ARNOLD v. ESPER (2019)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance, the response thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties’ positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee as to appellant’s Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim. Appellant does not point to record evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that appellee’s stated reasons for its decision to select another candidate for the position of Supervisory Social Worker were pretext for discrimination. See Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2008). In particular, appellant has not shown that the selectee failed to meet the minimum requirements for the position. Appellant contends that the selectee should have been disqualified because he submitted an expired license to practice social work with his application. But the vacancy announcement did not require applicants to submit a license with their application, and appellant does not dispute that the selectee possessed a valid license. In addition, the selectee’s resume reflects that his work history included at least 52 weeks of Federal service at the GS-12 grade level as required by the vacancy announcement, regardless of the fact that he held a GS-11 position at the time he was hired. Finally, appellant contends that the vacancy announcement required applicants to possess credentials to treat patients in a clinical setting, but that the selectee was in a non-clinical position at the time he was hired. However, although applicants were required to “qualify for and maintain” such credentials, the vacancy announcement did not state that they were required to possess them at the time of the application.

Pursuant to D.C. Cir. Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam