ALI v. AL NAHYAN (2025)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case arises from the ongoing, armed conflict in Yemen between Houthi insurgents and a group of nine countries led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), referred to as the Coalition Forces (“Coalition”). Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶¶ 1–3). On October 7, 2015, and October 8, 2016, Coalition airstrikes hit a wedding and then a funeral in Yemen, killing dozens and causing devastating injuries to Plaintiffs, seven Yemeni civilians. Id. at 7–14 (Compl. ¶¶ 11–25). Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated individuals against Saudi and UAE military officials, the U.S. Secretary of State, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and three U.S. corporations and their CEOs. Plaintiffs seek a court order enjoining “further military sales to the Coalition,” id. at 95 (Compl. ¶ 228), and compelling the U.S. government to comply with two statutes, the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”) and the Foreign Assistance Act (“FAA”). Id. According to Plaintiffs, “the Coalition has used U.S.-made arms to perpetrate war crimes.” Id. They assert that the United States should not have authorized arms sales to the Coalition because the “indiscriminate and brutal” civilian airstrikes and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen rendered such authorizations unlawful under the statutory framework. Id. at 28, 93 (Compl. ¶¶ 61–62, 227). They further allege that the U.S. government has failed to conduct mandatory end-use monitoring of how the military support to “Saudi Arabia and the UAE contributed to civilian harm in Yemen.” Id. at 64 (Compl. ¶ 164); id. at 93 (Compl. ¶ 227) (same).

Plaintiffs allege that the U.S. government's decisions authorizing arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion” and “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Id. at 90 (Compl. ¶ 222) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (2)(C)). Plaintiffs also assert claims for injunctive relief and money damages against the three corporations that allegedly manufactured and supplied the weapons at issue and their CEOs. They allege that the corporate defendants aided and abetted Saudi Arabia and UAE in committing war crimes and extrajudicial killings, including the October 2015 and October 2016 attacks, and that these defendants have committed various common law torts. Id. at 76–85, 95–99 (Compl. ¶¶ 196–215, 229–46).

For the reasons explained below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Dkt. 31, Dkt. 36, and Dkt. 37. Because the Court dismisses the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), it will not reach Defendants’ arguments on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6).

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

1. The Arms Export Control Act

The AECA declares that it be the policy of the United States “to facilitate the common defense by entering into international arrangements with friendly countries which further the objective of applying agreed resources of each country to programs and projects of cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production, procurement, and logistics support to achieve specific national defense requirements and objectives of mutual concern.” 22 U.S.C. § 2751. “To this end,” the AECA “authorizes sales by the United States Government” of military equipment “to friendly countries having sufficient wealth to maintain and equip their own military ․ in accordance with the restraints and control measures specified” in the Act “and in furtherance of the security objectives of the United States and the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.” Id.

The AECA authorizes two types of arms sales: “foreign military sales,” in which “the United States Government” sells arms directly “to friendly countries,” id., and “direct commercial sales,” in which U.S. companies sell arms to foreign governments or persons, see id. § 2778. The AECA also establishes various procedures that the President (or his delegees) must follow with respect to both types of sales. See id. §§ 2753, 2778. Finally, as relevant to this case, the AECA requires the President to establish an “end-use monitoring” program to ensure that “recipient” countries are “complying with the requirements imposed by the United States Government” and that defense articles are “used for the purposes for which they are provided.” Id. § 2785(a).

a. Foreign Military Sales

Foreign military sales (“FMS”) are sales from the U.S. government to a foreign country or international organization. Under the AECA, the United States government may sell defense articles and services to friendly countries for only certain purposes. In particular:

Defense articles and defense services shall be sold or leased by the United States Government under [the AECA] to friendly countries solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, for preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the means of delivering such weapons, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security ․

Id. § 2754. The U.S. government must meet four requirements before making government-to-government sales. First, the President (or his delegee) must “find[ ] that the furnishing of defense articles and defense services to such country ․ will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.” Id. § 2753(a)(1). Second, the recipient-country must agree not to transfer the defense articles to unauthorized third parties or use weapons “for purposes other than those for which furnished unless the consent of the President has first been obtained.” Id. § 2753(a)(2). Third, the recipient-country must agree to keep defense articles secured. Id. § 2753(a)(3). And fourth, the recipient-country must be “otherwise eligible” to purchase or lease the relevant defense articles and services. Id. § 2753(a)(4).

“Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State” is “responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of sales, leases, financing, cooperative projects, and exports” under the AECA and must consider, among other things, whether each sale or delivery of weapons shall proceed. Id. § 2752(b). In doing so, the Secretary of State must “tak[e] into account other United States activities abroad, such as military assistance, economic assistance, and the food for peace program,” and must ensure that the sale or delivery is “integrated with other United States activities” and that the sale or delivery will “best serve[ ]” “the foreign policy of the United States.” Id.

Congress has also established reporting procedures to facilitate oversight of major arms sales. Under the AECA, the President (or his delegee) must notify Congress before entering into an agreement for sales exceeding specified thresholds based on the type of sale and the recipient country.¹ Id. § 2776(b)(1), (b)(6). A component of the Department of Defense (“DOD”) known as the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (“DSCA”) is responsible for providing the required notifications. Dkt. 31-1 at 14–15. When the United States decides to accept an offer from a recipient country to buy or to lease covered defense articles, the DSCA notifies the Chairperson of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1). Unclassified versions of these notifications are also published in the Federal Register. Id. § 2776(f)(1).

The AECA requires that the notifications must inform Congress what is being sold, to whom, at what price, and by what agency. See id. § 2776(b)(1) (requiring inclusion of the “information specified in clauses (i) through (iv) of subsection (a)”). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Foreign Affairs Committee may also “request” additional information regarding the contemplated sale. Id. § 2776(b)(1). This supplemental information may include “a detailed description of the defense article[ ]” and its “capabilities,” id. § 2776(b)(1)(A); “the name of each contractor expected to provide the defense article,” id. § 2776(b)(1)(C); “an evaluation ․ of the manner ․ in which the proposed sale would [ ] contribute to an arms race; [ ] support international terrorism; [or] increase the possibility of an outbreak or escalation of a conflict,” id. § 2776(b)(1)(D); “the reasons why the foreign country ․ needs the defense articles,” id. § 2776(b)(1)(E); “the reasons why the proposed sale is in the national interest of the United States,” id. § 2776(b)(1)(G); and “an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on United States relations with the countries in the region,” id. § 2776(b)(1)(L).

Apart from its obligations under the AECA, the Department of State also submits informal notifications to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee ahead of prospective major arms sales. Paul K. Kerr, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process 1 (Mar. 18, 2025). This process, referred to as “tiered review,” involves a preliminary notification sent twenty to forty days before the formal notification. Id. It provides an opportunity for the relevant committees to “ask questions or raise concerns prior to the Department of State initiating formal notification,” and the informal process permits government officials to address congressional concerns confidentially. Id. (quoting Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, 115th Cong. 17 (2017) (statement of Tina Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Sec'y of State)). According to an August 2020 report by the State Department's Office of Inspector General, the State Department “generally will not” proceed with a formal notification of a proposed “arms transfer if a member of Congress raises significant concerns by placing a hold during the informal notification stage.” Off. of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of State, ISP-I-20-19, Review of the Department of State's Role in Arms Transfers to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 1 n.5 (Aug. 2020).

There are at least two ways that Congress can block arms sales after it is notified of the sales. First, the AECA establishes a process for Congress to disapprove a proposed sale by enacting a joint resolution within thirty days of receiving the notification.² 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1). Second, Congress can use the regular legislative process to block or to modify a proposed transaction. Both methods, however, are subject to a presidential veto. Paul K. Kerr, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process 8–9 (Mar. 18, 2025). To date, Congress has never blocked a proposed sale using its AECA disapproval powers, id. at 4, although it has, on occasion, reached a negotiated compromise, short of outright disapproval, with the Executive Branch, id. at 8.

b. Direct Commercial Sales

The AECA also requires the President to regulate direct commercial sales (“DCS”) of defense articles and services from companies in the United States to foreign governments or persons to ensure that such sales are “[i]n furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States.” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). To that end, the Act instructs the President to develop a list of “items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense services.” Id. The President has delegated this authority to the Secretary of State, 22 C.F.R. § 120.2, who publishes and maintains the “United States Munitions List,” 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, which contains twenty-one categories of defense articles subject to export controls. The listed articles range from small firearm accessories such as “silencers, mufflers, and sound suppressors,” id. § 121.1(I)(e), to larger devices like “torpedoes,” id. § 121.1(IV)(a)(7), “tanks,” id. § 121.1(VII)(a)(1), and “fighter bombers,” id. § 121.1(VIII)(a)(2).

Export of defense articles on the United States Munitions List is controlled by a registration-and-licensing regime governed by the AECA and its implementing regulations. Any entity in the United States that is engaged in the business of “manufacturing or exporting ․ defense articles” must first “register with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls” (“DDTC”). Id. § 120.13(a); id. § 120.61 (defining “person” to include “any ․ entity, organization or group”). Once an entity is registered, it must “request[ ] and obtain[ ]” an export license from the DDTC with respect to each defense article. Id. § 120.14(a). With a few exemptions not relevant here, see id. §§ 123.16, 123.17, defense articles on the United States Munitions List may not be exported without a DDTC-issued license, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2); 22 C.F.R. § 120.14(a). The AECA sets out approval criteria and reporting procedures that the President (or his delegee) must follow before issuing a DDTC license. In particular, the President and Secretary of State must

take into account whether the export of an article would contribute to an arms race, aid in the development of weapons of mass destruction, support international terrorism, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multilateral arms control or nonproliferation agreements or other arrangements.

22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(2).

DCS are also subject to a congressional review process like the FMS review process. Before issuing a license for the export of defense articles proposed for sale under a contract valued at $50,000,000 or more (or, in the case of some specified firearms, a contract valued at $1,000,000 or more), the President must formally report the proposed license to Congress in the manner described above and must give Congress thirty days to decide whether to disapprove the license. Id. § 2776(c)(1), (c)(2)(C). In addition, under the tiered review system, the State Department “transmits to the committees any license application for commercially licensed arms sales as soon as the department receives them” to give Congress a chance to ask questions or to raise concerns before receiving a formal notification. Paul K. Kerr, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process 1–2 & n.5 (Mar. 18, 2025).

c. End-Use Monitoring

The AECA also directs the President to “establish a program which provides for the end-use monitoring” of “defense articles and defense services sold, leased, or exported under” the AECA or the FAA. 22 U.S.C. § 2785(a)(1). The goal of the end-use monitoring program is to “improve accountability with respect to defense articles and defense services sold, leased, or exported” under the AECA or the FAA. Id. The AECA establishes three overarching requirements regarding the scope and content of the monitoring program.

First, the AECA prescribes which defense articles should be included in monitoring: “To the extent practicable” the program should provide for the monitoring of “high-risk exports” identified according to “the standards ․ developed under section 2778(g)(7).” Id. § 2785(a)(2)(A). Section 2778(g)(7), in turn, directs that “[t]he President shall, in coordination with law enforcement and national security agencies, develop standards for identifying high-risk exports for regular end-use verification” and to publish them in the Federal Register. Id. § 2778(g)(7). Pursuant to that direction, the State Department (acting as the President's delegee) developed the United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1, described above.

Second, AECA also addresses the content of the program. “To the extent practicable,” the program “shall be designed to provide reasonable assurance that [ ] (i) the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the United States Government” and that “(ii) such articles and services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided.” 22 U.S.C. § 2785(a)(2)(B). In addition, the President is required to “ensure that the program ․ provides for the end-use verification of defense articles and defense services that incorporate sensitive technology, ․ that are particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or ․ whose diversion or other misuse could have significant consequences.” Id. § 2785(b)(1). And he is required to “ensure that the program ․ prevents the diversion (through reverse engineering or other means) of technology incorporated in defense articles.” Id. § 2785(b)(2).

Third, AECA requires the President to submit annual reports to Congress “describing the actions taken to implement” the end-use monitoring program. Id. § 2785(c). Those reports must include “a detailed accounting of the costs and number of personnel associated with the monitoring program and the numbers, range, and findings of end-use monitoring of United States transfers of small arms and light weapons.” Id.

To fulfill these statutory obligations, the President has delegated responsibility to the Departments of State and Defense. See Exec. Order 13637, 78 Fed. Reg. 16129, 16130 (Mar. 7, 2013). Under the Blue Lantern Program, the Department of State monitors DCS and, under the Golden Sentry Program, the DSCA monitors government-to-government FMS. U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Pol.-Mil. Affs., End-Use Monitoring of U.S.-Origin Defense Articles (Jan. 20, 2025), https://perma.cc/C4Z2-NPFK.

2. The Foreign Assistance Act

The FAA prohibits the U.S. government from providing “security assistance” to “any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” subject to certain exceptions.³ 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2). Covered “security assistance” encompasses both government-to-government “sales of defense articles” under the AECA (i.e., FMS) and issuance of licenses for “the export” of “defense articles or defense services” under the AECA (i.e., DCS). Id. § 2304(d)(2)(B), (d)(2)(C).

For purposes of the FAA, “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” include “torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges and trial, causing the disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, and other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of the person.” Id. § 2304(d)(1). “In determining whether the government of a country engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” the President must “give particular consideration to whether” a country “has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom” or failed to combat such violations. Id. § 2304(a)(4).

The FAA further requires the Secretary of State to send Congress an annual report that describes “practices regarding the observance of and respect for internationally recognized human rights in each country” to which the Executive Branch has proposed to send security assistance. Id. § 2304(b). That report must include information about “the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and evidence of acts that may constitute genocide,” and about human trafficking. Id. § 2304(b), (h). If applicable, it must also provide information about “coercion in population control, including coerced abortion and involuntary sterilization;” “violations of religious freedom;” “acts of anti-Semitism;” “compulsory recruitment and conscription of individuals under the age of 18 by armed forces;” “the extent to which each country has extended protection to refugees;” the “status of freedom of the press;” and “the status of the practice of child marriage.” Id. § 2304(b), (i), (j). In addition, the report must include information about any “country-specific and thematic resolutions” voted on by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights; any “relevant findings of appropriate international organizations” including the “International Committee of the Red Cross;” and the extent to which the foreign government cooperated in the gathering of information for the report. Id. § 2304(b)–(b)(2).

Congress may also request freestanding reports with respect to a specific country and, after receiving that report, may “adopt a joint resolution terminating, restricting, or continuing security assistance for [that] country.” Id. § 2304(c), (c)(4)(A). If the Secretary of State does not provide Congress with a requested country report within thirty days after any such request, “no security assistance” may be delivered to that country until the report is received. Id. § 2304(c).

3. The Alien Tort Statute

Enacted in 1789, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to adjudicate “any civil action by an alien for a tort ․ committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350. It does not “create a cause of action” but, instead, serves as a vehicle by which “courts may exercise common-law authority,” albeit in “very limited circumstances.” Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe, 593 U.S. 628, 631 (2021). “If, for example, a treaty adopted by the United States creates a tort-related duty, federal district courts have jurisdiction to hear claims by aliens for breach of that duty.” Id. at 635 (Thomas, J., plurality op.). Although the ATS does not establish a general cause of action for “violation[s] of international law,” and aliens seeking to recover for violations of international law must identify an independent cause of action that can support their claim, one such independent cause of action is found in the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991. Id.

4. The Torture Victims Protection Act

The Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) “establish[es] a civil action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in torture or extrajudicial killing” while acting “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation.” Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note).

B. Factual Background

For the purposes of the pending motions to dismiss, the Court will accept the following facts, which, except as noted below, are taken from Plaintiffs’ Complaint. See Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Given the need to set the stage for Plaintiffs’ allegations, however, and because Defendants raise challenges to the Court's jurisdiction, see Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 420 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (D.C. Cir. 2005), the Court will also take judicial notice of facts outside the pleadings that are “not subject to reasonable dispute” and that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

1. The War in Yemen

The civil war in Yemen began in late 2014 when Houthi forces—working together with ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been deposed during 2011's Arab Spring—took over the capital city of Sana'a and ousted the then-incumbent government. See Coombs v. Islamic Republic. of Iran, 2022 WL 715189, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022); Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶ 1). After the ouster, “[a] Coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened to support the internationally recognized government in Yemen.” Oona A. Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?, 10 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. 1, 5 (2019) (hereinafter “Breaking the Law”); Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶ 2). That Coalition is composed of nine countries from West Asia and North Africa: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶ 2). According to a report prepared by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, which Plaintiffs cite, at least 7,825 civilians were killed and 12,416 civilians injured “as a direct result of the conflict between March 2015 and June 2020.” Id. at 28 (Compl. ¶ 62). A 2020 report prepared by the Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen, which Plaintiffs also cite, further asserts that “some of the airstrikes conducted by the Coalition appear to have been undertaken without proper regard to principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution to protect civilians and civilian objects[,] ․ inflicting harm.” Id. at 45 (Compl. ¶ 94).

2. Plaintiffs’ Injuries

Plaintiffs, seven Yemeni citizens, bring this action on behalf of themselves and others who are similarly situated. Dkt. 1. At the time they filed suit, their Complaint asserted claims against fourteen defendants, falling into four groups. First, they sued six Saudi Arabian and UAE military officials, including the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the UAE, the Vice President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defense of the UAE, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces, the former Chief of Staff of the Saudi Armed Forces, and the current Chief of Staff of the Saudi Armed Forces (collectively, “Saudi Arabian and UAE Military Officials”). Dkt. 1 at 14 (Compl. ¶ 26). Second, they sued three U.S. companies that produce defense articles pursuant to contracts with the U.S. government: Raytheon Technologies Corporation, now called “RTX Corporation,” see Dkt. 21 (“Raytheon”), Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed Martin”), and General Dynamics Corporation (“General Dynamics”) (collectively, “U.S. Defense Contractors”). Id. at 19 (Compl. ¶ 44). Third, they sued the CEOs of those three companies: Gregory J. Hanes (Raytheon); Jim Taiclet (Lockheed Martin); and Phebe Novakovic (General Dynamics). Id. Finally, they sued two federal officials in their official capacities: Antony Blinken, then-Secretary of State, and Lloyd J. Austin, III, then-Secretary of the Department of Defense (collectively “Federal Defendants”). Id. at 24 (Compl. ¶ 55). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth were automatically substituted as the U.S. official-capacity defendants.

Five Plaintiffs, Amin Allawi Ali, Fatima Mhamad Al Bayahi Al Kharabi, Yousra Abd El Aziz Mhamad Aamad, Ayman Mhamad Saleh Al Sanabani, and Khaled Ali Salem Chaib are “victims of the horrific bombing of a wedding in the village of Sanaban on October 7, 2015.” Dkt. 1 at 7 (Compl. ¶ 11). On that day, the village of Sanaban was holding a wedding for three brothers and their future wives. Id. at 8 (Compl. ¶ 13). At around 10:00 p.m., however, “the celebration was suddenly hit by two missiles launched by Coalition military aircraft.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 13). One missile hit the house hosting the wedding, and the other missile hit a tent for guests. Id. (Compl. ¶ 13). According to a Legal Center for Rights and Development report, which Plaintiffs cite, 49 people were killed in the attack and at least 75 people were injured. Id. at 9 (Compl. ¶ 14).

Plaintiff Ali was in the house next to the house that was hit. Id. at 10 (Compl. ¶ 16). After he heard the bomb, he went outside and “pick[ed] up” “unconscious or dead people” and body parts of dead victims. Id. (Compl. ¶ 16). He lost his sister-in-law, her husband, and their son during the bombing. Id. (Compl. ¶ 16). Plaintiff Kharabi was in the house hosting the wedding when the bomb hit. Id. (Compl. ¶ 17). The wall of the house fell on her, and she was hit in the head, lost her left eye, and broke her right foot. Id. (Compl. ¶ 17). She suffers from ongoing symptoms, including an intense pain in her right leg and nightmares. Id. (Compl. ¶ 17). Plaintiff Aamad's father owned the house hosting the wedding, and she was in the house when the bombing occurred. Id. at 10 (Compl. ¶ 18). After the bombing, she left the house disoriented and was surrounded by fire, fleeing people, and blood. Id. (Compl. ¶ 18). She lost her brother and uncle, and her older brother was hit by shrapnel. Id. (Compl. ¶ 18). Plaintiff Sanabani was hit in the back when the house collapsed. Id. at 11 (Compl. ¶ 19). He lost his father, mother, two brothers, and his wife in the bombing. Id. (Compl. ¶ 19). He experiences ongoing anxiety and fear. Id. (Compl. ¶ 19). Plaintiff Chaib was waiting outside the wedding house when the bomb exploded. Id. (Compl. ¶ 20). His son was killed in the attack. Id. (Compl. ¶ 20). Chaib and his wife suffer from ongoing psychological trauma. Id. (Compl. ¶ 20).

Two other plaintiffs, Ali Ahman Ali Abad Al Roweishan (“A. Roweishan”) and Mohamed Ali Hamoud Al Roweishan (“M. Roweishan”) are “victims of [the] horrific bombing of a funeral in Sana'a on October 8, 2016.” Id. at 7 (Compl. ¶ 12). On that day, the Great Hall of Sana'a City was hosting a funeral for Ali bin Ali Al Roweishan, the chief of the Kawhlan tribe. Id. at 11–12 (Compl. ¶ 22). Hundreds of people attended the funeral. Id. at 12 (Compl. ¶ 22). Coalition missiles hit the hall. Id. at 11 (Compl. ¶ 22). According to an article in The Guardian, which Plaintiffs cite, “more than 140 people were killed and more than 525 [were] wounded” in the strike. Id. (Compl. ¶ 22 n.10) (citing Nadia Khomami, Airstrikes on Yemen funeral kill at least 140 people, UN official says, The Guardian (Oct. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/F6UC-J3ZA).

A. Roweishan and M. Roweishan are both victims of the funeral bombing. A. Roweishan was in the funeral hall with 300 people when the first missile hit. Id. at 13 (Compl. ¶ 23). He was injured by the first missile and was crawling to the door when the second missile hit. Id. (Compl. ¶ 23). He was hospitalized for five days and, since the attack, has remained “in a permanent state of stress.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 23). M. Roweishan was in the same group of mourners when the missiles hit. Id. (Compl. ¶ 24). He suffered an injury to his torso and left thigh and was hospitalized after the attack. Id. at 13–14 (Compl. ¶ 24). He lost his ability to speak and suffers from various “psychological disorders.” Id. (Compl. ¶ 24).

3. U.S. Military Assistance to Saudia Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

“Th[e] Coalition has received significant military support from the United States,” including “in the form of weapons sales.” Breaking the Law, 10 Harv. Nat'l Sec. J. at 5; Dkt. 1 at 3 (Compl. ¶ 3); see also U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Pol.-Mil. Affs., U.S. Security Cooperation With Saudi Arabia (Jan. 20, 2025), https://perma.cc/HV9E-BVCL; U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Pol.-Mil. Affs., U.S. Security Cooperation With the United Arab Emirates (Jan. 20, 2025), https://perma.cc/AK2X-FQPS. According to Plaintiffs, “Saudi Arabia and UAE are both among the largest recipients of U.S. arms.” Dkt. 1 at 24 (Compl. ¶ 55). In addition, the DOD provides various forms of military support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, including defense articles and services, logistic support, supplies, services, trainings, and advisory services. Id. (Compl. ¶ 55). According to DSCA data, the DOD “administered sales of at least $54.2 billion in defense articles and defense services, including training, to Saudi Arabia and UAE through FMS agreements signed from fiscal years 2015 through 2021.” Id. at 25 (Compl. ¶ 57).

4. Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics

Raytheon is a multinational aerospace and defense conglomerate and the second-largest arms manufacturer in the world; the company develops and manufactures advanced aerospace and defense technology, including guided missiles. Dkt. 1 at 20 (Compl. ¶ 46). Raytheon was the first weapons manufacturer to establish permanent operations in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s. Id. (Compl. ¶ 47). Raytheon has several contracts with the U.S. military to provide defense articles. Id. at 21 (Compl. ¶ 48). Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes images and news reports that purport to identify Raytheon-made Coalition bombs or arms that allegedly hit Yemeni civilians, based on Raytheon's distinct identification number. Id. at 36–39 (Compl. ¶ 82).

Lockheed Martin is an aerospace, arms, defense, and technology corporation, the world's largest arms manufacturer, and the world's largest exporter of arms. Id. at 22 (Compl. ¶ 49). It was the U.S. government's top contractor in 2013, receiving almost 10% of the funds dispersed by the Pentagon. Id. (Compl. ¶ 49). According to Plaintiffs, “remnants of bombs produced by Lockheed Martin have been found in Yemen at the site of attacks on civilians,” which can be identified by Lockheed Martin's Commercial and Government Entity (“CAGE”) code, a unique identification code for U.S. arms suppliers. Id. at 23 (Compl. ¶ 51). Plaintiffs allege that Lockheed Martin's internal policies and procedures fail to account for the human rights impact of the company's sales in conflict-affected areas. Id. at 40–43 (Compl. ¶¶ 83–91).

General Dynamics is an aerospace and defense corporation, the fifth-largest defense contractor in the United States in 2019, and the sixth largest seller of arms in the world. Id. at 23 (Compl. ¶ 52).

C. Procedural Background and Plaintiffs’ Allegations

Plaintiffs’ Complaint originally included eight claims for relief, summarized as follows:

In response, Defendants filed four motions to dismiss: one on behalf of the Federal Defendants, Dkt. 31; one on behalf of the Saudi Arabian and UAE Military Officials, Dkt. 35; one on behalf of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and their respective CEOs, Dkt. 36; and one on behalf of General Dynamics and its CEO, Dkt. 37. In February 2024, however, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Saudi Arabian and UAE Military Officials, Dkt. 39, and, as a result, the Court denied the Saudi Arabian and UAE Military Officials’ motion to dismiss as moot, see Min. Entry (Feb. 26, 2024); Min. Entry (Mar. 28, 2024). In addition, in their opposition to the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs conceded that their negligent supervision claim against the Federal Defendants should be dismissed, Dkt. 40 at 7 n.1, and the Court now grants that unopposed motion by dismissing the negligent supervision claim against the Federal Defendants.

Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, accordingly, are as follows:

Because the precise nature of each claim bears on justiciability, the Court spends some time outlining Plaintiffs’ legal claims and theories of recovery.

The Court begins with Count V, which asserts an APA claim against the Federal Defendants. That claim raises four challenges to how the Departments of Defense and State have administered and overseen the FMS at issue. Dkt. 1 at 59 n.52 (Compl.) (citing U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-22-105988, Yemen: State and DOD Need Better Information on Civilian Impacts of U.S. Military Support to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (2022)). First, Plaintiffs allege that despite numerous reports of airstrikes and other attacks by Saudi Arabia and the UAE ⁴ on civilian targets in Yemen, and despite evidence that “Saudi Arabia and its Coalition partners have transferred U.S.-made weapons to Al-Qaeda-linked fighters, brutal Salafi militias, and other factions waging war in Yemen, in violation of their agreement with the United States,” id. at 57 (Compl. ¶ 151), the DOD has failed to report and the State Department has failed to investigate “any incidents of potential unauthorized use of equipment transferred to Saudi Arabia or the UAE.” Id. at 28 (Compl. ¶ 61); see also id. at 60 (Compl. ¶ 155). Second, they allege that the Departments of Defense and State have failed to implement “specific definition[s] or standards for evaluating the possible impact brought by the inappropriate use of U.S. arms,” such as by defining the terms “misuse” or “unauthorized.” Id. at 60 (Compl. ¶ 156). Third, they allege that DOD officials have admitted that they lack a “mechanism to track how foreign partners use defense articles transferred through FMS” and “that the vast majority of Saudi operations are done without any oversight or visibility by U.S. advisors.” Id. at 61 (Compl. ¶ 157). Fourth, Plaintiffs allege that DOD officials informed the GAO that “they lack guidance for implementing [end-use monitoring] requirements related to reporting potential end-use violations after they receive allegations,” and this lack of guidance precludes State and DOD from assessing “the extent to which U.S.-origin equipment is being used in offensive operations in Yemen against civilian populations.” Id. at 62 (Compl. ¶ 158–59).

Together, these asserted deficiencies allegedly show that the Federal Defendants “lack reasonable assurances that Saudi Arabia and UAE have only used U.S.-origin articles against legitimate military targets and for authorized purposes” and, accordingly, have failed to satisfy their obligations under the AECA and the FAA. Id. at 62, 64 (Compl. ¶¶ 158, 163–64). Had the Federal Defendants “adopted monitoring standards and procedures as outlined in” those statutes, Plaintiffs continue, “they would have affirmatively denied the arms sales from the defense contractor Defendants to the Coalition, and thus prevented civilian deaths.” Id. at 64 (Compl. ¶ 164). On this basis, Plaintiffs allege that the Federal Defendants’ approval of arms sales has been, and continues to be, “arbitrary and capricious” and in “excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,” in violation of the APA. Id. at 90 (Compl. ¶ 222) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (2)(C)). Plaintiffs ask the Court to order that the Federal Defendants “cease all further military sales to the Coalition parties;” order that the Federal Defendants conduct “a full investigation consistent with the applicable law to determine whether prior sales were in violation of the law;” and that the Court “impose clear restrictions on future sales to require full compliance with the law.” Id. at 95 (Compl. ¶ 228).

Counts III, VI, VII, and VIII, in turn, assert claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs, and Count IV asserts claims against the CEOs alone. Plaintiffs allege that each of the three U.S. Defense Contractors have sold weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE that have been “used in the attacks on Yemen, including [the attacks] that injured Plaintiffs and killed their relatives, friends[,] and members of their communities.” Id. at 21 (Compl. ¶ 48); see also id. at 22–23 (Compl. ¶ 50) (same regarding Lockheed Martin); id. at 24 (Compl. ¶ 53) (same regarding General Dynamics). They further allege that each of the three U.S. Defense Contractors and their CEOs “had much greater access to information related to the illegal use of arms than is available publicly when they executed the weapons sales to the Coalition.” Id. at 36, 43–44 (Compl. ¶¶ 82, 91, 93). In Count III, Plaintiffs allege that by providing arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs have aided and abetted the “military leaders” of those countries in committing “war crimes, extrajudicial killings, and torture against the Plaintiffs, in violation of international law.” Id. at 77, 79 (Compl. ¶¶ 198, 200); see also id. at 76–80 (Compl. ¶¶ 196–205). In Count IV, they allege that the CEOs knowingly aided and abetted torture and extrajudicial killings in violation of the TVPA. Id. at 81–85 (Compl. ¶¶ 206–15).

Plaintiffs invoke these same factual allegations in support of their common law claims. In Count VI, Plaintiffs seek restitution because “[t]he defense contractors have been unjustly enriched by selling at huge profits the weapons that were misused by the Saudi and UAE military officials ․ to the detriment of Plaintiff and Class Members.” Id. at 95 (Compl. ¶¶ 230–32). In Count VII, they allege that all “Defendants had the authority to supervise, prohibit, control, and/or regulate the purchase/sale, as well as the use of weapons” and “knew or reasonably should have known that unless they intervened to protect Plaintiffs and properly supervise, prohibit, control and/or regulate the conduct described herein, Plaintiffs would suffer the injuries alleged herein.” Id. at 98 (Compl. ¶¶ 238–39). In Count VIII, Plaintiffs seek damages for severe emotional distress and physical damage caused by U.S. Defense Contractors’ and CEOs’ “outrageous conduct”—the “intentional[ ] and continuous[ ] participat[ion] in a venture that profits from Plaintiffs’ suffering and injuries.” Id. at 99 (Compl. ¶¶ 243–245).

The three remaining motions to dismiss, Dkt. 31, Dkt. 36, and Dkt. 37, are now before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Defendants move under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Assessing the Court's jurisdiction begins with Article III of the Constitution, which vests federal courts with authority to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, this grant of power also marks the outer boundary of their authority to act. “In an attempt to give meaning” to the case or controversy requirement, “courts have developed a series of principles termed ‘justiciability doctrines,’ among which are standing[,] ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.” Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)). Two of these doctrines—standing and the political question doctrine—are relevant for present purposes. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974) (“[T]he concept of justiciability, which expresses the jurisdictional limitations imposed upon federal courts by the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Art. III, embodies ․ the political question doctrine[ ] ․” (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)); Al-Tamimi v. Adelson, 916 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2019)) (“In Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, the Court ․ explicitly treat[ed] the political question doctrine as jurisdictional [and] since Schlesinger, our Court has done so several times.” (collecting cases)).

Defendants also move to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint[.]” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “must first ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state [the] claim’ to relief, ․ and then determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded those elements with adequate factual support to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Blue v. District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (quoting Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675, 678 (2009)).

III. ANALYSIS

The Court begins with Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) defenses. Although their focus differs in certain respects, both the Federal Defendants and the U.S. Defense Contractors and their CEOs raise two threshold issues: standing and the political question doctrine. In ordinary course, the Court might start and end its analysis with standing. See Am. Jewish Cong. v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Here, however, the Court will address both defenses for three reasons. First, “the concepts of standing and political question are separate aspects of justiciability, and either the absence of standing or the presence of a political question precludes a federal court, under article III of the Constitution, from hearing or deciding the case presented.” Id. Unlike a merits defense, which the Court lacks authority to address without first concluding that the plaintiff has standing, see Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02, the political question doctrine speaks “to a claim's justiciability,” and because “it presents at least a non-merits, threshold issue,” the issue “can be addressed before jurisdictional issues,” Kaplan v. Cent. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Grell v. Trump, 330 F. Supp. 3d 311, 316 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Because the Court finds that the political question doctrine applies, it need not discuss standing.”). Second, although it is usually “prudent ․ to determine the issue of ․ standing” first, Am. Jewish Cong., 575 F.2d at 943, here, if Plaintiffs were granted leave to take jurisdictional discovery and were subsequently granted leave to amend, it is at least possible that they would be able to allege standing with respect to their damages claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and their CEOs. The same is not true with respect to the political question doctrine, which more definitively resolves the case. Third, as explained further below, the questions of standing and the applicability of the political question doctrine are, at times, intertwined and are thus best resolved in tandem.

A. Standing

The “Court lacks power to resolve a dispute unless [the] plaintiff has standing.” Abulhawa v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 239 F. Supp. 3d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2017). To satisfy the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of Article III standing, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support three elements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Lujan v. Defs. Of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). These include “ ‘(1) an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized as well as actual or imminent; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere speculation, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 755 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs “bear[ ] the burden of establishing” the elements of standing, although “the manner and degree of evidence required” varies with “the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561.

“[W]hen considering whether a plaintiff has Article III standing, a federal court must assume, arguendo, the merits of his or her legal claim.” Estate of Boyland v. Dep't of Agric., 913 F.3d 117, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct” will often suffice. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see also Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 879 F.3d 339, 346–47 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of [standing], supported by mere conclusory statements,” however, will not. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court need not “assume the truth of legal conclusions” nor must it “ ‘accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.’ ” Id. (quoting Islamic Am. Relief Agency v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

Notably, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)); Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“In a case of this sort, where the plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, past injuries alone are insufficient to establish standing.”); Endeley v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 268 F. Supp. 3d 166, 176 (D.D.C. 2017) (“[T]he Court cannot enjoin or otherwise provide a non-monetary remedy (such as declaratory relief) for a past event.”). Here, Plaintiffs seek two forms of relief: (1) money damages against U.S. Defense Contractors and their CEOs based on the harms resulting from the 2015 and 2016 bombing, and (2) injunctive relief barring the Federal Defendants from authorizing future FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and barring the U.S. Defense Contractors and their CEOs from supporting those FMS contracts with the arms that they manufacture or from otherwise selling arms to Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The Court considers each form of relief in turn.

1. Damages

Plaintiffs’ claims for money damages arising from the 2015 and 2016 bombing easily satisfy two of the three “irreducible” constitutional prerequisites for establishing Article III standing. All seven Plaintiffs adequately allege that they suffered actual and concrete injuries in fact due to the bombings, including property loss, bodily injury, medical expenses, pain and suffering, the loss of close family members, and ongoing psychological trauma. Dkt. 1 at 4, 8–14, 99–100 (Compl. ¶ 5, 13–25, 248); see also Transunion v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021) (“If a defendant has caused physical or monetary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff has suffered a concrete injury in fact under Article III.”); Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403, 409 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (“Physical injuries are tangible harms that are concrete and particularized.” (citations omitted)); Siegel v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 304 F. Supp. 3d 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The deprivation of property, even when that property is held abroad, constitutes a concrete and particularized injury in fact.”). And those injuries are redressable through the award of damages. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (“Compensatory damages are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct.” (citation omitted)).

The Court is unpersuaded, however, that Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the causation requirement. Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint is lengthy, it fails to include any meaningful factual allegations—as opposed to conclusory assertions and legal assertions—sufficient to support a plausible inference that either of the two bombings at issue was “attributable” to the challenged actions of one of the named U.S. Defense Contractors. Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2021). As a result, Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding causation “do[ ] not cross the line from conceivable to plausible.”⁵ Id. at 861–62.

The entirety of Plaintiffs’ claim that Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics caused their compensable losses is found in a single, boilerplate clause appended to a single sentence directed at each of these defendants. They allege as follows:

A major portion of Raytheon's sales to Saudi Arabia are weapons used in the attacks on Yemen, including those that injured Plaintiffs and killed their relatives, friends and members of their communities. Dkt. 1 at 21 (Compl. ¶ 48) (emphasis added).

A major portion of [Lockheed Martin's] sales to Saudi Arabia are weapons used in attacks in Yemen, including those that injured Plaintiffs and killed their relatives, friends and members of their communities. Id. at 22–23 (Compl. ¶ 50) (emphasis added).

[A] major portion of [General Dynamics's] sales to Saudi Arabia are weapons used in the attacks on Yemen, including those that injured Plaintiffs and killed their relatives, friends and members of their communities. Id. at 24 (Compl. ¶ 53) (emphasis added).

These conclusory allegations are not facts of the kind that are entitled to the presumption of truth at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

That is particularly so in this case, moreover, where Plaintiffs’ Complaint contains detailed factual allegations attributing other attacks to weapons manufactured by the U.S. Defense Contractors, Dkt. 1 at 23, 36–39 (Compl. ¶¶ 51, 81–82), where Plaintiffs themselves allege that, as of 2017, forty percent of the weapons used by the Coalition were not even “U.S.-made,” id. at 4 (Compl. ¶ 3), and where an article the Plaintiffs cite in their Complaint, id., explains that “contracts for most of these deliveries were agreed up to 10 years ago,” Pieter D. Wezeman et al., Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2017, at 3, SIPRI (Mar. 2018). As the Supreme Court has held, and as the D.C. Circuit has stressed in a context similar to that presented here, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ ” and “the plausibility standard ․ asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Kareem, 986 F.3d at 861, 866 (applying Iqbal to assess standing of plaintiff alleging that he was targeted by “five aerial bombings” that he sought to attribute to the United States). Even accepting Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the most the Court can conclude is that it is possible that the bombings at issue were carried out using a weapon acquired from Raytheon, or from Lockheed Martin, or from General Dynamics either indirectly through an FMS or (possibly, although not clearly alleged) directly through a DCS.⁶ More is required to allege Article III causation.

Recognizing this difficulty, Plaintiffs invoke a combination of statistics and tort law theories in hopes of establishing an adequate causal nexus.⁷ To be sure, mathematical certainty is not required to allege causation, and circumstantial evidence, including statistics, may at times suffice. But, here, Plaintiffs do not even allege that the relevant 2015 and 2016 bombings were conducted by Saudi Arabia or the UAE, see Dkt. 1 at 8, 11 (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 22), much less that the attacks were effectuated using weapons that one of the specific defendants sold to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Indeed, by Plaintiffs’ reasoning, a plaintiff could establish standing to sue Boeing and Airbus for any inflight disaster, simply because those companies manufacture most commercial aircraft sold around the world. That, of course, is not the law.

The D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Coubaly v. Cargill Inc., 144 F.4th 343 (D.C. Cir. 2025), is dispositive on this point. In that case, a group of Malian citizens brought suit under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act against a group of cocoa importers that purchased cocoa from plantations that trafficked Plaintiffs as child laborers. Id. at 346–47. The court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing because “the complaint fail[ed] to articulate a plausible causal link between the importers and the specific farms where the Plaintiffs worked.” Id. at 349. As relevant here, the D.C. Circuit rejected a theory of causation that, like Plaintiffs’ theory here, posited that because the “Importers buy nearly 70% of Ivorian cocoa, ․ it is more likely than not that each Plaintiff was forced to harvest cocoa for one or more of the [Importers] operating within the venture.” Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). As the court explained, the fact that the defendants, as a group, purchased 70% of the cocoa harvested in the region did not show “which farm sold to which Importer” and, thus did not suffice. It was not enough, in other words, “to allege only that some Importer might (or might not) have bought cocoa from a farm at a time that a Plaintiff might (or might not) have been forced to work there.” Id. at 350. In reaching that conclusion, the D.C. Circuit contrasted the Coubaly case with a case that the court decided the prior year, Doe 1 v. Apple Inc., 96 F.4th 403 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Id. at 350–51. In Doe 1, unlike in Coubaly, “the plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the defendants sourced cobalt from the very suppliers who benefitted from the plaintiffs’ forced labor.” Id. at 350. Although the respective roles of suppliers and purchasers are flipped in this case—that is, the U.S. Defense Contractors are the alleged suppliers, rather than the purchasers—the same principles apply. And, as in Coubaly, Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to identify which U.S. Defense Contractor sold which of the four missiles to which Coalition member.

Plaintiffs’ allegations, accordingly, “stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. To be sure, without discovery, it might be difficult for Plaintiffs to “know precisely what portion of the $54.2 billion in weapons each of the Defendants sold to the Coalition.” Dkt. 41 at 18. But a lack of knowledge does not excuse a plaintiff from alleging facts sufficient to establish standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013). Nor have Plaintiffs sought leave to take jurisdictional discovery, which in any event, even if otherwise appropriate, would likely prove futile for the reasons discussed below. For present purposes, however, it suffices to conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of pleading facts sufficient to allege that their compensable injuries are fairly traceable to any of the alleged misconduct by the U.S. Defense Contractors.

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiffs’ damages claims (to the extent they have not forfeited those claims) for lack of Article III standing.

2. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs also seek injunctive relief against the U.S. Defense Contractors under the ATS and against the Federal Defendants under the APA. Dkt. 1 at 5 (Compl. ¶ 6). As to these claims, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden with respect to each of the three constitutional prerequisites for standing.

a. Injury In Fact

As an initial matter, the Federal Defendants posit that Plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury in fact. On their telling, Plaintiffs’ “allegation of an imminent threat of future injury caused by State and DOD's approval of arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE is highly attenuated and speculative,” Dkt. 31-1 at 26, and Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate “that future sales will result in an increased risk of harm to civilians in Yemen,” id. at 25. Plaintiffs, in turn, maintain that their allegations regarding the Yemeni civilian death toll, the number of Coalition airstrikes in Yemen, and statistics regarding the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, along with “the GAO Report[,] establish [that] they face a reasonable risk of future injuries from ongoing Coalition attacks on civilian populations and the serious impacts on infrastructure and access by them to food, drinking water, and medical care attributable to the Coalition's attacks, as well as concrete emotional trauma from the attacks.” Dkt. 40 at 20.

In the context of a claim seeking prospective relief, a plaintiff must allege, and must ultimately “establish[,] a sufficient likelihood of future injury.” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 381 (2024). That future injury must be “certainly impending;” allegations of a “possible future injury” will not suffice. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (emphases in original); see also Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19 (a party that “seeks prospective declaratory and injunctive relief ․ must establish an ongoing or future injury that is ‘certainly impending;’ [they] may not rest on past injury.”). A future injury that “rests on [a] highly speculative fear,” “does not satisfy the requirement that threatened injury must be certainly impending.” Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410.

The Court does not doubt that Plaintiffs have suffered tragic physical, emotional, and property-related injuries. But the fact that Plaintiffs were victims of two airstrikes about a decade ago does not, standing alone, plausibly establish that they are likely to face similar injuries, during a similar attack, in the future. On Plaintiffs’ telling, “over 18,000 civilians” were killed or injured by Coalition airstrikes in Yemen between March 2015 and August 2021. Dkt. 40 at 9. But in a country with a population of over 34 million people, see Yemen, U.S. Census Bureau, https://perma.cc/YS2P-G2BF (noting demographic data is current as of July 1, 2025), even those striking numbers (over a period of about six-and-a-half years) fail to establish a substantial likelihood of future injury resulting from a Coalition airstrike.

To be sure, unlike plaintiffs in similar cases, Plaintiffs here allege that they are within “the target population of civilians living in Houthi-controlled areas,” Dkt. 40 at 22. Contra N.Y. Ctr. for Foreign Pol'y Affs. v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 20-3847, 2024 WL 3400122, at *5 (D.D.C. July 12, 2024) (“Missing from plaintiffs’ allegations is any reason to believe that the UAE is specifically targeting refugee detention centers.”); Indigenous People of Biafra v. Blinken, 639 F. Supp. 3d 79, 86 (D.D.C. 2022) (“[T]he Complaint is silent as to ․ why the government would be likely to use those aircraft to conduct raids against Biafrans in the regions where the John Does reside.”). But even if the Court were to focus on these geographically-targeted regions within Yemen, the seven Plaintiffs in this case have not plausibly alleged that they are “likely” to sustain injuries in any future airstrike carried out using weapons procured from the United States or manufactured by any of the U.S. Defense Contractors. Nor is that uncertainty merely a matter of statistics. As General Dynamics notes in its reply brief, “[t]he policy considerations involved in providing support to combat the Houthis are changing by the day.” Dkt. 43 at 5. Plaintiffs themselves refer to this fluidity and unpredictability about future policy, noting, for example, that “[i]n 2021, the United States vowed to end support of the coalition's offensive operations, including through arms sales,” even though Plaintiffs expressed doubt “about how seriously State Department and Defense Department officials complied with this duty.” Dkt. 1 at 93 (Compl. ¶ 227). More recently, according to news reports, the United States has launched its own airstrikes on Houthi targets in Yemen. See Eric Schmitt et al., U.S. Strikes in Yemen Burning Through Munitions with Limited Success, N.Y. Times (April 4, 2025), https://perma.cc/A5Y2-EJA9.

Because events in Yemen are constantly evolving and uncertain, because those future events will turn on the intervening actions and decisions of members of the Coalition, U.S. and foreign policymakers and military officials, and the supporters, allies, and foes of the Houthi forces, and because Plaintiffs represent a very small portion of the Yemeni population, the Court cannot conclude that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that they themselves face “certainly impending” physical or property-related harm from future FMS authorizations, if any. See Indigenous People of Biafra, 639 F. Supp. 3d at 85 (finding no imminent injury where the Court “would be required to predict what actions the Nigerian government will take in response to the United States’ actions”); N.Y. Ctr. for Foreign Pol'y Affs., 2024 WL 3400122, at *6 (finding no imminent injury where “the individual plaintiffs’ alleged injury depends on the decisions and actions of the UAE”).

Against the backdrop of this uncertainty, Plaintiffs offer two alternative theories of injury in fact in support of their claims for injunctive relief. First, they claim that they are “suffering serious and ongoing mental harm due to the threatened and imminent destruction of their families and communities due to the ongoing brutal attacks on civilian populations by the Coalition with U.S.-supplied weapons.” Dkt. 40 at 23. But there is “no legal support for the view that a subjective emotional response to the possibility of an invasion of a legally-protected interest”—even when considered in conjunction with the past injuries Plaintiffs have suffered—“constitutes an injury-in-fact.” Bernstein v. Kerry, 962 F. Supp. 2d 122, 127 (D.D.C. 2013), aff'd, 584 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Second, Plaintiffs maintain that Coalition-led airstrikes create “a reasonable prospect of future harm to the Plaintiffs” in the form of “lack of access to medical care, food, water, and infrastructure damaged by the attacks.” Dkt. 40 at 22–23; see also Dkt. 1 at 4, 32 (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 70–72) (documenting the Yemeni humanitarian crisis). But these possible future injuries suffer from the same imminence and certainty problems posed by Plaintiffs’ possible future physical and property-related injuries. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that it is likely that they themselves will suffer a deprivation of basic resources due to future airstrikes in Yemen targeting essential infrastructure.

The Court, accordingly, concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a plausible theory of future injury in fact.

b. Causation and Redressability

But even if Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the possibility of future physical, emotional, and property-related harm satisfied the imminence requirement, their allegations would fail for a second and third reason: the Complaint does not allege facts sufficient to meet the causation and redressability prongs of the standing test with respect to their claims for prospective relief. According to Plaintiffs, they satisfy both requirements because “without the weapons transfers approved by the [Federal] Defendants, the Coalition would not have the military capacity to conduct the attacks on the civilian population of Yemen,” Dkt. 40 at 25, and because the Federal Defendants’ “approval of FMS to the Coalition was a substantial factor motivating the third parties’ actions,” id. at 26 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs also emphasize that “[t]hey are not asking this Court to order the Coalition governments to stop attacking civilians in Yemen,” but contend that “an injunction [directing] that [the Federal Defendants] perform the end-use monitoring/investigation of prior sales” and “comply with the AECA and FAA before approving any further FMS to the Coalition ․ will redress [their] injuries ․” Id. at 27 (emphasis in original). The Court is unpersuaded.

The Court considers causation and redressability together because when, “as in this case, a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the government's allegedly unlawful” behavior directed at “someone else, ․ causation and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—and perhaps on the response of others as well.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (emphasis in original). In other words, when a causal chain “relies on a series of speculative inferences about the independent action[s] of some third part[ies] not before the [C]ourt,” Abulhawa, 239 F. Supp. 3d at 34 (alterations in original), the plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct “is at least a substantial factor motivating the third parties’ actions.” Am. Freedom L. Ctr. v. Obama, 821 F.3d 44, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Cierco v. Mnuchin, 857 F.3d 407, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“In such cases, the plaintiff must offer substantial evidence of a causal relationship between the government policy and the third-party conduct, leaving little doubt as to causation and the likelihood of redress.” (citation omitted)). And, as with causation, when redressability “ ‘depends on the unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the court[ ] and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict,’ it becomes ‘substantially more difficult to establish standing.’ ” Scenic Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 836 F.3d 42, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). “When conjecture is necessary, redressability is lacking.” West v. Lynch, 845 F.3d 1228, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 2017).

To establish that FMS authorizations will likely cause Plaintiffs some future injuries and that an injunction either barring those authorizations or at least requiring the Federal Defendants to engage in more vigorous end-use monitoring would redress their alleged injuries, Plaintiffs rely on the following causal chain: (1) the Federal Defendants will authorize future FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE; (2) the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs will provide those weapons to the U.S. Government or to Saudi Arabia and the UAE pursuant to contracts with or authorization from the Federal Defendants; (3) Saudi Arabia and the UAE will likely use, directly or indirectly, that assistance—rather than any assistance they receive from any other country or from any other defense contractor, or that they have received or will receive pursuant to previously approved FMS—to launch air attacks on locations at or near where Plaintiffs live, work, or visit; (4) those attacks will likely harm Plaintiffs; (5) in the absence of these future FMS authorizations, Saudi Arabia and the UAE “would find no other source of assistance and would be forced to abandon,” Siegel, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 53, or to curtail any such future attacks; and (6) as a result, Plaintiffs will avoid the injuries and losses that they would otherwise likely sustain.

Even if the Court were able to infer that the United States will continue authorizing FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE for operations in Yemen—an inference that the Federal Defendants contest in their reply brief, Dkt. 42 at 8—the Court cannot plausibly infer from any of Plaintiffs’ allegations that any such assistance will cause them any future injury or that the injunction that they seek in this case would redress that harm. This is particularly so, given the D.C. Circuit's reluctance “to find standing where the third party upon whose conduct redressability depends is a foreign sovereign.” Cierco, 857 F.3d at 419. As Plaintiffs concede, their alleged future injuries, if any, will necessarily result most directly from the Saudi and UAE governments’ tactical, strategic, and political decisions to engage in airstrikes in Yemen, and, if so, to target areas where Plaintiffs live, work, or visit. Dkt. 1 at 37–42 (“But for the command given by and the military strategies formulated by the named Saudi Arabian and UAE military leaders, [Plaintiffs] would not have suffered those injuries.”). Those “foreign sovereigns,” moreover, will decide which weapons, if any, to deploy—including weapons acquired from suppliers outside the United States or stockpiled from acquisitions made prior to the Court's issuance of a final decision in this case. Any role played by the Federal Defendants and the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs in the causal chain would be secondary and attenuated.

For similar reasons, Plaintiffs’ theory of redressability requires greater conjecture than the law allows. To take one example, as noted above, even if Saudi Arabia or the UAE were to decide to launch an airstrike in the future on an area where Plaintiffs live, work, or visit, they would decide what weapons to use in that strike. Beyond mere ipse dixit, see, e.g., Dkt. 40 at 26–27, however, Plaintiffs provide no basis to conclude that a bar on future FMS or a judicial decree requiring the Federal Defendants to better comply with the AECA and FAA “going forward” or to engage in more robust end-use monitoring would preclude the Coalition from launching such an attack. As Plaintiffs themselves assert, forty percent of the “weapons used by the Coalition” come from outside the United States, Dkt. 40 at 15, and Plaintiffs offer no reason to believe that Saudi or UAE munition stockpiles are by any means depleted of weapons that they have acquired through previous FMS transactions. Cf. Siegel, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 55 (“[N]umerous factors beyond the availability of U.S. aid play a role in the decisions of settlers and the Israeli military.”). Because the Coalition would not be prevented from using FMS weapons already in their possession or non-FMS weapons acquired from other countries, there is no reason to believe that a favorable decision in this case would redress any future injuries that Plaintiffs might otherwise sustain. See, e.g., Cierco, 857 F.3d at 418–19 (finding no redressability when the element depended on speculation about the Andorran government reversing course); Talenti v. Clinton, 102 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“In order to find standing, we would have to assume that the Italian government would respond to the suspension of aid by negotiating a resolution of Talenti's claim. We have no reason to think a foreign government would be so inclined.”).

Standing arguments of this type are not new, and this Court has rejected similar arguments in cases in which the plaintiffs have sought to enjoin U.S. aid to foreign sovereigns or non-party actors. This Court dismissed the complaint in Indigenous People of Biafra v. Blinken, 639 F. Supp. 3d 79 (D.D.C. 2022), for example, because the plaintiff failed adequately to allege causation or redressability. In that case, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim required the court to “speculate as to whether the Nigerian government [would] decide to conduct additional aerial raids against Biafran population centers, whether aircraft supplied by the United States will be used to perform those raids, and whether those aircraft will cause particularized injury to the John Does that they would not otherwise suffer” and redressability would “rely on Nigeria's decision to comply.” Id. at 86–87.

Similarly, in New York Center for Foreign Policy Affairs v. U.S. Department of State, No. 20-3847, 2024 WL 3400122 (D.D.C. July 12, 2024), the Court, again, concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to plead facts sufficient to establish causation and redressability. In that case, the plaintiffs challenged arms sales to the UAE based on concern that the weapons would be used in Yemen or Libya. Id. at *2. The individual plaintiffs premised their claim to standing on the fact that, like Plaintiffs here, they were survivors of prior air raids—in their case, the air raids targeted a detention center in Libya. Id. In dismissing their claims for lack of standing, the Court held that “[t]he individual plaintiffs’ allegations fail[ed] to show that the United States’ arms sale to the UAE [was] a substantial factor motivating potential future UAE airstrikes on refugee centers in Libya” and that their alleged injuries required undue speculation about “whether the conflict in Libya [would] remain[ ] ongoing when the defense articles arrive, ․ and [whether] UAE officials, who are not before the Court, [would] decide to use the procured defense articles in Libya or [to] transfer them to Libyan forces ․ and [whether] the UAE or Libyan forces [would] attack [the plaintiffs] using the defense articles procured from the sales at issue in this case to cause death or bodily injury to the individual plaintiffs.” Id. at *7 (second ellipsis in original) (citations omitted). That same reasoning is controlling here—and all the more so, since Plaintiffs no longer ask the Court to enjoin any future sales but, rather, only to require future compliance with the AECA and the FAA and more robust end-use monitoring by the Federal Defendants.

For these reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the causation and redressability requirements for Article III standing. The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for prospective relief for lack of jurisdiction.

B. Political Question Doctrine

Ordinarily, the Court might stop here. But because standing and the political question doctrine both pose threshold jurisdictional barriers, and because at least Plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief might (arguably) justify jurisdictional discovery, the Court will turn to the political question doctrine, which more definitively resolves this case. The Federal Defendants, the U.S. Defense Contractors, and their CEOs assert that all of Plaintiffs’ claims—both their retrospective and prospective claims—pose nonjusticiable political questions. Dkt. 31-1 at 38–42; Dkt. 36-1 at 26–34; Dkt. 37-2 at 20–24. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees.

The political question doctrine “excludes from judicial review those controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 840 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986)). A claim presents a political question if it involves any of the following six factors:

[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see also Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 194 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“To find a political question, we need only conclude that one [of these] factor[s] is present, not all.”).

The D.C. Circuit has “characterized the first two factors as the most important ones, ․ and the last four as merely prudential.” Schieber v. United States, 77 F. 4th 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). Although “[d]isputes involving foreign relations ․ are quintessential sources of political questions,” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 841 (citation omitted), it would be a mistake to assume “ ‘that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance,’ ” id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211), or that “in the context of military action, the courts” will never “have a role,” id. “Similarly, that a case may involve the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs does not necessarily prevent a court from determining whether the Executive has exceeded the scope of prescribed statutory authority or failed to obey the prohibition of a statute or treaty.” Id. at 842; see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,121 Harv. L. Rev. 689, 723 (2008) (“If there is a party with constitutionally sufficient standing to demand judicial protection from a presidential refusal to obey a statute during war, it is not clear why there should be a general rule that courts must leave the question to the political branches.”). Rather, courts must approach questions touching on foreign relations and national defense with particular attention to the relevant context and the respective roles of the coordinate branches of government.

In applying the political question doctrine, courts must bear in mind that it is not a doctrine of judicial abdication or an attenuation of the “strict duty” of the “federal courts ․ to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996). It is, instead, a “narrow exception” to jurisdiction, Zivitofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012), which is rooted in the separation of powers and Article III's case or controversy requirement, El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 840–41. For that reason, courts “must conduct ‘a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed’ in the ‘specific case’ ” before dismissing a case as presenting a non-justiciable political question. Id. at 841 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211).

Application of the political question doctrine proceeds in three steps. Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 8; see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Trump, 453 F. Supp. 3d 11, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2020) (applying three-step method); Vassiliades v. Rubio, No. 24-1952, 2025 WL 1905654, at *5 (D.D.C. July 10, 2025) (same). “First, [the Court must] identify the issues raised by the plaintiffs’ complaint.” Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 8. “Next, [it must] use the six Baker factors to determine whether any issue presents a political question.” Id. (citing El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 840–42). “Finally, [the Court must] decide whether the plaintiffs’ claims can be resolved without considering any political question, to the extent one or more is presented.” Id. “Indeed, the political question doctrine mandates dismissal only if a political question is ‘inextricable from the case.’ ” Id. (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).

The Court will, accordingly, proceed on a claim-by-claim basis to identify the issues raised by each claim before applying the six factors to those specific issues.

1. Count V

The first step—identifying the issues raised by Plaintiffs’ APA claim—is surprisingly elusive. As framed in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Count V alleges that “the State Department and the Department of Defense ․ have breached their obligations under the FAA and AECA” by failing to “fully determine[ ] the extent to which U.S. military support provided to Saudi Arabia and [the] UAE has contributed to civilian harm in Yemen, even though the U.S. government has had indications that U.S.-origin defense articles may have been used in strikes against civilians.” Dkt. 1 at 93 (Compl. ¶ 227). Plaintiffs further allege that, if the Federal Defendants “had adopted monitoring standards and procedures as outlined in the FAA and the AECA, they would have affirmatively denied the arms sales from the defense contractor Defendants to the Coalition, and thus prevented civilian deaths.” Id. at 64 (Compl. ¶ 164). And, in some tension with that allegation, they allege that, “[d]espite sufficient and specific knowledge that U.S.-made weapons would be used by the Coalition to commit war crimes,” the Departments of State and Defense “approved the sale of lethal weapons to the Coalition that eventually led to the Plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id. On this basis, Plaintiffs urged the Court to set aside the Federal Defendants’ “decisions to continue to approve arms sales” under the APA, to enjoin the Federal Defendants from authorizing any “further military sales to the Coalition parties,” and to require “a full investigation consistent with the applicable law to determine whether prior sales were in violation of the law and impose clear restrictions on future sales.” Id. at 94–95 (Compl. ¶ 228).

In their opposition to Defendants’ motions to dismiss, however, Plaintiffs step back from some of their allegations. Plaintiffs now assert that they:

do not and cannot ask this Court to overturn the [Federal] Defendants’ prior decisions to provide FMS to the Coalition. Nor do they ask this Court to decide that no further FMS should go to the Coalition for its war in Yemen ․ Plaintiffs are merely seeking an injunction requiring the [Federal] Defendants to comply with the court-clarified statutory restrictions of the AECA and FAA before providing any further FMS to the Coalition.

Dkt. 40 at 38. Although far from clear, the Court understands Plaintiffs’ (narrowed) APA claim as alleging that the Federal Defendants’ past decisions to approve FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE and past failure to engage in adequate end-use monitoring of those sales violated the AECA and FAA and were, thus, “arbitrary, capricious, ․ or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See Dkt. 40 at 43 (“Plaintiffs’ claims that the [Federal] Defendants violated federal statutory restrictions on FMS and failed to conduct end-use monitoring, are ‘straightforward,’ justiciable questions of law despite their ‘significant political overtones’ and ‘foreign relations’ implications.”). But rather than seeking to set aside the agency action or actions—past FMS authorizations—that resulted from these statutory violations, as is typical for an arbitrary and capricious challenge, Plaintiffs seek only a prospective restriction on “future FMS to the Coalition.” Id. at 40. In other words, Plaintiffs no longer ask that the Court enjoin “all further military sales to the Coalition parties and require a full investigation ․ to determine whether prior sales were in violation of the” AECA and FAA, Dkt. 1 at 95 (Compl. ¶ 228). Instead, they simply ask that the Court “clarify” what the Federal Defendants need to do to comply with the AECA and FAA going forward, Dkt. 40 at 38.

This reframing of Plaintiffs’ APA claim does little to address the justiciability concerns raised in Defendants’ motions to dismiss and, indeed, if anything, it poses additional difficulties. To start, it goes without saying that the Court lacks jurisdiction to opine in the abstract about how the Federal Defendants should apply the AECA and FAA to future sales of military equipment, in the absence of an identified, actual FMS authorization or other discrete agency action. Even putting aside the difficulty posed by the lack of any “final agency action” for purposes of APA review, 5 U.S.C. § 704, which goes to the merits, rather than jurisdiction, see Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 456 F.3d 178, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2006), courts do not interpret statutes for the sake of interpreting statutes or, as Plaintiffs suggest, to “determine the statutory requirements of the AECA and FAA that must be met to allow the [Federal] Defendants to approve FMS to the Coalition going forward,” Dkt. 40 at 43. Such an inquiry would require the Court to issue an advisory opinion, which would face its own jurisdictional impediment. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (“The federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not render advisory opinions.” (alteration and citation omitted)).

This difficulty can be avoided only by focusing on past sales and past failures to engage in adequate end-use monitoring. But that leads back to political questions that Plaintiffs seek to avoid. They ask the Court to evaluate (1) whether “furnishing of [the] defense articles” has strengthened and will continue to “strengthen the security of the United States and [would] promote world peace,” 22 U.S.C. § 2753(a)(1); (2) whether “the foreign policy of the United States” has and will continue to be “best served” by the military sales, id. § 2752(b); (3) whether the Federal Defendants have correctly determined that Saudi Arabia and the UAE used and will continue to use the defense articles for “internal security” or “legitimate self-defense,” id. § 2754; (4) whether FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE comport with the FAA's ban on provision of assistance to any foreign government that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” id. § 2304(a)(2); and (5) whether the President has established an end-use monitoring program that has, “[t]o the extent practicable,” provided “reasonable assurance[s] that ․ (i) the recipient is complying with the requirements imposed by the United States Government” and that “(ii) such articles and services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided,” id. § 2785(a)(2)(B).

On Plaintiffs’ telling, resolving these questions does not implicate the political question doctrine because they are not “seeking to interfere with any substantive decision regarding foreign relations or defense” and, instead, are merely “asking the Court to enforce statutory provisions enacted by Congress that govern the process by which the [Federal] Defendants are permitted by Congress to supply FMS to the Coalition.” Dkt. 40 at 38 (emphasis in original). The Federal Defendants disagree, arguing that “[c]ourts have consistently resisted parties’ attempts to recast substantive challenges to the Executive's foreign-policy laden decisions as procedural or statutory challenges under the APA.” Dkt. 42 at 27 (citing Mobarez v. Kerry, 187 F. Supp. 3d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2016) (K.B. Jackson, J.)). Having identified the “particular question[s] posed,” by Plaintiffs’ APA claim, Jaber v. United States, 861 F.3d 241, 245 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 211), the Court proceeds to apply the six Baker factors to each question, see Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 11–13, to determine whether any of the identified questions are political in nature.

a. Factor 1: Textual Commitment to the Political Branches

The Court begins with the first Baker factor, which asks whether there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the identified questions to the political branches. “[T]here [can] be no doubt that decision-making in the fields of foreign policy and national security is textually committed to the political branches of government.” Schneider, 412 F.3d at 194; see id. 194–95 (listing the constitutional provisions that evince “a clear textual allocation to the legislative branch” and “the President”). Because “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the political’—departments of the government, ․ the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). But, at the same time, the Constitution “commit[s] to the judicial branch” the role of “statutory interpretation,” Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 12 n.6, and the fact that a controversy merely “touches foreign relations” or national security does not remove the controversy from the judicial realm, Baker, 369 U.S. at 211; see also Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 229–30. In walking the line between these principles, the Court must avoid second guessing the “wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security,” without eschewing the judicial duty to resolve legal disputes, including disputes over “whether the government had legal authority to act.” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 842. Here, resolving each of the five questions identified above would require the Court to go beyond interpreting and applying the text of the AECA and FAA and to second-guess the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by Congress and the President in the realm of foreign policy and national security.

Questions 1 and 2 ask whether prior (and, based on Plaintiffs’ framing of their argument, future) FMS authorizations are arbitrary and capricious or exceeded statutory authority because the President erred in finding that the sales “strengthen[ed] the security of the United States and promote[d] world peace,” as required by 22 U.S.C. § 2753(a)(1), or because the Secretary of State erred in finding the sales “serve[d] the foreign policy of the United States,” as required by 22 U.S.C. § 2752(b). These questions are materially indistinguishable from the question the D.C. Circuit concluded lay beyond the judicial realm in People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. U.S. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In that case, the D.C. Circuit held that it could review the Secretary of State's designation of two organizations as foreign terrorist organizations to determine (a) “whether the Secretary followed statutory procedures” and (b) “whether she made the requisite findings” required by provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Id. at 22. The Court, however, limited the review to only two of the three statutory findings: whether the organizations are foreign and whether they engage in terrorist activity. Id. 23–24. The Court determined that it could not review the Secretary of State's determination regarding the third required finding—that is, that “the terrorist activity of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States”—because questions of that type involve “political judgments” “long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.” Id. at 23 (citations omitted).

Here, Questions 1 and 2 fall equally—if not more squarely—within the exclusive realm of the political branches. The Court cannot possibly decide whether the President and Secretary of State properly found that providing FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE “strengthen[ed] the security of the United States,” “promote[d] world peace,” or “serve[d] the foreign policy of the United States” without “reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security.” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 842; see also Jaber, 861 F.3d at 246 (concluding that Plaintiffs’ contention that “[n]o urgent military purpose or other emergency justified the drone strike” improperly required the court to “pass judgment on the wisdom of Executive's decision to commence military action” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). Indeed, Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that their APA claim requires reassessing the Federal Defendants’ judgments regarding undefined national security and foreign policy interests. Dkt. 1 at 87 (Compl. ¶ 219) (“No evidence has been presented to show that the Houthis are an existing threat to U.S. national security, or that they are premediating attacks in the U.S. territory.”). Because the assessment of these national security and foreign policy interests of the United States are constitutionally committed to the political branches, the first Baker factor counsels against judicial resolution of Questions 1 and 2.

Questions 3 and 4 ask whether prior (and, based on Plaintiffs’ framing of their argument, future) FMS approvals are arbitrary, capricious, or in excess of statutory authority because the Federal Defendants incorrectly determined that Saudi Arabia and the UAE would use the defense articles for “internal security” or “legitimate self-defense” as required by 22 U.S.C. § 2754 and that Saudia Arabia and the UAE have not “engage[d] in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” as required by id. § 2304(a)(2). The Court is, again, persuaded that these questions tread on grounds constitutionally committed to the political branches. Plaintiffs contend that, given evidence of Coalition airstrikes on Yemeni civilians and the corresponding “records of human rights abuses by the Coalition leaders,” the Federal Defendants could not plausibly have concluded that the FMS were for “internal security” or “legitimate self-defense” or that Saudi Arabia and UAE were not “engage[d] in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” Dkt. 40 at 16. The process of conferring with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to evaluate how the weapons will be used and to assess the internal security and self-defense needs of foreign states—one of which borders Yemen and the other of which is located not far away—falls squarely in the foreign affairs power, which is constitutionally vested in the political branches.

Notably, the Coalition's targeting choices—and the Federal Defendants’ responses to or assessment of those targeting choices—fall far from the judicial ken. If the political question doctrine precludes the federal courts from “assess[ing] the merits of the President's decision to launch an attack on a foreign target,” El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 844, it also bars the federal courts from second-guessing the President's assessment of the legitimacy of a foreign ally's targeting decisions, including his assessment of whether a foreign state has engaged in a “consistent pattern of gross violations” of human rights by failing to take sufficient precautions or exercise sufficient restraint to prevent civilian deaths and injuries in an armed conflict. As the D.C. Circuit explained in its en banc decision in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co.: “Whether an attack on a foreign target is justified—that is whether it is warranted or well-grounded—is a quintessential ‘policy choice[ ] and value determination[ ] constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch.’ ” 607 F.3d at 844–45 (alterations in original) (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230).

Question 5 requires a slightly different inquiry, but the outcome is the same. Plaintiffs contend that the Federal Defendants failed to “fully determine[ ] the extent to which U.S. military support provided to Saudi Arabia and [the] UAE has contributed to civilian harm in Yemen,” Dkt. 1 at 93 (Compl. ¶ 227), that the DOD has failed to do so because it lacks “guidance for implementing [end-use monitoring] requirements related to reporting potential end-use violations after they receive allegations,” id. at 62 (Compl. ¶ 158), and that the Federal “Defendants failed to implement the end-use monitoring program required by the AECA,” Dkt. 40 at 18. Although dressed in the garb of a “mandatory, non-discretionary duty of the Executive Branch that is enshrined in a statute,” Mobarez, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 94, Plaintiffs’ framing makes no difference to the political question inquiry. Plaintiffs do not contest that an end-use monitoring program for FMS—the Golden Sentry Program—exists. Dkt. 31-1 at 17 n.4. The crux of Plaintiffs’ APA claim, then, is that the end-use monitoring program was just not good enough. See Dkt. 1 at 93–94 (Compl.¶ 227) (drawing on GAO report to identify various alleged deficiencies and short-comings in end-use monitoring).

Plaintiffs’ challenge to the end-use monitoring program—in addition to lacking sufficient specificity and failing to identify a discrete final agency action—once again implicates the textually committed role of the political branches in the areas of national security and foreign affairs. The AECA recognizes the role of the President in conducting foreign affairs, and thus requires the program need only provide “reasonable assurance[s]” of compliance only “[t]o the extent practicable.” 22 U.S.C. § 2785(a)(2). Moreover, ensuring that foreign nations that receive military assistance from the United States comply with “the requirements imposed by the United States Government” and use the assistance only “for the purposes for which [it was] provided,” id. at § 2785(a)(2)(B), necessarily implicates the treaty power—that is, the terms of the aid agreements—and the foreign affairs power—that is, how the United States interacts with foreign nations to ensure, reasonably, their compliance.

But beyond all of this, Plaintiffs’ end-use monitoring claim ultimately circles back to the standing issues discussed above. It is not enough, of course, for Plaintiffs to allege in the abstract that the end-use monitoring program is insufficiently robust. To establish Article III standing, Plaintiffs must establish a nexus between any deficiencies in the program and the imminent injuries that they allege they face. Yet to do so, Plaintiffs would need to show that (1) had the President (or his delegees) established a more robust end-use monitoring program, (2) the Federal Defendants would have investigated and discovered human rights abuses, and (3) armed with that additional information, the Federal Defendants would have terminated or limited the FMS, (4) which would have precluded Saudi Arabia and the UAE from pursuing future airstrikes in Yemen in locations where Plaintiffs live, work, or visit. That analysis, however, raises the same issues discussed above, plus some. It would require the Court, for example, to assess whether the U.S. government would have concluded that Saudi Arabia and the UAE were failing to take adequate precautions to prevent unnecessary or disproportionate civilian casualties and, based on that assessment, would have terminated or limited FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For the same reasons that the Court concludes that it exceeds the constitutional authority of a federal court to second-guess whether the U.S. government should have terminated assistance, it would exceed the Court's Article III authority to speculate about whether the U.S. government would have terminated aid had it deployed a more robust end-use program. See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 845 (The Court cannot “mimic the constitutional role of the political branches by guessing how they would have conducted the nation's foreign policy had they been better informed.” (emphasis added)). Either way, Plaintiffs ask the Court to step into the shoes of the political branches to second-guess quintessential foreign policy and national security judgments.

In sum, for any of the five questions presented by Plaintiffs’ APA challenge, “apply[ing] [the Court's] analysis of the statute's meaning to the particular set of facts[ ] of the case” would require the Court to decide “whether Defendants acted prudently within a settled zone of discretionary authority,” and not simply “whether a specific statute authorized their action,” Vassiliades, 2025 WL 1905654, at *6 (alterations and citation omitted). The Court cannot do so “without invading ‘a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment’ to another branch.” Mobarez, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 93 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 841).

b. Factor 2: Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standards

All five questions posed by Plaintiffs’ APA claim also implicate the second Baker factor: the Court lacks judicially manageable or discoverable standards for resolving the claim. All of the AECA and FAA provisions that Plaintiffs claim should have precluded the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia and the UAE require the President and/or the relevant federal agencies to “exercise their discretion” regarding the application of indefinite standards, and the Court lacks the “means of measuring” whether the Federal Defendants have abused this broad discretion. Mobarez, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 97–98. The Court cannot resolve Plaintiffs’ APA claim based on Questions 1 or 2, for example, because it lacks manageable standards for assessing whether the provision of FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE has furthered (or will further) world peace and the foreign policy or national security interests of the United States. The answers to those questions does not lie in the application of a legal standard to ascertainable facts but, rather, requires the types of “prophecy,” “policy choices,” and “value determinations” that are best left to the political branches. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 843–45 (quoting Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230, and Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)); see also Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 48 (D.D.C. 2010) (“Nor are there judicially manageable standards by which courts may determine the nature and magnitude of the national security threat posed[.]”).

The same is true for Questions 3 or 4. Once again, the answers to those questions would require the Court to make a series of policy-laden or value-laden determinations or predictions without a manageable legal standard to guide it. Plaintiffs fail to identify any “discoverable or manageable standard[,]” for example, that would assist the Court in discerning whether any particular airstrike in Yemen, exceeded the bounds of “legitimate self-defense.” Nor do they identify a test that would permit the Court to decide—as a matter of law, rather than policy or moral judgment—that the Federal Defendants erred in declining to withhold FMS based on “a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2) (emphasis added). See El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d at 845 (“We could not decide this question without first fashioning out of whole cloth some standard for when military action is justified.”); Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86, 112 (D.D.C. 2005) (“Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare that Israel's self-defense policies are tantamount to terrorism, racketeering, or some other form of illegal activity. The Court can do none of this.” (citations omitted)).

Question 5 poses similar difficulties. To start, Plaintiffs fail to explain how the Court could determine whether end-use monitoring was “practicable” or whether the end-use program provided “reasonable assurances” of compliance in the present context. To take one example, what standard could guide the Court in evaluating how probing and insistent the United States should have been in seeking information and justifications from Saudi Arabia and the UAE regarding specific military strikes? Or, to take another, what standard could guide the Court in deciding whether the President took sufficient steps to assure, “reasonabl[y],” that foreign countries engaged in an armed conflict used their U.S.-made arms in a manner consistent with AECA or their FMS agreements? As in El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co., Plaintiffs’ contention that the “ ‘President failed to assure himself with a sufficient degree of certainty’ of the factual basis for his decision” would “ ‘require this court to elucidate the ․ standards that are to guide a President when he evaluates the veracity of military intelligence.’ ” 607 F.3d at 846 (quoting El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); cf. Schneider, 412 F.3d at 196 (“Unlike the executive, the judiciary has no covert agents, no intelligence sources, and no policy advisors.”). Finally, for the reasons explained above, resolving Plaintiffs’ APA claim based on Question 5 cannot avoid the problems posed by Questions 1–4, since the Court will still need to determine whether the Federal Defendants would have terminated or limited FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE if they had identified a substantive violation of the AECA or the FAA through the procedural mechanism of end-use monitoring.

In sum, none of Plaintiffs’ identified statutory provisions “set[ ] forth the kind of stark, obligatory action” that would allow the Court to resolve the case based exclusively on “the meaning or constitutionality of the provisions at issue.” Mobarez, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 96.

c. Prudential Factors

For many of these same reasons, the Court also concludes that all five questions posed by Plaintiffs’ APA challenge implicate the “prudential” Baker factors. Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 12. “In analyzing the prudential Baker factors, the official position of the Executive is highly relevant.” Id. at 13. “Accordingly, an Executive Branch opinion regarding these ramifications is owed deference, no matter what form it takes.” Id. (citing Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Here, the Federal Defendants assert that an order disagreeing with the U.S. government's determination that prior FMS authorizations serve the country's foreign policy interests would have “serious foreign relations repercussions standing alone” and that “any associated injunctive relief” barring future sales would have an even greater impact on U.S. foreign relations. Dkt. 31-1 at 41. Even without affording this view deference, the Court would conclude that the remaining prudential factors counsel against judicial review.

Each of the prudential Baker factors implicates a similar concern—a concern that the courts will express a view on a policy question that calls for the exercise of “nonjudicial discretion” and that by doing so, the court will express a “lack of respect” for the distinct role of the political branches of government, will inject uncertainty regarding “a political decision already made,” and will cause the United States “embarrassment” in the fields of international diplomacy and national security by contributing to “multifarious pronouncements” by different branches of the government “on one question.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The judiciary does not express a “lack of ․ respect due [to a] coordinate branch[ ] of government” for purposes of the political question doctrine whenever it performs its constitutionally assigned role of opining on the meaning or application of the constitution or a statute; that is what courts do, and within their realm, they must remain free to disagree with decisions and actions taken in violation of the law by the political branches. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 390 (1990). But the judiciary does fail to express “due” respect for the political branches—and does risk international embarrassment and a lack of adherence to otherwise settled policy choices—when a court ventures outside its constitutionally assigned realm and intrudes on discretionary matters of foreign policy and military affairs that are constitutionally entrusted to the political branches.

This is such a case. Plaintiffs ask the Court to second-guess the Federal Defendants’ conclusions that the military assistance at issue will “strengthen the security of the United States” and will “promote world peace;” that providing the assistance will advance “the foreign policy of the United States;” that Saudi Arabia and the UAE will use the assistance “for legitimate self-defense;” and that neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE has engaged “in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” Were the Court to disagree with any of these determinations—particularly with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight and with the limited intelligence and evidence available to the courts—the Court would not only need to make policy determinations that are constitutionally and statutorily committed to another branch, but it would also necessarily express a lack of respect for the constitutionally assigned roles of the political branches, creating confusion and uncertainty regarding U.S. foreign and national security policy.

Notably, all relevant decisions Plaintiffs challenge—whether the decisions to authorize prior FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE or the decisions to structure the end-use monitoring program in a particular way—are “political decision[s] already made.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. But even if Plaintiffs’ APA claim was focused on the lawfulness of some possible future and as-of-yet unidentified FMS to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the political question doctrine would bar review. In the absence of a real case or controversy, the Court would be “speculating about what the [Saudi Arabian and UAE] government[s] might do and how the President [and Secretary of State] might respond.” Endeley, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 177. The Court would be making policy determinations that “might prove both unnecessary and at odds with the judgments of those charged with speaking for the United States in foreign affairs.” Id.

Finally, although the Court is required to conduct its own “discriminating analysis” of Plaintiffs’ specific claims, it bears note that the Court's analysis is consistent with precedent from this Court and the Ninth Circuit involving similar claims regarding the AECA and the FAA. In 2003, this Court (Bates, J.) held that the political question doctrine barred review of a challenge brought by a group of Palestinian plaintiffs to foreign military sales to Israel. In that case, the plaintiffs argued that “President Bush ha[d] violated [the] reporting requirement [in AECA] because the military aid provided to Israel [would] neither strengthen[ ] the security of the United States nor promote[ ] world peace,” Doe v. Israel, No. 02-cv-1431, ECF. No. 42, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 03, 2003); that the “military aid provided to Israel ha[d] not been used for internal security or self-defense ․ in violation of AECA;” and that the Secretary of State had improperly underreported information to Congress about Israel's “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights” in violation of the FAA, id. at *5–6. Invoking the political question doctrine, Judge Bates held that the case raised “issues directly impacting United States foreign and military aid to other countries” and that resolution of those issues was “distinctly the province of the political branches.” Id. at 10. He also held that the fifth and sixth Baker factors were implicated because “any pronouncements by United States courts regarding foreign economic and military aid may risk embarrassment to the United States government's commitments to Israel” and those commitments “present[ ] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made ․ in light of the ongoing war on terrorism.” Id. at 13 (citation omitted). Applying Judge Bates's reasoning here supports the Court's conclusion that Questions 1, 3, and 4 present nonjusticiable political questions.

In Corrie v. Caterpillar, the Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion. In that case, the plaintiffs’ claims were all premised on Caterpillar Inc.’s sale of bulldozers to the Israeli Defense Forces (“IDF”), which were then used to demolish homes in the Palestinian Territories, allegedly in violation of international law, resulting in the death or injuries of the plaintiffs’ family members. 503 F.3d 974, 977–78 (9th Cir. 2007). The sales were financed by the U.S. government under the Foreign Military Financing program, a program authorized by the AECA. Id. at 978. The district court dismiss the action pursuant to the political question doctrine, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed that decision on appeal. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the plaintiffs’ claims were nonjusticiable because they implicated the first, fourth, fifth and sixth Baker factors. Id. at 980–84. Of particular relevance here, the Ninth Circuit observed that the decision “[w]hether to grant military or other aid to a foreign nation is a political decision inherently entangled with the conduct of foreign relations,” id. at 983, and that “a declaration that the IDF has systematically committed grave violations of international law” would “subvert United States foreign policy” because the “United States has [n]ever accused Israel of” any such violations, id. at 984. Those conclusions apply with equal force here.

Finally, the Court concludes that the political questions addressed above are “inextricable from the case.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The Court cannot carve off a portion of Plaintiffs’ APA claim that raises a legal question within the competence of the judiciary, while avoiding the questions that lay squarely and exclusively in the realm of the political branches. Contra Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 13–14. To the contrary, however framed, Plaintiffs’ APA claim would require the Court to answer at least one, if not more, of the political questions identified above, which would require the Court to second-guess the Federal Defendants’ value-laden, foreign policy judgments regarding the impact and propriety of FMS authorizations. The political question doctrine represents a narrow exception to the duty of the federal courts to exercise their jurisdiction without artificial limitation. But that narrow exception fits the present circumstances precisely. Most succinctly put, this is not a case in which the challenged actions “merely touch on foreign policy” or national defense; to the contrary, they “constitute foreign policy” and national security “decisions themselves.” Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 437 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiffs’ APA claim against Federal Defendants.

2. Counts III, IV, VI, VII, and VIII

The claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and the CEOs implicate similar concerns. For the most part, the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs press the same arguments raised in the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 36-1 at 26–35; Dkt. 37-1 at 20–24. They argue, for example, that “[t]he judiciary lacks authority to police the manner in which the political branches choose to carry out foreign policy objectives via weapons sales, end-use monitoring and related diplomatic activities,” Dkt. 36-1 at 29; that “there are no precise standards under the statutory regime for assessing whether the Executive Branch ‘correctly’ balances policy objectives,” id. at 32; that “[t]o adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court would need to make predicate findings regarding the propriety of military operations by U.S. allies amidst an ongoing conflict,” id. at 31; and that Plaintiffs’ claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs are “ ‘inextricably bound to an inherently political question,’ namely, ‘the propriety of the United States’ decision’ to provide [military] support” to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Dkt. 37-2 at 24. And, in response, Plaintiffs reprise the same arguments that they raised in opposition to the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Dkt. 41 at 14 (“Plaintiffs’ case merely asks this Court to perform ․ statutory interpretation of the AECA and FAA to clarify the scope of the statutory requirements placed on the [Federal] Defendants in approving FMS and in conducting required end-use monitoring,”); id. (“limited claim brought by Plaintiffs here under the APA to simply require future compliance with the AECA and FAA by the [Federal] Defendants”); id. at 15 (“Plaintiffs here are merely seeking a statutory interpretation of the AECA and FAA under the APA”); see id. (“A routine statutory interpretation of what the AECA and FAA require going forward ․”). As explained below, the Court agrees with the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs that the same justiciability concerns that bar review of Plaintiffs’ APA claim apply with equal force to Plaintiffs’ claims against the non-governmental defendants.

The Court begins with two baseline principles that guide its analysis. First, although it is true that “the political question doctrine is typically invoked by governmental entities or actors,” Doe v. Israel, No. 02-cv-1431, ECF. No. 42, at *15 (D.D.C. Oct. 03, 2003), the political question “doctrine is designed to restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Government,” and, thus, “the identity of the litigant is immaterial to the presence of these concerns in a particular case,” Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 394 (emphasis in original). Indeed, and as relevant here, the D.C. Circuit has stressed that the “constitutional constraint [of the political question doctrine] cannot be circumvented merely by bringing claims against the individuals who committed the acts in question within the scope of their employment.” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 438; Lee v. Garland, 120 F.4th 880, 894–95 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (same).

Second, the political question doctrine bars review of “the manner in which [a] policy decision was implemented” where it is “inextricable from the broader policy.” Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 436. In Bancoult, the plaintiffs sued Executive Branch officials challenging the method by which “the United States government forcibly removed them from their homes on islands in the Indian Ocean in order to construct a military base.” Id. at 429. Plaintiffs conceded “that the decision to establish a military base on Diego Garcia [was] not reviewable” but maintained that the “egregious and illegal conduct during the depopulation process” was “distinct from the policy itself, and [was] thus reviewable.” Id. at 436 (citations omitted). Unconvinced, the D.C. Circuit held that “the specific tactical measures allegedly taken to depopulate the Chagos Archipelago” were “inextricably intertwined with the underlying strategy of establishing a regional military presence,” and, thus, the political question doctrine applied. Id.

Applying these principles, several decisions have held that the political question doctrine bars review of claims against defense contractors, where those claims are inextricably intertwined with foreign policy or national security decisions.⁸ The Ninth Circuit's decision in Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974 (2007), is particularly on point. As explained above, Corrie involved a challenge to a company's sale of equipment to the IDF under the Foreign Military Financing program, where the equipment was paid for by the United States government and was used to demolish homes in the Palestinian Territories. Id. at 977–78. The United States was not a party to the suit, but the Ninth Circuit nonetheless held that “[a]llowing th[e] action to proceed would necessarily require the judicial branch ․ to question the political branches’ decision to grant extensive military aid to Israel.” Id. at 982. In short, the plaintiffs’ common law, TVPA, and international law claims were inextricably intertwined with the political decision “[w]hether to grant military or other aid to a foreign nation,” which was itself “inherently entangled with the conduct of foreign relations.” Id. at 982–93.

That type of entanglement stands in contrast to cases brought against military contractors that do “not inevitably” draw the court “into a reconsideration of military decisions or be forced to announce its opposition to an Executive or Congressional policy.” Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 563 (5th Cir. 2008). The mere fact that a tort or breach of contract occurred during wartime or the testing of a weapons system is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis to invoke the political question doctrine.⁹ What matters is whether adjudication of the plaintiffs’ claim would inevitably require the court to second-guess discretionary judgments made by the political branches in the fields of foreign relations or national security and to do so without the benefit of judicially manageable legal standards.

The questions posed by Plaintiffs’ claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs are not only “inextricably intertwined” with the underlying policy decision to authorize FMS, but they are co-extensive with the questions (discussed above) posed by their APA claim against the Federal Defendants. Although Plaintiffs’ Complaint is far from clear, and although they at times discuss the law governing direct sales, they do not allege that the U.S. Defense Contractors made any relevant DCS to Saudi Arabia or the UAE, much less that they can trace any such direct sales to any cognizable injury that they have suffered. See supra n.6. To the contrary, Plaintiffs introduce their company-specific allegations by averring that “Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin are the major U.S. Defense Contractors whose commercial sales to the Coalition countries ․ are made through the Foreign Military Sales (‘FMS’) program.” Dkt. 1 at 33 (Compl. ¶ 73) (emphasis added); see also id. at 77 (Compl. ¶ 199) (referring to this same press release). And in responding to General Dynamics's observation that the Complaint fails “to allege that any” of the defense articles at issue “were sold to the Coalition countries through DCS,” Dkt. 37-2 at 13 n.4, Plaintiffs point to only four paragraphs of the Complaint, which, as explained above, supra n.6, do not refer to any direct commercial sale to any member of the Coalition. Thus, although General Dynamics might be correct that “the method of transfer makes no difference to the” political-question-doctrine analysis, Dkt. 37-2 at 13 n.4, the Court need not reach that question because, even liberally construed, the Complaint fails to allege that Plaintiffs sustained any injury fairly traceable to a sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia or the UAE that occurred outside the FMS program and that was not inextricably intertwined with the conduct of U.S. foreign relations and national defense.

Ultimately, however, the Court need look no further than Plaintiffs’ own response to the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs’ motions to dismiss to conclude that the political question doctrine bars Plaintiffs’ private party claims for the same reasons that it bars their claims against the government. To start, Plaintiffs address only the FMS program in opposing the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEO's motions to dismiss; at least in this context, Plaintiffs say nothing about DCS, and they focus, instead, exclusively on government-to-government sales of defense articles manufactured by U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs. Dkt. 41 at 13. But even more importantly, Plaintiffs simply incorporate the very same arguments that they made in response to the Federal Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 13–15. They assert, for example, that they are merely asking the Court “to clarify the scope of the statutory requirements placed on the [Federal] Defendants in approving FMS and in conducting required end-use monitoring” in order to “decide whether the [Federal] Defendants failed to comply with these requirements.” Id. at 13–15. Notably, they do not argue that any distinct considerations apply to their claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs. To the extent one might imagine any such distinctions, Plaintiffs have forfeited those arguments.

Finally, even if the Court were to reach beyond Plaintiffs’ arguments, the same result would ensue. This is not a case in which the Court can maintain a manageable divide between Plaintiffs’ claims against the private-party defendants and the governmental defendants, and resolving Plaintiffs’ claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs would “inevitably” draw the court “into a reconsideration of military decisions or [would] force[ ] [the Court] to announce its opposition to an Executive or Congressional policy.” Lane, 529 F.3d at 563. Thus, for example, the Court cannot decide whether the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs have aided and abetted extrajudicial killings or other violations of international law, Dkt. 1 at 76–80 (Compl. ¶¶ 196–205); id. at 81–100 (Compl. ¶¶ 206–15), without second-guessing the Federal Defendants’ determination that the FMS would “promote world peace,” was provided to Saudi Arabia and the UAE “for legitimate self-defense,” and was not provided in contravention of the ban on providing assistance to a foreign government that “engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights,” see supra Part III.B.1.

At least in this context, the Court cannot discern any meaningful “distinction between challenging ‘an action’ and challenging a ‘policy.’ ” Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Although Plaintiffs include allegations regarding the U.S. Defense Contractors’ lobbying efforts, Plaintiffs’ ATS, TVPA, and D.C. tort law claims require deeming the U.S. Defense Contractors’ sales to Federal Defendants—not their various independent lobbying activities—as tortious or unlawful. Regardless of the framing, each of Plaintiffs’ statutory and common law claims against the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs rests on the premise that U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been misused, that the provision of that assistance was ill-advised, and that any future assistance must clear a higher hurdle than the assistance provided to date. For all of the reasons explained above, engaging in that analysis would inescapably draw the Court into matters of discretionary judgment committed to the political branches. Simply put, “[b]ecause arms sales are an integral part of foreign policy, the government's authorization of sales by defense contractors as a means to execute foreign policy cannot be challenged in the courts.” Doe v. Israel, No. 02-cv-1431, ECF. No. 42, at *16 (D.D.C. Oct. 03, 2003).

Finally, “[t]he type of relief that plaintiff[s] seek[ ] only underscores the impropriety of judicial review here.” Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d. at 47. Surely, if the Court were to require the U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs to pay money damages for various torts emanating from their contracts with the government, Dkt. 1 at 100 (Compl.), to disgorge the benefits they earned from those government contracts, id. at 96 (Compl. ¶ 233), or to enjoin U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs from performing future contracts with the government, id. at 5 (Compl.¶ 6), the Court would be doing far more than creating an “apparent inconsistency” with “the position of another branch.” Al-Tamimi, 916 F.3d at 12; see Dkt. 31-1 at 41 (“any associated injunctive relief, such as a court order to cease arms sales ․ would almost certainly engender serious foreign relations repercussions.”). Such an order would dramatically interfere with the Executive Branch's ability to conduct foreign relations and to provide for the national security. Although “[a]t first blush, it might appear that [P]laintiffs only seek redress for suffering or some other vindication of their rights,” Doe I, 400 F. Supp. 2d at 112, resolution of their claims would require the Court to second-guess the propriety of the political branches’ predicate decisions to provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, would risk ending existing and future assistance, and would chill contractors from meeting future requests by the U.S. government to provide military equipment in response to governmental overtures.

Because Plaintiffs cannot “extricate their [ATS, TVPA, and tort] claims from the political question[s] that permeate[ ] their complaint,” Gonzalez-Vera, 449 F.3d at 1264, the Court will dismiss all claims against U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs.

C. Leave to Amend

Having dismissed all the claims in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ request, in their opposition briefing, for “leave to file a motion to amend their complaint and submit a First Amended Complaint to address any such rulings by the Court.” Dkt. 41 at 54. The U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs, for their part, argue that granting leave to amend would be futile. See Dkt. 43 at 21; Dkt. 44 at 32.

Leave to amend should be freely granted, but “a court may, in its discretion, deny leave to amend in cases of ‘undue delay, bad faith ․ or futility of amendment.’ ” Carty v. Author Sols., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Moreover, “[w]here a court determines that the assertion of additional facts consistent with the challenged pleading would not remedy the deficiency, dismissal of a claim with prejudice is appropriate.” Id. at 136; see also Price v. Unite Here Loc. 25, 883 F. Supp. 2d 146, 154 (D.D.C. 2012).

Although Plaintiffs gesture at seeking leave to amend, at present, no motion to amend is before the Court, and the Court will not opine in the abstract about whether such motion that Plaintiffs might someday file is futile. The Court cannot assess whether an amendment would be futile without reviewing the proposed amendment. For this reason, this Court's local rules require a motion for leave to file an amended pleading to “be accompanied by an original of the proposed pleading as amended.” Local Rule 7(i). In any event, the Court will dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of jurisdiction but will do so without prejudice. If Plaintiffs seek leave to amend, they will be required to proffer a proposed, amended complaint. Defendants will have an opportunity to respond to that motion, and the Court will be better positioned to decide whether to grant any such request.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Dkt. 31, Dkt. 36, and Dkt. 37, and will DISMISS the Complaint without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

A separate order will issue in due course.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For example, for an FMS valued at $50 million or more to the governments of Saudi Arabia or the UAE, the President must notify Congress at least thirty calendar days before the sale can be finalized. 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1), (b)(6).

2.   In extraordinary circumstances, the AECA authorizes the President to waive the congressional review requirement and thirty-day waiting period by certifying that “an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national security interests of the United States.” 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1). Any emergency certification must include “a detailed justification” and “a description of the emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the letter of offer.” Id. The President has used this waiver authority on only a handful of occasions, including in 2019 to sell defense articles to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. See Paul K. Kerr, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process 6–7 (Mar. 18, 2025).

3.   The prohibition does not apply if the President “certifies in writing to” the Speaker of the House and specified congressional committees that “extraordinary circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance.” 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2).

4.   Although Plaintiffs focus on assistance provided to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to the extent their Complaint intends to include sales to other members of the Coalition, the same factual background and analyses apply. For ease of presentation, the Court will refer only to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but that shorthand does not exclude the possibility that Plaintiffs intend to include military assistance provided to other members of the Coalition.

5.   The U.S. Defense Contractors and CEOs also correctly note that Plaintiffs’ opposition briefing seems to disavow any claim for retrospective relief. Dkt. 41 at 14. Plaintiffs, for example, attempt to distinguish “the sweeping cases cited by the Corporate Defendants” on the ground that those cases, unlike this one, “sought compensatory and punitive damages for their alleged injuries, and [sought] to enjoin the federal defendants from providing any further military or economic aid to Israel and to halt military sales and weapons contracts between Israel and the defense contractors.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But that apparent disavowal is difficult to square with Plaintiffs’ defense of their tort claims, which seek monetary relief. See id. at 44–54. Because the Court concludes the Plaintiffs, in any event, lack standing to pursue their damages claims, it need not decide whether they have forfeited those claims.

6.   In a footnote in their opposition brief responding to U.S. Defense Contractors’ motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs assert that “there is no question that each of the Corporate Defendants had a direct commercial relationship with and sold weapons directly to the Coalition.” Dkt. 41 at 19 n.5. Plaintiffs contend that various paragraphs in their Complaint raise allegations regarding how DCS sales to the Coalition by U.S. Defense Contractors caused their injuries. See id. (citing “Complaint ¶¶ 73, 92, 199, 203”). Even if a footnote were sufficient to preserve this issue, Jarmillo v. FCC, 162 F.3d 675, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1988), Plaintiffs’ characterization of the Complaint is incorrect. The paragraphs that Plaintiffs identify as challenging DCS are either irrelevant to DCS or provide further support to the contention that Plaintiffs are challenging FMS authorizations. See, e.g., Dkt. 1 at 33 (Compl. ¶ 73) (“[M]ajor U.S. Defense Contractors whose commercial sales to the Coalition countries ․ are made through the Foreign Military Sales (‘FMS’) program.”); id. at 43–44 (Compl. ¶ 92) (discussing General Dynamics's shareholder meeting on human rights impact and the corporation's lobbying efforts); id. at 77 (Compl. ¶ 199) (stating “Raytheon, General Dynamics, and Lockheed Martin were among the major U.S. Defense Contractors whose commercial sales with the Coalition countries” and proceeding to discuss their lobbying efforts); id. at 79–80 (Compl. ¶ 203) (discussing Raytheon's lobbying efforts). Beyond these identified paragraphs, Plaintiffs include one paragraph on how DCS work. Id. at 27 (Compl. ¶ 60). In short, Plaintiffs’ Complaint simply fails to allege (1) that the U.S. Defense Contractors made direct sales during or before the relevant years (2015 and 2016) to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and (2) that these direct sales included the weapons used to cause Plaintiffs’ injuries in 2015 and 2016.

7.   As General Dynamics and its CEO point out, Dkt. 43 at 15, Plaintiffs also raise (for the first time in their opposition brief) the contention that “Defense Contractor Defendants acted in concert to aid and abet the war crimes and extrajudicial killings of the Coalition.” Dkt. 41 at 19 (citing Compl. “¶¶ 200–05, 209–15”) (emphasis added). But the Complaint says no such thing. Rather, it merely alleges that U.S. Defense Contractors lobbied Congress to advance Saudi Arabian interests so that they could procure additional FMS contracts. These allegations do not even hint that U.S. Defense Contractors worked together in manufacturing, producing, and selling weapons, much less the specific weapons that harmed Plaintiffs in 2015 and 2016.

8.   See, e.g., Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1282–83, 1294 (11th Cir. 2009) (Plaintiffs’ negligence and negligent supervision claims against military contractor barred by political question doctrine “because the circumstances under which the accident took place were so thoroughly pervaded by military judgments and decisions,” and “DoD regulations, as well as [Defendant's] contract with the military, required that [Defendant] be trained in accordance with military standards” (emphasis in original) (citation omitted)); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 840 F.3d 147, 151 (4th Cir. 2016) (“acts committed by [contractors] are shielded from judicial review under the political question doctrine if they were not unlawful when committed and occurred under the actual control of the military or involved sensitive military judgments.”); Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 755 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (D. Conn. 1990), aff'd, 935 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1991) (dismissing negligent design claims against defense contractors, including General Dynamics and Raytheon, on Baker factors 1 and 2 because “it seems unavoidable that this case would touch on military decisions”); Bentzlin v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 833 F. Supp. 1486, 1497 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (Plaintiffs’ tort claims alleging “manufacturing defect” by aircraft company that supplied military aircraft “necessarily require inquiry into military strategy” which is “constitutionally committed to the Executive Branch”); Whitaker v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1281 (M.D. Ga. 2006) (“a soldier injured at the hands of a contractor which is performing military functions subject to the military's orders and regulations also raises the same political questions.”); Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006 WL 2521326, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (Plaintiff's negligence claims against military contractors “fails to recognize that were the case to proceed, this court would have to second-guess the decisions of the United States military, even though the suit is ostensibly against only military contractors.”).

9.   See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1362 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding political question doctrine did not bar negligence suit against military contractor where complaint would not require “examining a single military judgment.”); Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (same); Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1239 (D. Or. 2010) (refusing to dismiss suit where claims were about “defendants’ performance of its contractual obligations to the government and to the plaintiffs rather than the advisability of any governmental policy-related decision.”); McMahon v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 933 F. Supp. 2d 682, 695 (D.N.J. 2013) (where “allegedly faulty exercise of military judgment was [not] the basis of the complaint,” political question doctrine was not applicable).

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge