had erred in retaining jurisdiction over the adverse proceeding and, in any event, had erred in failing to apply D.C. procedural law regarding the entry of default judgments.

Deprived of his default judgment and his preferred forum, Appellant now asks this Court to set aside the bankruptcy court's orders setting aside the default judgment and remanding the case to Superior Court. In response, Appellee argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal; that the bankruptcy court, in any event, correctly granted Appellee's motion for reconsideration; and that, even if this Court disagrees with the bankruptcy court's reasoning, any error was harmless.

For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that Appellant, who is proceeding pro se, has the better of the argument on each of these points. The Court will, accordingly, reverse the bankruptcy court's decision on reconsideration, vacate the bankruptcy court's orders vacating the default judgment and remanding the case to Superior Court, and remand this case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings, if any, necessary to implement this decision.

I. BACKGROUND

The dispute between these two parties dates back to 2007, when Appellant David Brooks (“Mr. Brooks” or “Appellant”) loaned Appellee Erin Rosebar (“Ms. Rosebar” or “Appellee”) and her husband, Michael Rosebar (“Mr. Rosebar”) $30,000, “secured with a promissory note and a rental stream as collateral.” Brooks v. Rosebar, 210 A.3d 747, 748 (D.C. 2019) (“Rosebar I”). The Rosebars did not repay the loan, and Mr. Brooks eventually secured a judgment against them in D.C. Superior Court, entitling him to $30,000 plus interest. Id. While Mr. Brooks sought to execute that judgment, Mr. Rosebar filed a host of unsuccessful administrative and judicial complaints against Mr. Brooks, see generally Dkt. 17-1 at 102–40, leading the D.C. Superior Court to enter an order in December 2013 directing the clerk of the court “no longer [to] accept claims by Mr. Rosebar against Mr. Brooks without leave of the court because those claims appear to be ‘an attempt to use judicial process to bar Mr. Brooks from recovering a debt to which this Court has already determined that he is legally entitled,’ ” Rosebar I, 210 A.3d at 748–49.

Later that same month, according to Mr. Brooks, the Rosebars posted false online reviews about his security camera business, accusing him of stealing money and accusing the business of operating without a license as a front for illegal activity. Id. at 749. Mr. Brooks claimed that “after the reviews were posted, he received no new referrals from the Internet and his business closed within one year.” Id. Believing that the Rosebars had authored the reviews, in December 2014, Mr. Brooks instituted a defamation action against them in D.C. Superior Court, seeking both injunctive relief and damages. Id. “In connection with [that] case, Mr. Brooks attempted to depose Ms. Rosebar multiple times, but she either did not show up to or refused to answer questions at the scheduled depositions, notwithstanding court orders to comply.” Id. “As a result, the [Superior] [C]ourt entered a default against Ms. Rosebar on May 19, 2016.” Id. Ms. Rosebar twice moved for reconsideration and to set aside the entry of default, and the Superior Court denied both motions. See Dkt. 17-1 at 45–46. Although Mr. Brooks obtained a default “against Ms. Rosebar,” he did not take the further step of moving for entry of a default judgment—that is, an enforceable decree—“and no further actions were pursued as to that default.” Rosebar I, 210 A.3d at 749.

The Superior Court subsequently dismissed the defamation case against both Mr. and Ms. Rosebar based on the mistaken belief that Mr. Brooks and the Rosebars had orally agreed to settle the case for $800 during a September 2016 court hearing. See id. at 749–51. Mr. Brooks appealed that dismissal, arguing that there was no meeting of the minds on the material terms of the proposed settlement because he had only intended to settle his claims as to Mr. Rosebar, and not as to Ms. Rosebar, against whom he incorrectly believed he had already secured a default judgment. Id. at 748, 750. In 2019, the D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Brooks, holding that there was “insufficient evidence indicating that the parties had achieved a meeting of the minds sufficient to create a valid, enforceable settlement agreement as to the claim against Ms. Rosebar.” Id. at 753. The D.C. Court of Appeals, accordingly, set aside the dismissal and remanded the case to the Superior Court for further proceedings. Id.

The Superior Court reopened the case in July 2019, and Mr. Brooks filed a “Praecipe Requesting Ex Parte Proof Hearing” on September 23, 2019, see D.C. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 55(b), in an effort to secure a default judgment against Ms. Rosebar, Dkt. 17-1 at 48–49. The Superior Court held a status conference on November 8, 2019, at which Ms. Rosebar, appearing pro se, represented that she was “not certain” if her previous attorney “still represent[ed] her.” Id. at 49. In response, the Superior Court continued the status conference to January 10, 2020, “to allow Defendant Rosebar to obtain counsel.” Id. On January 6, 2020, however, Ms. Rosebar filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 20. That petition (at least initially) resulted in an “automatic stay” of the Superior Court defamation case. Id. at 50. On March 26, 2020, Mr. Brooks removed his defamation case against Ms. Rosebar to the Bankruptcy Court as a “related to” adversarial proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452. Dkt. 17-2 at 67.

Ms. Rosebar's bankruptcy proceeding never reached fruition. On the morning of July 9, 2020, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order finding that she had failed to show cause why the “case ought not be dismissed for 180 days based on failure to comply with the [Bankruptcy Court's] order to produce documents to [Mr.] Brooks” and, accordingly, “dismissed the case with prejudice for 180 days.” Id. at 65–66. But in the same order, the Bankruptcy Court indicated that it would retain jurisdiction “to enforce the court's order to produce documents” and would also retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding between Mr. Brooks and Ms. Rosebar, “unless otherwise ordered.” Id. at 66. Bankruptcy Judge Teel held a hearing later that morning to address whether the Bankruptcy Court should, in fact, continue to retain jurisdiction given the dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case. Dkt. 17-3 at 210. Judge Teel explained:

There's an issue with an adversary proceeding [which] has been filed and addressed at some point which is whether the Court should retain jurisdiction or not. And the case law makes it a discretionary decision. If the parties have invested a lot of time on the issues, they have already tried the issues and the judge is getting ready to issue a decision, the case law suggests that the Court ought to retain jurisdiction. But if the adversary proceeding is in its infancy, then the case law generally is you ought to dismiss it. So that's what I have to tackle.

Id. at 212–13.

After hearing from the parties, Judge Teel offered a “tentative decision,” while explaining that he “want[ed] to look at [the issues] more closely.” Id. at 230. He then explained that “subject matter jurisdiction is tested as of the date of filing of the complaint” and that, at the time the case was removed to the Bankruptcy Court, the court had jurisdiction over Mr. Brooks's claim for damages. Id. at 230–31. Moreover, even though the court dismissed the bankruptcy petition, it retained jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding, and “[t]he case law permits the court to retain jurisdiction based upon a number of factors,” “[o]ne of [which] is how far [ ] the litigation” has proceeded. Id. at 231. And, here, the case had “proceeded to the point where we're ready to adjudicate the amount of damages;” “Mr. Brooks ha[d] filed an affidavit that has not been contested in any meaningful fashion;” and the “calculation of damages” in that affidavit was, in Judge Teel's view, “reasonable.” Id. Judge Teel also took into consideration the fact that the Superior Court had not yet conducted a hearing and that the proceedings in Superior Court were “very slow” in progressing, whereas Judge Teel had already “spent considerable time reviewing the parties[’] papers.” Id. at 232. As a result, were the Bankruptcy Court to remand the matter, “the Superior Court judge would have [been required] to go through the same drill that [the Bankruptcy Court had] gone through.” Id. Weighing all these considerations, Judge Teel suggested that he “may end up entering judgement [himself] and directing the clerk to enter judgment here” on the claim for damages, while remanding the claim for injunctive relief (which had little, if any, bearing on the bankruptcy estate) to the Superior Court. Id. at 232–33.

Judge Teel further concluded that Ms. Rosebar had failed to proffer “any reason why this court should not proceed ․ to enter default judgment in accordance with the damages set forth in Mr. Brooks’ affidavit.” Id. at 231. Although Ms. Rosebar continued to “contest[ ] whether she ever defamed Mr. Brooks,” Judge Teel explained that the underlying merits were “no longer an issue.” Id. at 232. As Judge Teel put it: “[s]he's in default” and the case was, accordingly, “ready for adjudication of the damages.” Id. at 232.

Judge Teel subsequently issued a written opinion and order finalizing and memorializing his reasoning from the hearing and awarding Mr. Brooks $602,755.55 in damages for loss of income, injury to reputation, and related mental anguish, and $50,000 in punitive damages. In re Rosebar, No. 20-06, 2020 WL 6156329, at *2–3 (Bankr. D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2020) (“Rosebar II”). In that opinion, Judge Teel reaffirmed his conclusion that the court should retain jurisdiction over Mr. Brooks's claim for damages—but not his claim for injunctive relief ¹ —because the “court had already expended substantial time establishing a procedure ․ to fix the amount of damages;” Mr. Brooks “had prepared and filed the declaration setting forth his damages;” and “the court ha[d] spent considerable time reviewing that declaration as well as Ms. Rosebar's response.” Id. at *2. He added: “[Mr.] Brooks has already suffered long delay, and a remand would result in further delay.” Id.

As to the pending claim for damages, Judge Teel explained that Mr. Brooks had “established an entitlement to damages” in a “Declaration” filed “under penalty of perjury” and that Ms. Rosebar had failed to “rebut [Mr.] Brooks's showing of an entitlement to damages.” Id. To the contrary, Judge Teel continued, she “failed to articulate any reason why the court ought not treat the damages as established” and, instead, only “contested ․ whether she ever defamed [Mr.] Brooks.” Id. Judge Teel also rejected Ms. Rosebar's contention that she was denied an “adequate opportunity to obtain the services of an attorney,” concluding, instead, that she simply “neglected to do so.” Id.

About two weeks after Judge Teel entered his order, Ms. Rosebar (who was represented by counsel at this point) filed a timely motion for reconsideration. She argued, once again, that she had not been given a sufficient opportunity to secure counsel prior to the hearing on the default judgment, and, for the first time, she challenged the “staggering” size of the damage award that Mr. Brooks sought and the slightly smaller amount that Judge Teel awarded. Dkt. 17-3 at 249, 255–56, 259. In her view, the mere size of the award constituted a “manifest injustice.” Id. at 259.

In February 2022, Bankruptcy Judge Gunn, who assumed Judge Teel's docket after he retired, held a hearing on Ms. Rosebar's motion to reconsider Judge Teel's default judgment order. At the hearing, she requested supplemental briefing on whether “there [is] something in the record leading up to Judge Teel's order, which establishes that the causes of action have been pled sufficiently and that therefore the calculation is appropriate.” Dkt. 17-4 at 35. In response, the parties filed “Post-Hearing Briefs.” Mr. Brooks argued that Judge Teel did not need to make any “further findings,” id. at 41, and that in any event, he “implicitly found that the reviews constituted defamation per se,” id. at 44. Ms. Rosebar argued that Judge Teel's order should be set aside because under D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) and 55-II(a)(1), Mr. Brooks's motion for entry of a default judgment was untimely, id. at 66–68, and because Judge Teel “failed to consider the appropriate scope of damages,” id. at 68–69. Ms. Rosebar also argued—for the first time—that reconsideration and vacatur were proper because “the Court's retention of jurisdiction after [Ms. Rosebar's] voluntary dismissal of her bankruptcy petition was improper.”² Id. at 69.

Judge Gunn issued an order in March 2023, granting the pending motion for reconsideration on two grounds. Brooks v. Rosebar, No. AP 20-10011, 2023 WL 2697939, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023) (“Rosebar III”). First, she concluded that reconsideration was warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4), which is made applicable to adversary proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 9024, because Judge Teel erred by retaining jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding after he dismissed Ms. Rosebar's bankruptcy case and because the default judgment was, as a result, void for want of subject matter jurisdiction.³ Id. at *6–13; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) (providing for relief from a final judgment if “the judgment is void”). In reaching that conclusion, Judge Gunn weighed four factors and determined that “each ․ weigh[ed] against the Court exercising its discretion and retaining subject matter jurisdiction of the Defamation Claim in this case.” Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *13. Judge Gunn then concluded that the Bankruptcy Court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Defamation Claim” after the underlying bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed. Id. She therefore granted Ms. Rosebar's motion for reconsideration, vacated the default judgment, and remanded the defamation case to the Superior Court. Id.

In the alternative, Judge Gunn held that “even if the [bankruptcy] [c]ourt had properly retained subject matter jurisdiction,” “reconsideration would be appropriate” under Rule 60(b)(1) “due to a mistake of law.” Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (providing for relief from a final judgment in the case of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”). Judge Gunn started by noting that, under D.C. law, the defaulting “party is prohibited from challenging the allegations in the complaint,” Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *13, but added as follows:

However, such prohibition does not result in an immediate grant of default judgment to the Plaintiff. Under the Superior Court of the District of Columbia Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff seeking default judgment must file a motion or praecipe requesting an ex parte proof hearing. The plaintiff must then show by either a verified complaint or additional ex parte proof during a hearing that they have [pled] a prima facie case in their complaint. In this case, the Defendant's default was entered after she had filed an answer; therefore, in addition to reliance on his verified complaint, the Plaintiff would be required to prove his right to a default judgment through an ex parte proof hearing.

Id. at *14 (citations omitted). Because “[s]uch hearing never occurred” in this case, Judge Gunn concluded that Ms. Rosebar's motion for reconsideration “could also be granted” on the ground that Judge Teel “failed to first complete the ․ analysis” required under D.C. law to determine “whether [Mr. Brooks] was entitled to a judgment for defamation before the entry of a judgment for damages.” Id.

After Mr. Brooks appealed Judge Gunn's decree to this Court, Dkt. 1, Ms. Rosebar moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In particular, she argued that appellate review was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and the Supreme Court's decision in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124 (1995), which together preclude review of remand orders in bankruptcy cases based on “a timely raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,” id. at 127; Dkt. 11 at 1. This Court denied that motion, explaining that Judge Gunn's order was best understood, despite some language to the contrary, as remanding based on a “discretionary decision[ ] to relinquish jurisdiction” and not because the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 16 at 32. That distinction mattered under the Supreme Court's decision in Carlsbad Technology, Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635 (2009), which addressed “what it means for a remand to be based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for purposes of sections 1447(c) and (d),” Dkt. 16 at 32. As the Supreme Court explained, “whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is distinct from whether a court chooses to exercise that jurisdiction.” Carlsbad Tech., 556 U.S. at 639. In Carlsbad Technology, the defendant removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 based on a federal RICO claim, and the district court had supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over related state claims but declined to exercise that supplemental jurisdiction. 556 U.S. at 636–37. Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court wrote:

With respect to supplemental jurisdiction in particular, a Federal Court has subject matter jurisdiction over specified state-law claims, which it may (or may not) choose to exercise ․

․ Upon dismissal of the federal claim, the [d]istrict [c]ourt retained its statutory supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Its decision declining to exercise that statutory authority was not based on a jurisdictional defect but on its discretionary choice not to hear the claims despite its subject-matter jurisdiction over them․ The remand order, therefore, is not based on a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” for purposes of the bar to appellate review created by §§ 1447(c) and (d).

Id. at 639–41 (citations omitted).

Because Judges Teel and Gunn agreed that the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding at the time of removal and that the sole question was whether the court should exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding when the bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed, the Court concluded that—as in Carlsbad Technology—the decision whether to remand was not based on a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” and that appellate review, accordingly, was not precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1447. Dkt. 16 at 32–35. After the Court rendered that decision, Ms. Rosebar's counsel indicated that she intended to raise other “potential ․ jurisdictional issues;” the Court welcomed counsel “to raise anything [he] want[ed] to in [his] brief,” while also noting that Mr. Brooks was free “to respond in any way that he thinks is appropriate.” Id. at 37.

The merits of Mr. Brooks's appeal, and Ms. Rosebar's further jurisdictional arguments, are now before the Court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

The Court starts with Ms. Rosebar's contention that this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction for a different reason than the one raised—and rejected—at the motion to dismiss stage. The jurisdiction of district courts to hear appeals from bankruptcy proceedings is defined by 28 U.S.C. § 158. Under that provision, the federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals “from final judgments, orders, and decrees ․ of bankruptcy judges” as of right and jurisdiction to hear appeals “from other interlocutory orders and decrees” “with leave of the court.” 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3). According to Ms. Rosebar, this Court lacks jurisdiction as of right because “the Bankruptcy Court's order granting reconsideration of, and thus vacating, the default judgment is not a final judgment, order, or decree,” Dkt. 19 at 10, and she further argues that the Court should not grant leave to appeal because the order at issue “does not involve a ‘controlling question of law,’ ” Dkt. 19 at 11. As explained below, the Court concludes that Mr. Brooks has properly brought this appeal as of right and, accordingly, does not reach the question whether it might also be brought with leave of the Court.

Section 158(a)(1) vests the federal district courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals “from final judgments, orders, and decrees ․ of bankruptcy judges.” The rules of finality that govern bankruptcy proceedings are more flexible than those concerning civil matters generally; “to be appealable, the challenged bankruptcy decision does not have to end the entire bankruptcy case; it just has to end a proceeding inside the case.” Kiviti v. Bhatt, 80 F.4th 520, 529 (4th Cir. 2023). “A bankruptcy case involves ‘an aggregation of individual controversies,’ many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (quoting 1 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 5.08[1][b], p. 5–42 (16th ed. 2014)). Bankruptcy court orders are thus considered final so long as they conclusively “ ‘dispose of discrete disputes within the larger bankruptcy case.’ ” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 39 (2020) (alterations and citations omitted).

Here, Mr. Brooks challenges Judge Gunn's orders in several respects. See generally Dkt. 17. Most fundamentally, he asks this Court to hold that Judge Gunn erred by vacating the $652,755.55 default judgment that Judge Teel entered. Id. at 8. But at a more granular level, he argues that Judge Gunn erred in holding that the default judgment was “void” for purposes of Rule 60(b)(4) because the Bankruptcy Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time it entered judgment, id. at 8, 19–24; erred in remanding the case to Superior Court, id. at 24–39; and erred in holding the Judge Teel had misapplied D.C. law regarding the entry of a default judgment, id. at 39–44.

Had Judge Gunn merely vacated Judge Teel's entry of a default judgment, Ms. Rosebar would have a point. Such an order, standing alone, would not have finally and conclusively disposed of a discrete dispute between the parties—that is, the adversarial defamation case. That dispute would have remained live, and Mr. Brooks would have been free to renew his motion for entry of a default judgment and to proffer further support, to the extent necessary, in support of his claim for damages. By analogy, district court orders granting Rule 60(b) motions and setting aside default judgments are generally not appealable. See 15B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3916 (3d ed. Nov. 2025 update) (“Wright & Miller”) (“An order that vacates a judgment and sets the stage for further trial court proceedings is not final ․ [A]n order denying Rule 60(b) relief is final ․”); 15A Wright & Miller § 3914.5 (3d ed. Sep. 2025 update) (“An order setting aside [a default] judgment ordinarily is not final, while an order refusing to set aside the judgment is final.”).

But that is not all that happened here. Judge Gunn's decree not only granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated the default judgment; it also remanded the defamation case to Superior Court. Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *14. As the Court has previously held, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 does not bar appellate review of that remand order because the order was not premised on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction but, rather, on a discretionary judgment about whether to exercise the bankruptcy court's extant jurisdiction over the related-to adversary proceeding. See Dkt. 16 at 24–35; see also Carlsbad Tech., 556 U.S. at 638–41; cf. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 128–29. That holding, then, leaves two questions for present purposes. First, in the absence of an “affirmative bar to appellate review,” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712 (1996), does the remand order constitute an appealable “final judgment[ ], order[ ], or decree[ ]” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)? Second, if so, does the order constitute a final decree, which would permit appellate review of all intermediate orders that are merged into the final order, see LeFande v. District of Columbia, 841 F.3d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2004), or merely a collateral order, which would permit review of only those intermediate orders that are “inextricably intertwined” with the appealable order, Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 50–51 (1995)?

As discussed above, 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) takes a more liberal approach to appealability than 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which governs appeals from the district courts to the courts of appeals. That is because “[t]he ordinary understanding of ‘final decision’ is not attuned to the distinctive character of bankruptcy litigation,” where cases “encompass[ ] numerous ‘individual controversies, many of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the debtor.’ ” Ritzen Grp., 589 U.S. at 38 (citation omitted). Because “[i]t is thus common for bankruptcy courts to resolve discrete controversies definitively while the umbrella bankruptcy case remains pending,” Congress has authorized “appeals from final decisions in bankruptcy ‘proceedings,’ as distinguished from bankruptcy ‘cases.’ ” Id. at 38–39. But that more flexible rule still limits appeals to those orders that “ ‘completely resolve all of the issues pertaining to a discrete claim, including issues as to proper relief.’ ” In re Gonzalez, 795 F.3d 288, 290–91 (1st Cir. 2015) (alteration and citation omitted). Against this backdrop, it is safe to assume, however, that if an order would satisfy the more stringent rules applicable under § 1291, it also satisfies § 158(a).

The Court has little doubt that the Bankruptcy Court's order remanding Mr. Brooks's case to the Superior Court would be appealable under § 1291 and, accordingly, is appealable under § 158(a). Ms. Rosebar points to no authority to the contrary, and, as discussed further below, all of the caselaw that the Court has reviewed supports the conclusion that the remand order is appealable. The more difficult question is whether it is appealable as a final order or as a collateral order. Understanding why the order is clearly appealable, and why the nature of the appeal is less obvious, starts with the Supreme Court's decision in Quackenbush.

In Quackenbush, the Supreme Court considered whether an abstention-based remand order was immediately appealable. As this Court has already done, the Supreme Court started by concluding that 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d) did not pose a bar to appellate review because the remand was not premised on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal process. 517 U.S. at 711–12. The Court then concluded that “the appealability of the remand order ․ [was] controlled by [the Court's prior] decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp,” 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 712. As the Supreme Court further explained, Moses H. Cone held that an order staying a diversity suit based on Colorado River abstention was immediately appealable “on two independent grounds.” Id. at 713.

The Moses H. Cone Court “first concluded that the abstention-based stay order was appealable as a ‘final decision’ under § 1291 because it put the litigants effectively out of court, ․ and because its effect was precisely to surrender jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.” Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Quackenbush Court noted that “[t]hese standards” differed from the Court's “oft-repeated definition of finality,” it observed that the Moses H. Cone Court's finality determination was, nonetheless, “compelled by precedent” and, in particular, by the Supreme Court's decision in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962). 517 U.S. at 713.

In the alternative, Moses H. Cone recognized that the stay order at issue in that case “was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.” Id. As the Court explained in Quackenbush, that alternative holding relied on the facts (1) that the issuance of a stay as a matter of Colorado River abstention presented “ ‘an important issue separate from the merits’ because it ‘amount[ed] to a refusal to adjudicate’ the case in federal court;” (2) that the order “could not be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the federal action because the district court would be bound, as a matter of res judicata, to honor the state court's judgment; and (3) that “abstention-based stay orders of this ilk are ‘conclusive’ because they are the practical equivalent of an order dismissing the case.” Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 12).

Applying Moses H. Cone to the abstention-based remand at issue in Quackenbush, the Supreme Court concluded that the orders were “indistinguishable” for purposes of assessing “finality.” Id. at 714–15. Indeed, as the Court explained, the “remand order” was, if anything, “more ‘final’ than [the] stay order.” Id. at 714. And, the remand order, “[n]o less than [the] order staying [the] federal court action ․ put[ ] the litigants in this case effectively out of court.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of particular relevance here, the Supreme Court wrote: “When a district court remands a case to a state court, the district court disassociates itself from the case entirely, retaining nothing of the matter on the federal court's docket.” Id. The Quackenbush Court further held—in the alternative—that the remand order at issue in that case was “also indistinguishable from the stay order [at issue] in Moses H. Cone,” because it also “conclusively determine[d] an issue that [was] separate from the merits, namely, the question whether the federal court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction in the interest of comity and federalism.” Id. The questions at issue, moreover, were “sufficiently important to warrant an immediate appeal,” and they would “not be subsumed in any other appealable order entered by the District Court.” Id.

Finally, the Court concluded by noting that although “remand orders like the one entered in [that] case do not meet the traditional definition of finality—they do not ‘en[d] the litigation on the merits and leav[e] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,’ ” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 US. 229, 233 (1945))—remand orders that are “functionally indistinguishable from the stay order ․ in Moses H. Cone” are “appealable,” id. at 715. The same is, of course, true for remand orders that are functionally equivalent to the remand order at issue in Quackenbush.

Because Quackenbush and Moses H. Cone were both premised on “two alternative grounds”—the appealability of a final decision and the appealability of a collateral order—this Court must decide which of these grounds best fits the present context. That matters because the Court's authority to review final orders includes the authority to review all preceding interlocutory orders, which are merged with the final order, see 15A Wright & Miller § 3905.1 (3d ed. Sep. 2025 update), while the appeal of a collateral order does not typically justify the assertion of pendent jurisdiction over other orders that are neither “inextricably intertwined” with the collateral order nor “necessary to ensure meaningful review” of that order, Swint, 514 U.S. at 51. Not all collateral orders, moreover, are immediately appealable—only those that “conclusively determine the disputed question;” that are “ ‘completely separate from the merits of the action;’ ” Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 431 (1985) (citation omitted); and that are “too important to be denied review,” Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Because the Court is convinced that Judge Gunn's remand order constitutes a final decision, which is appealable along with all the preceding orders, the Court need not decide whether it also constitutes an appealable collateral order and, if so, whether the other orders at issue in this appeal are sufficiently intertwined with that order to fall within the jurisdictional umbrella.

Notably, most circuits presented with the question have concluded that remand orders that are not subject to the reviewability bar in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), including discretionary remands under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and abstention-based remands, constitute final decisions that are reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.⁴ Nor is there any reason to doubt that Quackenbush supports treating bankruptcy court orders remanding proceedings to state courts as final orders appealable as of right, as this Court and other district courts have already done. See Ludwig & Robinson, PLLC v. Yelverton Law Firm, PLLC, No. 11-1452, 2012 WL 12905556, at *2 (D.D.C. May 3, 2012) (“Judge Teel's April 27, 2011, Order remanding the proceeding to Superior Court is unmistakably a final order that may be appealed under [28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)].” (collecting cases)); see also Sharpe v. Spark, No. 7:24-cv-556, 2024 WL 4481602, at *1 n.2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 11, 2024) (collecting cases).

But even without that substantial body of precedent, this Court would reach the same conclusion based on the clear import of Quackenbush. The Court is persuaded that Judge Gunn's remand order is functionally equivalent to the remand order at issue in Quackenbush and, accordingly, is appealable. As in Quackenbush (and Moses H. Cone), the remand order put Mr. Brooks out of federal court and “surrender[ed] jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court.” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11; see also Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714. The remand order, here, moreover, is as “final” as the order at issue in Quackenbush, and more “final” than the order in Moses H. Cone, and it would otherwise evade review. Quackenbush does not treat the alternative bases of appellate jurisdiction as mutually exclusive but, rather, recognizes that they constitute “independent grounds” for review. 517 U.S. at 713. And, for that same reason, the D.C. Circuit's observation that Quackenbush “held that a remand order ․ was a collateral order appealable pursuant to § 1291,” Barksdale v. WMATA, 512 F.3d 712, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2008), has no bearing on the distinct question, not addressed in that decision, of whether Quackenbush also supports the appealability of a discretionary remand as a “final decision.”

Although the Quackenbush Court does not expressly address the applicability of the merger doctrine to appeals taken from decisions remanding cases to state court, there is no reason to doubt that it applies. Under the Supreme Court's reasoning, a discretionary remand order constitutes a “final decision[ ]” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and long-established precedent holds that appellate jurisdiction over final decisions “extends as well to the interlocutory rulings that preceded” that decision. Ciralsky, 355 F.3d at 668. The two courts of appeals that have expressly considered the question, moreover, have adopted this reasoning. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Harmston v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, “because the remand order disassociated the district court from the case entirely, and surrendered the district court's jurisdiction to a state court, it should be considered final for purposes of allowing a party to appeal prior non-final federal court orders,” including a prior sanctions order. 627 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 2010), (cleaned up). The Fifth Circuit agreed in Haase Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., which held that, under Quackenbush, a “ ‘remand order is final for appeal purposes,’ ” 748 F.3d 624, 628–29 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), and that, as a result, the appeal of a remand order permits review of a preceding, non-final “grant of partial summary judgment,” id. at 628. That reasoning makes eminent sense.⁵

The Court, accordingly, concludes that the Bankruptcy Court's discretionary remand order constitutes a final, appealable decision for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and that this Court has jurisdiction to review both that order and the Bankruptcy Court's orders granting reconsideration and setting aside its prior entry of the default judgment, which necessarily preceded it.

B. Merits

On appeal from a bankruptcy court, a district court reviews findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. See Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd. P'ship v. RIASO L.L.C., 473 B.R. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd sub nom. In re Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd. P'ship, 743 F.3d 867 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Generally, orders granting reconsideration and vacating prior orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“the district court's grant or denial of relief under Rule 60(b), unless rooted in an error of law, may be reversed only for abuse of discretion.”). That standard “encompasses the clearly erroneous standard with respect to [a bankruptcy court's] findings of fact and the de novo standard with respect to [its] legal conclusions.” Advantage Healthplan, Inc. v. Potter, 391 B.R. 521, 553 n.17 (D.D.C. 2008). “Thus, a bankruptcy court abuses its discretion when it ‘relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, fails to consider a relevant factor, or applies the wrong legal standard.’ ” Hope 7 Monroe St. Ltd. P'ship, 473 B.R. at 6–7 (quoting Pigford v. Johanns, 416 F.3d 12, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).

Here, the Bankruptcy Court vacated its prior entry of a default judgment and remanded the case to Superior Court pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(4). The Court considers each basis for the Bankruptcy Court's orders in turn.

1. Rule 60(b)(4) Determination

Although “Rule 60(b) motions are generally committed to the discretion of the district court [or, here, the bankruptcy court], and thus subject to review for abuse of discretion, ‘there is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4); if the judgment is void, relief is mandatory.’ ” Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 734 F.3d 1175, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Because a decision to vacate a prior judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), accordingly, turns on a question of law, the Court will review the Bankruptcy Court's Rule 60(b)(4) decision de novo. Id.

Under Rule 60(b)(4), a court “may relieve a party ․ from a final judgment” if “the judgment is void.” “A judgment is ‘not void ․ simply because it is or may have been erroneous.’ ” Micula v. Gov't of Romania, 101 F.4th 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010)). Rather, “a void judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity that the infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes final.” United Student Aid Funds, 559 U.S. at 270. “Where a jurisdictional defect is alleged, relief is usually reserved ‘only for the exceptional case in which the court that rendered judgment lacked even an arguable basis for jurisdiction.’ ” Micula, 101 F.4th at 51 (quoting United Student Aid Funds, 559 U.S. at 271). “Under that ‘arguable basis’ standard, a ‘total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction,’ ” and only a total want of jurisdiction can justify vacating a judgment under Rule 60(b)(4).⁶ Lee Mem'l Hosp. v. Becerra, 10 F.4th 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990)).

As this Court has already determined, Judge Gunn's order remanded the case to the Superior Court based on a “discretionary decision[ ] to relinquish jurisdiction”—and not because the Bankruptcy Court lacked extant subject matter jurisdiction. Dkt. 16 at 32. Judge Gunn observed that “[i]t is up to the discretion of the bankruptcy court [ ] whether to retain subject matter jurisdiction of an adversary proceeding post-dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.” Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *8 (emphasis added). She then identified “factors for bankruptcy courts to consider” when deciding whether to exercise that discretion, including “judicial economy,” “fairness and convenience to the parties,” “the degree of difficulty of the related legal issue involved,” and “whether the remedies sought by the plaintiff are unique bankruptcy remedies.” Id. at *9. Concluding that Judge Teel's “[o]pinion did not conduct” a “thorough analysis” of these factors, id.at *8, Judge Gunn went on to consider the relevant factors herself, id. at *9–13, and, after doing so, found that “the entire [d]efamation [c]laim should have been remanded to the Superior Court at th[e] time” Judge Teel dismissed “the underlying chapter 13 case,” id. at *13.

These facts do not constitute the type of “ ‘rare’ ” circumstances that warrant setting aside a final judgment on the ground that it was “void” under Rule 60(b)(4). Lee Mem'l Hosp., 10 F.4th at 863 (citation omitted). As explained, “under [the] ‘arguable basis’ standard, a ‘total want of jurisdiction must be distinguished from an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.’ ” Id. at 864 (quoting Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d at 661). All agree, however, that the Bankruptcy Court had subject matter jurisdiction and merely needed to decide whether to exercise its discretion to retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. Fair minds, to be sure, might differ about whether the final stages of Mr. Brooks's defamation action were better handled by the Bankruptcy Court or the Superior Court. But there was more than an “arguable basis” for jurisdiction; the Bankruptcy Court, in fact, had subject matter jurisdiction. And the decision whether the Bankruptcy Court should exercise the jurisdiction that it already had undoubtedly turned on an exercise of discretion.

That conclusion provides sufficient basis to hold that Judge Gunn erred in setting aside the default judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). But the Court also notes that the difference of opinion about whether to continue to exercise the court's extant jurisdiction of the defamation action was just that—a difference of opinion. Judge Teel explained his reasoning at both the hearing and in his written opinion. At the hearing, he identified a number of factors that weighed in favor of retaining jurisdiction, including how far the case had already proceeded; the fact that Mr. Brooks had already “filed an affidavit that [was] not [ ] contested in any meaningful fashion by Ms. Rosebar;” the fact that the Superior Court action “had been very slow [to] progress;” the fact that the Bankruptcy Court had already “spent considerable time reviewing the parties[’] papers;” the fact that, if the case were remanded, “the Superior Court [ ] would have [had] to go through the same drill that [the Bankruptcy Court had already] gone through;” and the “interest of justice” in “bring[ing] [the dispute] to an end as far as the damages claim is concerned.” Dkt. 17-3 at 231–34. And in his written opinion, he reiterated:

The court decided to retain jurisdiction over the claim for damages. This court had already expended substantial time establishing a procedure at the scheduling conference of May 28, 2020, to fix the amount of damages; [Mr.] Brooks prepared and filed the declaration setting forth his damages; and the court has spent considerable time reviewing that declaration as well as Ms. Rosebar's response (which failed in any way to challenge [Mr.] Brooks's Declaration). Although the claim for damages could be remanded to the Superior Court, [Mr.] Brooks has already suffered long delay, and a remand would result in further delay.

Rosebar II, 2020 WL 6156329, at *2. Although Judge Gunn offered reasonable grounds for reaching a different conclusion, Rule 60(b)(4) “provides an ‘exception to finality’ ” only “under a limited set of circumstances,” United Student Aid Funds, 559 U.S. at 269–70 (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529, 528 (2009)). A disagreement about how to weigh these discretionary considerations falls well beyond the scope of Rule 60(b)(4).

2. Rule 60(b)(1) as an Alternative Ground

Ms. Rosebar asserts that “[e]ven if Rule 60(b)(4) was not the correct vehicle for Judge Gunn to reconsider the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, she could have done so under Rule 60(b)(1) as well,” Dkt. 19 at 25, and she asks the Court to affirm Judge Gunn's decision on that alternate ground, see United States ex rel. Heath v. AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d 112, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (the Court “can affirm a judgment on any basis adequately preserved in the record below”). Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to relieve a party from a previous judgment based on “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). As the Supreme Court explained in Kemp v. United States, “[t]he ordinary meaning of the term ‘mistake’ in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's legal errors.” 596 U.S. 528, 534 (2022). This includes not only “obvious legal mistakes,” such as “overlooking controlling statutes or case law,” id. at 535, but also the misapplication of “controlling law to record facts,” id. at 535 n.2.

Here, the Court is unpersuaded that Judge Gunn's decision to set aside Judge Teel's decision to retain jurisdiction can be upheld on this alternative ground. For the reasons explained above, Judge Teel reasonably exercised his discretion to retain jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. He understood the discretionary nature of the decision; he considered the relevant factors, and he made a reasoned decision that judicial economy, fairness, convenience to the parties, and the stage of the proceeding all favored retaining jurisdiction. As Judge Gunn acknowledged, “[n]o one factor is determinative, nor is any factor required.” Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *9. Although she placed greater weight on other factors than those that Judge Teel emphasized, that difference in focus is what distinguishes the exercise of discretion from a mandate, and it is what distinguishes a mistake of law from a difference of opinion. See Muñoz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 730 F. Supp. 2d 62, 67 (D.D.C. 2010) (a court's alleged “error[s] of legal reasoning” are not grounds for Rule 60(b)(1) relief); Avila v. Dailey, 404 F. Supp. 3d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2019) (same; citing Muñoz); Baxley v. Wormuth, No. 21-cv-2245, 2024 WL 3443326, at *3 (D.D.C. July 15, 2024) (same, even post-Kemp); cf. Rowe v. PChange LLC, No. 22-cv-3098, 2025 WL 2803859, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2025) (“ministerial determination of the reasonableness of the fees requested” “is not the kind of ‘judicial error of law’ that warrants relief under Rule 60(b)(1)” (citing Kemp, 596 U.S. at 539)).⁷

The Court, accordingly, declines to affirm the decision on that alternate ground.

3. Rule 60(b)(1) Determination Regarding Default Judgment Procedure

Judge Gunn also held that even if her Rule 60(b)(4) analysis was incorrect, she would still have granted Ms. Rosebar's motion for reconsideration of Judge Teel's entry of default judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *13. In Judge Gunn's view, Judge Teel made a “mistake of law” when he failed to “complete the required analysis of whether [Mr. Brooks] was entitled to a judgment for defamation before the entry of a judgment for damages.” Id. at *14. This procedure, she explained, was required under D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) (hereinafter “D.C. Rule 55”), id. at *14 & n.107, which directs a plaintiff seeking entry of a default judgment to “apply to the court ․ by motion or by praecipe, served on all parties, requesting the setting of an ex parte proof hearing,” D.C. Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Under D.C. Rule 55, Judge Gunn further explained, plaintiffs seeking entry of default judgments must show “by either a verified complaint or additional ex parte proof during a hearing that they have plead a prima facie case in their complaint,” in this case, a prima facie case for defamation. Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *14 (citing Jones v. Health Res. Corp., 509 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1986)). Because Judge Gunn's decision once again turns on a question of law, the Court will review her reasoning de novo.

As a threshold matter, it is unclear why Judge Gunn concluded that Judge Teel was required to comply with the procedures set forth in D.C. Rule 55 before entering a default judgment. She cites no authority applying D.C. (or state law) procedures for entry of default judgments to bankruptcy court proceedings, and at times, she cites to this Court's case law, which in turn invokes the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see, e.g., Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *14 n.105, n.109. In any event, “[i]t is settled that if [the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] [o]n point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, and the Constitution, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law.” Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996). As the Supreme Court explained in Hanna v. Plumer, “[w]hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules ․ the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.” 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).

For present purposes, the “situation is covered by” Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055, which sets the procedures for the entry of default judgments in adversary proceedings (including garden variety actions to recover damages or property pursuant to state law) in federal bankruptcy courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under title 11.”); see also In re Greene, 223 F.3d 1064, 1071–72 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Hanna’s substance-procedure dichotomy to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure); In re Frates, 507 B.R. 298, 305 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014) (applying Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure instead of contrary state procedural law “in light of Hanna”). And, significantly, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055 applies Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 to all adversary proceedings, rather than any state or D.C procedural rule governing the entry of default judgments. See In re Buscone, 61 F.4th 10, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2023) (affirming the bankruptcy court's entry of default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 procedure); In re OCA, Inc., 551 F.3d 359, 369 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 and Bankruptcy Rule 7055 as governing bankruptcy court in deciding whether or not to set aside default); In re Lam, 192 F.3d 1309, 1311 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The proper method by which a party may apply to have a default set aside [in a bankruptcy adversary proceeding] is to file a formal motion with the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) or, as applicable in this case, the corresponding bankruptcy rule, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055(c).”); In re Chalasani, 92 F.3d 1300, 1307 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming bankruptcy court's refusal to set aside default judgment, stating “Bankr. R. 7055 makes Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 applicable in adversary proceedings”); Matter of State Exch. Fin. Co., 896 F.2d 1104, 1105 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming bankruptcy court's refusal to set aside an “entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), made applicable to bankruptcy proceedings by Bankr. R. 7055”); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 458 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a party fails to answer or appear in an adversary proceeding [in bankruptcy court], the Federal Rule governing default judgments applies. Fed. Rule Bkrtcy. Proc. 7055 (adopting Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 55).”).

To the extent Judge Gunn concluded that D.C. Rule 55 applied because the adversary proceeding was removed from D.C. Superior Court, that too, is incorrect. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 applies even when, as is the case here, a case is removed to federal court from state court. A state court's entry of default before the case is removed to federal court “is treated as if it ha[s] been entered in a federal proceeding.” Darby v. McDonald, 307 F.R.D. 254, 256 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Butner v. Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, 785–86 (9th Cir. 1963)). District courts routinely apply the procedures set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 to cases removed to federal court following the entry of a default. See, e.g., id.; Void-El v. O'Brien, 811 F. Supp. 2d 255, 259 (D.D.C. 2011) (setting aside Superior Court default in removed case for good cause pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55); PEPCO v. China Constr. Am. Inc., No. 9-cv-111, 2009 WL 3163058, at *1 (D.D.C. 2009) (same). In short, federal district courts and bankruptcy courts must apply federal procedural law to the entry of default judgments, rather than state law, even in cases removed from state court after the state court enters default.

Thus, under the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) and its progeny, Judge Teel was required to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 in deciding whether to enter a default judgment. It follows that he did not commit the legal error that Judge Gunn relied upon in setting aside the default judgment. But because the Court “can affirm a judgment on any basis adequately preserved in the record below,” AT&T, Inc., 791 F.3d at 123; see Meza v. Renaud, 9 F.4th 930, 933 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (Court may affirm judgment “on any ground supported by the record”), the Court goes on to consider whether Judge Teel's entry of the default judgment was consistent with Bankruptcy Rule 7055 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55.

a. Failure to Set Ex-Parte Proof Hearing and Deficient Procedures for Calculating Damages

As a preliminary matter, the Court can quickly dispense with two asserted errors in Judge Teel's default judgment proceedings. First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) (and thus Bankruptcy Rule 7055) provides that when a “party must apply to the court for a default judgment,” “the party against whom a default judgment is sought ․ must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing.” Accordingly, Judge Teel did not commit a mistake of law by failing to require Mr. Brooks to request an “ex-parte proof hearing,” Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *14, or by failing to set such a hearing, id. To the extent that such a motion and hearing are required by D.C. Rule 55(b)(2), no such requirement exists in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2).

Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 is discretionary (and tracks the language of D.C. Rule 55(b)(2)) in other relevant respects: “The court may conduct hearings or make referrals ․ when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to: (A) conduct an accounting; (B) determine the amount of damages; (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or (D) investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) (emphasis added). Judge Gunn's orders were not premised on purported legal errors in how Judge Teel structured the default judgment proceedings or calculated the damages, although she expresses some doubt about the sufficiency of the procedures Judge Teel employed. See Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *4 (“Judge Teel issued a tentative oral ruling” “without providing any opportunity for either party (i) to brief or otherwise research the legal question as to the continuing subject matter jurisdiction of the Court as to the entire Defamation Claim or (ii) cross-examine the opposite party on the contents if [sic] their affidavits.”).

In her “Post-Hearing Brief,” and in this appeal, Ms. Rosebar avers that “[t]he appropriate scope of damages is unclear from Mr. Brooks's statement of damages and the Bankruptcy Court's opinion” because Judge Teel “did not consider whether any other causes contributed to Mr. Brooks's loss, nor whether there was any mitigation by Mr. Brooks,” and “damage to a company purportedly owned by Mr. Brooks is not the appropriate scope.” Dkt. 19 at 45; Dkt. 17-4 at 68–69 (raising the same arguments in the “Post-Hearing Brief” to Judge Gunn). This argument can be rejected in short order. First, the argument is unavailing in part because Ms. Rosebar, once again, relies on procedural requirements in D.C. Rule 55, see Dkt. 19 at 44–45, which, as explained above, does not apply to federal bankruptcy proceedings. Nor did Judge Teel make a mistake of law in how he structured the submission of evidence to calculate damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), which, as the Court has explained, commits broad discretion to the trial (and by extension, bankruptcy) court. Here, Judge Teel issued an order directing Mr. Brooks to file “a statement of damages and ․ a request for injunction, which shall be supported by affidavits,” and directing Ms. Rosebar to “file any opposition ․ supporting any facts therein with affidavits.” Dkt. 17-3 at 239. Fanning v. AMF Mech. Corp., 326 F.R.D. 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2018) (Plaintiff may prove damages by offering “ ‘detailed affidavits or documentary evidence’ on which the Court may rely.” (quoting Int'l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. R.W. Amrine Drywall Co., 239 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2002)). Judge Teel was not required to hold a hearing or to invite cross-examination of Mr. Brooks, where Ms. Rosebar took no steps to contest the accuracy of his evidentiary showing. Swanson v. Martins, 232 F. Supp. 3d 23, 26 (D.D.C. 2017) (“To determine damages, the Court may conduct a hearing, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), but need not do so, and may instead rely on ‘detailed affidavits or documentary evidence.’ ” (citation omitted)); see generally 10A Wright & Miller § 2688 (4th ed. Sep. 2025 update).

At the July 9, 2020, hearing, moreover, Judge Teel provided Ms. Rosebar with “a second opportunity to tell [him] why [he] should not award damages as set forth in Mr. [ ] Brooks’[s] affidavit” because, as Judge Teel further explained, Ms. Rosebar's “opposition failed to really wrestle with that question.” Dkt. 17-3 at 221; see also Rosebar II, 2020 WL 6156329, at *2 (“Ms. Rosebar's response ․ failed in any way to challenge [Mr.] Brooks's Declaration.”). Judge Teel reviewed Mr. Brooks's “Declaration under penalty of perjury,” found that it “established an entitlement to damages,” found that Ms. Rosebar “failed to articulate any reason why the court ought not treat the damages as established by [Mr.] Brooks's Declaration,” and set forth his basis for awarding the damages he awarded. Rosebar II, 2020 WL 6156329, at *2.

The Court is unable to identify any mistake of law that Judge Teel committed by proceeding in this manner. But, even if the process that he applied was less than perfect, his factual findings on the scope and reasonableness of damages offer no grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), especially in light of the fact that Ms. Rosebar did not challenge the scope or calculation of damages prior to the default judgment, Dkt. 17-3 at 221; Rosebar II, 2020 WL 6156329, at *2 (Ms. Rosebar failed to challenge the calculation of damages in front of Judge Teel); see Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Notably, “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 places a harmless error caveat on Rule 60(b).” Gilmore v. District of Columbia, No. 17-cv-1046, 2024 WL 1833878, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2024); accord. Maynard v. District of Columbia, 579 F. Supp. 2d 137, 142 n.5 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that harmless error is no ground for disturbing a judgment or order of the Court ․”). “[T]he court must,” accordingly, “disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any party's substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. “This ‘means that the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the [bankruptcy court] proceedings.’ ” Sibert-Dean v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 721 F.3d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). In other words, the Court's role is limited to assessing whether Judge Gunn's reconsideration and vacatur orders can be affirmed on alternative grounds, including any prejudicial mistakes of law made by Judge Teel. Here, Ms. Rosebar fails to identify any mistake of law, much less a prejudicial one.

b. Failure to Make Explicit Findings Regarding Whether Mr. Brooks's Complaint States a Claim

The only remaining issue, then, is whether Judge Teel made a mistake of law by failing to make an express finding, before entering default judgment, that Mr. Brooks's defamation Complaint stated a claim for relief. See Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *13–14. Once default is entered, the defendant “is deemed to admit every well-pleaded allegation in the [C]omplaint.” Adkins v. Teseo, 180 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2001); 10A Wright & Miller § 2688.1 (4th ed. Sep. 2025 update) (“Once the default is established, defendant has no further standing to contest the factual allegations of plaintiff's claim for relief.”). Despite this posture and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55’s discretionary language, “[m]odern courts are ․ reluctant to enter and enforce judgments unwarranted by the facts.” Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Accordingly, at times, courts within this district, including this Court, have explained that “the defendant[’s] default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief.” Jackson v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 564 F. Supp. 2d 22, 26–27 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Descent v. Kolitsidas, 396 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005)); accord. Cong. Hunger Ctr. v. Gurey, 308 F. Supp. 3d 223, 227 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Even after default, however, it remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts constitute a legitimate cause of action, since a party in default does not admit conclusions of law.” (citation omitted)); Saravia v. Yuan Profit, Inc., No. 20-cv-232, 2023 WL 2585675, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2023); United States v. $1,071,251.44 of Funds Associated with Mingzheng Int'l Trading Ltd., 324 F. Supp. 3d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[C]onceptually, ․ a motion for default judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim ․ [A] plaintiff must ‘plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ ” (third alteration in original) (first quoting Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015); and then quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))).

To be sure, this Court does not invariably make an express determination that the plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim before entering a default judgment; many of the reported Rule 55(b)(2) orders from this Court simply enter the requested default judgment after concluding that the defendant was properly served and failed to answer or otherwise to appear, or failed to comply with court orders, and after determining the relief that is due. See, e.g., Reyes v. Kimuell, 270 F. Supp. 3d 30, 34, 33 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting the “entry of a default judgment is appropriate” “when the defendant ‘makes no request to set aside the default’ and ‘gives no indication of a meritorious defense.’ ” (citation omitted)); Carazani v. Zegarra, 972 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12– 14, 15 (D.D.C. 2013) (making no findings regarding the sufficiency of the complaint in the context of a default judgment entered as a sanction for violating the court's orders, even where the defendant “has denied each of the plaintiff's allegations but [did] not respond[ ] to the Supplement to the Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment”); see generally Boland v. Yoccabel Const. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 2013); Friends Christian High Sch. v. Geneva Fin. Consultants, 309 F.R.D. 38 (D.D.C. 2015). In many of these cases, it seems likely that the sufficiency of the complaint was obvious and required no analysis or comment.

For present purposes, the Court need not decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 requires a court to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint explicitly before entering a default judgment for two reasons. First, given the uncertainty about this rule, it is safe to conclude that Judge Teel did not commit the type of mistake of law (if he, in fact, made a mistake of any type) that would justify setting aside the default judgment. See, e.g., Archirodon Constr. (Overseas) Co. Ltd. v. Gen. Co. for Ports of Iraq, No. 22-cv-1571, 2024 WL 3844800, at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2024,) (noting that although courts had “generally adhered to” a legal procedure, “habit does not a legal rule make” and therefore, a failure to follow that legal procedure was not an error of law within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) (citing Kemp, 596 U.S. at 534)), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 24-cv-7133, 2025 WL 3072549 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 3, 2025). Second, as is often the case—and as was clearly the case here—there is no doubt that Mr. Brooks's Complaint stated a claim for defamation. As a result, the Court can either assume that Judge Teel considered this fact before entering the default judgment or that, at the very least, his mistake (if he, in fact, made a mistake) was harmless under Rule 61.

To assess whether a complaint states a claim, the Court “must first ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state [the] claim’ to relief, ․ and then determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded those elements with adequate factual support to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Blue v. District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 675, 678). To state a claim for defamation under D.C. law,⁸ a plaintiff must allege: “(1) that the defendant made a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant published the statement without privilege to a third party; (3) that the defendant's fault in publishing the statement [met the requisite standard]; ․ and (4) either that the statement was actionable as a matter of law irrespective of special harm or that its publication caused the plaintiff special harm.” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann, 150 A.3d 1213, 1240 (D.C. 2016) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Because Mr. Brooks does not contend that he is a public figure, the requisite fault standard to defame a private individual—negligence—applies. Salem Media Grp., Inc. v. Awan, 301 A.3d 633, 645–46 (D.C. 2023). Here, taking all the facts from Mr. Brooks's Complaint as true, see Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the Court has little doubt that he stated a claim for defamation.

First, he alleged that in December 2013, “Defendants falsely represented themselves to be customers of [his] security camera business” and posted one Google Plus review and one Yahoo Local business review accusing him of “st[ealing] money from [poster's] family,” being “a predatory lender—and a fraud,” failing to “hold the proper license for any” of Brooks's businesses, failing to “pay DC taxes,” “harass[ing] people,” “threaten[ing] people to do bodily harm,” “hir[ing] illegal immigrants,” being a “criminal,” “us[ing] tactics such as harassment, intimidation, extortion, blackmail and public humiliation to collect on loans that were ILLEGAL from origination,” and “taking pictures off the internet - social media websites of your children.” Dkt. 17-1 at 57 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 17) (emphasis in original). These statements are plainly defamatory, see Competitive Enter. Inst., 150 A.3d at 1241 (“A statement is defamatory ‘if it tends to injure [the] plaintiff in his trade, profession or community standing, or lower him in the estimation of the community.’ ” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)), and, indeed, because they accuse Mr. Brooks of having committed various “criminal offense(s)” and question his “fitness for trade, business, or profession,” they constitute defamation per se, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 n.18 (1978); see Moss v. Stockard, 580 A.2d 1011, 1033 n.40 (D.C. 1990) (implicitly recognizing defamation per se).

Second, Mr. Brooks alleged that at least one of these “reviews” received hundreds of views online, Dkt. 17-1 at 57 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Compl. ¶ 16), which supports the element of publication. See Competitive Enter. Inst., 150 A.3d at 1251 (“blog post on ․ website constitute[s] publication”).

Third, Mr. Brooks alleged that “the allegations in the Google + and Yahoo Local reviews ․ are the same rejected allegations that the Rosebars made against [Mr. Brooks] in court testimony, legal filings, police reports and complaints to administrative agencies,” Dkt. 17-1 at 57 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Compl. ¶ 18), for which there is support in the record, see, e.g., id. at 102 (motion filed by Mr. Rosebar seeking to set aside Mr. Brooks's judgment because “Mr. Brooks is not licensed in the District of Columbia”); id. at 137 (Rosebars’ consumer complaint stating that Mr. Brooks “has never and is not licensed to lend money” and “harassed [them]” (emphasis in original)). The Complaint thus raised a plausible inference that the Rosebars posted the false reviews. Considered in light of the long and tortured history between Mr. Brooks and the Rosebars, id. at 53–56 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Compl. ¶¶ 5–14), the Complaint plausibly alleged that the Rosebars posted the reviews with “ ‘knowledge of the statement's falsity,’ ” Competitive Enter. Inst., 150 A.3d at 1252 (citation omitted).⁹

Finally, Mr. Brooks alleged that because these two reviews “were the only ones posted online for 24 Hour Eyewitness for almost a year,” his “Internet referrals immediately dropped from approximately ten inquiries per week to zero inquiries per week, [ ] his sales suffered an equally rapid and major decline,” Dkt. 17-1 at 59 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Compl. ¶ 23), and he went out of business within a year, id. at 247.

In sum, then, the Complaint sufficiently alleged that the Rosebars negligently or intentionally posted false and defamatory statements about Mr. Brooks and his business and that he experienced specific harm as a result. The sufficiency of the Complaint was presumably obvious to Judge Teel and required no explanation, but, even if he was required to make an express finding regarding its sufficiency, any error was not prejudicial to Ms. Rosebar's “substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. This conclusion is further reinforced, moreover, by the fact that Ms. Rosebar filed multiple answers to Mr. Brooks's Complaint in D.C. Superior Court See Dkt. 17-1 at 34, 37, 39. While represented by counsel, she also filed a motion to dismiss, and in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment, see Dkt. 17-4 at 48, which failed to raise a Rule 12(b)(6) defense but, instead, insisted that Mr. Brooks's “case should be dismissed because he has failed to present any evidence that the Defendants made the alleged defamatory [statements],” id. at 50. The D.C. Superior Court judge denied Ms. Rosebar's motion to dismiss from the bench. Dkt. 17-1 at 43–44; Dkt. 17-4 at 59 (paper order denying motion to dismiss). Against this backdrop, and reviewing the Complaint and the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Brooks, there is no basis to conclude that Judge Teel committed legal error, much less prejudicial error, by failing to make an express finding that the Complaint stated a claim for defamation.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will VACATE the Bankruptcy Court's orders granting reconsideration, vacating the default judgment, and remanding the case to D.C. Superior Court, Brooks v. Rosebar, No. AP 20-10011, ECF No. 136 (Bankr. D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2023), and REMAND for any proceedings that may be necessary to implement this decision.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mr. Brooks represents that his claim for injunctive relief is now (and has long been) moot. Dkt. 17 at 12.

2.   To clarify what the Court understands Ms. Rosebar to mean when she refers to her “voluntary dismissal,” Ms. Rosebar moved to dismiss her bankruptcy petition on June 18, 2020. See Debtor's Mot. to Dismiss, ECF. No. 106, In Re Rosebar, No. 20-06 (Bankr. D.D.C. June 18, 2020). Without ruling on the motion, on July 9, 2020, Judge Teel dismissed the bankruptcy action with prejudice for 180 days as a discovery sanction on Ms. Rosebar for failing to produce documents to Mr. Brooks in the adversary defamation proceeding. Dkt. 17-2 at 65–66. Judge Teel, however, during the hearing that followed that order, “decided not to impose coercive sanctions [in addition to the dismissal], as Ms. Rosebar's motion to dismiss the main case purged her of contempt for failure to produce documents,” Rosebar II, 2020 WL 6156329, at *1.

3.   Judge Gunn declined to rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which is made applicable to adversary proceedings by Bankruptcy Rule 9023, because Rule 59(e) does not permit a party to raise “new arguments or evidence that the moving party could have raised before the decision issued.” Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *7 (quoting Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 508 (2020)).

4.   See Bryan v. BellSouth Commc'ns, Inc., 377 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have recognized that a remand order based on § 1367(c) is appealable as a final order pursuant to § 1291.”); Harmston v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 627 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e think the cases stand for the proposition that when a remand order is not barred from review under § 1447(d), it is final for purposes of § 1291.”); Erie Cnty. Retirees Ass'n v. Cnty. of Erie, Pa., 220 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2000) (same); Haase v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 628–29 (5th Cir. 2014) (same); Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (same); Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 642 (7th Cir. 2014) (same); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 542 (8th Cir. 1996) (same); In re Stone Container Corp., 360 F.3d 1216, 1219–20 (10th Cir. 2004) (same); Ariail Drug Co. v. Recomm Int'l Display, Inc., 122 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1997) (where the case was not barred by “28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and § 1452(b),” “review of remand orders may be obtained by appeal under § 1291”); Reifer v. Westport Ins. Corp., 751 F.3d 129, 133–34 (3d Cir. 2014) (discretionary remand under the Declaratory Judgment Act is a reviewable final order); cf. Shapiro v. Logistec USA, Inc., 412 F.3d 307, 314 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Quackenbush’s conclusion “that the remand order was appealable under section 1291” to “decide[ ] that, following Quackenbush, the proper avenue for review is by appeal rather than by mandamus.”).

5.   The merger doctrine should not be confused with the Waco severability doctrine. See City of Waco, Tex. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934). In Waco, an individual sued the City of Waco in state court. Id. at 141. The City brought a cross-complaint against an out-of-state surety, and that party removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. Id. The plaintiff, in turn, moved to dismiss the cross-complaint based on improper joinder. Id. at 141–42. The district court agreed, dismissed the cross-complaint for improper joinder, and “since, upon that dismissal, there was no diversity of citizenship of the remaining parties, ․ remanded the cause to the state court.” Id. at 142. The City, then, sought to appeal the order dismissing its action against the out-of-state surety, but the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction over the remand order. Id. at 142–43. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the City was entitled to appeal the dismissal even though it was not allowed to appeal the remand order. That limited appeal was proper, the Supreme Court explained, because “the decree of dismissal preceded that of remand” and because, even though reversal would not set aside the remand, a decision holding that the dismissal was “erroneous” would permit the district court to “remit the entire controversy, with the [out-of-state surety] still a party, to the state court for such further proceedings as may be in accordance with law.” Id. at 143–44.Because Waco was decided prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1447 and the Supreme Court's precedent interpreting the bar on appellate review of remand orders contained in that provision, the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the Waco doctrine's “continued vitality.” Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 644 n.13 (2006); Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 266 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The continuing vitality of Waco is dubious in light of more recent precedents.”); see also DeMartini v. DeMartini, 964 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2020) (describing Waco as “terse, cryptic, and now-controversial”); In re C & M Props., L.L.C., 563 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009) (Gorsuch, J.). But all that matters for present purposes is that the Waco severability doctrine is distinct from the merger of interlocutory orders into an appealable final order. Under Quackenbush, remand orders constitute final orders to which the usual merger doctrine applies, while the Waco doctrine, at most, permits review of interlocutory orders that may have a “conclusive effect” on state court proceedings and that preceded the unreviewable remand order. See Aquamar, S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 179 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999); Hernandez v. Seminole Cnty., Fla., 334 F.3d 1233, 1241 (11th Cir. 2003).

6.   The D.C. Circuit has observed that the total-want-of-jurisdiction standard applies so long as the case does not involve a defendant who failed to enter an appearance altogether or a foreign sovereign. See Lee Mem'l Hosp., 10 F.4th at 864. Because this case involves neither, the Court will apply that standard.

7.   Notably, Ms. Rosebar did not meaningfully contest Judge Teel's discretionary decision to retain jurisdiction until after he entered judgment against her. See Good Luck Nursing Home, Inc. v. Harris, 636 F.2d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[A] party that ․ has not presented known facts helpful to its cause when it had the chance cannot ordinarily avail itself on [R]ule 60(b) after an adverse judgment has been handed down.”); PETA v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 343, 355 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (same; quoting Good Luck Nursing Home). Indeed, she did not even seek reconsideration of that portion of Judge Teel's decision in her original motion for reconsideration. The issue was first raised in her “Post-Hearing Brief” after Judge Gunn held a motions hearing on Ms. Rosebar's motion. Dkt. 17-4 at 69–71; see Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *6 (“In her Post-Hearing Brief ․ [Ms. Rosebar] challenged the Court's retention of subject matter jurisdiction of the Defamation Claim following dismissal of her underlying chapter 13 bankruptcy case.”); id. at *7 (“Although not pled in the Motion for Reconsideration, in the Reply brief, [Ms. Rosebar] raised the question of whether this Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying removed action after the dismissal of [Ms. Rosebar's] chapter 13 case.”).

8.   The Court assumes, as Judge Gunn did, that D.C. law applies to Mr. Brooks's defamation suit, and the parties do not argue otherwise. See Rosebar III, 2023 WL 2697939, at *14 n.110.

9.   The D.C. courts have opined that, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “we must assume, as the complaint alleges, the falsity of any express or implied factual statements made,” and “[w]e must also assume that such statements were made by appellees with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for their truth.” Klayman v. Segal, 783 A.2d 607, 613 (D.C. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting Weyrich v. New Republic, Inc, 235 F.3d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Similarly, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) permits a plaintiff to allege “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind ․ generally.”

RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge