CORBETT FOR CORBETT v. BROWNING (2024)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT MASSACHUSETTS STATE POLICE'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND PLAINTIFF CORBETT'S MOTION TO AMEND

Daniel P. Corbett has sued the Massachusetts State Police (the “Commonwealth”) and five of its individual troopers following a traffic incident. The Commonwealth has moved to dismiss the singular count against it, a claim alleging a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Doc. No. 47.¹ While that motion was pending, Corbett moved to amend his complaint to allege a violation of the Massachusetts Equal Rights Act (“MERA”) against all defendants. Doc. No. 65. For the reasons stated herein, this Court ALLOWS the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss, and ALLOWS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Corbett's Motion to Amend.

I. BACKGROUND 2

On January 12, 2021, Corbett was driving on a highway with his son Brian, who has Down's Syndrome. Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 13, 14. Brian is “four feet, eleven inches tall, and is visibly disabled.” Id. ¶ 15. In the car, Brian had an incident which required Corbett to pull his truck into a breakdown lane to assist his son. Id. ¶ 18. Corbett also called Brian's mother, because she is “able to calm and re-direct Brian when he becomes upset.” Id. ¶¶ 19-20. While waiting, Massachusetts State Police trooper Stevie Browning arrived on the scene and offered help to Corbett. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. Corbett declined and informed the trooper that Brian's mother was en route to help diffuse the situation. Id. ¶¶ 25-26.

During this exchange, Massachusetts State Troopers Jeffrey Bermani, Christopher Goodwin, Caden Tibert, and Gary Sacco arrived in marked cruisers. Id. ¶ 30. Trooper Browning ordered the four other troopers to force Brian to the ground and place him in handcuffs. Id. ¶ 32. The other troopers complied. Id. An ambulance arrived, and Brian was transported to Salem Hospital, still handcuffed. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35. Neither Corbett nor Brian's mother were allowed to intervene or ride in the ambulance with Brian. Id. ¶¶ 34, 36. At the hospital, “Brian was treated for abrasions to the knees and pain in the shoulder caused by his arrest.” Id. ¶ 37.

Following the incident, Corbett sued the five state troopers on the scene, alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and associated torts. See Doc. No. 1. On April 14, 2023, Corbett amended his complaint for the first time, adding the Commonwealth as a defendant and substituting the names of the four state troopers originally identified as John Does. Doc. No. 35 at 1. Against the Commonwealth, Corbett alleged discrimination on the basis of Brian's disability in violation of Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Doc. No. 35 at 1. In response, the Commonwealth filed the pending motion to dismiss the amended complaint.³ Doc. No. 47. Corbett opposed, and the Commonwealth replied. Doc. Nos. 58, 59.

While the motion to dismiss was pending, Corbett moved to amend his complaint for a second time, seeking to correct a clerical error in the title of Count III (the Title II claim) and to add a MERA claim alleging a violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 103, against all defendants. Doc. No. 65. The Commonwealth opposed the motion to amend; the individual defendants did not respond to it.⁴ Doc. No. 70.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To avoid dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need not demonstrate that they are likely to prevail, but a claim must suggest “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In other words, a complaint must provide enough facts to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).

Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), a party may amend a pleading with written consent from the opposing party or the court's leave, the latter of which should be freely given “when justice so requires.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15(a)(2) “reflects a liberal amendment policy” and entrusts the district court with significant discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion to amend. U.S. ex rel. Gagne v. City of Worcester, 565 F.3d 40, 48 (1st Cir. 2009). Reasons for denial of a motion to amend may include “undue delay in filing the motion, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss

The Commonwealth moves to dismiss the only count asserted against it. Doc. No. 47. In its motion, the Commonwealth urges that vicarious liability is unavailable in a Title II context.⁵ Doc. No. 48. In his opposition, Corbett takes the opposite position. Doc. No. 58 at 2. The Court is persuaded that the Commonwealth is correct.

The Supreme Court has not considered the question of whether a Title II claim may be pursued on a theory of vicarious liability. See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 610 (2015) (declining to decide whether vicarious liability for money damages under Title II is available “in the absence of adversarial briefing”). The First Circuit has also declined to directly resolve the question. See Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2019) (assuming, without deciding, that an entity may be held liable under Title II on a theory of vicarious liability).⁶ After identifying a clearer path to disposing of Gray, the First Circuit explicitly noted that it was “reluctant to plunge headlong into the[ ] murky waters” of vicarious liability and Title II. 917 F.3d at 16. Because there is no binding precedent answering the question posed here, the Court looks elsewhere for guidance.

Decisions finding vicarious liability is not available under Title II rely on the Supreme Court's analysis in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). There, the Supreme Court ruled that a school district could not be held vicariously liable under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1974 (“Title IX”) for a teacher's acts of sexual harassment. In its analysis, the Supreme Court wrestled with the language of Title IX “to ensure that [it] d[id] not fashion the parameters of an implied right in a manner at odds with the statutory structure and purpose.” Id. at 284 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Supreme Court refused to hold the school district vicariously liable for the teacher's misconduct. Id. at 292-93. The Supreme Court reasoned that this rule avoided the possibility that a recipient of Title IX funding might face liability for discrimination of which it had no notice—a result it concluded would be at odds with Congress's intent. Id. at 287-88.

Recent Sixth and Eleventh Circuit decisions suggest that the Title II vicarious liability issue has become less “murky” than it was when the First Circuit decided Gray. In Jones v. City of Detroit, 20 F.4th 1117 (6th Cir. 2021), the Sixth Circuit held that vicarious liability was unavailable under Title II. In analyzing whether the Title II claim could proceed on a theory of vicarious liability, the Jones court looked to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: “Because Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act import Title VI's remedial regime, that ends the inquiry. If Title VI does not allow vicarious liability, neither do these provisions of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 1121. Likewise, because Title VI adopts the remedies of Title IX, the Sixth Circuit considered Gebser and highlighted the features that Title VI and Title IX share. In particular, both laws were “enacted at a time when existing civil rights statutes containing express rights of action authorized private claims for injunctive and equitable relief, not monetary relief[,]” were derived from Spending Clause powers, and “contained the same administrative enforcement mechanism,” requiring actual notice to the federal funding recipient. Jones, 20 F.4th at 1121.

Similarly, in Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241 (11th Cir. 2022), the Eleventh Circuit focused on Title II's enforcement provisions and employed a parallel framework to that in Jones, reaching the same result. That is, because vicarious liability was unavailable under Title IX in Gebser, and because Title IX shares many features with Title VI (as noted by the Jones court), the Ingram court found vicarious liability could not support a Title II claim. 30 F.4th at 1256-59.

Corbett directs the Court's attention away from Gebser, Jones, and Ingram, relying instead on decisions of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits allowing for vicarious liability claims under Title II of the ADA. Doc. No. 58 at 6-7. Having reviewed those decisions, however, the Court finds them unpersuasive. Neither the Fourth nor Fifth Circuit engaged in a meaningful analysis of the issue. See Rosen v. Montgomery Cnty., 121 F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (predating the Supreme Court's careful analysis in Gebser and relegating the entire Title II discussion to one footnote); Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., 302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002) (assuming, without analyzing, that vicarious liability under Title II was available because the defendant had not argued otherwise).

The Ninth Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to more squarely address the issue and adopt a position in line with Corbett's. In Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2001), the court concluded that because it had previously decided vicarious liability was available under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, such liability also was applicable to Title II. Id. at 1141. However, Duvall’s reasoning has been criticized, largely for failing to address Gebser. See Ravenna v. Vill. of Skokie, 388 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“The foundation of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Duvall is questionable.”); Barnett v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:21-cv-00218-APG-VCF, 2023 WL 6048796, at *26 (D. Nev. Sept. 14, 2023) (“Duvall did not address prior Supreme Court authority ․ that compels the conclusion that there is no vicarious liability for money damages under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.”). With a lack of reliance on Duvall and a consistent failure to address the Supreme Court's decision in Gebser, the Court does not find the cases that Corbett relies on to be convincing. In these circumstances, the Court finds the recent, thoughtful decisions in Jones and Ingram provide far more persuasive guidance in resolving the question now pending.

Here, like in Jones and Ingram, Corbett alleges a violation of Title II.⁷ Doc. No. 35 at 7-8. Title II incorporates by reference the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a, which in turn incorporates by reference the rights and remedies of Title VI. The Court concludes, therefore, that availability of vicarious liability under Title II turns on whether it is available under Title VI. Because Title VI adopts Title IX's remedies, the logical chain guiding interpretation of these statutes leads back to Gebser, as the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits explained. Thus, the Supreme Court's finding that vicarious liability is barred under Title IX leads this Court to conclude that it is not available in a Title II context, either.⁸

For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that a Title II claim may not be pursued on a theory of vicarious liability. Accordingly, the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss is ALLOWED.⁹

B. Corbett's Motion to Amend

Corbett has also moved to amend his complaint to add a claim against all defendants alleging a violation of MERA and to correct a minor error.¹⁰ See Doc. No. 65. In response to that motion, the Commonwealth filed an opposition that persuasively demonstrated it is immune from the MERA claim. Doc. No. 70 at 3-6. When invited to respond to this showing, Corbett opted to withdraw the proposed MERA claim against the Commonwealth. Doc. No. 72. In light of these events, the Motion to Amend is DENIED insofar as it sought to add a MERA claim against the Commonwealth.

The individual troopers, however, have not raised any objection to the MERA claim, and the immunity arguments advanced by the Commonwealth are not available to them. Thus, the Motion to Amend is ALLOWED as UNOPPOSED insofar as it seeks to add a MERA claim against Browning, Bermani, Goodwin, Tibert, and Sacco.

Finally, Corbett seeks to correct a clerical error in Count III of his complaint—a claim which related only to the Commonwealth and was the subject of the legal challenge discussed above. Doc. No. 65 at 1. Because Count III is being dismissed, the Motion to Amend is DENIED as MOOT insofar as it sought to correct the clerical error in that claim. The Court notes the clerical error had no effect on the resolution of the motion to dismiss.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Commonwealth's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 47) is ALLOWED, and Count III is DISMISSED. Corbett's Motion to Amend (Doc. No. 65) is ALLOWED IN PART insomuch as it proposes adding a MERA claim against the individual troopers, and is otherwise DENIED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Citations to “Doc. No. _” reference documents appearing on the court's electronic docketing system. Pincites are to the page numbers in the ECF header.

3.   The five individual troopers answered Corbett's amended complaint, and discovery is ongoing insofar as the allegations pertain to them. See Doc. Nos. 38, 51-55.

4.   Although Corbett requested oral argument on one motion, the Court resolves the motions on the papers. The issues presented are fully and ably addressed by the parties in their submissions, and the Court finds that further argument is unnecessary.

5.   The Commonwealth also argues that Corbett's claim against it should be dismissed for a failure to state a claim. See Doc. No. 48 at 8 (contending “Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts to support either an ‘effects’ or ‘accommodation’ ADA violation”). Because the Title II vicarious liability issue is dispositive of the present motion, the Court need not reach the Commonwealth's alternative argument.

6.   Having drawn this assumption, the First Circuit went on to explain that the plaintiff in Gray had failed to put forth sufficient evidence to move beyond summary judgment in any event. 917 F.3d at 18-19.

7.   Any bar to vicarious liability in the present case extends from Title II to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1256 (“Given the textual similarities between [Title II and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act], the same standards govern claims under both, and [courts] rely on cases construing Title II and section 504 interchangeably.”). No party before the Court argues otherwise.

8.   Two other district court opinions within the First Circuit are worth noting. First, in Fortin v. Hollis School District, No. 15-cv-179-JL, 2017 WL 4157065, at *6 (D.N.H. Sept. 18, 2017), a judge in the District of New Hampshire found that vicarious liability was available in a Title II context. However, Fortin was decided before Gray (which did not adopt its reasoning), and without the benefit of Jones and Ingram. Second, in J.S.H. v. Newton, 645 F. Supp. 3d 7 (D. Mass. 2023), Judge Hillman determined that vicarious liability was available under Title III of the ADA. That decision rested on three critical differences between Title III and Title IX (which materially distinguished J.S.H. from Gebser). The same cannot be said here, as two of the three factors on which Judge Hillman focused connect—rather than distinguish—Title II and Title IX.

9.   In his opposition, Corbett argues that even if Gebser governs, he has plausibly alleged a direct liability theory of his Title II claim against the Commonwealth. Doc. No. 58 at 10. The Court disagrees. Corbett's pleading expressly pursues the Commonwealth on a theory of vicarious liability. See Doc. No. 35 ¶¶ 1, 62 (alleging the Commonwealth “is vicariously liable” for the individual defendants’ actions). The facts he alleges, even read through the lens of Rule 12, do not plausibly support any theory of direct liability, and he has not requested an opportunity to amend (again) to offer additional facts that would do so. Doc. No. 58 at 10.

10.   Corbett's Motion to Amend, Doc. No. 65, does not impact the substance of the Title II allegations. Therefore, it has no impact on the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss.

SOROKIN, United States District Judge