GRAY v. UNITED STATES (2020)

MEMORANDUM ***

Paul Gray timely appeals from the district court's denial of his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and, reviewing de novo, United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299, 306 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), we affirm.

1. The predicate offense for Gray's § 924(c) convictions, aggravated postal robbery in which he placed a mail carrier's “life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114(a), is a crime of violence.¹ The term “rob” in § 2114(a) means common-law robbery, Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 267 n.5, 120 S.Ct. 2159, 147 L.Ed.2d 203 (2000), and common-law robbery is a crime of violence, Stokeling v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555, 202 L.Ed.2d 512 (2019). Additionally, robbery that puts a “life in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon” means “a holdup involving the use of a dangerous weapon actually so used ․ that the life of the person being robbed is placed in an objective sta[t]e of danger.” Wagner v. United States, 264 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1959); see also United States v. Bain, 925 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2019). Putting a life in an objective state of danger requires the intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, which makes it a crime of violence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L.Ed.2d 757 (2019), that § 924(c)’s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, does not compel a different result. See United States v. Burke, 943 F.3d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that Davis “is of no consequence” to the court's analysis of predicate offenses under the elements clause of § 924(c)).

2. Gray's § 924(c) convictions are not invalid because the jury was instructed that liability for the predicate offenses of aggravated postal robbery could be based on Pinkerton or aiding and abetting. A defendant found guilty based on aiding and abetting or Pinkerton liability is treated as if that defendant had committed the offense as a principal. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a); Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 653, 659 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Allen, 425 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 2005). We have previously upheld § 924(c) convictions based on Pinkerton and aiding and abetting in United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1214–17 (9th Cir. 2014) (conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, controlled substances), Allen, 425 F.3d at 1233–34 (bank robbery), and United States v. Johnson, 886 F.2d 1120, 1121–23 (9th Cir. 1989) (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine). See also Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 67, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 188 L.Ed.2d 248 (2014) (a defendant may be convicted under § 924(c) for aiding and abetting an armed drug sale if he “actively participated” in the predicate offense with “advance knowledge that a confederate would use or carry a gun during the crime's commission”). Since Davis, we have sustained § 924(c) convictions for robbery as a crime of violence. See United States v. Dominguez, 954 F.3d 1251, 1260–62 (9th Cir. 2020) (Hobbs Act robbery); Burke, 943 F.3d at 1238 (armed robbery involving controlled substances). Davis does not compel a different result or a reexamination of Pinkerton or aiding-and-abetting liability when, as here, the defendant was convicted of the underlying substantive crimes of violence as well as conspiracy. Gray's § 924(c) convictions remain valid.

AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because § 2114(a) is divisible, we use the modified categorical approach to determine the specific offense of conviction. See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261–63, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013).