Scott Allen Lyles v. Stu Sherman (2023)

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR REVIEW OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MAY 22, 2023, ORDER GRANTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TO GROUND ONE [69] AND VACATING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S MAY 22, 2023, ORDER [68]

Before the court is Respondent Stu Sherman's (“Respondent”) Motion for Review of the Magistrate Judge's May 22, 2023, Order Granting Evidentiary Hearing as to Ground One (“Motion” or “Mot.”). (Dkt. 69.) Petitioner Scott Allan Lyles opposes the Motion (“Opposition” or “Opp.”). (Dkt. 75.) Respondent also filed a Reply (“Reply”). (Dkt. 76.) The court held oral argument on this matter on July 27, 2023. (Dkts. 77, 78.) Based on the state of the record, as applied to the applicable law, the court GRANTS the Motion and VACATES the Magistrate Judge's May 22, 2023, Order.

I. Relevant Background

In 2015, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder at a trial wherein Petitioner's counsel did not present the testimony of an eyewitness, Alvin Bruno, who would have allegedly corroborated that Petitioner was acting in self-defense. (See Dkt. 22-7.) Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of eight-five years to life: fifteen to life for second degree murder, tripled to forty-five to life as a third-strike offender; twenty-five to life for firearm enhancements; and fifteen years for three prior serious felonies. (Id.)

In 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se state habeas petition with the Los Angeles Superior Court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. (See id.) On February 15, 2019, the Los Angeles Superior Court summarily denied Petitioner's habeas petition, stating:

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective but has failed to show that but for counsel's allegedly deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that a more favorable outcome would have resulted. It is not enough to speculate about possible prejudice to be accorded relief. Petitioner has failed to show that the prejudicial effect of counsel's errors was a “demonstrable reality.” In re Cox (2003) 30 Cal. 4th 974, 1016; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750, 766; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697. For the foregoing reason, the petition is DENIED.

(Dkt. 1 at 14 (“Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial”).)

On August 26, 2019, the California Court of Appeal denied the Petition without further explanation or citations. (Id. at 15 (“California Court of Appeal's Summary Denial”).) On April 29, 2020, the California Supreme Court denied the petition, citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995), along with a parenthetical stating “a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence.” (Id. at 16 (“California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial”).) Petitioner then resubmitted the Petition to the California Supreme Court along with the transcript of Mr. Bruno's testimony from the preliminary hearing. (See Dkt. 1-3 at 1.) On August 26, 2020, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the Petition, stating only “the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.” (Dkt. 1 at 17 (“California Supreme Court's Summary Denial”).)

Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in federal court on September 17, 2020, and subsequently amended his petition on January 14, 2021. (Dkts. 1, 14.) On November 15, 2021, the Magistrate Judge granted Petitioner's prior request for counsel and appointed counsel. (Dkt. 35.) On February 23, 2023, the Magistrate Judge ordered Petitioner to file any motion for an evidentiary hearing by March 20, 2023. (Dkt. 56.) Petitioner filed a motion for evidentiary hearing on March 17, 2023. (Dkt. 57.) The matter was fully briefed. (Dkts. 60, 61.)

On April 12, 2023, the Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the motion for evidentiary hearing and ordered supplemental briefing as to:

(1) the proper application of the look-through doctrine in light of Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2013) and Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2015); and (2) whether, assuming the Court should review the deficient performance prong de novo, the Court may have an evidentiary hearing addressing deficient performance only, or whether Petitioner must first satisfy § 2254(d) with respect to prejudice.

(Dkt. 62.)

Both parties provided supplemental briefing. (Dkts. 64, 65.) On May 22, 2023, the Magistrate Judge granted Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Dkt. 68 at 1 (“May 22, 2023, Order”).) Respondent timely appealed the Magistrate Judge's order granting the evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 69.)

II. Legal Standard

A magistrate judge has the authority to hear matters that are not dispositive of a claim or defense. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. Under Rule 72(a), a party may serve and file objections to a magistrate judge's order within fourteen days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Evid. 72(a). Non-dispositive magistrate judge orders may be set aside where such orders are “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Under the “contrary to law” standard, the court conducts “independent, plenary review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.” FDIC v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D. Cal. 2000); see also PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2010); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992); Avalos v. Foster Poultry Farms, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1160 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

III. Discussion

In this case, the Magistrate Judge granted an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See generally Dkt. 68.) As discussed above, Petitioner brings an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on his attorney's failure to present Mr. Bruno's testimony. (See generally Dkt. 1.) To prove a constitutional violation for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must show: (1) “that counsel's performance was deficient,” and (2) “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

The Magistrate Judge applied AEDPA deference to the prejudice prong and determined Petitioner had met his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), stating “that least one juror would have harbored reasonable doubt had they been confronted with Bruno's testimony.” (Dkt. 68 at 3.) The Magistrate Judge reviewed the deficient performance prong de novo, noting the there was no testimony or declaration from trial counsel indicating his reasons for omitting Mr. Bruno's testimony and that “Petitioner could show trial counsel had no strategic reason for failing to admit Bruno's preliminary hearing testimony, which would have provided the sole corroboration to Petitioner's testimony that he acted in self-defense.” (Id. at 2.) The parties dispute whether the Magistrate Judge applied the correct standard of review in assessing the deficient performance prong of Petitioner's claim de novo, rather than through 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)'s deferential lens.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), the level of deference a federal habeas court accords a state-court decision depends upon whether the state-court decision reached the merits of the petitioner's claim.¹ See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97-98 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “For claims adjudicated on the merits in state court, AEDPA sets a ‘difficult’ standard to meet.” Kipp v. Davis, 971 F.3d 939, 948 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (Section “2254(d)'s highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings ․ demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When a claim was adjudicated on the merits, a federal habeas court may only grant relief where “the relevant state-court ‘decision’ (1) ‘was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,’ or (2) ‘was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’ ” Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. ----, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191 (2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). By contrast, “[i]f the claim was not ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by the state court, the review is to be de novo.” Amado v. Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1130 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002)).

“The first step in determining whether [to] give deference under § 2254(d) is to determine which state court decision [to] review.” Id. “AEDPA directs federal courts to train their attention on the particular reasons why each state court that considered a prisoner's claim denied relief.” Curiel v. Miller, 830 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2016). Federal habeas courts “look ‘to the last reasoned decision’ that resolves the claim at issue in order to determine whether that claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Kipp, 971 F.3d at 948 (quoting Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991)).

“When the state's highest court does not provide reasoning for its decision, a federal habeas court may ‘ “look[s] through” ’ the unexplained decision to the last-related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale’ and ‘presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192); see also Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870 (“When at least one state court has rendered a reasoned decision, but the last state court to reject a prisoner's claim issues an order ‘whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the judgment,’ [the court] ‘look[s] through’ the mute decision and presume[s] the higher court agreed with and adopted the reasons given by the lower court.”) (quoting Ylst, 501 U.S. at 802-06). Where “more than one state court has rendered a reasoned decision on a habeas petition, the ordinary rules of appellate review apply such that a determination by a higher-level court overrules a determination on the same issue by a lower-level court.” Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870 (citations and footnote omitted).

Because the applicable standard of review depends on which state-court decision constitutes the “last reasoned decision” on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court first considers whether the Magistrate Judge erred in looking to Los Angeles Superior Court Denial. Kipp, 971 F.3d at 948 (quoting Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804).

A. The Last-Reasoned State Court Decision

In this case, there are four state-court decisions at issue: (1) the Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial on February 15, 2019; (2) the California Court of Appeal's Summary Denial on August 26, 2019; (3) the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial on April 29, 2019; and (4) the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial on August 26, 2020. In the May 22, 2023, Order, the Magistrate Judge “looked through” the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial, the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial, and the California Court of Appeal's Summary Denial to the Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial. (See Dkt. 68 at 1.) The May 22, 2023, Order did not explain why the Magistrate Judge looked through the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial to the Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial.² (See generally id.)

Respondent argues that the Magistrate Judge erred by “looking through” the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial because that denial was a reasoned decision in and of itself. (Mot. at 13-18; see also Dkt. 1 at 16.) Petitioner counters that the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that the Los Angeles Superior Court's decision was the last reasoned state-court decision because the California Supreme Court's Duvall denial provided no “relevant” rationale as to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Opp. at 8-10.)

As a preliminary matter, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and the parties that the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial provides neither reasoning nor citations explaining the decision. Therefore, the court “looks through” the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial to “the last-related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale,” beginning with the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial. Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192.

The court finds the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial provides a “relevant rationale” for denying the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, federal habeas courts “have no cause to treat a state's summary order with citations as anything but a ‘reasoned’ decision, provided that the state court's references reveal the basis for its decision.” Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870 (citations omitted); see also id. (“The Supreme Court has never required state courts to be verbose for AEDPA purposes.”). Here, the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial sufficiently explained the basis for its decision by citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (1995) and including a parenthetical stating “a petition for writ of habeas corpus must include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence.” (Dkt. 1 at 16.) This explanation was “informative with respect to the question before [the court]” because it specifically pertained to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and Petitioner's ability to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in federal court. Cf. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805 (looking through state procedural denial based on exhaustion as irrelevant because the state rule at issue “ha[d] no bearing upon [petitioner's] ability to raise the Miranda claim in federal court”); see also Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating to establish prejudice for failure to call an alibi witness, the petitioner must present evidence “sufficient to establish what [the witness'] testimony would have been”). Therefore, at the first step of the “look through” presumption, the court concludes the last reasoned decision was the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial and accordingly presumes that the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial adopted the same reasoning.³

At the second step, the court considers whether it is reasonable to presume that the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial adopted the same reasoning as the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial or whether Respondent has rebutted the “look through” presumption. See Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192; Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805.

B. Whether Respondent Rebutted the “Look Through” Presumption

In Wilson, the Supreme Court explained that the “look through” presumption may be rebutted where: (1) the unexplained appellate decision relied on “alternative grounds ․ that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed,” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192; and (2) “the lower state court decision is unreasonable,” id. at 1196; see also Flemming v. Matteson, 26 F.4th 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2022). “Where there are convincing grounds to believe the silent court had a different basis for its decision than the analysis followed by the previous court, the federal habeas court is free ․ to find [the presumption rebutted].” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1197.

Respondent argues that he has rebutted the presumption here because the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial “plainly does not rest on the same reasoning as” the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial. (Mot. at 16 n.2) In support of this argument, Respondent notes that Petitioner attached additional documents to his second habeas petition, including Mr. Bruno's preliminary hearing transcript, which allowed the California Supreme Court to review the claim on the merits. (Id.)

In assessing whether the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial relied on “alternative grounds ․ that were briefed or argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the record it reviewed,” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1192, the court first considers the meaning of the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805 (“The details of state law need not be inquired into unless ․ they would constitute strong evidence that the presumption, as applied, is wrong.”). Although the exact meaning of an unaccompanied Duvall citation is an open question, see Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2015),⁴ the court is persuaded by the weight of the authority amongst the district courts suggesting that a pincite to Duvall at page 474, accompanied by a parenthetical suggesting the petitioner did not include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence, is a procedural denial that allows the petitioner to refile with the requisite evidence. See, e.g., Howe v. Gamboa, 2022 WL 603390, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2022) (“[T]he state supreme court's citation to Duvall indicates that his state habeas petition was procedurally deficient.”); Dilley v. Kernan, 2021 WL 3622154, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2021) (“Because [a Duvall] denial allows the petitioner to file an amended petition attaching the missing documentary evidence, federal courts generally conclude that such a denial fails to exhaust a claim for purposes of federal habeas review.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 3618045 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2021); Hoang v. Madden, 2020 WL 5665809, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2020) (“[T]he California Supreme Court's citation to Duvall indicated a procedural denial, meaning that the state court did not reach the merits of his claim.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 5658346 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020); Kamfolt v. Lizarraga, 2019 WL 917424, at *6 n.5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2019) (“[A] citation to ‘Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474’ is a dismissal on procedural grounds, whereas a citation to ‘Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474–75’ or to ‘Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 475’ would be a denial of the petition on the merits.”). In sum, the court concludes the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial did not reach the merits of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

With this understanding of Duvall in mind, the court finds Respondent has provided “strong evidence” suggesting that the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial adopted alternative reasoning than the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial.⁵ Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805. In particular, the court notes that Petitioner followed the California Supreme Court's directive in the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial and resubmitted his Petition along with Mr. Bruno's preliminary hearing transcript. (See Dkt. 22-14.) In his second Petition to the California Supreme Court after the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial, Petitioner also stated he added “the required documents to [his] list of exhibits that [he] believe[s] the court needs to determine [his] petition.” (Dkt. 22-13.) At that point, the California Supreme Court possessed the evidence necessary to decide Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the merits. Therefore, the court concludes Respondent rebutted the “look through” presumption based on “equivalent evidence presented in its briefing to the federal court ․ establishing that the State's highest court relied on a different ground than the lower state court, such as the existence of a valid ground for affirmance that is obvious from the state court record.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1196.

Because the court concludes that the record demonstrates Respondent rebutted the “look through” presumption, the relevant state court decision for federal habeas purposes is the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial. The court presumes that the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial was a decision on the merits of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 293 (2013) (“[W]hen a state court issues an order that summarily rejects without discussion all the claims raised by a defendant, including a federal claim that the defendant subsequently presses in a federal habeas proceeding, the federal habeas court must presume (subject to rebuttal) that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits”); Flemming, 26 F.4th at 1138-39 (“[Federal habeas courts] presume that the state court adjudicated each claim ‘on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.’ ”) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). Therefore, the California Supreme Court's Summary Denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is entitled to AEDPA deference, and the appropriate standard of review consists of “an independent review of the record to determine whether the [California Supreme Court's] decision was objectively unreasonable.” Kipp, 971 F.3d at 948 (cleaned up). “This is not a de novo review; rather [a federal habeas court] must determine what arguments could have supported the state court's decision and assess whether fairminded jurists could disagree whether those arguments are unreasonable.” Id.; see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (“[R]eview under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”).

The court concludes that the Magistrate Judge applied the incorrect standard of review by conducting a de novo review of the deficient performance prong of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Magistrate Judge's May 22, 2023, Order granting an evidentiary hearing relied on this de novo review. (See generally Dkt. 68.) Therefore, the court GRANTS the Motion and VACATES the Magistrate Judge's May 23, 2023, Order.

IV. Disposition

For the reasons set forth above, the Motion is GRANTED and the Magistrate Judge's Order granting an evidentiary hearing is VACATED. The matter is referred to the Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Initials of Deputy Clerk: mku

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because Plaintiff filed his habeas petition after April 24, 1996, AEDPA applies. White v. Ryan, 895 F.3d 641, 665 (9th Cir. 2018).

2.   Neither party argues that the California Court of Appeal's Summary Denial is the last reasoned decision.

3.   Because the court concludes the California Supreme Court issued a reasoned decision, the court does not consider the Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial. See Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870 (“[I]f more than one state court has rendered a reasoned decision on a habeas petition, the ordinary rules of appellate review apply such that a determination by a higher-level court overrules a determination on the same issue by a lower-level court.”) (citations and footnote omitted).

4.   Petitioner relies on Seeboth v. Allenby, 789 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2015) to argue that the California Supreme Court's Duvall denial was not a reasoned decision. In Seeboth, the Ninth Circuit stated that its decision in Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2015) “suggests that a citation to Duvall alone might not constitute sufficient reasoning to make the California Supreme Court's order more than a summary denial.” 789 F.3d at 1103. However, Seeboth did not ultimately reach the issue of “whether a citation to Duvall constitutes a reasoned decision,” see id., and subsequent to Seeboth, an en banc panel overturned Curiel and issued a new opinion that did not discuss the significance of a standalone Duvall citation. See Curiel, 830 F.3d at 870.

5.   Even if the court looked to the Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial instead of the California Supreme Court's Duvall Denial, the court concludes Respondent would have rebutted the “look through” presumption for two reasons. First, the Magistrate Judge determined the Los Angeles Superior Court's Denial was unreasonable as to the prejudice prong and “the unreasonableness of the lower court's decision itself provides some evidence that makes it less likely the state supreme court adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson, 138 S. Ct. at 1196. Second, the California Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Lewis, 9 Cal. 5th 883 (2020) indicates the California Supreme Court “does not directly review the superior court's ruling but makes it owns ruling” as an exercise of “the higher court's original jurisdiction.” 9 Cal. 5th at 896-97. “Where no lower court decisions are subjected to review, the foundation underlying the ‘look through’ doctrine is weakened, as the higher courts' consideration of the newly filed petition is likely to be wholly independent of the lower court's decision.” Ward v. Cates, 2023 WL 4681363, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2023); see also Garcia v. Cisneros, 2022 WL 2593517, at *1 (9th Cir. July 8, 2022) (reasoning that “the California Supreme Court [likely] performed its own merits analysis of [a]ppellant's habeas petition and did not rely on the incomplete reasoning of the Superior Court, particularly because, under California law, ‘a [California] Court of Appeal that considers a new [habeas] petition does not directly review the superior court's ruling but makes its own ruling’ as an exercise of ‘the higher court's original jurisdiction’ ”) (quoting Robinson, 9 Cal. 5th at 896-97).

HONORABLE FRED W. SLAUGHTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE