RASUL ROE v. KRISTI NOEM (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Baddar Boe, Basel Boe, Bahar Boe, Barakat Boe, Baharak Boe, Baktash Boe, Benesh Boe, Basim Boe, Basir Boe, and Burhan Boe (the “Boe Family), Malik Moe, Marwa Moe, Malia Moe, Medina Moe (the “Moe Family”), Nahid Noe, Naser Noe, Nabi Noe, Naji Noe (the “Noe Family”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) brought the instant suit against Kristi L. Noem and Kika Scott, named in their official capacities as, respectively, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (collectively, the “Defendants”), challenging the standard and pace under which Afghan nationals’ humanitarian parole applications were adjudicated in the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in the fall of 2021.¹ See [ECF No. 1-3 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”)]. Currently before the Court are the parties’ motions for summary judgment. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 173], is DENIED, and Defendants’ cross-motion, [ECF No. 179], is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Material Facts 2

1. Statutory Background: Humanitarian Parole

Humanitarian parole (“HP”) is a process by which the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

may ․ in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the [Secretary of Homeland Security], have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added).³ DHS sub-agencies, including the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), may grant HP. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 20]. As relevant here, if an individual seeking HP is outside of the United States (“U.S.”), USCIS adjudicates and processes the application through its Humanitarian Affairs Branch (“HAB”). [Id.]. HAB is part of the International and Refugee Affairs Division (“IRAD”), which in turn is housed within USCIS's Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations Directorate (“RAIO”).⁴ [Id.].

For an individual outside the United States, there are two ways to initiate the HP application process.⁵ Either a person or an entity (the “petitioner”) submits an HP application to USCIS on behalf of a noncitizen (the “beneficiary”), or a noncitizen self-petitions. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 21]. In each scenario, the application process starts with the filing of a Form I-131, Application for Travel Document (“Form I-131”).⁶ [USCIS-0119].

There are two relevant guidance documents, USCIS's Humanitarian Affairs Branch Procedures Manual and the International Operations Officer Training Module on Humanitarian and Significant Public Benefit Parole, which HAB officers use when processing and adjudicating Form I-131 parole requests.⁷ [ECF No. 189 ¶¶ 2–4]. These guidance documents are periodically updated, see [id. ¶ 2], and the operative versions here are the Humanitarian Affairs Branch Procedures Manual dated July 9, 2021 (the “2019 HAB Manual”) and the International Operations Officer Training Module on Humanitarian and Significant Public Benefit Parole dated March 18, 2019 (the “2019 Training Module”),⁸ [ECF No. id. ¶¶ 3–5]; see [2019 HAB Manual at 6 (“The manual establishes operational guidance and procedures for HAB adjudicators and staff to adjudicate and process ․ [The manual] should be followed in conjunction with the [2019 Training Module].”); 2019 Training Module at 3 (“This training module provides an overview of the relevant statutory and policy guidance pertaining to the adjudication of an application for advance authorization of humanitarian or significant public benefit parole.”)].

Parole requests may be based on either, or both, urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons. [2019 HAB Manual at 7]. As a general matter, “[p]arole is an extraordinary measure used sparingly to bring an alien ․ into the United States for a temporary period.” [2019 HAB Manual at 6; 2019 Training Module at 11 (same)]. Historically, “the overwhelming majority of parole requests are for humanitarian reasons,” which is why parole requests are colloquially referred to as humanitarian parole. [2019 HAB Manual at 7; see also ECF No. 192 (“Mot. Hr'g Tr.”) at 44:24–45:8]. While HP requests for a significant public benefit are “often ․ based on law enforcement and national security considerations,” [2019 HAB Manual at 33], requests for urgent humanitarian reasons are commonly based on medical treatment, family unification, or attending legal proceedings, and “in extremely limited circumstances, [and as relevant here,] for protection purposes.”⁹ [Id. at 7]. Most protection-based HP requests fall into one of three categories: natural disasters, civil conflict, or targeted harm. [2019 Training Module at 53].

The 2019 Training Module emphasizes that “parole is generally not used for protection reasons,” even though such requests often “present compelling circumstances.” [2019 Training Module at 54]; see also [USCIS-0025–34 (document titled “Documents to Submit in Support of All Parole Requests” dated July 1, 2016); id. at -0031 (for “individuals [who] wish to come to the United States for temporary protection from natural disasters, civil conflicts or other harm, such as threats or persecution[,] [p]arole is only rarely granted ․, even if urgent humanitarian reasons have been established.”)]. This is in part because there are other programs, for example the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) or the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) through which individuals may seek protection. [2019 Training Module at 54]. Additionally, the 2019 Training Module notes that USCIS “has no operational ability to conduct an interview of a parole applicant to gather additional details about the need for protection and to assess his or her credibility firsthand.” [Id.].

In accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), the 2019 HAB Manual instructs HAB officers to “adjudicate each parole request on a case-by-case basis.” [2019 HAB Manual at 7]; see also [2019 Training Module at 22 (“Although parole requests may be similar in nature, each application is unique and must be evaluated on its own merits taking into account all the factors unique to the specific parole request, considering the totality of circumstances.”)].¹⁰ Specifically, HAB officers apply a two-step analytical framework when adjudicating parole requests. [2019 Training Module at 23–28]; see also [2019 HAB Manual at 32 (stating that when deciding on a parole request, “officers should ․ consider[ ] the totality of the circumstances, apply[ing] the two-step parole analytical framework to the facts”)]. “First [adjudicators] evaluate the evidence to determine whether the beneficiary has urgent humanitarian reasons or if there is significant public benefit for his or her presence in the United States.” [2019 Training Module at 23]. Second, HAB officers “[a]nalyze factors relevant to discretion.” [Id.].

As to the first step, the 2019 Training Module notes that “[t]here is little additional guidance as to the meaning of the terms ‘urgent humanitarian reasons’ or ‘significant public benefit’ in the current statute, applicable regulations, or precedent case law.” [2019 Training Module at 23]. Thus, with regard to “urgent humanitarian reasons,” the 2019 Training Module instructs adjudicators to

evaluate the evidence presented to determine whether a certain set of factors are present. You will then weigh or consider these factors, which may vary depending on the type of parole request, in order to determine if there is an urgent humanitarian reason to approve the application. You may give some factors more weight than others, or evaluate each factor equally, but first you will need to determine which factors, if any, are relevant to the decision. Think of the factors relevant to urgent humanitarian reason as initial guideposts in your analytical process ․ Once you have determined which factors are applicable to the case you are currently adjudicating, you should determine, based on the record whether the factors support a finding of urgent humanitarian reason.

[Id. at 24]. The second step requires adjudicators to “exercise discretion, considering the totality of circumstances.” [Id. at 25]. “Discretion is exercised on a case-by-case basis, taking into account and weighing the positive factors in the record against any negative factors, to determine if discretion should be exercised favorably.” [Id.].

For protection-based HP requests based on targeted harm, the 2019 Training Module lists the following factors relevant to the urgent humanitarian reason analysis: imminent risk of serious harm, living conditions and accessibility of existing relief mechanisms, ability to relocate within the country, and availability and accessibility of other protection measures, including whether international protection is available through refugee settlement via UNHCR or USRAP. [2019 Training Module at 59–60]. In order to exercise discretion favorably where the sole asserted urgent humanitarian reason is targeted harm, the 2019 Training Manual states that there must be “credible, third-party evidence of the threat” or “other compelling, positive factors associated with the case.” [Id. at 61].

The 2019 HAB Manual states that upon approval of an HP application, a beneficiary “must complete a Form DS-160, Application for a Nonimmigrant Visa ․, and appear for an appointment with the consular section to verify identity and collect biometrics ․ and for additional security vetting.” [2019 HAB Manual at 16]. “Unless the consular staff identifies derogatory or conflicting identify information,” the manual continues, “they will issue a boarding foil.”¹¹ [Id.].

2. August 2021: The United States Withdraws from Afghanistan and USCIS Responds by Expediting Afghan HP Requests During the Evacuation Efforts

In 2021, the Taliban launched a major offensive against the Afghan National Army and the remaining coalition forces, and, by mid-August, took control of Afghanistan's capital, Kabul. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 52].¹² As the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan and the conditions in the country devolved, USCIS began to see an increase in Form I-131 humanitarian parole requests for Afghan nationals.¹³ [ECF No. 189 ¶ 56]. Although, the administrative record is not clear on how many HP applications USCIS received in August alone, between July 1 and September 1, 2021, the agency recorded 1,356 Form I-131s for Afghan nationals, [USCIS-0363], with that number increasing to approximately 42,000 by January 31, 2022.¹⁴ [USCIS-0792–93].

With the Taliban capturing control of Kabul, on August 14, 2021, HAB Chief John “Wally” Bird (“Bird”) instructed his staff “to drop everything, and focus on completing all Afghan parole cases.” [USCIS 0234–35]. Bird informed staff that “the situation [in Afghanistan] is deteriorating and the embassy might evacuate at any minute.” [USCIS-0235]. As such, he continued, “[i]t is a crucial life and death situation for the parole beneficiaries in Afghanistan, and we need to complete these [parole] cases as soon as possible.” [Id.].

On or about August 15, 2021, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul closed. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 54]. The administrative record reveals that some limited emergency consular processing services remained available, though the record is unclear as to the nature of those services or for how long they were offered. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 54]; see [USCIS-0246 (email dated August 19, 2021, wherein Bird alerted USCIS staff to individuals in Afghanistan whose “expedited review will allow HAB to complete the adjudication process in order to support emergency processing in Kabul”); USCIS-0225–26 (IRAD Chief Joanna Ruppel (“Ruppel”) noting on August 13 that “there is very limited capacity at the US Mission in Afghanistan to process requests for parole from individuals” and that while “USCIS adjudicates certain parole requests,” the agency needed “in country assistance for the processing” and that U.S. government staff “in country are focused on SIVs and evacuation of US citizens”); USCIS-0601 (a State Department memorandum providing that “U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations on August 31, 2021”)]; cf. [USCIS-0217 (email from Ruppel to USCIS Director Ur Jaddou (“Jaddou”) dated August 14, noting that “the Embassy is closing and people are moving to the airport”); USCIS-0272–73 (email from State Department employee dated August 18, stating that “DOS will not be able to collect biometrics before the travelers leave Afghanistan”).

On August 20, 2021, USCIS began issuing “Parole Conditional Approval” notices, which informed beneficiaries that their parole had been “conditionally approved,” but was “contingent upon successful completion of [c]onsular processing” in a third country. [USCIS-0367, -0371 (“USCIS recognizes that U.S. Embassy Kabul is closed and all normal consular services in Afghanistan have been suspended until further notice.”)].

On August 30, 2021, the evacuation efforts ended, [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 70], and the next day the U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended all operations, [USCIS-0601]. Although USCIS claimed that no conditional approvals were granted after August 31, “when the evacuation flights ended,” [USCIS-1176], the administrative record also reveals that some conditional approvals of Afghan-based HP beneficiaries were seemingly inadvertently issued at least until September 10, see [USCIS-0408 (Bird noting that despite the pause on issuing decisions, he had “caught a case going out” on approximately September 10)].

