Laura C. Jones, Appellant v. George W. Bush, President of the United States and Alan Robert Swendiman, Director, Executive Office of the President, Agency, Appellees (2017)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the motion to appoint counsel; and the motion for summary affirmance, the response thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion to appoint counsel be denied. In civil cases, appellants are not entitled to appointment of counsel when they have not demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success on the merits. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam).

With respect to appellant's First Amendment claim, appellant's speech during the March 24, 2004 incident was not protected under the First Amendment because it was made within the scope of appellant's official duties as a government employee. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”).

With respect to appellant's claims of discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, appellant failed to rebut the non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory explanations offered by appellees for their actions, or to offer evidence such that “a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination or retaliation ․” See, e.g., Carter v. George Washington University, 387 F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Finally, with respect to appellant's hostile work environment claim, appellant failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to behavior that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment,” or that any alleged behavior was directed at appellant because of her race. See Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d 519, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.

Per Curiam