UNITED STATES v. LOFTIS (2021)

MEMORANDUM **

Joseph Brent Loftis appeals pro se from the district court's orders denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Loftis contends that he is entitled to compassionate release because his age and medical conditions put him at increased risk of severe complications or death if he contracts COVID-19. The district court, however, considered these factors and concluded that they were insufficient to warrant Loftis's release in light of the danger he poses to the public. Because this conclusion is supported by the record and the statutory sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court did not abuse its discretion ¹ by denying Loftis's motion. See United States v. Robertson, 895 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2018) (a district court abuses its discretion only if its decision is illogical, implausible, or without support in the record).

Assuming without deciding that Loftis's Eighth Amendment claim may be brought under § 3582(c)(1)(A), Loftis has not shown that his sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to his offenses. See United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998). To the extent Loftis seeks injunctive relief in the form of a court order directing the Bureau of Prisons to screen him for home confinement, we decline to consider this request, which was raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). We accept for purposes of this appeal the government's undisputed assertion that the abuse of discretion standard also applies to denials under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).