On August 26, 2021, USCIS published a webpage providing “Information for Afghan Nationals on Parole into the United States.” [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 64]. The webpage's background section explained that “[i]ndividuals who are outside of the United States may request parole into the United States based on urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons for a temporary period, on a case-by-case basis.” [USCIS-1164]. Specifically, the webpage provided that

[t]he U.S. government is making every effort to assist individuals who have been granted parole into the United States. Due to quickly changing circumstances in the region and the closure of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, beneficiaries may experience delays in processing their cases and may need to arrange travel to a U.S. embassy outside of Afghanistan to continue processing their parole request.

[Id.]. Under a section titled “Eligibility,” the webpage further stated that “USCIS may exercise discretion to authorize parole on a case-by-case basis for individuals with urgent humanitarian or significant public benefit reasons to come to the U.S. for a temporary period.” [Id.]. The same section also noted that “[t]o avoid delays, all relevant supporting evidence to show that the beneficiary qualifies for parole and merits a favorable exercise of discretion must be submitted with the Form I-131, Application for Travel Document.” [Id.]. Under the “How to Apply” section, the webpage instructed applicants to “write the word EXPEDITE in the top right corner of the application in black ink” for “expedited processing.” [Id.].

During the evacuation efforts in August, HAB did in fact expedite the processing of HP applications for Afghan beneficiaries. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 60]; see also [USCIS-0240, -0246 (emails from Ruppel and Bird to USCIS staff on August 16 and August 19, respectively, discussing the prioritization of Afghan HP applications)]. HAB “focus[ed] on just getting the approvals out in hopes of the beneficiaries getting on an evacuation flight.”¹⁵ [USCIS-0364 (email attachment Ruppel sent to Jaddou on September 1, 2021) (emphasis omitted); id. (“USCIS prioritized the requests for parole for individuals inside Afghanistan during the evacuation.”); USCIS-0380 (email from Ruppel to State Department and USCIS staff dated August 30, 2021, stating that the agency had “been expediting processing of requests for parole filed by Afghan nationals in Afghanistan ․ in hopes that some of them may be able to get on the [U.S. Government] evacuation flights”); USCIS-0445 (email from Ruppel to State Department and USCIS staff dated September 10, 2021, explaining that “[w]hile the evacuation was ongoing, we moved forward with approvals with the hope those individuals would get on evacuation flights”)]. Seemingly as a result of these efforts, USCIS reported a 95% approval rate—or 72 approvals out of 76 applications—by August 31, 2021. [USCIS-0364].

3. September–October: USCIS Stops Expediting Afghan HP Applications, Pauses Issuing Decisions for Afghan Parole Beneficiaries, and Develops Afghan-Specific Adjudication Guidance

On August 31, 2021, USCIS leadership determined it would “no longer expedite parole requests based on being an Afghan nationals [sic] in Afghanistan[,] but [would] return to [the] regular process of expediting based on individualized circumstances.” [USCIS-0350]. Specifically, in an email dated September 1, 2021 HAB's Chief was informed that USCIS leadership “made the decision yesterday [to] ․ no longer expedite all Afghan parole requests” and that “[t]he decision to expedite those cases initially was about getting people out on flights.” [Id.]. Because the evacuation flights had ended, HAB “need[ed] to go back to the ‘normal’ expedite process based on triage, not nationality.” [Id.].

With the end of the evacuation, Defendants seemingly expected the 95% approval rate of parole requests from Afghan beneficiaries to decline. In response to Jaddou's questions about the humanitarian parole program for Afghan beneficiaries, Ruppel wrote that the high approval rates in August “may be misleading because we were focusing on just getting the approvals out in hopes of the beneficiaries getting on an evacuation flight.” [USCIS-0364]. “As such,” she continued, the August “rates should not be used to anticipate what would be approved in the future, particularly as the volume increases and many people see parole as a ticket out of Afghanistan or to the U.S.” [Id.]. Additionally, in response to Jaddou's question as to why “under current HP standards ․ a good number of [Afghan parole requests] would be denied,” Ruppel wrote that “[w]e anticipate that a significant number of applications will be general pleas for help to get out of Afghanistan based on fear of harm.” [Id.]. Ruppel further directed Jaddou to an excerpt from the 2019 HAB Manual on the analytical framework for protection-related cases. [Id.].

On approximately September 3, 2021, Bird, HAB's Chief, asked IRAD for additional guidance on parole cases filed by Afghans in view of some “specific Afghan adjudication issues.” [USCIS-0400; USCIS-0403 (“Bird/HAB Request for Guidance on Afghan Parole Applications” dated September 3, 2021); ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 83]. Bird wrote that “during the last weeks of August, HAB adjusted the weighing of certain factors to meet the significant public benefit of moving approvable Afghan parole cases forward.” [USCIS-0403]. Specifically, “HAB weighed the evacuation process [ending on August 31] heavily[ ] against some traditional evidentiary requirements.” [Id.]. According to Bird, “[s]ome of the factors that were adjusted to allow this emergent processing,” included

1. Waiving the requirement that parole not circumvent normal immigration processing[.]

2. Waiving the need for Afghan passport information when passports were not available, and emailing petitioners and counsel directly to ascertain whether passports were available, in lieu of the traditional [Request for Evidence] process du[e] to time urgency.

3. Weighing [significant public benefit parole (“SPBP”)] evacuation issues against traditional protection evidentiary requirements, not requiring third party evidence be submitted to determine whether protection, and not requiring that beneficiaries avail themselves of refugee protection where available.

4. Expediting the review of all Afghan cases above other cases and submitting daily [National Counterterrorism Center] expedite requests to [the Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate].

[Id.]. With regard to the third bullet point, Ruppel commented that she “saw this a little differently,” and did not “see [the submission of third-party evidence or availability of refugee protection] as being waived.” In particular, she noted that country of origin information “was pretty strong to support evidence of risk for those closely associated with the [U.S. Government] and certain other categories” and that “no refugee protection was available.” [Id.].

Bird further noted that “Afghan applications [were] arriving at an abnormally high rate” and that most of them were “protection related.” [USCIS-0403 (“We received 177 cases on Tuesday, and on Thursday, 10 boxes of cases averaging 10-30 cases in each box.”)]. As to the adjudication of these and future incoming applications, Bird highlighted “[s]ome factors ․ that affect [HAB's] analysis for regular [Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”)] adjudication:”

1. For Afghans in Afghanistan there is no consular operation that issues parole foils.

2. Due to the lack of consular processing, there is no opportunity to obtain visas, so in-country beneficiaries cannot avail themselves of regular immigration or visa processing.

3. Most claims that we are seeing are protection related. We are not clear on how we should weigh protection on an on-going basis, and how to consider the weight of 3rd party credible evidence that supports parole on a protection basis.

4. We need to understand the current SPBP weight, given public interest in providing an option for Afghans to leave Afghanistan - considering on-going family relationships with people in the United States, pending or approved SIV applications, affiliations with the US government and or US or international NGOs.

5. Given security concerns, are there new procedures relating to Afghan approvals that are being implemented?

[Id.]. Ruppel responded that “[t]hese are all issues we are working through and discussing with leadership.” [Id.]. “For now,” she continued, “we should pause adjudication until we can provide more guidance to adjudicators given that the U.S. military assisted evacuation has ended.” [Id.].

Thus, on September 7, 2021, HAB was instructed to “temporarily hold off on issuing any decisions for Afghan nationals seeking parole.” [USCIS-0401]. Although the issuance of decisions was paused, other aspects of case processing, such as accepting applications and creating case records, carried on. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 81].

As USCIS continued to receive a high volume of parole requests—the agency accepted 1,700 applications on October 12 alone—it continued through September and October to try to address issues related to Afghan-specific adjudications.¹⁶ See, e.g., [ECF No. 189 ¶¶ 82, 85, 87–90]; [USCIS-0503–05]; see also [USCIS-0506 (USCIS Director Jaddou noting that the agency is receiving 500–1,000 new cases per day)].¹⁷ Specifically, on October 15, in an email titled “Afghan parole updates” and sent to Jaddou and other USCIS staff, Ruppel wrote that IRAD “drafted an SOP for adjudicators that provides how to apply [the] parole analytical framework in the context of the Afghan situation.” [USCIS-0503–04]. Then, on October 26, Ruppel directed HAB to lift its pause on issuing parole decisions for Afghan HP beneficiaries, explaining that

1. We can move forward to begin to deny cases for those who are ineligible, including the protection cases that do not meet our parole requirements who should seek protection though existing third country protection and refugee processing channels. We should be sure to include very specific language in our denial letters and about the possibility of contacting the UNHCR and contact info (if we have it for the country where the beneficiary is) or website link.

2. We should prioritize processing of beneficiaries outside of Afghanistan, but still process some inside Afghanistan․

3. We should move forward with the formal clearance process for the analytic framework and guidance in the SOP and ensure we also are transparent with that on the website (e.g., the proposed language we have for the website).

[USCIS-0572–73].¹⁸

In an email dated November 1, 2021, USCIS Director Jaddou further clarified that the agency had “decided to prioritize those outside of Afghanistan because they clearly have a much more realistic path to the U.S.” [USCIS-0611]. “At the same time,” Jaddou wrote, “we decided to continue processing others.” [Id.].

4. November 2021: USCIS Issues the November 2021 Guidance

On November 5, 2021, USCIS issued a new guidance titled “Parole Requests for Afghan Nationals Interim Policies and Procedures.” [USCIS-0654–65 (the “November 2021 Guidance”)].¹⁹ The November 2021 Guidance proffered “eligibility considerations ․ specific to [the] parole of Afghan nationals, taking into account the evolving situation in Afghanistan, U.S. policy interests, and other protection mechanisms in place for vulnerable Afghan nationals.” [November 2021 Guidance at 1]. The November 2021 Guidance provided that “[a]djudicators must follow the [2019] HAB ․ Manual and the [2019] Training Module”²⁰ and that each application “must be evaluated on its own merits taking into account all the factors unique to the specific parole request and considering the totality of the circumstances.” [Id.]. Nonetheless, in light of “conditions specific to Afghanistan,” adjudicators were instructed to follow “additional guidance specific to parole requests for Afghan nationals.” [Id.]. This included “prioritizing relocation to the United States of [several] ․ categories of Afghan nationals who have been able to leave Afghanistan.” [Id. at 2]. Further, the November 2021 Guidance explained that “[m]embership in one of [certain] groups ․ should be considered a strong positive factor when assessing urgent humanitarian reasons, significant public benefit, and the exercise of discretion.” [Id.]. These groups included:

• Immediate relatives of a U.S. Citizen (spouse, unmarried children under 21, and parents);

• Immediate relatives of a U.S. Lawful Permanent Resident (spouse and unmarried children under 21);

• Locally Employed Staff (LES) of U.S. Embassy Kabul and their immediate family (spouse and unmarried children under 21);

• Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants who have received Chief of Mission (COM) approval and immediate relatives (spouse and unmarried children under 21) included on their case;

• Immediate relatives of Afghan nationals previously relocated to the United States through [Operation Allies Welcome (“OAW”)] (spouse, unmarried children under 21, and, in the case of unaccompanied minors relocated as part of OAW, their primary caregiver, including but not limited to a parent or legal guardian, and the spouse and dependent children under 21 of the primary caregiver); and

• Individuals referred to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) through a Pl embassy referral or P2 group designation referral and in imminent risk of refoulement or serious, targeted harm in the country outside Afghanistan where they are located.

[Id. (footnote omitted)].

In addition, the November 2021 Guidance noted that “[p]arole is not intended to replace refugee processing and, wherever possible, it is [U.S. Government] policy to process protection needs through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).” [November 2021 Guidance at 2]. Nevertheless, the Guidance explained that “in some circumstances, the protection needs are so urgent that processing via the USRAP ․ is not a realistic option to accord needed protection,” and “[w]hile each case is unique and parole determinations are made based on the totality of the circumstances, USCIS generally approves requests based on protection needs only if there is credible, third-party evidence naming the beneficiary that shows the beneficiary is targeted and at imminent risk of severe harm.” [Id.].

As relevant here, the November 2021 Guidance included a section titled “Beneficiaries still in Afghanistan.” [November 2021 Guidance at 3]. That section stated that “[s]ince the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan has suspended operations, including all normal consular services, a beneficiary will be required to leave Afghanistan in order to complete processing of their parole request.” [Id. at 3]. As such, “[i]f an adjudicator finds that a beneficiary residing in Afghanistan is initially found eligible for parole, the adjudicator may issue a Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) stating that USCIS cannot complete processing of the parole request unless and until the beneficiary informs USCIS that they are able to report to a U.S. embassy or consulate.” [Id.].

The November 2021 Guidance acknowledged that it “may be difficult to assess eligibility based purely on protection needs while an individual is still in Afghanistan” given that the “adjudicator will not know when or how the beneficiary will leave Afghanistan, where the beneficiary will be once outside of Afghanistan, or the protection that may be available to the beneficiary in that location.” [November 2021 Guidance at 3]. Therefore, the November 2021 Guidance continued,

for Afghan nationals in Afghanistan, parole requests based on protection needs, without other factors, such as the beneficiary's falling into one of the categories of Afghan nationals prioritized by the interagency, family reunification, or urgent medical needs, generally will be denied.

[Id. (emphasis added)]. In these cases, beneficiaries

should be given denial notices, informing them that 1) their parole applications cannot be approved at this time and that, should they get to a third country, they should contact the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for protection and consideration of refugee resettlement in the United States through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; and 2) should they be at imminent risk of severe harm in that third country or forced return to Afghanistan, they should contact USCIS with information on whether they have contacted UNHCR for protection assistance and include any third-party credible evidence of their risk in that third country.

[Id.]. The November 2021 Guidance provided that “USCIS will consider reopening the denied parole application (for no fee) within a year from the denial and may reconsider their request if sufficient additional new evidence is provided.” [Id.].

In relation to the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing), the November 2021 Guidance explained that:

Parole beneficiaries must report to a U.S. embassy or consulate to complete processing of their parole request, including identity verification, biometrics collection, and receipt of vaccination records. Adjudicators should issue a Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) if an Afghan beneficiary is initially found eligible for parole, but the beneficiary is residing in Afghanistan or another country without U.S. consular services. The Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) states that USCIS cannot complete processing of the parole request unless and until the beneficiary informs USCIS that they are able to report to a U.S. embassy or consulate.

[November 2021 Guidance at 8–9]. Further, the November 2021 Guidance cautioned adjudicators that the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) “should only be issued for cases that are initially found eligible for parole and all biographic vetting ․ is complete.” [Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted)]. Upon issuance of the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing), the adjudicator was instructed to “administratively close the case ․ purely for case tracking and workload management purposes.” [Id.].

On November 2, a few days prior to the issuance of the November 2021 Guidance USCIS began to train HAB staff on the new guideline. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 123; ECF No. 189 ¶ 96]; see also [USCIS-0619–47 (“Parole Training”)]. The training included a slide on the eligibility of protection claims for beneficiaries in Afghanistan, noting the following:

• Unable to complete processing of the parole request

• Unknown how the beneficiary will leave Afghanistan or what protection will be available in third country

• Unless other factors (e.g. family reunification, urgent medical needs, SIV post-COM), most requests will be denied

○ If initially found eligible, Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) should be issued.

• USCIS may consider reopening a parole request within one year of denial if the beneficiary relocates outside of Afghanistan and provides USCIS:

○ Credible third-party evidence of their imminent risk of severe harm in the third country

○ Whether they have contacted UNHCR or the host country for protection

[Parole Training at USCIS-0626 (emphasis in original)]. With regard to the Suspension of Processing, the Parole Training gave the following instructions:

• Parole beneficiaries must report to a U.S. Embassy or Consulate to complete processing of their parole request

• Suspension of Processing issued to:

○ Beneficiaries in locations without U.S. consular services (e.g. Iran, Afghanistan)

○ When immigrant visa or 1-730 travel document processing is available

• Only issue the Suspension of Processing Notice if all security checks are complete and beneficiary is initially found eligible (if ineligible, deny)

[Id. at USCIS-0635].

5. December 2021–April 2022: USCIS Updates Adjudication Guidance, Pauses Denial Notifications for Afghan Parole Beneficiaries, and Issues Another Revised Adjudication Guidance

On December 17, 2021, USCIS issued an updated version of the “Parole Requests for Afghan Nationals: Interim Policies and Procedures.” [ECF No. 189 ¶ 131]; see [USCIS-0736–48 (the “December 2021 Guidance”)]. The December 2021 Guidance largely mirrored the November 2021 Guidance.²¹ [ECF No. 189 ¶ 132].

In early 2022, DHS received inquiries from members of Congress who expressed concern about denial rates for Afghan HP beneficiaries and the evidentiary standard applied to protection-based requests. [USCIS-0791]; see also [USCIS-0792–95 (USCIS Briefing Memorandum titled “Meeting with Secretary Mayorkas on Afghan Parole” (“Mayorkas Briefing Memorandum”))].²² On February 20, 2022, Ruppel communicated to others at USCIS that Secretary Mayorkas wanted “to develop a way to better address protection needs of vulnerable Afghans who likely would qualify for protection.” [USCIS-0819]. Per Secretary Mayorkas’ direction, USCIS staff considered “what a ‘lower evidentiary standard’ will look like” for protection-based parole requests. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 142 (cleaned up)]; see [USCIS-0819–22].

As USCIS was reconsidering the evidentiary burden for protection cases, on February 23, 2022, Ruppel directed HAB to “temporarily pause” denial notifications for “1) Afghan parole beneficiaries and 2) beneficiaries of other nationalities whose cases are on targeted harm.” [USCIS-0830].²³ On March 8, 2022, Ruppel informed USCIS staff that a revised guidance on “discretionary evidentiary requirements in cases based primary [sic] on protection concerns” had been drafted, and also noted that while guidance awaited agency clearance, suspension of denials continued. [USCIS-0836]. Specifically, the approved guidance, Ruppel explained, “would allow approval when a beneficiary is a member of a targeted group for which country conditions show a pattern and practice of persecution.” [USCIS-0836]; see also [USCIS-0848–51 (email from Ruppel to USCIS staff dated April 13, 2022, attaching a document titled “Discussion points for Afghan Parole,” which recommended changes for the evidentiary burden for parole requests “based primarily on protection concerns”)].

In accordance with these deliberations, on April 18, 2022, USCIS issued a new iteration of the 2019 Training Module. See [ECF No. 189 ¶ 154]; [USCIS-0859–0936 (the “2022 Updated Training Module”]. The 2022 Updated Training Module included a revised targeted harm section, indicating that

[i]f there is no credible, third-party evidence of a direct threat against the beneficiary, there may be other strong evidence, such as evidence clearly establishing widespread or pervasive, systematic targeting of a specific group for serious harm, the beneficiary's membership in the targeted group, and that those who are targeting the group know or likely will become aware of the beneficiary's membership in the group.

[2022 Updated Training Module at 64]. As such, the training module continued, “[r]eliable country conditions reports could ․ support a claim of targeted harm based on membership in a targeted group, if country conditions reports show widespread or pervasive, systematic targeting of serious harm directed at a particular group.” [Id. at 65]; see also [USCIS-1069, -1075 (Training Presentation on “Updated Guidance On Protection-Based Parole Requests” dated April 28, 2022, highlighting the revised guidance that urgent humanitarian reasons may be based on individualized threats or membership in a “targeted group” and that while “[c]redible third-party evidence of threats specifically naming the beneficiary [was] still the preferred evidence[,] ․ ‘[o]ther strong evidence’ of risk may also be considered”)]. This represented a departure from the 2019 Training Module, which stated that “as a matter of discretion,” parole “will generally not [be] authorize[d] ․ for protection from targeted harm without credible evidence that the beneficiary is individually at risk of imminent and serious harm.” [2019 Training Module at 62 (emphasis added); id. at 63 (“[G]eneral reports on country conditions generally would not be considered credible third party evidence of risk of imminent serious harm to an individual, unless the reports contain specific references to the beneficiary or, in some situations, to the beneficiary's immediate family members.”)]. This modification was created to benefit Afghans seeking parole on protection-based claims. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 155].

On April 25, 2022, USCIS again updated the “Parole Requests for Afghan Nationals Interim Policies and Procedures” guidance document. [USCIS-1039–49 (the “April 2022 Guidance”)]. The April 2022 Guidance, which seemingly incorporated the 2022 Updated Training Module, largely resembled the November 2021 and December 2021 iterations, including the reference to “strong positive factor[s]” to be considered when exercising discretion. [April 2022 Guidance at 1–2]. Nonetheless, it also made some noteworthy changes. Under a section titled “Beneficiaries in a location without consular processing,” the April 2022 Guidance explained that

[p]arole beneficiaries must report to a U.S. embassy or consulate to complete processing of their parole request, including identity verification, biometrics collection, and confirmation that all medical requirements have been completed. Since the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan has suspended operations, including all normal consular services, a beneficiary in Afghanistan who initially appears eligible for parole will be required to arrange their own travel out of Afghanistan in order to complete processing of their parole request. Afghan beneficiaries who are in another location without a U.S. embassy or consulate that provides visa services, such as Iran or Russia, would similarly need to arrange travel to another country with a U.S. embassy or consulate to complete processing.

[April 2022 Guidance at 4]. In contrast to the November 2021 Guidance, the April 2022 Guidance thus omitted the “generally denied” language with regard to parole requests based only on protection needs from individuals in Afghanistan, [November 2021 Guidance at 3], and instead clarified that in cases where a beneficiary is in a location without consular processing, but otherwise appears eligible for parole,

the adjudicator may issue an Afghanistan Notice of Continued Parole Processing, which states that the beneficiary must arrange their own travel to a location with a U.S. embassy or consulate to complete processing of their parole request. The Afghan Notice of Continued Parole Processing should only be issued for cases that initially appear eligible for parole and all biographic vetting, including OAW NCTC vetting, is complete. Adjudicators are not required to review pre-existing A-files prior to issuing a Notice of Continued Parole Processing unless the A-file is required to determine initial eligibility. The adjudicator should administratively close the case ․ purely for case tracking and workload management purposes.

The petitioner must notify USCIS via email when the beneficiary has relocated and is able to complete processing. Adjudicators will then reopen the parole request, review all required USCIS-initiated security checks to confirm they are valid, and, if no derogatory information is uncovered and there is no new information that would significantly impact the reason for the parole request, issue a conditional approval notice to the petitioner and representative of record and an authorization memo to post. The parole application will remain open for at least a year.

[April 2022 Guidance at 4–5 (emphasis omitted)]. Thus, the April 2022 Guidance substituted the “Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing),” [November 2021 Guidance at 3], with the “Notice of Continued Parole Processing” for beneficiaries who “initially appear eligible for parole,” [April 2022 Guidance at 4–5].²⁴

Notably, the April 2022 Guidance differentiated between “Conditional Approval Notice, Referral to Consular Processing” and “Notice of Continued Parole Processing.” [April 2022 Guidance at 10]. Regarding the former, the guidance noted that “HAB issues this notice ․ when [it] determines that the beneficiary is eligible for parole and all USCIS-initiated security checks have been completed.” [Id.]. The latter, the April 2022 Guidance clarified, is issued in situations where “HAB determines that the beneficiary initially appears eligible for parole, but the beneficiary is in a location where there is no U.S. embassy or consulate.” [Id.]. On April 29, 2022, USCIS leadership directed HAB to lift the pause on protection-related denials. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 178].

By the end of April 2022, USCIS “had received over 45,600 parole requests for Afghan nationals and continued to receive new requests daily.” [USCIS-1055]. Out of those requests, 75% of which were for beneficiaries in Afghanistan, USCIS had processed around 2,800 applications, while approximately 42,800 remained pending. [Id.]. This marked a stark increase in HP requests: prior to August 2021, USCIS processed less than 2,000 HP cases per year. [USCIS-0793].

As to the denial rate of Afghan-based HP requests for protection reasons, the Court is unable to draw definite conclusions from the administrative record. A briefing memorandum for Secretary Mayorkas ahead of a Capitol Hill meeting in April 2022 provides that USCIS's denial rate for Afghanistan-based beneficiaries was around 90%, “consistent with historic rates of denial for parole requests based primarily on protection concerns.” [USCIS-1050, -1055]. Plaintiffs assert that because that statistic combines both the time period before and after November 2021, it does not accurately reflect denial rates.²⁵ [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 131]. As a point of comparison, the administrative record shows that between 2015 and 2021 USCIS approved approximately 13% of parole requests “based on purely protection needs.”²⁶ [USCIS-0793]; see also [USCIS-0352–59 (charts containing parole decisions by fiscal years)].

6. The Plaintiffs

i. The Boe Family

Basel Boe (“Basel”) and Baddar Boe (“Baddar”) are, based on documents submitted to USCIS, [Redacted] who worked as [Redacted] supporting U.S. troops in Afghanistan. [BADI BOE-132]. Basel is a lawful permanent resident of the United States and Baddar is a U.S. citizen. [BADI BOE-001; BAKTASH BOE-009]. Basel filed Forms I-131 for [Redacted] Badi Boe (“Badi”), [Redacted] Bahar Boe (“Bahar”), his sister Baharak Boe (“Baharak”), and his brother Barakat Boe (“Barakat”). [BADI BOE-001, 028; BAHAR BOE-001, 028; BAHARAK BOE-001, 028; BARAKAT BOE-001, 028]. USCIS received their HP petitions on September 9, 2021, and the unredacted Parole Adjudication Worksheets (“PAWs”), wherein adjudicators memorialize their reasoning for denying or granting HP requests,²⁷ indicate “family based” and “protection” grounds for their requests. [BADI BOE-001, 028–30; BAHAR BOE-001, 028–30; BAHARAK BOE-001, 028–30; BARAKAT BOE-001, 028–29]. On September 21, 2021, USCIS received HP requests filed by Baddar for [Redacted] Baktash Boe (“Baktash”), his sister-in-law Benesh Boe (“Benesh”), and their three children, Basim, Basir, and Burhan. [BAKTASH BOE-001, 028; BENESH BOE-001, 028–29, BASIM BOE-001, 031–32; BASIR BOE-001, 029–30; BURHAN BOE-001, 028–29]. The PAWs for Baktash, Benesh, Basim, Basir, and Burhan show “family based” and “protection” reasons for their HP requests. [BAKTASH BOE-028; BENESH BOE-028–29; BASIM BOE-031–32, BASIR BOE-029–30; BURHAN BOE-028–29].

In a declaration submitted with the applications for Badi, Bahar, Barakat and Baharak, Badi explained that he and his family were the “subject of an active Taliban effort to find and kill those who assisted the United States over the past 20 years.” [BADI BOE-132; BAHAR BOE-121; BARAKAT BOE-108; BAHARAK BOE-120]. Specifically, as a [Redacted] of Afghanistan, Badi had not only collaborated closely with the United States, but “spent years [Redacted] many Taliban who have now been released and are seeking revenge.” [BADI BOE-132; BAHAR BOE-121; BARAKAT BOE-108; BAHARAK BOE-120]. Because of his and [Redacted] (Baddar and Basel) work, Badi asserted that he and his family were “in grave danger.” [BADI BOE-132; BAHAR BOE-121; BARAKAT BOE-108; BAHARAK BOE-120]. Baktash, who had previously worked with the [Redacted] and international aid agencies, also submitted a declaration with his and his family's applications (Benesh, Basim, Basir, and Burhan). [BAKTASH BOE-057–62; BENESH BOE-057–62; BASIM BOE-060–65; BASIR BOE-058–63; BURHAN BOE-057–62]. He described how “[a]s a direct result of my and my family's work with the United States and against the Taliban, the Taliban are continuously looking to find my family and me, to either kill us or take us hostage.” [BAKTASH BOE-058; BENESH BOE-058; BASIM BOE-061; BASIR BOE-059; BURHAN BOE-058]. “Over the last few years,” he wrote, he “received phone calls, text messages, and ‘night letters’ from the Taliban, which were delivered to my home and reference the work I performed for the U.S. and [Redacted] governments, and threaten to take revenge against me for that work.” [BAKTASH BOE-058; BENESH BOE-058; BASIM BOE-061; BASIR BOE-059; BURHAN BOE-058].

Badi's, Bahar's, Barakat's, and Baharak's applications were denied on May 24, 2022. [BADI BOE-032; BAHAR BOE-032; BARAKAT BOE-030; BAHARAK BOE-031].²⁸ While adjudicators found neither urgent humanitarian reasons nor a significant public benefit in Barakat's and Baharak's applications, [BARAKAT BOE-028; BAHARAK BOE-28], they concluded that a significant public benefit existed for Badi and Bahar in light of their relationship—[Redacted]—with Basel and Baddar. [BADI BOE-029–30; BAHAR BOE-028–30]. Adjudicators nonetheless denied their applications, stating that because of Badi's work as a [Redacted] officer, an interview would be required to assess whether [Redacted].²⁹ [BADI BOE-030–31; BAHAR BOE-030–31]. USCIS denied the applications of Baktash, Benesh, Basim, Basir, and Burhan Boe on July 2, 2022, finding no urgent humanitarian reasons for parole or a significant public benefit.³⁰ [BAKTASH BOE-032; BENESH BOE-032; BASIM BOE-035; BASIR BOE-033; BURHAN BOE-032]. In particular, the adjudicators noted for each family member that they had “failed to present proof of any threat from the Taliban” and that “[a]lthough the applicant presented previous work document no recent activity was presented that shows that the applicant may be in danger.” [BAKTASH BOE-029; BENESH BOE-029; BASIM BOE-032; BASIR BOE-030; BURHAN BOE-029]. The adjudicators further wrote that each “applicant mentioned that [their] family members [sic] previous work with the US government may also cause the Taliban to retaliate against them,” but failed to submit “proof of documentation or threat.” [BAKTASH BOE-029; BENESH BOE-029–30; BASIM BOE-032–33; BASIR BOE-030; BURHAN BOE-029].

On approximately June 27, 2022, Basel filed Forms I-290B, requesting that USCIS reconsider the Badi, Bahar, Barakat, and Baharak denials. [ECF No. 159 at 2]. Baddar Boe followed suit on or about August 9, 2022, filing the Form I-290B on behalf of Baktash, Benesh, Basim, Basir, and Burhan Boe. [ECF No. 159 at 2]. On November 21, 2024, USCIS denied the motions for reconsideration for each applicant, but nevertheless reopened the Forms I-131 for every family member except for Badi, who passed away [Redacted], and Bahar. [ECF No. 159 at 2]; [ECF No. 182-1 ¶¶ 170, 173]. Barakat, Baharak, Baktash, Benesh, Basim, Basir, and Burhan Boe, who remain [Redacted], have since received requests for evidence from USCIS, which they responded to in mid-January 2025.³¹ [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 171].

ii. The Moe Family

Malik Moe (“Malik”) is a U.S. citizen and resident of Massachusetts who filed I-131 Forms on behalf of [Redacted] Malia Moe (“Malia”), Marwa Moe (“Marwa”) and Medina Moe (“Medina”) for “family based” and “protection” reasons, which USCIS received on September 24, 2021. [MALIA MOE-001, 027; MARWA MOE-001,027; MEDINA MOE-001, 027]. The [Redacted], in letters accompanying the Moe applications, explained that they feared reprisals from the Taliban because of their professional backgrounds: Malia was a former [Redacted], Marwa a judge for the Afghan government, and Medina [Redacted]. [MALIA MOE-062; MARWA MOE-063; MEDINA MOE-062]. Adjudicators determined that the [Redacted] had established urgent humanitarian reasons and a significant public benefit, writing that they were “members of the priority group for relocation ‘extended family members[, which includes siblings] ․ of Afghans who have received [Chief of Mission] approval or entered the United States on an [SIV].”³² [MALIA MOE-029; MARWA MOE-029; MEDINA MOE-029]. The adjudicators further noted that, “[a]lternatively, the[y] ․ are members of the priority group for relocation as ‘individuals who were employed or volunteered in positions supporting the broader U.S. objectives in Afghanistan and who assert risk of harm due to that work.’ ” [MALIA MOE-029; MARWA MOE-029; MEDINA MOE-028]. As such, “there [was] an urgent humanitarian reason and significant public benefit reason ․ to approve [their] parole.” [MALIA MOE-030; MARWA MOE-030; MEDINA MOE-030]. Accordingly, the [Redacted] each received a Notice of Continued Parole Processing dated May 16, 2023. [MALIA MOE-136; MARWA MOE-141; MEDINA MOE-127]. The Notice of Continued Parole Processing informed the [Redacted] that because the U.S. Embassy in Kabul suspended operations, they must “arrange travel to a country where there is a U.S. embassy or consulate to continue processing [their] parole request[s].” [MALIA MOE-136; MARWA MOE-141; MEDINA MOE-127]. Once they are in a location with a U.S. embassy or consulate, USCIS “will review [their] case,” and “[i]f no new derogatory information is found and [they] remain[ ] eligible for parole,” the agency will issue “a conditional approval notice to the petitioner.” [MALIA MOE-136; MARWA MOE-141; MEDINA MOE-127]. While Malia and Media [Redacted], Marwa was [Redacted] in January 2025 through the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation (“CARE”) process to continue refugee processing [Redacted]. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶¶ 200–01]. Before her refugee processing could be completed, the United States suspended refugee processing.³³ [ECF No. 182-1 ¶¶ 200–01]. Marwa's counsel informed USCIS that she had relocated to a country with U.S. consular services. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 200; ECF No. 184].

iii. The Noe Family

Plaintiffs Nahid Noe (“Nahid”), Naser Noe (“Naser”), and their children Nabi and Naji, are an Afghan family who self-petitioned for HP. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 176]. USCIS received their applications on September 3, 2021, and the unredacted PAWs for each family member indicate that they requested HP for “protection” reasons. [NAHID NOE-001, 022; NASER NOE-001, 022; NABI NOE-001, 022; NAJI NOE-001, 022]. Nahid's request indicates that [Redacted] and had worked on various [Redacted] programs.³⁴ [NAHID NOE-038, 57]. Her husband Naser was a [Redacted] and had been engaged in civil society, [Redacted]. [NASER NOE-057–60].

USCIS denied Nahid's and Naser's applications on February 14, 2022, Nabi's on February 16, 2022, and Naji's on approximately June 1, 2022, finding neither urgent humanitarian reasons nor a significant public benefit. [NAHID NOE-023, 25, 27–28; NASER NOE-023, 25, 29–30; NABI NOE-022–23, 25, 114–15; NAJI NOE-023, 25, 27–28]. Specifically, the PAW shows that the adjudicator concluded that Nahid “failed to provide documentation corroborating ․ any specific and imminent threat of serious harm faced by [her],” and as such failed to meet the burden of proof establishing urgent humanitarian circumstances warranting a grant of parole. [NAHID NOE-024; NASER NOE-023–24 (same)]; see also [NABI NOE-022–24 (finding no urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit); NAJI NOE-023–24 (same)]. The adjudicators further noted that Naser and Nahid “failed to provide evidence of a lack of access to relief mechanisms or protection measures other than parole” and that “USCIS does not generally authorize parole for protection reasons.” [NAHID NOE-024; NASER NOE-024].³⁵ As of the date of this order, the Noe family are [Redacted], where they had been evacuated as part of the CARE process to continue refugee processing.³⁶ [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 190]. As refugee processing has since been suspended, the Noe family remains [Redacted]. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 190].

B. Procedural History

The Complaint, which Plaintiffs brought against Defendants on May 25, 2022, asserts four counts under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”): arbitrary and capricious agency action, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (Count I), [id. ¶¶ 176–84]; failure to comply with law and agency rules, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (Count II), [id. ¶¶ 185–88]; failure to comply with notice-and-comment requirements, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Count III), [id. ¶¶ 189–93]; and agency action unlawfully withheld and/or unreasonably delayed, 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (Count IV), [id. ¶¶ 194–97]. Counts V and VI seek mandamus relief that would compel USCIS to process Plaintiffs’ applications and a declaratory judgment from the Court regarding USCIS's purported unlawful actions. [Compl. ¶¶ 198–203].

On April 28, 2023, the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss on Count III, but denied the motion on Counts I and II, as related to the November 2021 Guidance, as well as Counts IV and V. [ECF No. 69 (“MTD Order”) at 36]. On October 2, 2024, the Court denied the Boe and Noe families’ preliminary injunction on Counts I and II. [ECF No. 141 (“PI Order”)]. The same day, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ motion for completion and/or supplementation of the administrative record. [ECF No. 142]. Specifically, the Court ordered Defendants to produce the unredacted PAWs of the individual plaintiffs’ humanitarian parole applications and confirm that the administrative recorded includes all documents and materials directly or indirectly considered by USCIS as to changes in adjudication standards and pace of HP applications for Afghan nationals in Afghanistan. [ECF No. 142 at 24]. Defendants produced the unredacted PAWs on October 16, 2024, [ECF No. 146], and filed an expanded administrative record on January 15, 2025, [ECF No. 168]. Subsequently, on February 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment, [ECF No. 173], and Defendants cross-moved on March 10, 2025, [ECF No. 179]. Plaintiffs filed their reply and opposition to Defendants’ cross-motion on April 11, 2025, [ECF No. 188], and Defendants replied on April 25, 2025, [ECF No. 190]. The Court held oral argument on the motions on May 8, 2025. [ECF No. 191].

On January 25, 2025, Kristi L. Noem replaced Alejandro Mayorkas as the Secretary of Homeland Security, and as of the date of this order, Kika Scott is the current Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Accordingly, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Noem in her official capacity is substituted as a Defendant in place of Mayorkas, and Scott in her official capacity as a Defendant in place of Jaddou, USCIS's former director.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is normally appropriate where the movant can show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “However, in cases involving review of agency action under the APA, the traditional Rule 56 standard does not apply due to the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Bennett v. Murphy, 166 F. Supp. 3d 128, 139 (D. Mass. 2016) (citing Int'l Jr. Coll. of Bus. and Tech., Inc. v. Duncan, 802 F.3d 99, 106 (1st Cir. 2015)). In particular, for summary judgment motions under the APA, the Court's review “is limited to the administrative record,” Lovgren v. Locke, 701 F.3d 5, 20 (1st Cir. 2012), and “[t]he ‘entire case’ on review is a question of law.” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); id. (holding that in summary judgment cases involving final agency the district judge “sits as an appellate tribunal”); see also Doe v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 239 F. Supp.3d 297, 305 (D. D.C. 2017) (“Summary judgment is [ ] the mechanism for deciding whether as a matter of law the agency action is supported by the administrative record and is otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.” (internal quotations omitted)).

“Under the APA, a reviewing court may set aside an agency's decision if it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,’ such as if it is ‘unsupported by substantial evidence.’ ” Atieh v. Riordan, 797 F.3d 135, 138 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). As a general matter, judicial review of an APA claim is “narrow” because “the APA standard affords great deference to agency decisionmaking.” Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997). “If the agency's decision is supported by any rational view of the record, a reviewing court must uphold it.” Atieh, 797 F.3d at 138. Importantly, the Court “may not substitute [its] judgment for that of the agency, even if [it] disagree[s] with [the agency's] conclusions.” Sig Sauer, Inc. v. Brandon, 826 F.3d 598, 601 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Craker v. DEA, 714 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2013)).

“[T]he plaintiff has the burden of showing by cogent and clearly convincing evidence that the decision was the result of a material legal error or injustice.” Piersall v. Winter, 507 F. Supp. 2d 23, 33 (D.D.C. 2007) (further internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doyle v. England, 193 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207 (D.D.C. 2002)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court's Jurisdiction

As a general matter, the APA offers legal recourse to a “person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or [who is] adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. Legal redress under the APA, however, is unavailable when a “statute[ ] preclude[s] judicial review.” Id. § 701(a)(1). Here, the relevant jurisdiction-stripping provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to review ․ any ․ decision or action of the ․ the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of ․ the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting the relief of section 1158(a) of this title.”³⁷ “[U]nder this subchapter” refers to specified discretion under Subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381, and includes the humanitarian parole statute § 1182(d)(5)(A), which grants the Secretary discretion to parole individuals “under such conditions as he may prescribe only on a case-by-case for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”³⁸ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). See Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233, 253 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring).

Defendants argue that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars this Court from exercising jurisdiction over the instant action, and urge it to revisit its prior jurisdictional findings. [ECF No. 180-1 at 17–22]. Specifically, Defendants assert that the Court has previously improperly inserted “individual” into § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), meaning it limited the Secretary's discretion to individual parole decisions when the statute in fact envisions discretion over agency practice or policy underpinning parole determinations. [Id. at 18–19]. Because the Secretary's discretion extends to agency practice or policy as authorized by § 1182(d)(5)(A), Defendants argue that the Court is precluded from reviewing the November 2021 Guidance under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). [Id. at 18–22].

Although the Court finds Defendants’ argument unavailing, it need not resolve the jurisdictional threshold question before it. “Rather, [this Court] may assume that there are no statutory bars to the exercise of jurisdiction and proceed directly to the merits, because, for the reasons [it] will next explain, [it] resolve[s] the merits in the [D]efendants’ favor.”³⁹ Gupta v. Jaddou, 118 F.4th 475, 482–83 (1st Cir. 2024) (citing Doe v. Town of Lisbon, 78 F.4th 38, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2023) (finding that when a case poses a question of statutory, as opposed to Article III jurisdiction, “the question of jurisdiction need not be resolved if a decision on the merits will favor the party challenging the court's jurisdiction.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted))).⁴⁰

B. APA Review

Judicial review under the APA, unless otherwise specified by statute, is limited to final agency action. 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704. Because the parties are seemingly in agreement that the November 2021 Guidance, for purposes of the instant order, constitutes a final agency action, see [Mt. Hr. Tr. 31:23–32:5]; see generally [ECF Nos. 174, 180-1, 188, 190], the Court need not needlessly belabor this issue and accordingly proceeds with the same understanding.⁴¹

1.Whether the November 2021 Guidance Was “in Accordance with Law” (Count II)

The essence of Plaintiffs’ argument is that the November 2021 Guidance foreclosed case-by-case adjudication of Afghan-based HP applicants. [ECF No. 174 at 17; ECF No. 188 at 18–20]. Specifically, Plaintiffs assert that the November 2021 Guidance denied Afghans in Afghanistan who applied for HP on protection grounds “any opportunity to be approved” in two different, but unacceptable, ways. [ECF No. 174 at 17–18]. First, the guidance instructed adjudicators to “generally ․ den[y]” HP applications based solely on protection reasons for individuals in Afghanistan because “the adjudicator will not know when or how the beneficiary will leave Afghanistan, where the beneficiary will be once outside of Afghanistan, or the protection that may be available to the beneficiary in that location.” [Id. at 17 (quoting [November 2021 Guidance at 3])]. Therefore, as a practical consequence, “a beneficiary in Afghanistan generally could not be approved for parole based on protection needs because they may theoretically no longer be at an imminent risk of harm if they escape to a third country for processing.” [Id. at 17–18]. Second, even if a beneficiary based in Afghanistan was “initially found eligible for parole” for protection reasons, adjudicators could only issue a Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing), [id.; ECF No. 188 at 19], informing the beneficiary that they “must travel to a country where there is a U.S. embassy or consulate to continue processing [their] parole request,” [MARWA MOE-143 (Notice of Continued Parole Processing)]; see also [November 2021 Guidance at 8–9]. Unlike the conditional approval notices issued in August or regular approvals, which were “conditioned only upon successful [consular] processing”—that is, identity verification, biometrics collection, additional security vetting, and receipt of travel documents unless any derogatory or conflicting information was discovered—the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) required re-adjudication of a beneficiary's case based on the harm they may face in the third country. [ECF No. 188 at 19; ECF No. 174 at 18]. Afghan beneficiaries in Afghanistan initially found eligible for parole could, as a result, at most hope for re-adjudication of their cases when reaching a place with U.S. consular processing, but, crucially, never outright approval. [ECF No. 188 at 18–20]; see [Mt. Hr. Tr. at 7:8–9].

Defendants respond that the November 2021 Guidance not only expressly provided that “each application must be evaluated on its own merits taking into account all factors unique to the specific parole request and considering the totality of the circumstances,” but that the unredacted PAWs show that USCIS did in fact decide cases individually. [ECF No. 180-1 at 27 (quoting November 2021 Guidance at 1)]. At its core, Defendants maintain, Plaintiffs take issue with the fact that the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) does not guarantee parole after an Afghan beneficiary's relocation, without, however, explaining why 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(d)(5)(A) bars consideration of the circumstances, including access to other relief, a beneficiary may find in a third country. [Id. at 28–29].⁴²

The Court cannot conclude that Defendants acted “in conflict with the language of [the parole] statute” or otherwise exceeded their authority under 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(d)(5)(A). California v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 718 F. Supp. 3d 1060, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nw. Env't Advocs. v. EPA, 537 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2008)). With regard to the November 2021 Guidance's instruction to “generally ․ den[y]” HP applications based purely on protection needs, the Court finds it consistent with the 2019 Training Module, which emphasizes that “parole is generally not used for protection reasons.” [2019 Training Module at 54; id. at 53 (protection-based parole requests are “some of the most difficult cases ․ to adjudicate and typically involve compelling fact patterns of individuals outside the United States, who may genuinely be at risk of harm, even death, but for whom there may be no legal, timely, or accessible pathway to come to the United States”)]; see also [USCIS-0005 (“Generally, parole is not authorized for protection reasons”)].⁴³

Neither can the Court find that the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) constituted an outright refusal. Plaintiffs are correct, and Defendants do not dispute, that the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) required the re-evaluation of a beneficiary's parole eligibility upon arrival in a third country. Compare [November 2021 Guidance at 9 (“[T]he adjudicator should verify that the beneficiary is still eligible for parole and that all required USCIS-initiated security checks are valid.”)], with [2019 HAB Manual at 16 (upon approval, beneficiaries “must complete a Form DS-160 ․ and appear for an appointment with the consular section to verify identity and collect biometrics ․ and for additional security vetting” and, “[u]nless the consular staff identifies derogatory or conflicting identity information, they will issue a boarding foil within 30 days ․”)], and [USCIS-0371–72 (conditional approval notice template stating that approval is “contingent upon successful completion of consular processing” and that, provided USCIS “discovers no new information that would impact eligibility for parole, a travel document will be issued”)]. That does not mean, however, that the November 2021 Guidance barred approval altogether; once a beneficiary was able to relocate and assuming that they remained eligible, they could obtain parole. In that way, the Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) was not entirely dissimilar from conditional approvals, which expressly stated that, upon relocation, a travel document would only be issued if “USCIS discovers no new information that would impact eligibility for parole.” [USCIS-0372]. That is, even with a conditional approval in hand, an Afghan beneficiary may find themselves in a third country, but nonetheless unable to enter the United States.⁴⁴

Further, the Court is not persuaded that in requiring an additional step, namely the reassessment of the beneficiary's circumstances in the third location, Defendants exceeded their authority under the parole statute. While, ordinarily, USCIS issues a decision on a parole request before consular processing, see [2019 HAB Manual at 14–16; 2019 Training Module at 20–23], nothing in the statute appears to prevent Defendants from re-evaluating the eligibility of a beneficiary once they arrive in a third country. The guidance documents repeatedly note the exceptional nature of granting protection-based HP requests and emphasize that adjudicators should consider accessibility of other relief mechanisms, including refugee processing, when deciding such cases. See [2019 HAB Manual at 7; 2019 Training Module at 54].⁴⁵ As such, it does not strike the Court as out of bounds for Defendants to re-evaluate a beneficiary's circumstances outside of Afghanistan.⁴⁶

In sum, the Court cannot find that, as a matter of law, Defendants did not act in accordance with law. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on Count II is DENIED, and Defendants’ motion on the same count is GRANTED.

2. Whether The November 2021 Guidance Was Arbitrary and Capricious (Count I)

“The task of a court reviewing agency action under the APA's ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is to determine whether the agency has examined the pertinent evidence, considered the relevant factors, and ‘articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ” Penobscot Air Servs., Ltd. v. FAA, 164 F.3d 713, 719 (1st Cir. 1999) (alterations in original) (second-level internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). “While this is a highly deferential standard of review, it is not a rubber stamp.” Id. at 720 (quoting Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1285 (1st Cir. 1996)). The Court “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given.” Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).

In the context of a policy change, “the requirement that an agency provide a reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (emphasis omitted). “An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.” Id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974)). That said, agencies are “free to change their existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016) (citations omitted). The agency must further “show that there are good reasons for the new policy,” although “it need not demonstrate “that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.” Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (emphasis omitted). “[I]t suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the conscious change of course adequately indicates.” Id. A “more detailed justification” may be required when 1) the agency's new position “rests upon factual findings that contradict those which underlay [the] prior” position or 2) when the agency's prior position “has engendered serious reliance interests.” Id.; see NLRB v. Lily Transp. Corp., 853 F.3d 31, 36 (1st Cir. 2017) (Souter, J.) (“[A]n about-face ․ owing to facts changed from those underlying the prior view requires that the new facts be addressed explicitly by reasoned explanation for the change of direction.”). Further, “when an agency rescinds a prior [position,] its reasoned analysis must consider the ‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the existing [position].’ ” DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020) (“Regents”) (second alteration in original) (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. at 51).

Plaintiffs argue that USCIS violated APA's reason-decision making requirement in three ways. First, USCIS did not consider reasonable alternatives to the November 2021 Guidance's “blanket no approvals policy.” [ECF No. 174 at 19]. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that “USCIS failed to consider the possibility of continuing its existing policy, which allowed for conditional approval of in-country Afghan cases.” [Id.]. Second, the agency did not consider the reliance interests created under the standards in existence in August 2021. [Id.]. Third, USCIS failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the November 2021 Guidance. [Id.]. Defendants reject each of these arguments. [ECF No. 180-1 at 30–35].

The Court first addresses whether Defendants ran afoul of the APA by not articulating why they discontinued the “new policy” of conditionally approving applications when instituting the November 2021 Guidance.⁴⁷ [ECF No. 174 at 19–21; ECF No. 188 at 20–22]. The administrative record suggests that the conditional approvals reflected Defendants reckoning with diminished consular processing capabilities in Kabul, while also seeking to facilitate the evacuation of as many Afghans as possible while flights were still departing Afghanistan. By August 13, 2021, the embassy already had “very limited capacity ․ to process requests for parole from individuals,” [USCIS-0225–26], and by August 18, the administrative record indicates, it had likely stopped providing consular services to HP beneficiaries altogether, [USCIS-0272–73 (email from State Department to USCIS staff dated August 18, 2021, explaining that “DOS will not be able to collect biometrics before the travelers leave Afghanistan”)]. Two days later, on August 20, USCIS began issuing conditional approval notices, informing beneficiaries that their parole requests were “contingent upon successful completion of [c]onsular processing” in a third country. [USCIS-0367, -0371]. Given that USCIS leadership repeatedly underscored that the priority in August was “just getting the approvals out in hopes of the beneficiaries getting on an evacuation flight,” [USCIS-0364], it made good sense for Defendants to issue such conditional approvals while airlifts continued to enable the relocation of Afghan beneficiaries. See [USCIS-0445 (IRAD Chief Ruppel explaining that “[w]hile the evacuation was ongoing, we moved forward with approvals with the hope those individuals would get on evacuation flights”); USCIS-0380 (Ruppel writing on August 30 that USCIS “ha[s] been expediting processing of requests for parole filed by Afghan nationals in Afghanistan ․ in hopes that some of them may be able to get on the [U.S. Government] evacuation flights”)].

Thereafter, when the evacuation efforts and U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan came to an end, Defendants reconsidered their approach.⁴⁸ As the record reveals, despite the end of the airlifts, “Afghan applications [were] arriving at an abnormally high rate” and the majority were “protection related.” [USCIS-0403]. HAB's Chief consequently called attention to “[s]ome factors” affecting the adjudication of Afghan-based parole adjudications, including lack of consular operations. [Id.]; see also [USCIS-0406 (email from Ruppel to USCIS staff dated September 10, 2021, referring to discussions on how to deal with Afghan parole cases, including “insur[ing] that staff have the information they need to apply [the] existing framework within the context of the current situation”)]. In re-evaluating its approach to these Afghan-based parole applications, USCIS ultimately decided to discontinue prioritizing Afghans in Afghanistan and instead focus on those outside of the country given that these individuals had “clearly ․ a much more realistic path to the U.S.” [USCIS-0611]; see also [USCIS-0512 (email from Ruppel to USCIS staff dated October 18, 2021, stating that while conferring with Jaddou, “there was some discussion on prioritizing cases for those outside of Afghanistan”); USCIS-0567 (document titled “Notes for meeting with D1 [Jaddou],” noting that Jaddou agreed to “[p]rioritize those outside of Afghanistan”)]. As Ruppel explained in an email dated October 26, which outlined “next steps” after a discussion with Jaddou, USCIS “should prioritize processing of beneficiaries outside of Afghanistan.” [USCIS-0572–73].

Although the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the administrative record does not categorically, as Defendants insist, show a “historic practice” of denying HP parole requests in locations without consular processing, [ECF No. 188 at 22–23], it nonetheless offers sufficient evidence that parole requests from locations without consular processing were rarely accommodated. Training material on parole adjudication dating from 2013, for example, states that “[p]arole [is] generally not authorized for locations where there is not USCIS or US Embassy presence.” [USCIS-0007].⁴⁹ Similarly, the 2019 HAB Manual provides that if “the parole beneficiary is unable to travel to a U.S. Embassy/Consulate to obtain a boarding foil, ․ HAB staff[ ] should contact the supervisor for the case, so they may consider alternative options that may be available in rare circumstances for extremely urgent cases.” [2019 HAB Manual at 87 (emphasis added)]; see also [USCIS-0506 (email from Jaddou to DHS staff dated October 17, 2021, explaining that “[w]ith no consulate in Afghanistan, we can no longer process regular USCIS humanitarian parole for individuals inside Afghanistan”)]. Albeit thinly, the record suggests that obtaining HP without consular processing was the exception rather than the norm.

The record further shows that USCIS rarely granted parole requests based only on protection grounds. [2019 Training Module at 54; USCIS-0005; USCIS-0031]; see also [USCIS-0506 (Jaddou explaining that parole requests demand “a high standard,” which is “generally very difficult for most” to meet, and that, as a result, “[a]pproval rates are low”)]. The fact that USCIS seemingly adapted the adjudication of Afghan parole requests to reflect the extraordinary and unprecedent crisis unfolding in August, see [USCIS-0403 (Bird stating that “HAB weighed the evacuation process heavily [ ] against some traditional evidentiary requirements” and that “[s]ome ․ factors were adjusted to allow for this this emergent processing”)], was laudable. It cannot be that emergency measures undertaken in a time of crisis forever obligate the agency to keep those same measures in place as the circumstances change and evolve. Determining otherwise would discourage an agency from responding flexibly and compassionately to a humanitarian emergency. Re-evaluating and re-prioritizing how to expend its efforts, as Defendants have done here, is squarely within the agency's prerogative.

This is not to say that the Court agrees with Defendants’ decision to discontinue conditional approval notices or does not feel for the plight of Afghans caught in this web. The Court's role here, however, is to determine, based on the administrative record before it, whether the November 2021 Guidance was “accompanied by some [contemporaneous] reasoning,” Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 59 F.3d 284, 291 (1st Cir. 1995); see FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021) (a court “may not substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency”). This is plainly satisfied here; Defendants began prioritizing Afghans outside of Afghanistan because they believed they could more feasibly obtain a path for entry to the United States. The November 2021 Guidance, in sum, reflects what the agency “believe[d] ․ to be [a] better” way of handling Afghan HP applications, Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2018).

The Court similarly cannot find, despite being sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ position, that Defendants failed to “consider the ‘alternative[s]’ that are ‘within the ambit of the existing [policy].’ ” Regents, 591 U.S. at 30 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). As the Court already noted in its PI Order, Defendants dealt with an unprecedent influx of HP applications in a challenging geopolitical situation. On October 12, USCIS accepted approximately 1,700 HP requests for Afghan nationals on one day alone—almost the same number of requests USCIS normally receives in an entire year. [USCIS-0504; -0506]. At that rate, Ruppel observed, she would “need over 500 adjudication officers to keep up—[and] more to address the pending workload of over 16,000.” [USCIS-0504]. As Jaddou stated on October 17, the number of HP applications were “overwhelming and there is no way [USCIS] will be able to process these cases as we normally do.” [USCIS-0506]. Consistent with USCIS's decision to “prioritize those outside of Afghanistan” who would likely be able to successfully complete consular processing and arrive safely in the United States, Defendants allocated “more staff” to adjudicate those requests. [USCIS-0567]. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“An agency has broad discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and to carry out its delegated responsibilities.”).

Defendants rely primarily on a document titled “Discussion points for Afghan and Ukrainian Parole” (“IRAD Discussion Points”), which was prepared by IRAD and dated March 24, 2022, [USCIS-0840–45], to challenge Plaintiffs’ position that they failed to consider alternatives to conditional approval notices, [ECF No. 180-1 at 32–33]. Specifically, the document shows how IRAD assessed various options for how to process parole requests for beneficiaries in Afghanistan, including whether to continue prioritizing requests of beneficiaries outside of Afghanistan, issue conditional approvals, or continue to suspend approvals. [USCIS-0843–44]. Plaintiffs maintain that because the document post-dates the November 2021 Guidance, it is irrelevant to the Court's analysis. [ECF No. 188 at 23]. Although the Court is generally wary of post-hoc rationalizations, the document here bears some relevance to the current analysis given that it precedes the April 2022 Guidance, which “retained the bar on conditionally approving humanitarian parole cases for Afghans in Afghanistan.” [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 147]. In fact, the IRAD Discussion Points largely reflect the same explanation for discontinuing conditional approvals—that is, “focusing limited resources on actions that will have a more immediate effect for someone with urgent need”—found in documents leading up to the November 2021 Guidance. [USCIS-0844]; see Alpharma, Inc. v. Leavitt, 460 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (post-hoc rationalization “is not a time barrier which freezes an agency's exercise of its judgment after an initial decision has been made and bars it from further articulation of its reasoning”); cf. Regents, 591 U.S. at 24 (post-hoc rationalization impermissible where agency relied on reasons absent from original explanation and after three courts had identified flaws in the explanation). As such, the Court finds the document instructive. In particular, the discussion points reveal that Defendants chose not to issue conditional approvals as they believed that such notices “could cause further confusion for petitioners or beneficiaries who might believe the conditional approval is ․ a way out of Afghanistan.” [USCIS-0844]. This suggests that by at least March 2022, Defendants considered alternatives to conditional approvals and nonetheless determined that Parole Notice (Suspension of Processing) continued to be the preferred avenue. This, though barely, satisfies the Defendants’ obligation to consider alternatives.

Plaintiffs’ third challenge to the November 2021 Guidance, namely that Defendants failed to consider the reliance interests engendered by its actions in August 2021, including the creation of an Afghan-specific webpage, is similarly unavailing. [ECF No. 174 at 22–24; ECF No. 188 at 24]. As an initial matter, reliance interests ordinarily only arise from “longstanding policies.” Regents, 591 U.S. at 30. The time period at issue here, approximately one month, did not generate a serious reliance interest. The Court, moreover, again emphasizes that humanitarian parole is an “extraordinary measure used sparingly,” [2019 HAB Manual at 6], “generally not used for protection reasons,” [2019 Training Module at 54]; see also [USCIS-0031 (“parole is only rarely granted” on protection grounds)]. Given the unique and discretionary nature of parole, the Court cannot conclude that the circumstances here created a reliance interest. See Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785, 789 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) which gives the Attorney General discretionary authority to waive the exclusion of otherwise excludable aliens, “aliens do not have a cognizable reliance interest in the availability of discretionary ․ relief”).

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs summary judgment on Count I, but GRANTS summary judgment on this count for Defendants.

3. Whether Defendants Unreasonably Delayed the Adjudication of Plaintiffs’ Parole Applications (Count IV)

“To state a claim for unreasonable delay under the APA, Plaintiffs must show that (1) a government agency failed to take legally required action and (2) the agency's delay in taking this action was unreasonable.” Conley v. U.S. Dep't of State, 731 F. Supp. 3d 104, 110 (D. Mass. 2024) (first citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 62–63 (2004); and then citing Da Costa v. Immigr. Inv. Program Off., 80 F.4th 330, 340 (D.C. Cir. 2023)). With regard to (2), courts in the First Circuit consider the six factors laid out in Telecomms. Rsch. & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (hereinafter “TRAC”). The TRAC factors are as follows:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not “find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’ ”

Id. (cleaned up).

While Plaintiffs contend that Defendants unreasonably delayed the adjudication of their HP applications, [ECF No. 174 at 26–28], they recite the TRAC factors, but then fail to apply them. [Id.]. Because “[t]he district court is free to disregard arguments that are not adequately developed,” Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 260 (1st Cir. 1999), the Court denies summary judgment as to Plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay claim (Count IV) on this basis alone.

Separately, the Court concludes that apart from Marwa Moe, Plaintiffs’ unreasonable delay claims have become moot. USCIS denied the Boe's HP applications in May and July 2022 and further denied the family members’ respective motions for reconsiderations on November 21, 2024. See Section I.A.6. The record thus indicates that USCIS completed any action it was required to take regarding the Boe families.⁵⁰ As to the Noe family's applications, they were similarly adjudicated in February and June 2022. Section I.A.6. The Moe's were issued a “Notice of Continued Parole Processing” on May 16, 2023, informing them that they must “arrange travel to a country where there is a U.S. embassy or consulate to continue processing [their] parole request[s].” [MARWA MOE-141; MALIA MOE-136; MEDINA MOE-127]. Because Malia and Medina remain [Redacted], USCIS's ability to act on their requests is constrained. After being evacuated through CARE, Marwa is presently based in [Redacted],⁵¹ and alerted USCIS on approximately February 6, 2025, that she had arrived in a country with consular processing. [ECF No. 184]; Section I.A.6. Although her application is not moot, because USCIS received her relocation notice only recently, the Court cannot grant her unreasonable delay claim. See Skalka v. Kelly, 246 F. Supp. 3d 147, 154 (D.D.C. 2017) (noting that because it had only been two years since USCIS last reviewed a petition, the matter did not warrant judicial intervention).

In sum, because USCIS has, apart from Marwa's request, adjudicated Plaintiffs’ HP applications, and did so under a standard which the Court has determined is not contrary to the APA, granting Plaintiffs’ request for prompt adjudication would not “make a difference to the legal interests of the parties.” Bos. Bit Labs, Inc. v. Baker, 11 F.4th 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 897 F.2d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1990)); see also LaMarche v. Mayorkas, No. 23-cv-30029, 2024 WL 2502929, at *4 (D. Mass. May 22, 2024) (“The Court cannot compel USCIS to complete acts which ‘have already been completed.’ ” (quoting Norton, 542 U.S. at 68)); Matt v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 783 F.3d 368, 372 (1st Cir. 2015). Because “there is literally no controversy left for the court to decide—the case is no longer ‘live,’ ” ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 53 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)), and the Court accordingly dismisses Plaintiffs’ claims under Count IV.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion, [ECF No. 173], is DENIED, Defendants’ motion, [ECF No. 179], is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The following original parties to the action have been dismissed. Plaintiffs Rasul Roe, Rena Roe, Rafi Roe, and Rabi Roe provided notice of dismissal on January 2, 2023, [ECF No. 64], Permaz Doe on January 18, 2023, [ECF No. 65], and Diana Doe, Amir Doe, Afsoon Doe, Aazar Doe, Abdul Doe, Afshaneh Doe, Ali Doe, and Alima Doe on June 28, 2024, [ECF No. 132-1]. The Court dismissed former Secretary of State, Antony J. Blinken, as a party on April 28, 2023, [ECF No. 69].

3.   Although the statute refers to the Attorney General, Congress transferred enforcement of immigration laws to the Secretary of Homeland Security (“Secretary”) in 2002. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 402, 116 Stat. 2135, 2178 (2002).

4.   Following an internal reorganization, HAB has been renamed “Parole Operations.” [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 20]. For purposes of the instant order, and consistent with the parties’ briefing, the Court will continue referring to “Parole Operations” as “HAB.”

5.   In addition, a U.S. government agency may request parole for noncitizens based on national security interests, advancing U.S. foreign policy goals, or in light of other advantages or benefits to the U.S. government. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 21]. Such government requests follow a different process from what is at issue here and are less frequently used. [USCIS-0129–30].

6.   On October 11, 2024, a revised Form I-131 was published and renamed “Application for Travel Documents, Parole Documents, and Arrival/Departure Records.” [ECF No. 189 at 1 n.2]

7.   For purposes of this order, the Court uses the terms “HAB officers” and “adjudicators” interchangeably.

8.   The 2019 HAB Manual comprises USCIS-0112–0208, and the 2019 Training Module encompasses USCIS-0954–1029.

9.   Applicants are not asked to categorize their requests using specific categories. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 29]. Instead, the 2019 Training Module makes clear that there are “wide varieties of reasons that individuals request parole” and gives guidance to adjudicators for common types of requests. [2019 Training Module at 35].

10.   The 2019 Training Module and the 2019 HAB Manual delineate, broadly speaking, seven steps in the “lifecycle” of a parole case. [2019 Training Module at 20–22; 2019 HAB Manual at 14–16]. They are: (1) filing of the parole request; (2) case entry, triage (determining whether a request requires expedited processing), and assignment (entering the case into a case management system called “CAMINO”); (3) the adjudication of the request, which includes reviewing the application and supporting documents, issuing request for evidence, completing security checks, completing the parole adjudication worksheet, preparing decision notices, and entering appropriate information in CAMINO; (4) supervisory review; (5) applicant and/or consulate notification, that is, if an application is approved, a parole authorization email is sent to the embassy or consulate closest to the beneficiary's residence; (6) issuance of travel documents and parole into the United States, which only applies to approvals, and requires a beneficiary to complete a Form DS-160, Application for a Nonimmigrant Visa, and “appear for an appointment with the consular section to verify identity and collect biometrics for additional security vetting” and, if no “derogatory information or new information is identified” results in the issuance of a “boarding foil”; and (7) physical entry into the U.S. by a CBP officer, following inspection at a port of entry. [2019 Training Module at 20–22]. Although the 2019 HAB Manual contains a slightly different list of steps, the differences, for present purposes, are immaterial. See [2019 HAB Manual at 14–16].

11.   The boarding foil is a travel document authorizing travel to the United States. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 21].

12.   The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that by approximately August 15, 2021, the Taliban had regained control of Kabul. David Zucchino, Kabul's Sudden Fall to Taliban Ends U.S. Era in Afghanistan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 2021; Minuteman Health, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 291 F. Supp. 3d 174, 194–95 (D. Mass. 2018) (“Judicial notice is an evidentiary doctrine that may be used to admit ‘a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute.’ ” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201)).

13.   In addition to regular USCIS parole processing, the U.S. government launched efforts such as Operations Allies Welcome (“OAW”) to facilitate parole processing of Afghans. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 62]. Through OAW, Afghans who had been evacuated to U.S. military bases received initial processing abroad, before receiving parole into the United States by CBP. [Id.]. Other mechanisms through which USCIS facilitated entry of Afghans into the United States included the Special Immigrant Visa (“SIV”) for Afghan interpreters who had worked for the U.S. government for at least a year in Afghanistan, a refugee priority program for individuals who worked with U.S. media or nonprofit organizations, and family petitions from immediate family members who are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 17].

14.   As noted infra, USCIS receives normally approximately 2,000 parole requests in an entire year. [USCIS-0792–95 (USCIS Briefing Memorandum titled “Meeting with Secretary Mayorkas on Afghan Parole” (“Mayorkas Briefing Memorandum”)); id. at -0792–93].

15.   Plaintiffs object to Defendants’ characterization that HAB prioritized HP applicants in Afghanistan during the evacuation efforts, as the vast majority of applicants were based in Afghanistan at that time. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 59].

16.   Other issues concerned how to harmonize the treatment of HP applicants with the vetting procedures and medical screening requirements of other U.S. initiatives such as OAW. [ECF No. 189 ¶¶ 82, 85, 87–90].

17.   In an effort to process the influx of HP requests, USCIS issued multiple requests for inter-agency volunteers in October 2021. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 88].

18.   The second bullet point has been partially redacted for privilege. See [USCIS-0572–73]

19.   Around the same time, USCIS updated the Afghan Parole Webpage, noting that for Afghans in Afghanistan, the agency was “unable to complete processing of ․ parole request[s] ․ because the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is closed and all normal consular services in Afghanistan have been suspended.” [USCIS-1203, -1205].

20.   The parties agree that the 2019 HAB Manual and the 2019 Training Module were the operative guidance documents for parole adjudication at the time the November 2021 Guidance was issued. See [ECF No. 189 ¶ 110].

21.   The December 2021 Guidance made changes to vetting and medical requirements that are not relevant for purposes of the instant action. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 132; ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 135].

22.   The Mayorkas Briefing Memorandum appears to have been drafted sometime in February 2022, as it is dated “February XX, 2022” and was attached to an email dated February 11. [USCIS-0789]; [Mayorkas Briefing Memorandum at USCIS-0792].

23.   Other actions, such as notices of continued processing and most requests for evidence, carried on during the pause on denials. [ECF No. 189 ¶ 143].

24.   Plaintiffs assert that despite the change in language, the April 2022 Guidance “retained the bar on conditionally approving humanitarian parole cases for Afghans in Afghanistan.” [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 147].

25.   Plaintiffs assert that while HAB's approval rate from August 16 to September 5, 2021 was 93%, it dropped to 1% for the period from November 8, 2021—after the November 2021 Guidance came into effect—to the week of July 11, 2022. [ECF No. 182-1 at ¶ 130]. Defendants dispute the statistic in part because Plaintiffs rely on third-party evidence rather than the administrative record. [ECF No. 182-1 at ¶ 130].

26.   While Defendants do not dispute that the administrative record indicates a 13% approval rate for those years, they note that the statistics might be inflated “if they combine protection-based parole requests via Government referral and protection-based parole request via Form I-131, because the former is granted at a much higher rate than the latter.” [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 49].

27.   See [2019 Training Module at 20–22].

28.   They received their Parole Denial Notices on May 27, 2022. [BADI BOE-051; BAHAR BOE-036; BARAKAT BOE-38; BAHARAK BOE-045].

29.   USCIS does not conduct interviews for protection-based parole requests. See [2019 Training Module at 54].

30.   They received identical Parole Denial Notices on July 7, 2022. [BAKTASH BOE-124; BENESH BOE-122; BASIM BOE-124; BASIR BOE-115; BURHAN BOE-115].

31.   Baharak and Barakat submitted their responses on January 6, 2025, and the other four family members submitted responses on January 13, 2025. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 171].

32.   Malik had worked as a contractor for the U.S. government and obtained a SIV. [Medina Moe-027–28].

33.   The Court takes judicial notice of Executive Order 14163 – Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program. See Exec. Order No. 14163, 90 Fed. Reg. 8459 (Jan. 20, 2025); Thornton v. Ipsen Biopharms., Inc., No. 23-cv-11171, 2023 WL 7116739, at *2 (D. Mass. Oct. 26, 2023), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 126 F.4th 76 (1st Cir. 2025) (“[T]he parties refer to certain executive orders issued by President Biden. This Court may take judicial notice of such orders.” (citations omitted)).

34.   The Court notes an immaterial discrepancy in that Nahid's resume submitted to USCIS indicates that she was the [Redacted] whereas her Form I-131 states that [Redacted] Compare [NAHID NOE-057], with [NAHID NOE-038].

35.   Plaintiffs point out that Nahid's PAW incorrectly stated that Naser was a [Redacted] when Nahid in fact was the [Redacted]. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶ 182].

36.   Following the denial of their applications, the Noe family fled to Iran and, from there, relocated to Pakistan to attend an interview at the U.S. consulate for [Redacted] visas to the United States. The U.S. consulate denied the family's visas, and when attempting to travel to a second interview in April 2024, they were deported back [Redacted]. [ECF No. 182-1 ¶¶ 187–89].

37.   Section 1158(a) relates to the grant of asylum and is not relevant for present purposes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).

38.   The jurisdictional bar is also triggered by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), referring to “any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title.” § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The five statutes referenced in § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) refer to individual, discretionary relief and pertain to waiver of an alien's admissibility based on a single offense of marijuana possession (§ 1182(h)), waiver of immigrant's inadmissibility for fraud or willful misrepresentation of material fact (§ 1182(i)), cancellation of removal for certain permanent residents (§ 1229b), permission for alien to voluntarily depart the United States (§ 1229c), and adjustment of status of an alien (§ 1255).

39.   As to Defendants’ view that the consular non-reviewability doctrine bars the Court from reviewing the November 2021 Guidance, [ECF No. 180-1 at 22–25], the Court declines to depart from its prior finding. [PI Order at 30–31]. At issue here are not individual parole decisions, but rather whether the November 2021 Guidance was unlawful. Cf. Department of State v. Muñoz, 144 S. Ct. 1812, 1820 n.2 (2024) (judicial review of an admissibility finding would amount to a “level of judicial involvement in the visa process [that] would be a significant extension of our precedent”); see also Anameze v. Jaddou, 24-cv-00192, 2025 WL 447742, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2025) (concluding that consular non-reviewability did not apply because plaintiff did “not challenge a discretionary decision made by a consular officer or a delay in the processing of a visa application ․ [but rather] br[ought] his claims against USCIS ․ the authority for which is statutorily distinct from a consular officer's decision”).

40.   Defendants make a cursory standing argument, citing to the newly enacted Laken Riley Act, which extended statutory standing to states. [ECF No. 180-1 at 22]; 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(C). Specifically, the newly added provision under § 1182(d)(5) provides that “States ․ shall have standing to bring an action against the Secretary of Homeland Security.” § 1182(d)(5)(C) (emphasis added). Defendants appear to suggest that this provision removes Plaintiffs’ standing, yet their reasoning is neither clearly explained nor supported by the statute. Accordingly, the Court disregards it.

41.   Regardless, the Court finds, as it did in the PI Order, [PI Order at 32], which was based substantially on the same administrative record as the present motions, that the November 2021 Guidance passes muster under the two-prong Bennett test. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997).

42.   Defendants further contend that case-by-case adjudication under 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(d)(5)(A) is limited to the grant of parole, and does not include denials. [ECF No. 180-1 at 26–27]. The Court cannot agree. Such a distinction not only strikes the Court as highly impractical—how can the grant of parole be administered on a case-by-case bases without also reviewing meritless cases?—, but the 2019 HAB Manual expressly states that “[o]fficers adjudicate each parole request on a case-by-case basis.” [2019 HAB Manual at 7]. It is thus the adjudication that occurs on a case-by-case basis.

43.   [USCIS-0001–24] appears to be a PowerPoint presentation for a course on parole adjudication from approximately 2013. [USCIS-0012].

44.   Although it is Plaintiffs’ view that the unredacted PAWs are of limited assistance given their position that the November 2021 Guidance categorically disallowed approvals, [ECF No. 188 at 20], the Court nonetheless observes that the unredacted PAWs suggest that case-by-case adjudication occurred. See, e.g., [BARAKAT BOE-028–29 (describing reasons for not granting parole); BAHARAK BOE-028–29 (same); BADI BOE-029–31 (stating reasons for not finding urgent humanitarian reasons and explaining why parole could not be granted despite a finding of significant public benefit); BAHAR BOE-029–31(same); NAHID-NOE-023–24 (concluding that there was insufficient documentation to corroborate threat of harm)].

45.   The Court notes that unlike the internal USCIS policy at issue in Aracely R. v. Nielsen, which set forth “certain procedures that must be utilized” by adjudicators, 319 F. Supp. 3d 110, 122 (D. D.C. 2018), the 2019 HAB Manual and 2019 Training Module here are more aptly characterized as “guidance documents” meant to facilitate the statutorily mandated case-by-case adjudication. See [2019 HAB Manual at 6 (noting that the manual establishes “operational guidance and procedures”); 2019 Training Module at 10 (explaining that the module's purpose was to provide “a general framework for adjudicating parole requests, in order to promote consistency and transparency”); id. at 26–28 (listing common negative and positive factors in assessing parole requests but noting that assessments “are not limited” to those factors)].

46.   Additionally, and as further discussed infra, the Court would be remiss in not mentioning the extraordinary circumstances under which conditional approvals were issued. They were, as the administrative record suggests, a response to the on-going evacuation efforts, with the purpose of facilitating the airlift of Afghans despite limited consular processing capabilities. See [USCIS-0225–26; USCIS-0364; USCIS-0380; USCIS-0445]. The November 2021 Guidance, in turn, was a response to the end of the evacuation effort and the complete suspension of U.S. diplomatic presence in Afghanistan, coupled with the receipt of an unparalleled volume of parole requests from beneficiaries in Afghanistan. See [USCIS-0403; USCIS-0504–06].

47.   The Court observes that in its prior submissions, Plaintiffs did not refer to the conditional approval notices as a new policy, but instead characterized these notices as being in accordance with existing practices. [ECF No. 102 at 23; id. at 9 n.6 (noting that the shift from regular to conditional approval notices “was likely for clarity, as approval was already conditioned on the completion of consular processing”)]. Regardless of the characterization, the Court here assesses whether the November 2021 Guidance marked an unexplained departure from existing practices, as articulated in the 2019 HAB Manual and 2019 Training Module.

48.   Plaintiffs assert that USCIS continued to send out conditional approvals after the airlifts ceased, thus negating Defendants’ argument that they were issued to facilitate access to evacuation flights. [ECF No. 188 at 21–22]. The Court agrees that conditional approvals were seemingly disseminated until September 10, despite the adjudication pause imposed on September 7. [USCIS-0408]. That said, documents in the administrative record also suggest that USCIS did not intend to send out conditional approvals after the airlift had ended. See [USCIS-1176 (“None have been conditionally approved since August 31, 2021, when the evacuation flights ended.”)]. Regardless of the discrepancy, the issue here is whether Defendants showed awareness when changing course and provided an explanation for doing so. Based on the administrative record before it, the Court believes that Defendants have adequately done so.

49.   While the next bullet point mentions that in such situations, HP would “only be authorized if individual could get to another location for processing,” this does not change the Court's analysis. [USCIS-0007]. Defendants had no way of knowing—or indeed anticipating—whether an Afghan-based HP beneficiary would be able to relocate to a third location.

50.   The fact that USCIS, on its own accord, reopened the Forms I-131 for Barakat, Baharak, Baktash, Benesh, Basim, Basir, and Burhan Boe in November 2024 does not change the Court's analysis. USCIS reopened the applications after having already made a final determination. See Section I.A.6.

51.   As to Marwa's refugee processing through CARE, that application is separate from USCIS's adjudication of Marwa's parole request and, as such, outside of the purview of the instant action.

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE