SPRINGFIELD v. CRAIG (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Ciron Bentay Springfield appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Springfield's action because Springfield failed to allege facts sufficient to show that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-85, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (a prisoner has no federal or state protected liberty interest when the sanction imposed neither extends the length of his sentence nor imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007) (California regulations governing security classification of prisoners and subsequent prison placement do not give rise to a protected liberty interest); Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that “[t]ypically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected liberty interest”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.