JONES v. MAILROOM OFFICIALS CSATF (2020)

MEMORANDUM **

California state prisoner Garland A. Jones appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First Amendment claims in connection with his legal mail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Jones's action because Jones failed to allege facts sufficient state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim); see also Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 2017) (requirements for a First Amendment claim arising from the opening of legal mail); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (under § 1983, the focus is “on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation”).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.