UNITED STATES v. REDDICK (2025)

ORDER

This Order follows the Probation Office's “administrative review” of Mr. Reddick's case, and subsequent filing of probation memoranda in two of his cases, Nos. 08-cr-342 and 12-cr-148. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES the requests in the memoranda and notes again that this case is closed.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2013, in No. 08-cr-342, Judge Nichols sentenced Mr. Reddick to a 36-month term of supervised release to run concurrently with the 36-month term of supervised release Judge Contreras ordered in No. 12-cr-148. See J. Revocation, United States v. Reddick, No. 1:08-cr-342 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2013), ECF No. 39. Mr. Reddick's concurrent terms of supervision began on August 6, 2021 and were set to expire on August 5, 2024. See Probation Petition 2, United States v. Reddick, No. 1:08-cr-342, (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2024), ECF No. 45; see also Probation Petition 2, No. 12-cr-148, ECF No. 34.

On November 10, 2021, the Probation Office instructed Mr. Reddick to maintain monthly contact. See Probation Petition 1, No. 12-cr-148, ECF No. 30. Mr. Reddick informed the Probation Office that he was homeless. See id. Understandably, this made it difficult to stay in touch. Despite his housing and life challenges, Mr. Reddick remained sober. See id. On December 10, 2021, Mr. Reddick failed to maintain monthly contact with his probation officer. See id.

On February 3, 2022, the Probation Office filed a petition alleging a single violation: that Mr. Reddick was a loss-of-contact for three months. See id. On February 7, 2022, Judge Nichols and Judge Contreras issued the requested arrest warrants.

On July 29, 2024, law enforcement executed the two arrest warrants and arrested Mr. Reddick. See Min. Order, United States v. Reddick, No. 1:08-cr-342, (D.D.C. July 29, 2024), see also Min. Order (July 29, 2024) No. 12-cr-148. Judge Nichols and Judge Contreras referred the matter to the undersigned for a Hearing on Violation and preparation of a report and recommendation. See Min. Order, United States v. Reddick, No. 1:08-cr-342, (D.D.C. July 30, 2024); see also Min. Order (Aug. 1, 2024) No. 12-cr-148. The February 2022 petition alleged only a single Grade C violation for loss of contact.

The undersigned held four hearings between July 29 and October 29, 2024, during which Mr. Reddick's probation officer noted Mr. Reddick's significant progress in terms of housing, employment, and mental health.

On October 29, 2024, the Court held a final hearing on violation.

We must pause the clock and fast forward to correct a material misstatement in the February 2025 Probation Memo. That memo indicates that the undersigned “request[ed] to withdraw the violations” at the October 29, 2024 hearing. See Probation Memo 2, No. 1:08-cr-342, ECF No. 46; see also Probation Memo 2, No. 12-cr-148, ECF No. 35 (together and separately, “Feb. 2025 PO Memo”). Wrong.

Rewind back to the October 29, 2024 hearing: There, “[t]he United States Probation Office, joined by the government, orally moved to withdraw the pending petitions given the defendant[’]s exemplary progress.” See Min. Order (Nov. 6, 2024). Before granting that request, the undersigned inquired as to whether continued supervision would benefit Mr. Reddick in terms of continued access to Probation Office's resources. To her credit, Mr. Reddick's probation officer proffered that further supervision was unnecessary. She pointed to Mr. Reddick's sustained progress, access to free resources in D.C., and underscored that there was no need to punish Mr. Reddick. Based on this confirmation, the undersigned then granted the Probation Office's and the Government's motion—not the undersigned's—to withdraw Mr. Reddick's petition.

The Probation Office then informed the Court that Mr. Reddick's period of supervision had “expired.” Mr. Reddick's term of supervised released should have expired on August 5, 2024. However, it could not expire while the February 2022 petition was pending. But once the undersigned dismissed that petition, nothing was left to extend supervision. It bears repeating: this was all put on the record at the October 29, 2024 hearing.

On November 6, 2024, the undersigned issued a Minute Order in both cases memorializing the requested withdrawal of the petitions and the Courts’ granting of these requests. These orders concluded that Mr. Reddick's supervision had expired successfully and commended Mr. Reddick's probation officer for her work in achieving a successful outcome. See id.¹ Both cases were closed.

The story should end there. But on February 14, 2025—over three months following the final hearing—the Probation Office filed identical Probation Memoranda in both cases. See Feb. 2025 PO Memo. Therein, the Probation Office stated:

Upon administrative review the probation office has determined that misinformation had been provided to Magistrate Judge Faruqui concerning the case's expiration date. Mr. Reddick's term of supervised release was tolled after the issuance of the absconder warrant on February 7, 2022. Mr. Reddick's supervision had not expired, and his new expiration date is March 20, 2027, due to the two years and seven months he had absconded.

Feb. 2025 PO Memo at 3. The Probation Office further stated that “a report and recommendation has not been submitted, and the final disposition of the violations must be determined by the sentencing/presiding judge; therefore, court intervention is necessary to resolve Mr. Reddick[’s] supervised release status.” Id. The Probation Office suggests that only two options exist to correct their mistake. Either “[t]he Court may accept the decision of the [undersigned] and terminate Mr. Reddick[’s] supervised release unsuccessfully or order Mr. Reddick continue on supervised release under the original terms and conditions until case expiration on March 20, 2027.” Id. Wrong again.

II. DISCUSSION

A. This Case Is Past Its Expiration Date

1. This Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Congress—not the Probation Office—decides whether a court has jurisdiction to exercise supervised release over a defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583. “[S]tatutes conferring jurisdiction on federal courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against federal jurisdiction.” United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067 (5th Cir. 1984)). Courts “are unwilling to ‘contemplate strained readings that would blur the bright line provided by Congress,’ particularly ‘[g]iven the ease with which the statute can be satisfied.’ ” Id. at 88 (quoting United States v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 2010)).

Congress contemplated that a term of supervised release might expire before a violation could be resolved. So it enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). See id. at 79. Section “3583(i) is a jurisdictional statute.” Id. It provides “two [jurisdictional] conditions[ ]: (1) ‘before [the term's] expiration, a warrant or summons [must be] issued’; and (2) ‘any period’ of delay must be ‘reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before [the term's] expiration.’ ” United States v. Gulley, 130 F.4th 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2025) (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)); see also United States v. Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d 63, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (jurisdictional “extension operates only in a particular set of [two] circumstances” set out in § 3583(i)).

“To answer [§ 3583(i)’s subject matter jurisdiction] question, we must discern whether the two statutory conditions on which the court's power depends have been satisfied.” Gulley, 130 F.4th at 1185. “Here, a [warrant] issued on [February 7, 2022,] before [Mr. Reddick's] term expired on [August 5, 2024].” Id. Thus, the first prong of § 3583(i) was satisfied. “The only remaining question” is whether the adjudication of the matter arising before the term's expiration occurred in a timely manner. Id. (cleaned up). There's the rub. The matter that had sustained the Court's jurisdiction was the February 2022 violation. Once that was withdrawn, there were no pending “matters arising before [ ] expiration [of supervision]” requiring adjudication. See Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 66–67. Without any such matter, there is nothing empowering the court to continue supervision. See id. Indeed, even a timely warrant for one violation does not “operate[ ] to preserve jurisdiction for later violations occurring after the expiration of the supervised release term.” Id. Because the second prong does not apply, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Gulley, 130 F.4th at 1187 (court lacked subject matter jurisdiction where the period of delay to adjudicate the pending supervised release violation was unreasonable).²

The Probation Office is fixated on the fact that undersigned has not submitted a report and recommendation. See Feb. 2025. Memo at 3. This attention is misplaced. First, the Court could not issue a report and recommendation because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Second, there was nothing to issue one on. There were no pending matters once the Probation Office and the government withdrew the February 2022 petition. No “findings of fact” were necessary, nor were there any “applications for revocation or modification of ․ supervised release” on which to report and recommend. See LCrR 59.2(a)(2).³

2. The Probation Office Lacks Statutory Authority

Congress—not the Probation Office—determines the duties of United States probation officers. The relevant portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3603 are:

- § 3603(1) states that probation officers shall inform a “person on supervised release, who is under his supervision” of the conditions of his or her release and keep the court informed of that person's status. (emphasis added);

- § 3603(2) states that a probation officer shall “keep informed, to the degree required by the conditions specified by the sentencing court, as to the conduct and condition of a probationer or a person on supervised release, who is under his supervision, and report his conduct and condition to the sentencing court” (emphasis added); and

- § 3603(4) states that a probation officer shall “be responsible for the supervision of any probationer or a person on supervised release who is known to be within the judicial district” (emphasis added).

So, as relevant here, a defendant must be “on supervised release” to be under the probation's office's authority.

Mr. Reddick's supervision ended once the undersigned granted the joint motion to withdraw the February 2022 petition. See Min. Order (Nov. 6, 2024). From then on, Mr. Reddick was not “on supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3603.⁴ Since then, the Probation Office has lacked statutory authority to do anything as to Mr. Reddick.

B. No Take Backs

“When we review the Government's [and Probation Office's] fulfillment of [their] promises in a [criminal case], we ‘give the benefit of any doubt to the defendant, given [the Government's and Probation Office's] tremendous bargaining power.’ ” United States v. Davis, 105 F.4th 541, 553 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting United States v. Davenport, 775 F.3d 605, 609 (3d Cir. 2015) (cleaned up)). While the inquiry is “fact-specific, the basic rules are clear.” United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2005). “Prosecutors [and probation officers] are bound by the letter and spirit of the bargains [they strike] with defendants, and ‘once [they] make[ ] a promise, [courts] requires strict adherence.’ ” Davis, 105 F.4th at 553 (cleaned up).

Promises were not kept here. First, the Probation Office asked to withdraw its petition. Then, the Probation Office promised the Defendant that his supervision had expired.⁵ But now, the Probation Office has changed their mind. That is not fair, and it is asymmetrical. Courts do not allow defendants to break their promises. For example, Mr. Reddick promised to stay in contact with his probation officer. When he failed to keep his promise, largely because he was homeless, the Probation Office violated him and sought to have him detained. So the formula is:

- When the less powerful party—the defendant on supervision—fails to uphold a promise → the defendant gets punished.

- When the more powerful party—the Probation Office—fails to uphold a promise → the defendant gets punished.

It is “heads I win, tails you lose.” No wonder many people have little faith in the supervision process. For example, one study found that “[e]ligible participants [for a probation programs] are often skeptical that they won't be arrested or put back in jail. This can be attributed to historical mistrust between the probation department and people on probation.” Evelyn F. McCoy and Natalie Lima, Reducing Probation Violations in Pima County, Arizona, Urban Institute (March 2024), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/reducing-probation-violations-pima-county-arizona. Defendants appear to be the only party in the criminal justice system that are held accountable for mistakes, no matter how technical. See, e.g., Scott Shackford, Judge Frees 76-Year-Old Woman Sent Back to Federal Prison After Missing a Phone Call from Officials, Reason (July 7, 2021), https://reason.com/2021/07/07/judge-frees-76-year-old-woman-sent-back-to-federal-prison-after-missing-a-phone-call-from-officials/ (grandmother on federal supervision attended a word processing class during which she missed a call from her probation officer. The probation office sought and obtained a warrant for this violation of supervised release, for which she was then arrested and taken to jail.); Reform, Explore the Latest Stories, https://reformalliance.com/latest-stories/ (last visited April 16, 2025) (collecting stories on punitive technical violations).

Think of what the Probation Office is asking: to haul Mr. Reddick back to court after he was promised that he was free. Then to place him back on supervision for years or inform him that he was terminated as unsuccessful, not because of anything he did, but because of a mistake by the Probation Office. Would “it [not] seem to [Mr. Reddick] that he is caught in a revolving door from which there is no escape”? United States v. Nation, 377 F. Supp. 3d 962, 963 (D. Neb. 2019). Yet unlike in many cases, where “that figurative door continues to revolve because of the actions of [the defendant],” here it would be because of the mistake of the Probation Office. Id. That is unacceptable. Permitting it would undercut the moral suasion of courts’ regular admonishment to defendants that if they had just “complied with the conditions of release, [they] would be free of the court by now. Defendant[s] must learn to follow the rules.” United States v. Stan, No. 21-1065, 2022 WL 664796, at *3 (10th Cir. Mar. 7, 2022) (citation omitted). The same rules of keeping promises and candor to the court must apply equally, if not in greater force to the Probation Office. “The lesson of [this] case[ ] is clear ․ promises made by [a probation officer] bind [the Probation Office].” Margalli-Olvera v. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 345, 353 (8th Cir. 1994).

On top of the Probation Office's bait-and-switch, “[t]he court told [Mr. Reddick] that if he were to ‘start[ ] living a productive and law-abiding life,’ the court would [support the Probation Office's request to allow] his supervised release [to expire].” United States v. DeMarrias, 895 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir. 2018). The Court should not and will not go back on its word. Mr. Reddick's supervision “must and does come to an end.” United States v. Hernandez, 655 F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 2011).

C. No Tolling

Congress—not the Probation Office or the courts—creates tolling provisions for supervised release deadlines. “Federal courts ․ possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Yet the Probation Office contends, without any citation to legal authority, that the warrant the court issued on February 7, 2022 “tolled” Mr. Reddick's term of supervised release. See supra Part I. Wrong again. “[T]here can be no tolling of the period of supervised release on the basis of fugitive status.” See Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 64; see also United States v. Talley, 83 F.4th 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2023).

“[T]he statutory provisions touching upon supervised release neither expressly require nor expressly permit tolling during the interval when an offender is in fugitive status. The only tolling provision that Congress saw fit to enact is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which tolls the running of a term of supervised release during any period in which an offender is imprisoned for thirty days or more in connection with a different crime. The absence of an express tolling provision for fugitive status, coupled with the presence of an express tolling provision that encompasses other circumstances, is highly significant,” because it means that “[t]he maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’ ․ is directly applicable here.” Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 67–68 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, (1983)). “[W]hen Congress explicitly allows for tolling in a particular circumstance, there is a strong presumption that Congress did not intend to allow tolling in other circumstances.” Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 68. The Probation Office offers “nothing that would suffice to rebut this strong presumption.” Id. For these reasons, numerous courts “have ruled that the pertinent statutes do not authorize tolling a term of supervised release during the period in which an offender is absent by reason of his deportation.” Id. (collecting cases).

Other circuits ⁶ have ignored the supervised release statute and instead read the fugitive tolling doctrine into supervised release cases. They argue that “[j]ust as an escaped prisoner or parole violator is not credited for time during which they are not in compliance with their criminal sentence, a fugitive from supervised release should not be so credited.” United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 455 (4th Cir. 2011). But the “justifications for fugitive tolling in other contexts—such as prison escapes—do not apply to the context of supervised release.” Talley, 83 F.4th at 1301. Crucially, a supervisee at large is still “subject to a restraint contemplated by the law—namely, the conditions of supervision—for the entire term of supervised release no matter where he is.” Id. at 1302 (citing Anderson v. Corall, 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923)) (emphasis added).

