BUTTON v. MELCHER (2025)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Dusty Button and Mitchell Button (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action against Massachusetts attorney Maura Melcher concerning her representation of plaintiff Sage Humphries (“Sage”) in abuse prevention proceedings against Plaintiffs. For the reasons stated below, the Court DISMISSES this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

I. Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Plaintiffs commenced this action without paying the filing fee or filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On October 17, 2024, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to resolve the fee by (1) paying the fee; or (2) each Plaintiff filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Dkt. # 4).

In response to the order, Dusty Button filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which was not signed by Mitchell Button. (Dkt. #8). Upon review of the motion the Court concludes that Dusty Button has adequately shown she is unable to pay the filing fee, and the Court GRANTS the motion.¹

II. Review of the Complaint

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). This statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss actions in which a plaintiff proceeds without prepayment of fees if the action is malicious, frivolous, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In conducting this review, the Court liberally construes Plaintiffs’ complaint because they are proceeding pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

A. Plaintiffs’ Claims

The Court briefly summarizes Plaintiff's 121-page complaint, treating all well-pleaded factual allegations as true for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of the pleading.

In the spring of 2017, Plaintiffs and Sage, all of whom were members of the Boston Ballet at the time, were in a consensual sexual relationship. Sage's parents, who lived in California, initially approved of the relationship and even expressed gratitude to Plaintiffs for their support of Sage's career. However, Sage's parents took a different view of the relationship when Sage insisted that she was going to travel with Plaintiffs to Australia in the summer of 2017 rather than follow the schedule her parents had planned for her. Sage's parents forced her to return to California, break up with Plaintiffs, and seek a restraining order against Plaintiffs in Boston Municipal Court.

Melcher represented Sage in the abuse prevention proceeding. Melcher knew that Plaintiffs had never abused Sage and that Sage had been forced to sign the false complaint for a restraining order. Notwithstanding, Melcher presented to the court the false narrative Sage's parents had created about the Plaintiffs—that they had manipulated and forced Sage into an abusive relationship. Melcher made false representations to the court, allowed Sage to perjure herself, and failed to disclose relevant information. As a result, in 2017, the court entered a restraining order against Plaintiffs, and the order became permanent in 2018. “Melcher's lies to the Court and unethical violations in aiding and abetting her client led to the complete destruction of Plaintiffs’ lives, as those very same lies secured the granting of permanent orders for [Sage] against the Plaintiffs, under false pretenses ․” Compl. ¶ 5.

Plaintiffs bring claims under state law for negligence, civil conspiracy, “civil aiding and abetting,” intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortuous interference with business relations, and fraud on the court.

B. Discussion

Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted because, under Massachusetts law, the “litigation privilege” protects an attorney from civil liability for actions during the course of a judicial proceeding. Bassichis v. Flores, 490 Mass. 143 (2022). “Although the privilege developed to protect lawyers from defamation suits, its scope has expanded in many States to bar additional claims, because ‘[a] privilege which protected an individual from liability for defamation would be of little value if the individual were subject to liability under a different theory of tort.’ ” Id. at 151 (alteration in original) quoting Correllas v. Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 324 (1991). “In Massachusetts ․ it is well established that ‘[t]he privilege applies not only to defamation claims brought against [an] attorney, but to civil liability generally.’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bartle v. Berry, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 372, 378 (2011)). “[T]he privilege has been applied in Massachusetts to bar claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, violations of G. L. c. 93A, and violations of the Civil Rights Act, G. L. c. 12, §§ 11H-11J.” Id. (citations omitted). The litigation privilege applies “regardless of malice, bad faith, or any nefarious motives on the part of the lawyer so long as the conduct complained of has some relation to the litigation.” Id. at 150 (quoting Anenson, Absolute Immunity From Civil Liability: Lessons for Litigation Lawyers, 31 Pepp. L. Rev. 915, 918 (2004)).

The litigation privilege does not “distinguish between communications made during the litigation process and conduct occurring during the litigation process.” Id. at 157-58 (quoting Clark v. Druckman, 213 W.Va. 427, 433, 624 S.E.2d 864 (2005)). “The acts of preparing and advancing a litigation strategy are as integral to the duties of a lawyer as is advocating in the court room.” Id. at 158. “To find otherwise would invite attorneys to divide their interest between advocating for their client and protecting themselves from a retributive suit.” Id. (quoting Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 841, 243 P.3d 642 (2010)); see also Nnodim v. U.S. Bank Trust Ass'n as Frustee for LB-Igoo Series IV Trust, 703 F. Supp. 3d 296, 303-06 (D. Mass. 2023) (granting summary judgment in favor of attorney based on litigation privilege).²

Here, all of Melcher's alleged misconduct—both in and outside the courtroom-occurred “during litigation process” of seeking, obtaining, defending, and enforcing a restraining order against Plaintiffs. Even assuming Melcher acted with “malice, bad faith, or [a] nefarious motive[s],” she is not directly liable to Plaintiffs because all “the conduct complained of ha[d] some relation to the litigation.”

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.³

SO ORDERED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mitchell Button did not file a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Because the Court finds that this action is subject to sua sponte dismissal the Court need not address Mitchell Button's failure to respond to the Court's order regarding the filing fee.

2.   The litigation privilege does not “deprive the public of a mechanism for discouraging attorney misconduct.” Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 159. For example, trial judges possess inherent authority to sanction attorneys for knowingly misleading the court through concealment or misrepresentation. Id. “Such sanctions may be in the form of fines designed to compensate the aggrieved person for losses incurred by the misconduct of the offending party.” Id. “Furthermore, an attorney may be subject to disciplinary proceedings for his or her misrepresentations to a court or other misconduct.”

3.   Given the broad scope of the litigation privilege, sua sponte dismissal is appropriate because it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to amend their complaint.

YOUNG, DISTRICT JUDGE