“[I]t makes very little sense to conclude that [Mr. Reddick] was not subject to his supervised release conditions [from 2022 until 2024] for the purposes of fugitive tolling, while simultaneously concluding that he violated his conditions of supervision at that time.” Id. In fact, at the July 29, 2024 hearing, the probation officer argued for Mr. Reddick's detention because he was a loss of contact from December 10, 2021 (violation date) to July 29, 2024 (arrest date). But if the time tolled from the date of his warrant, he was only a loss of contact from December 10, 2021 to February 7, 2022 (warrant date). As another example, had Mr. Reddick committed any additional violations between August 5, 2024 (expiration date) and October 29, 2024 (final hearing date), the Probation Office would have likely included those as new violations. The Probation Office cannot have it both ways. If the time is tolled, the defendant's conduct upon becoming a fugitive shall not be the subject of the revocation proceeding. But if it is not tolled, then the original expiration date applies. This latter rule makes more sense given the statutory analysis above.

To the extent that the tolling courts are relying on a perceived statutory ambiguity to justify manufacturing fugitive tolling, they are mistaken. Where a “statute [is] ambiguous, the rule of lenity ․ require[s] a narrow construction.” United States v. Singleton, 182 F.3d 7, 13 n.12 (citing Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)). “The ‘rule of lenity’ is a new name for an old idea—the notion that ‘penal laws should be construed strictly.’ ” Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360, 388 (2022) (Gorsuch, J. concurring) (quoting The Adventure, 1 F. Cas. 202, 204 (No. 93) (CC Va. 1812) (Marshall, C.J.)). “It ‘places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly,’ forcing the government to seek any clarifying changes to the law rather than impose the costs of ambiguity on presumptively free persons.” Id. at 391 (quoting United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008) (plurality opinion)). “The rule applies to penalty provisions in criminal statutes.” Singleton, 182 F.3d at 13 n.12 (cleaned up). “An interpretation of § 3583 that allowed [both tolling and conduct after the date of tolling to be considered] would increase the penalty imposed upon [a defendant] without any clear statutory basis for doing so, counter to the rule of lenity.” United States v. Koehler, 973 F.2d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000). When courts fail to enforce the rule of lenity, defendants instead face the rule of cruelty.

Some courts warn that the lack of tolling “would reward those who flee from bench warrants and maintain their fugitive status until the expiration of their original term of supervised release.” United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Crane, 979 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1992)). “This warning cannot withstand scrutiny. If an offender absconds before the expiration of his supervised release term, he will not do so with impunity. After all, the statute allows for the passage of a period of time, following the expiration of a term of supervised release, which is ‘reasonably necessary’ to adjudicate matters arising before expiration.” Hernandez-Ferrer, 599 F.3d at 69 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)). “It follows that a judicially contrived tolling mechanism is not necessary to deter offenders from absconding.” Id.

Moreover, the supervised release statute itself provides a backstop against “reward[ing] an absconder for his misconduct.” Buchanan, 638 F.3d at 455. Violations of supervised release conditions trigger revocation proceedings. Congress empowered judges in those proceedings to imprison a defendant and/or impose a new period of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Mr. Reddick was subject to this statutory backstop. He had a hearing on violation. That the Court did not further imprison him or subject him to a new period of supervision has no bearing on the fact that it could have done so.

Worst of all is the danger the Probation Office's position on tolling, which defies both temporal and metaphysical reality, creates. The clock never “stopped” on Mr. Reddick's term of supervised release. Should the Court adopt the Probation Office's “tolled” time calculation and end supervision on the newly-calculated date, Mr. Reddick will have served sixty-seven months and fifteen days of supervised release—August 6, 2021 through March 20, 2027—even though his original sentence provided for only thirty-six months of supervised release. See supra Part I. “This result is hard to square with the fugitive tolling doctrine,” which, as applied to terms of incarceration, “is meant to ensure that an original sentence is served, not to increase a sentence's length.” Talley, 83 F.4th at 1302 (emphasis added). The Probation Office's proposed sentence enlargement is particularly disturbing given the Probation Office's previous recommendation to withdraw the violation altogether.

D. Success Is Mr. Reddick's Only Option, Failure Is Not

Assume the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, the Probation Office was acting within its statutory duty, the Probation Office is allowed walk away from its prior promise, and tolling applies. The Probation Office then states that are only two possible outcomes: terminate as unsuccessful or extend supervision. Wrong again. There is a third solution which is not offensive: successful early termination.

“The imposition of a term of supervised release is not necessarily final. A court may terminate a term of supervised release for good behavior after at least one year has been served.” United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 483 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)). Mr. Reddick's period of supervision began on August 6, 2021. Tolling would begin on February 7, 2022 based on the warrant. His period of supervision would have then resumed on July 29, 2024, when the Court returned the warrant. Adding this time up, Mr. Reddick has now served more than one year of supervised release and with distinction.

The statutory factors courts consider in making supervised release determinations counsel in favor of early termination. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). At bottom, “the primary purpose of supervised release is to facilitate the integration of offenders back into the community rather than punish them.” U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release (2010) (“Supervised Release Report”) 9. Indeed, “[s]upervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). From the time of his arrest through October 2024, Mr. Reddick completely dedicated himself to reintegration. At each hearing, Mr. Reddick and his probation officer reported on Mr. Reddick's diligent efforts to find employment and stable housing, and his commitment to a positive life trajectory. At the October 2024 hearing, the parties and the Court agreed that Mr. Reddick had accomplished the goal of stable, sustained reintegration. For that, Mr. Reddick should be celebrated, not punished.

The Probation Office's request “misconstrues the nature and purpose of supervised release.” United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1995). Instead of prioritizing rehabilitation, it would needlessly punish Mr. Reddick. Pulling the rug out from underneath Mr. Reddick by bringing him back into supervision or changing his status to unsuccessful termination risks spiraling him into instability. “[T]he length of [ ] supervision is dependent solely upon the defendant's need for supervision after release from jail.” Montenegro–Rojo, 908 F.2d at 432. There is no further need for supervision here.

III. CONCLUSION

Under the Probation Office's vision, Mr. Reddick would be trapped in the world of supervised release, not unlike an innie on the severed floor. While innies cannot escape their prison through the exit door, defendants can exit supervised release via reintegration. Mr. Reddick has successfully reintegrated. Thus, he is free.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Court wholeheartedly stands by its praise for the probation officer's work in this case. Her initial trust in Mr. Reddick set him up to succeed. Her dedication ensured his success during supervision. And her compassion will continue to inspire him and the undersigned in the future.

2.   The undersigned has no concern “that strict application of § 3583(i) will result in routine windfalls to opportunistic criminal defendants․ [T]he Government could have satisfied its minimal burden here in a variety of ways—most notably by [seeking revocation on the violation instead of withdrawing it].” Merlino, 785 F.3d at 85.

3.   LCrR 59.1(b) requires that “written objections to a magistrate judge's ruling” be filed “within 14 days after being served with the order of the magistrate judge or after the oral order is stated on the record.” The government—not Probation Office—may file objections to a Magistrate Judge's order. The government had 14 days to object to the undersigned's oral order on the record granting the motion to withdraw the petition. The government did not object in 14 days, three months, or any time thereafter. And why would they? The undersigned ordered exactly what the government asked for. Unlike the Probation Office, the government has stood by its request.

4.   It is unclear what—if any—statutory authority directs the Probation Office to conduct “administrative review” of expired cases. Section 3603(5) states that a probation officer shall “keep a record of his work, and make such reports to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts as the Director may require.” Perhaps this creates authority for the creation of TPS reports and the like? However, it does not authorize the Probation Office to make updates or modifications to a term of supervised release that has already expired.

5.   In an earlier petition, the Probation Office noted that the lodging of a warrant would toll expiration. But that ex parte document has less meaning. It is primarily for the judge's benefit. What matters more are the promises made in open court to a defendant.

6.   United States v. Island, 916 F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2019); United States v. Barinas, 865 F.3d 99, 108–10 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 455–57 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Murguia-Oliveros, 421 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 2005).

ZIA M. FARUQUI, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE